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The Significance of this Study 
This thesis outlines a proposal from an explicitly religious standpoint of the key dimensions of 
peacebuilding, focusing particularly on mediation and facilitation as a primary task. What is the 
value of such a study? My initial responses in the paragraphs which follow are made at the broadest 
possible level: the desperate need for effective peacebuilders in a world tom by violence and the 
potential for religiously-based peacebuilders to fill that need. I then support this response by 
examining other reasons for the study: the current inadequacy of religious response to conflicts, the 
danger of manipulation of religious leadership by other actors, and potential for the insights of 
religiously-based actors to contribute to the over-all practice of peacebuilding and diplomacy. In 
addressing the latter question I outline my own understanding of the meaning of "religion", an 
understanding whose impact on the broad question of peacebuilding I explore throughout the chapters 
which follow. 
The Changing Context of Conflict and International Relations 
That conflict is devastating to our world requires little documentation, yet only in numbers are we 
able to grasp the dimensions of the costs of war. One respected researcher reports that since World 
War II there have been 149 wars and a total of23,142,000 people killed in them.1 In 1993, the same 
report estimated that military programs worldwide cost $600 billion per year.2 Another study reports 
that between 1989 and 1994, ninety-four armed conflicts took place globally in sixty-four locations.3 
The statistics for war over a four-century period numb the mind. 
I Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1993 (Washington DC: World Priorities, 1993), 20. 
2 Ibid., 5. 
3 Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "After the Cold War: Emerging Patterns of Armed Conflict 1989-94" in 
Margareta Sollenberg, editor, States in Armed Conflict 1994 (Uppsala: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 
Uppsala University, 1995), 7. 
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What may be less apparent than the devastation of war is the changing nature of conflict. Perhaps the 
most important change here is the shift away from the large state as the source of identity towards 
smaller regional entities, ethnicism, and religion as the source of identity.5 In 1994, only 4 of the 42 
conflicts recorded concerned a "classical" inter-state conflict, "where two internationally recognized 
countries were waging an armed battle over a politically defined issue. Instead, the most common 
conflicts during this period have been internal conflicts over government (civil wars) or over territory 
(state formation conflicts)."6 Parties in conflict increasingly seek identity and internal cohesion 
around narrower lines than that offered by national citizenship, namely through clan, ethnicity, 
religion, or geographic location.7 Thus traditional approaches to diplomacy and peacebuilding, 
which assumed the nation-state as the fundamental unit of operation are increasingly impotent to deal 
with conflicts. 
Directly related to this isfactionalization and diffusion of power. 8 One researcher concluded that as 
many as 100 different political parties and movements may be active in the countries of Djibouti, 
Somaliland, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Sudan.9 Such a proliferation of factions makes 
power a diffuse and ever-shifting phenomenon. Organization and planning of peace efforts are 
complex and difficult. Claims of individual leaders to be representative are hard to assess. 
Agreements that may be reached are subject to the internal vicissitudes of larger numbers of 
organizations and thus are harder to sustain on the long-term. In short, no longer is it possible for two 
or three parties to gather at a negotiations table and walk away confident that agreements reached 
among them will be sustained. Far larger and more complex processes of negotiation are required to 
4 From Donald W. Shriver, Jr., An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 
65. 
5 Manus Midlarsky, The Internationalization of Communal Strife (New York: Routledge, 1992), xii. 
6 Wallensteen and Sollenberger, States in Armed Conflict 1994, 7. 
7 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Tokyo: The United Nations 
University, 1995), 9. 
8 Ibid., 10. 
9 Suzanne Lunden, editor, The Horn of Africa Bulletin, 1993 (Uppsala, Sweden: Life and Peace Institute), quoted in John 
Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies (Tokyo: The United Nations University, 
1995), 8. 
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build a body of consensus among the large number of stakeholders whose support is often required to 
sustain the peace. 
As local and communal identities take on greater significance in defining the parties in conflict, 
increasingly combatants live in relatively close proximity to each other and hence are connected in 
immediate ways by long-term relationships. "For the purveyor of inflammatory propaganda .. .it is not 
necessary to portray a people half way around the globe as a threat to group security. The enemy is 
only a village away - or in some instances actually lives next door." 10 
In summary then, the changing nature of conflict suggests a new set of requirements of peacebuilding 
as well. For one, peacebuilding is more likely to be successful if it does not depend heavily on 
classical "statist" models of political analysis for assessing the causes, dynamics and possibilities for 
resolution of conflict. For another, peacebuilding can no longer be an activity centralized in time and 
location and dependent on the power of a small number of participating leaders to impose agreements 
on constituents. Rather, peacebuilding must be de-centralized and diffuse, unfolding chronologically 
as an on-going task and rooted broadly across the social/political spectrum of affected peoples. 
Finally, due to the proximity of combatants to each other, peacebuilding can no longer settle for 
political settlements which at one time might have been expected to be implemented through 
impersonal political processes between former combatants interacting primarily through political 
representatives. Peacebuilding must address not only the need for political settlements, but also the 
need for healing from the social, psychic, and spiritual damage of war, enabling parties whose 
constituents must inescapably interact in large numbers to restore ( or establish for the first time) 
relationships capable of sustaining peace on the long-term. 
The Disintegration of Existing Peacebui/ding Mechanisms 
Accompanying these trends in the changing nature of conflict has been the disintegration and 
widespread discrediting of the mechanisms of peacekeeping employed in the last century (such as 
existed). The structures of colonialism and more recently the superpower contest between East and 
West provided the primary framework for peacekeeping and peacebuilding throughout most of the 
twentieth century. These structures repressed conflicts in many situations, such as in the Balkans, or 
parts of Africa and Asia, where the presence of colonials prevented local and regional conflicts from 
flaring up. In the era of the superpowers and client states, the superpowers sometimes pressured 
client states to settle conflicts. The United States, for example, pressured Egypt and Israel to come to 
10 Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 11. 
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terms 11 But the end of the colonial era and the decline of the superpowers has meant that a handful 
of nations are no longer willing or able to impose peace on the many regional conflicts which 
remained latent throughout much of this century. 
The structure widely looked to provide mechanisms for resolving conflict, the United Nations, has 
proven to be far less effective than many hoped it might be. Burdened by impossible expectations, 
severely limited in its resources, heavily oriented towards military peacekeeping operations, 
paralyzed by political squabbles both among as well as within member states, and hobbled by 
bureaucracy and poor internal coordination 12, the United Nations is at best capable of reducing 
bloodshed and helping to create an environment in which conflicts can be peacefully resolved. But 
the number and scope of conflicts in today's world and the problems inherent in mobilizing any 
multi-national effort mean that the UN is likely to remain limited in its ability to address conflicts. 
Thus, we face a critical situation. At the same time that conflicts are increasing, even the slender and 
often poorly conceived resources that existed previously have disappeared or prove painfully limited 
in their ability to address conflicts. 
The Potential for Religiously-based Peacebuilding 
The Ubiquitous Presence of Religious Institutions 
Few social institutions hold potential for constructive impact on situations of social and political 
conflict equal to that held by organized religions. At the most obvious level of analysis, organized 
religious institutions are pervasively present in communities through-out the world. "The Methodist 
Church has more retail outlets than any other institution in this country," quipped an American 
Methodist leader some years ago, pointing out that the Methodist Church had more than 50,000 
institutions in the US alone. Such figures would of course multiply if one considered world-wide 
Methodist structures. This is just one denomination within one religion which has many other 
denominations as well. Ifwe add to this the presence not only of similar structures in numerous 
other religions, but also "second-tier" ecumenical bodies such as local, national, or international 
councils of churches, the potential for involvement and impact of religious leaders becomes evident. 
In an effort to systematically document the many roles of religious figures and institutions in a 
historical conflict, Cynthia Sampson identified over 20 types of religiously-based actors at work in 
11 Reflecting in 1995 on the changes in the international conflict, Henry Kissinger commented: "Ethnic conflicts are quite a 
different phenomenon from our historical experience. The Cold War encouraged some calculus of risks and rewards on 
which superpower policy could be based. Even in regions of intense passions such as the Middle East, the adversaries 
were clients of the superpowers and therefore to some extent restrained." Henry Kissinger, "Bosnia: Only Just 
Beginning", Washington Post. Sept. 11, 1995: 21. 
12 Kofi A. Annan, head of UN Peacekeeping Operations, "Towards a Future for Peacebuilding", Row Memorial Lecture 
presented at Bridgewater College, Bridgewater, Virginia, USA, April 24, 1995. 
South Africa during the years of the struggle against apartheid. These ranged from individual 
laypersons at local church levels to local clergy to national denominational leaders to international 
ecumenical figures; from local churches to regional, national, and international religious bodies.13 
The Human Capacity of Religious Institutions 
5 
The potential for significant involvement in conflicts is more than a matter of numbers of "retail 
outlets". Response to conflict requires specific resources from those attempting to respond. The most 
important is human capacity in the form of people within physical proximity of disputing parties with 
excellent knowledge of the local scene, and with culturally appropriate skills for leadership and 
problem-solving. Religious institutions routinely train, field, and support individuals with these 
capacities. 
Availability of Material Resources 
Additionally, these people need material resources to sustain them, in the form of access to meeting 
places and communication networks, transportation, backup personnel, and emergency funds to 
enable travel or cover other needs. An institutional base - a large and strong one - is often required to 
provide these elements and sustain involvement. Again, religious institutions are often already 
equipped to meet these needs. 14 
Credibility 
Just as important as the resources at their disposal is the credibility of peacebuilders in the eyes of 
conflicting parties. Credibility begins with being perceived as capable of understanding the 
dimensions of the problems at hand, as having an understanding of the larger political, economic, and 
social context in which conflicts arise. Even more important, credibility raises issues of values and 
integrity. Is the peacebuilder motivated to truly serve the best interests of others? Do the 
peacebuilder' s commitments go deeper than the narrow parochial interests that define the activities 
and sympathies of most economic, professional, political, and social institutions? Is the ideological 
foundation of the peace builder sufficiently broad and autonomous as to support the peace builder to 
act on principle rather than yield to the partisan pressures so powerfully at work in the arena of 
conflict? While many exceptions could be found, it seems apparent that religious leaders in many 
places in the world enjoy high credibility in ways that would offer them an effective base for 
peace building if they chose to act on it. 
13 Cynthia Sampson, "Religion and Peacebuilding", an essay in a larger volume, Handbook on International Conflict 
Resolution, to be published by the United States Institute of Peace in 1996. 
14 Cf. Douglas Johnston, "Review of the Findings", in Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, Religion: The Missing 
Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 262. 
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Influence on Values and Ethics 
One of the most important and difficult challenges in peacebuilding lies in the realm of minds and 
hearts. If conflicts are to be truly resolved, parties must come to genuinely perceive the situation 
and/or each other in different terms. Such changes in perceptions can result from a variety of inner 
shifts within one or both parties: a re-focusing of priorities to recognize the benefits of peace over 
short-term military gains, a willingness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the claims of the opponent, 
a discovery that the basic needs of both sides can be addressed in a "win/win" solution, a decision to 
act on the base of moral reflection rather than political expediency, etc. 
Actors from a wide variety of backgrounds are capable of operating effectively at the level of deepest 
values, motives, needs, and perceptions, of course, but religious actors possess a unique set of 
resources. 15 Most religions, after all, concern themselves extensively, though by no means 
exclusively, with the inner realm of mind and heart. Not only are religious actors often highly skilled 
in this arena, their contributions are usually viewed as credible if not noteworthy. What is more, 
because religious institutions normally have a vast network of influence ranging from the realm of 
personal interaction with leaders of conflicting parties to public media access to national and 
international audiences, their ability to provoke and encourage moral reflection is often unrivaled by 
h 
, , , 16 
any ot er mst1tut1on. 
Recalling Reinhold Niebuhr's social and moral vision of "a body of citizens ... who see the issues 
between their own nations ( or groups) more clearly than the ignorant patriot and more disinterestedly 
than the dominant classes", Charles Villa-Vicencio described the potential for churches to contribute 
to the South African struggle in the following terms: 
... when this community of people emerges from within the dialectic of conflict and 
commits itself through participation to be part of the resolution of social conflict, it 
provides an eschatological or utopian vision that no society can afford to ignore. 17 
In summary, involvement in peacebuilding requires numerous important elements including presence, 
capacity, resources, credibility and moral influence. Many religious organizations are richly 
endowed in these areas. If they acknowledge the wealth of their resources and direct them 
constructively, religious organizations could contribute significantly to the resolution of many 
conflicts. 
15 See Harvey Cox's summary of themes, stories, scriptures, and traditional wisdom of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Sikhism 
and Judaism relevant to peacebuilding. Harvey Cox, "World Religions and Conflict Resolution" in Johnston and 
Sampson, 266-282. 
16 A recent study of the role of the Roman Catholic Church in the overthrow of the Marcos regime in the Philippines in 
February, 1986, highlights the significance of the Catholic Church's moral legitimacy in its ability to mobilize nonviolent 
opposition to the military. Henry Wooster, "Faith at the Ramparts: The Philippine Catholic Church and the 1986 
Revolution", in Johnson and Sampson, 153-176. 
17 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Trapped in Apartheid (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1988), 21. 
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The Reality of Uninvolvement or Negative Involvement of Religious Leadership 
The above is a discussion of need and potential. The reality of course is different. At a functional 
level religious identity has often served as the demarcation line separating groups in conflict, as 
ilJustrated in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and even the Cold War, when 
"Christian" leaders rallied constituencies against "godless" communism. Worldwide, the bone of 
contention in armed conflicts has shifted away from ideology which dominated perceptions during the 
Cold War towards the demands of regions and identity groups for self-determination. The Canadian 
peace and conflict researcher Ernie Regehr estimates that two-thirds of the world's current armed 
conflicts can be identified as identity conflicts, that is "conflicts in which the rights and 
political/social viability of ethnic groups or national communities are central issues."18 As a powerful 
definer of identity, religion is inherently vulnerable to manipulation by leaders seeking to mobilize 
partisan support for group struggle.19 
In addition to providing a convenient demarcation and rallying point, religion has long been used by 
dominant political groups to legitimize and perpetuate their dominant status, and hence to justify a 
brutal response to opponents.20 South Africa provides one of the most notorious and prolonged 
examples here: the role of the Dutch Reformed Church in legitimating the imposition of political, 
social and economic structures by the Nationalist Party in the apartheid era, and the role of the 
English-speaking and indigenous churches in fostering apathy towards the injustices of apartheid has 
been well-documented. 21 
In Zimbabwe, the object of later study in this thesis, Anglican priest Michael Lapsley documented the 
misguided efforts of white Anglican leaders there to take a role of "neutrality" during the war, thus 
prolonging the deception of whites about the reality of their government's policies by failing to take a 
clear moral stand in regards to the underlying issue at stake in the conflict.22 Although the Catholic 
Church ultimately committed itself to actively supporting the struggle for racial justice in Zimbabwe, 
18 Ernie Regehr, War After the Cold War: Shaping a Canadian Response, Ploughshares Working Paper 93-3 (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Project Ploughshares) 2. 
19 Cf. Rene Girard, who in Violence and The Sacred, translated by Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1979), presents a complex argument that anthropologically the development of religion can be demonstrated to be 
the result of competition, jealousy, and envy. These dark desires, "mimetic desire" as Girard calls them, lead eventually to 
murder; and the myths, rituals, and prohibitions which form the heart of primitive religious experience are "the essential 
tools for extending the social benefits of the esprit de corps that accompanied the founding murder." The quote is from 
Gil Bailey's insightful elaboration on Girard's work, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroad (New York: 
Crossroad, 1995), 127. 
20 Otto Maduro, Religion and Social Conflicts (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982), develops this thesis in detail in a Marxist 
framework in his study of religion in the Latin American context. 
21 See for example, John W. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, second edition, 
1986), and Villa-Vicencio, ibid. 
22 Michael Lapsley, Neutrality or Co-Option? (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1986). 
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significant portions of Church leadership resisted this commitment in the beginning and a small 
minority maintained its opposition long after the larger Church had entered the fray. 23 
The varieties ofreligious apathy or negative involvement in conflicts, then, though only rev,iewed in 
part above, are many. The roots of these destructive involvements are many as well, ranging from 
laziness and greed to class interests to dualistic theologies which call for disengagement from 
material matters. We must acknowledge this dark face of the religious presence in conflict if we 
intend to build on the positive potential ofreligious response to conflicts. 
But ultimately we must light a candle rather than curse the darkness. While granting that religion is 
often a destructive force in conflict, my interest is in addressing those people who are committed to 
bringing the rich and life-giving forces present within the human experience of religion into the arena 
of conflict. From years of personal experience serving as a resource person to religious communities 
in conflict situations worldwide in North America, Europe, Africa, and Asia, as well as from the in-
depth study of the response of religious actors to the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict occasioned by 
writing the case study in this thesis, I am convinced that in every situation of conflict there exists an 
surprisingly large category of people on all sides who are committed to the well-being of all. These 
people long to respond in ways that meet the needs not only of themselves and their children but also 
the needs of their "enemies" and their children. While by no means all are rooted in communities of 
explicit faith, to a disproportionate extent, most of them are. 
The struggle of these potential peacebuilders is not if they want to do something to bridge the chasm 
between themselves and their enemies, or in some instances to bridge as impartials the gap between 
two enemies both of whom they count as friends. Rather the cry of their heart is what to do. As 
latent peacebuilders the problem is less a matter of will than of skill. 24 While it is important to 
explore and address the many ways in which.religious communities allow themselves to be used for 
destructive purposes in conflict, there is an even more urgent challenge to meet in mobilizing the 
resources of religious communities and religiously-aware persons for peace. That challenge is to help 
those who already possess the will to act courageously but are unsure how to proceed, by assisting 
them in determining how to respond. This thesis cannot offer a blueprint for all peacebuilders, but 
23 Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Longman Group Ltd., 1980). See also Carl 
Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo, Church and State in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1988), particularly 
Hallencreutz's essay on the response of the Zimbabwe Christian Council, "A Council in Crossfire: ZCC 1964-1980", 51-
113; Victor de W aal, The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade (London: Hurst and Co., 1990), describes 
briefly and critiques at some length the efforts of some church leaders, notably Anglicans, to be "neutral" in the Zimbabwe 
conflict. 
24 I wish to acknowledge Barbara Date who worked closely for a number of years with peacebuilding efforts in the Church of 
the Brethren for this formulation. I should also point out that I use the work "skill" loosely here; a more precise word 
might be praxis. 
hopefully it will invite others to something essential to effectiveness and integrity in peacebuilding: 
reflection about values and articulation of strategic responses consistent with those values. 
Religious Actors Used to Further the Interests of Others 
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Another concern motivating this study is the fact that religious leaders are frequently used by other 
actors to further their own interests in a situation of conflict. We witness this in most pernicious form 
when political leadership solicit divine sanction by religious leaders of partisan war efforts, a 
maneuver practiced worldwide. 
But a current and more subtle phenomenon forms part of the motivation for this thesis: the interest 
apparent among diplomats and professional practitioners in the field of conflict resolution in studying 
and working in partnership with religiously-based peacebuilders. Although I welcome this interest for 
its many positive potentials, to the extent that religious actors lack a clear framework for 
peacebuilding which is explicitly grounded in their own vision for human life, they are vulnerable in a 
number of ways. 
At the very least, there is danger that religious actors betray their own comprehensive vision for 
human life by uncritically throwing support behind efforts which usually have a much narrower 
agenda. The "bottom line" for political decisionmakers who in turn control diplomats at work in a 
regional conflict, for example, may be that they seek resolution by any means which can bring a hasty 
end to overt manifestations of tensions due to their disruption of economic markets. From the 
perspective of a religious vision, other factors may be more important than ending economic 
disruption, such as the need for injustices to be openly challenged, or for conflicts to be addressed in 
ways that strengthen the role of civilians in public decisionmaking rather than relegating it to an elite 
corps of politicians. Similarly, while there is a clear trend apparent in the world ofNGOs to solicit 
the involvement of religious agencies in conferences, training events and mediation efforts, the 
motivation for doing so may have more to do with a desire on the part ofNGOs to add the luster of 
affiliation with grassroot-based organizations to funding applications than an understanding of, 
appreciation for, and willingness to be responsive to the insights of religious communities. 
A question which peacebuilders would do well to ponder regarding any initiative seeking their 
partnership is this: Whose interests are the initiators of this request ultimately committed to serving? 
Even many apparently altruistic NGOs operate in ways that make it clear that their ultimate interest is 
self-serving: to expand the reputation, power, and resources of the organization and/or the individuals 
in it. Self-service is of course a ubiquitous motivation that cannot and perhaps should not be 
eradicated, even from religious institutions. The question is one of degree, transparency, 
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countervailing values, and accountability. The ideal partner would be one who brings a track record 
of relatively low levels of self-interest, great transparency regarding "what's in it for themselves", 
high levels of counter-vailing values such as clear commitment to justice, compassion, and 
empowerment of others, and proven willingness to be accountable to others in discerning the 
appropriateness of actions under question. 
But religious leaders, like everyone else, are easily blindsided by the glamour of operating in the 
arena of public issues. Frequently they appear to yield to the supposition that if they are to operate in 
such arenas they must assume the vision and ethics of the actors already at work there. One intention 
of this thesis is to challenge this naive and corrosive assumption. In part I will do this by defining 
religion in such a way that the fundamentally religious nature of even "political" visions become 
more obvious and therefore more accessible to moral scrutiny. Rather than blindly entering the 
political arena on its own terms, my hope is that religious leaders might recognize that the political 
world is populated by religious visions which make powerful, self-serving claims on all they 
encounter. My goal is for more interaction - not less - on the part of recognized religions with 
"political" religions. But it is important that such interaction take place in full awareness of the terms 
of encounter. This would enable people from recognized religions to bring the same critical scrutiny 
to dialogue and involvement in the political arena that they rightly bring to their conversations and 
0 
partnerships with each other. 
Building on this broadened understanding of religion, I then propose ways of operating in the realm 
of public conflicts that are grounded in my own religious vision and practice. Such a framework is 
unlikely, of course, to provide a suitable framework for others whose experiences differ from those 
which shape the vision I here outline. But my hope is that it might serve as a catalyst for such self-
explication by others, leading ultimately to the possibility of honest, insightful dialogue. 
Dialogue with the Broader Field of Conflict Resolution 
A final reason for this study is to contribute to the broader professional field of conflict resolution. 
As a professional active in the field of conflict resolution for nearly 20 years I have been convinced 
for many years that the questions I wrestle with as a person of faith merit the reflection of a much 
larger community. Some of those questions are of course particular to the experiences and 
understandings of my own community of faith, the Mennonites. But many of them are generic. 
About a decade ago I attended a conference of conflict resolution practitioners from throughout the 
United States. During the course of the conference I experienced enormous inner ambivalence. On 
one hand I felt stimulated and encouraged by the intense commitment to peaceful resolution of 
conflicts apparently shared by a body of over 500 people. But at the same time many small signals 
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made it clear that many of the participants had only a superficial grasp of many of the concepts which 
they so glibly referred to during the course of the workshop. For example, while ideas of "win/win" 
negotiations and joint problem-solving were frequently referred to throughout the conference, it was 
apparent that great competition was at work among the organizations attending. Participants guarded 
their training materials carefully. Prickliness among competing organizations and individuals became 
apparent in a number of sessions. I had the feeling that many people were more interested in 
demonstrating their own success and that of their organizations than in learning from or genuinely 
contributing to others. At a personal level, I felt by no means immune from the spirit of competition 
and egocentrism. Throughout the conference I repeatedly wrestled with my own desire for personal 
and institutional credit for the work I and my colleagues had been engaging in. 
I was scheduled to address a plenary session of the conference, and I decided to share my experience 
with the group as the core of my presentation. I confessed the inner struggle I felt in wanting to work 
cooperatively with others but at the same time feeling the pulls of competition and desires for credit 
and control, and I observed that it seemed to me that this same struggle was also at work among many 
others. I suggested that conflict resolution is potentially more than simply a set of techniques, that it 
can also be a way of life that has much to say about how we function as human beings in all areas of 
life, including the ways in which we functioned as professionals. I closed by challenging the group 
to reflect on their "theology of peacebuilding", that is, to seek to identify the values underlying their 
work in conflict resolution and to bring all of their life and professional conduct into systematic 
service of those values. 
I said this with sweaty palms and quaking knees. I was afraid that I would sound "soft", parochial 
and judgmental, and that my words might effectively end my ability to work as a colleague with many 
present. The speaker who was scheduled to follow me was an internationally known author and 
practitioner of conflict, based in a large and prestigious secular institution. In many ways he 
symbolized for me the very tension I had been trying to describe. On one hand he was noted for 
advocating participatory and "win/win" approaches to resolving conflict. But on the other hand, he 
was noted for operating in ways that suggested to others that his interest in building a personal and 
institutional reputation was as big or bigger than his commitment to working constructively as an 
equal with others. I had no idea how he would react to my comments. 
I was astonished when he began by addressing me directly from the podium, expressing thanks for 
my presentation, saying that although he had planned a talk he had decided to discard his notes 
because he thought the questions raised were so important. After the session many individuals 
pressed to the front of the crowded auditorium to thank me as well, some in very emotional ways. 
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They too experienced the struggle I had shared and were disturbed by the dynamics present in the 
conference. "This is the first time anyone has ever publicly named this," commented one women. 
For several years afterwards people continued to approach me in letters, phone calls and at 
conferences to talk further about a theology of conflict. Some of them worked for religious 
organizations, but most did not. The majority were sensitive and thoughtful professional people 
working with secular organizations who had, through the course of their work in conflict resolution, 
come to realize that much more was at stake than simply a body of skills and tactical concepts. They 
were not sure exactly what else was at stake, nor how far it could take them, but they were eager to 
explore. 
It is widely accepted that in the post-modern era there is no moral center, that, in the words of Scott 
Holland, "the Enlightenment's dream of discovering one story that can name us all has crashed 
leaving us with many little narratives."25 Tragically, commitment to moral reflection and 
discernment of any kind also seems to have crashed as well. Indeed, for many people there is no 
longer any kind of meaningful "little narrative" available, but only a collection of little episodes, 
shards of experience unassimilated by the kind of thoughtful reflection that enable human beings to 
act with consistency, decency, and integrity. In making decisions about personal, professional, and 
public conduct, each individual stands in isolation, guided only by personal devise and predilection, 
none powerful enough to provide an organizing center from which to mount a coherent framework 
through which to view reality and guide moral decisionmaking. 
Like every other professional discipline of our times, the field of conflict resolution suffers from the 
inability of those active in it to engage in sustained reflection on their own personal lives and careers 
or to enter thoughtful discussion with others about the larger issues in the field. Although the field 
displays enormous vitality and much positive intent, there are few signs of systematic moral 
reflection and dialogue. It is as though conflict resolution practitioners were struggling to plant a 
massive and beautiful tree which had no roots. Practitioners talk the language of"human 
community" and "reconciliation" and employ techniques useful in accomplishing these, but often 
behave in ways that make it clear they have no understanding of the terms. 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the behavior of conflict resolution practitioners towards each 
other. A practitioner recently confided that thrice in twelve months he had personally witnessed 
situations where large, expansionist conflict resolution organizations made moves to work in 
partnership with smaller organizations. But in each instance the behavior of the largefC>Qrganization 
25Scott Holland, "So Many Good Voices in My Head", paper given at Bluffton College Forum, Bluffton, Ohio, 26 
September 1995. 
strongly suggested that the primary motivation was not a genuine partnership to enable collaboration 
in serving a superordinate goal, rather the motivation was to secure funding and to enhance its own 
credibility by enlisting the support of organizations "on the ground." A handful of conflict resolution 
professionals could easily multiply such stories. 
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An ethics professor once opened a class I took by saying that it was the intention of this class to 
reflect on issues of our times "from the perspective of the afterlife."26 No matter how we define the 
afterlife, such a perspective raises profound questions. What kind of human society would we like 
our children and grandchildren to inherit? When our work is assessed 50 years from now, what might 
we most hope would be said about us and our lives? What kind of persons would we hope to be 
remembered by others as being? Are the things we are doing now consistent with those hopes? 
What activities deserve highest priority in light of those hopes? What is the meaning of "success" 
and "failure" in light of those hopes? These are enduring questions that, if answered only in small 
measure are capable of making us consistent and therefore powerful, aware and therefore vital 
spiritually, sensitive and therefore humane. 
Ever since the conference experience I have been convinced that a substantial number of people 
operating in the professional field of conflict resolution wrestle inwardly with such enduring 
questions, that they long to engage others with them, and that the insights and experiences of o 
religiously-based peacebuilders have much to contribute in addressing this longing. 
Awareness Leading to Accountability and Discernment 
Accompanying my hope to contribute to moral discourse in the field of conflict resolution is the 
conviction that the first goal in moral reflection and discourse is awareness, by which I mean 
conscious understanding of the components of our value system and the ability to reflect thoughtfully 
on our actions and the ways our values are expressed in our actions. Only as we become aware we 
are able to critically scrutinize our values and actions. Only when an administrator explicitly states, 
for example, that he holds equality between men and women to be an important value can he begin to 
wrestle with the implications of this value for hiring procedures in a firm where all senior partners are 
men. Additionally, only as he becomes aware that his own conduct towards women is so patronizing 
that every competent woman who meets him decides not to apply for positions in the firm can he 
begin to bring his daily conduct into conformity with a value that in theory he may hold deeply. 
0 
Two important results can follow from awareness. One is accountability. Only when we have stated 
what we believe and how we believe that is expressed in action can we be held accountable by others 
26 The professor was the late Clarence Bauman of Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminaries, Elkhart, Indiana. 
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for what we do. Let us say, for example, that a peacebuilder says, as many do, that she holds a 
general commitment to empowering others to take greater control over their own lives. But in fact, 
after years of effort, she continues to be the primary resource person at work in virtually all the 
conflicts and training workshops she is involved with. Because she has explicitly stated that 
empowerment is an important value for her, she is vulnerable to the constructive challenge of others 
in ways that would never be possible had she not stated her values explicitly. Possibly there are good 
reasons why those she seeks to empower still rely heavily on her, but perhaps she is unawarely 
operating in ways that are inconsistent with her values. Either way, only as practitioners consciously 
identify their values and, better still, articulate them openly to others, does it become possible to 
examine and address issues which every practitioner ought to address regarding their practice. 
Another result of awareness is moral discernment. How should mediators respond where there are 
grave power disparities between the parties? Mediators respond differently to such a question based 
on their differing experiences of life and values. There may be no "right" answer but the issue merits 
wrestling with. The most illuminating insights are likely to come when mediators are able to state 
clearly the values which they think are important and describe specifically how they have handled 
such situations. From dialogue and debate between these explicit points of view arises greater 
sensitivity to the variety of factors needing to be weighed in such a situation, and possibly even 
consensus about some general guidelines for responding. 
Thus, I view the framework which follows as an essential first step towards entering into moral 
discourse with fellow practitioners. Although I hope that a few may here and there be persuaded by 
the reasoning by which I present my understandings, my intention is dialogue rather than prescription. 
Theory of Religion and Implications for Peacebuilding 
Up to this point I have used the term "moral discourse" to describe the reflection process to which I 
hope to contribute, choosing this term in order to express my interests in the broadest terms possible. 
But my understanding of religion and of the kind ofreflection required make this term less than 
satisfactory. 
In his seminal essay laying forth a sociological theory of religion, The Sacred Canopy, Peter Berger 
outlines a theory describing how societies constitute their own reality through a three step process of 
externalization, objectivation, and internalization. Human beings express themselves in various 
actions in the first step, these then take on the appearance of constituting an objective reality 
sustained in its own right in the second step, and this perceived reality in tum acts on and shapes the 
people in a society in the third step.27 These processes are not apparent to people in a society, hence 
the reality of any given society has a taken-for-granted quality which makes it extremely powerful if 
not irresistible in informing the understandings of its members about what is "real" and what is not. 
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Then, at a certain point, Berger says, a critical new dimension enters the picture. Reality as 
experienced by a given society begins to be perceived as corresponding to "the nature of things" and 
indeed to the reality of the entire universe, the very cosmos itself. In Berger's words, the meanings of 
the constructed social order merge "with what are considered to be the fundamental meanings 
inherent in the universe. Nomos [i.e.: the taken for granted social order] and cosmos appear to be co-
extensive."28 One of the consequences of this is increased stability for the social order: "When the 
nomos is taken for granted as appertaining 'to the nature of things,' understood cosmologically or 
anthropologically, it is endowed with a stability deriving from more powerful sources than the 
historical efforts of human beings."29 
This point is the beginning of religion. Historically, this expansion of the world of human meaning to 
cover the entire cosmos was expressed and conducted in a sacred mode. Certain objects, spaces, 
persons, moments in time were linked in special ways to the meanings of the cosmos and imbued with 
a quality of mystery and awe. Originally, Berger says, "all cosmization had a sacred character".30 
But cosmization need not be sacred in its expression. "Particularly in modem times there have been 
thoroughly secular attempts at cosmization, among which modem science is by far the most 
· ,,31 important. 
Building on Berger's theory of religion I now wish to make several assertions which form the point of 
departure for this thesis. 
Humankind as Homo Religiosus 
Firstly, human beings are homo sapiens or wise beings only in our best moment, but we are at all 
times homo religiosus, religious beings.32 Of course many people are not religious in "conventional" 
ways, that is, consciously living their lives under the umbrella of meaning offered by recognized 
religions such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, etc. But people and societies organize their 
time, energies, and resources around certain priorities which they hold important. What frames of 
meaning are at work in establishing and communicating those priorities? The chances are very high 
27 Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), 4. 
28 Ibid., 25. 
29 Ibid., 25. 
30 Ibid. , 27. 
31 Ibid., 27. 
32 Karen Armstrong, A History a/God: The 4000-Year Quest/or Judaism, Christianity and Islam (New York: Knopf, 1993), 
xxi. 
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that, in Berger's terms, they are religious in nature. The fact that many "modem" people are unaware 
of the religious nature of their worldview and understand themselves to be non-religious merely 
confirms the success of the cosmization of their own understanding of the world. To take but one 
example here: to assert that there is no God assumes an ability to know the true nature of the universe. 
Whatever frame of reference which is assumed to correspond so exactly to the reality of the universe 
as to allow for such an assertion is itself a r;... igion as defined by Berger. 
Such an understanding was stated in theological terms by Paul Tillich, who defined God as "that to 
which we give "ultimate allegiance"33• Much earlier Luther offered a similar understanding: 
"Whatever then thy heart clings to ... and relies upon, that is properly thy God."34 The significance of 
these definitions of God becomes more obvious if we state them conversely: That which lies at the 
source of our values and the center of our loyalties is God. 
From this perspective it becomes apparent that a pantheon of gods inhabit our world and compete for 
our attention. This is not all bad. For example, as a secular religion, scientific empiricism assumes 
that its own understanding of reality as residing only in that which is empirically verifiable 
corresponds to the nature of the universe. Pressed to its logical conclusions, scientific empiricism 
contradicts fundamental dimensions of many sacred religions. Yet many people who are deeply 
committed to sacred religions recognize the value of the scientific method in exploring the world. 
The problem lies less with the competition of the gods and more with the capacity of the gods to 
confuse the humans who create and then serve them. On one hand, human beings typically fail to see 
the mortal origins of their gods, that is, they assume that their worldview does indeed correspond to 
the reality of the universe and thus act arrogantly and often cruelly in regards to other human beings. 
The act of war in this sense represents a massive assertion of the religion of one group over against 
that of another, an insistence that our ability to correctly apprehend the true reality of this situation 
corresponds so closely to the true nature of the universe that we are prepared to sacrifice life itself in 
defense of what we believe to be right and just. 
More devastating yet is the capacity of the gods to dress themselves in the clothes of mortals, to 
function surreptitiously as gods while appearing to be lesser beings. Capitalism like its erstwhile 
counterpart Marxism offers one such an example. Although it lacks the trappings of familiar sacred 
religions, most people in capitalist societies assume that the capitalist tenets of a primary human quest 
for material possessions and an innate sense of competition correspond to the nature of 
33 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 12-14. See also D. MacKenzie 
Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1965), 1-16. 
34 Quoted in H. Richard Niebuhr, Radical Monotheism and Western Culture (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960, 119. 
anthropological reality. So successful has capitalism been in defining the perceived reality of the 
universe that many people in such societies are not even aware of the basic tenets of capitalism 
because they have never encountered a different point of view. Yet their lives are dominated by the 
power of this hidden god. They are bombarded from the time they awake until they fall asleep at 
night with messages manipulating their deepest drives to motivate them to purchase goods; they trek 
to malls on a regular basis to appease their unmet longings; they engage in daily rituals to confirm 
their financial worth in stock reports, etc. 
Nationalism and ethnicism would provide equally fruitful examples of the power of historical 
phenomena to press themselves into the pantheon and lay godlike claims on humans while 
nevertheless disguising their status as gods. 
In a world with a crowded pantheon then - and the effect of global communication has thus far been 
to make the pantheon of gods ever fuller - the most powerful gods are often those which avoid 
confrontation by disguising their status as gods. It is the hidden nature of the secular god of 
capitalism, to return to the example above, which prevents millions of Christians and Jews in modem 
capitalist societies from wrestling with the many ways in which capitalism contradicts fundamental 
dimensions of their sacred religions. 
Unmasking the Gods 
My second point of departure flows from the first. The hiddenness of the gods, I have been arguing, 
forms a major part of the challenge of discerning what is right and good for the human community. 
Only as humans name our gods and reflect on the claims they make on us through our taken-for-
granted understandings of reality are we capable of genuine introspection and responsible choice. 
Hence my dissatisfaction with the term "moral discourse". Valuable though it is as a starting point, 
the term fails to alert us linguistically to the existence of the reality where dwell our greatest 
problems. "Moral discourse" as a response to the challenges of our world is equivalent to calling 
housecleaners in response to a house filled with smoke and lethal fumes and asking them to organize 
the furniture in a safe place. They might with perseverance and a willingness to press into places 
uninvited get to the source in the basement, but their skills and the understanding of the task given to 
them fails to equip them for the nature of the real problem. 
Peacebuilders as Inherently Religious 
It follows from the above that every peacebuilder is religious and could not be otherwise. Although I 
focus in Section Two on peacebuilders who are explicitly religious, to isolate them for study partially 
undercuts my argument that all are religious for it could imply that only those who are explicit about 
0 
it are religious. Rather than supporting what I see as an already too-strong tendency to lump 
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"religiously-based peacebuilders" into a special minority category of saintly actors my intention is the 
opposite. Namely, I wish to expand definitions of the "religious" category so that a greater number of 
peacebuilders recognize their presence in it and thus enter the process of critical self-reflection and 
dialogue which I see as essential to the integrity and effectiveness of peacebuilders. However when I 
use the term "religiously-based" I refer to peacebuilders whose efforts are based in institutional 
structures that are explicitly religious in nature. 
Peacebuilding as Doing Theology 
The only linguistic concept which does justice to the kind of inquiry called for then is doing theology. 
By now it should be apparent that I am not calling for formulation and disputation of dogma nor for 
prescribing for others how they ought to live. Rather I seek a process of dialogue and critical self-
reflection about human activity, in this case about peacebuilding, which unmasks the gods, that 
penetrates to the deepest assumptions and meanings underlying our understanding of the world. 
James McClendon hints at the kind of activities I have in mind when he defines theology as "the 
discovery, understanding, and transformation of the convictions of a convictional community, 
including the discovery and critical revision of their relation to one another and to whatever else there 
. ,,35 
lS. 
In the previous discussion about moral discourse I developed the case for awareness as the starting 
point. All that was said there could be said now about the task of doing theology, but with some 
additions. The challenge is not merely self-awareness, foundational though it be in the task of 
theological discernment. The task is also god-awareness, that is, becoming aware of the 
fundamentally religious nature of the structures shaping human communities and perceptions, a task 
that is particularly difficult because of the hidden character of many of the most influential religions 
of our times. But unless we recognize the nature of this foundational layer of the structures of human 
perception we are unlikely to penetrate it. We are not truly aware until we name the gods governing 
awareness. 
McClendon's definition highlights two additional points inherent in my understanding of doing 
theology in conflict. One is his focus on "convictional communities" as the social unit under 
scrutiny. A great deal of conflict resolution, like a great deal of ethics, reflects the modern liberal 
worldview which assumes the individual as the locus of awareness and decisionmaking about values 
and strategies. The widely-known concept of "separating interests from positions"36, for example, 
35 James Wm. Mcclendon, Jr., Ethics (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1986), 23. 
36 In their best-selling book on negotiation, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1991) authors Roger Fisher and Bill Ury offer the devise of "separating interests from positions" in conflict 
resolution. Positions are the demands presented by people in conflict; interests are the deeper concerns which positions 
are intended to address. In an example cited in the book, two people arguing in a library have opposing positions: One 
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while useful tactically in generating options for resolving conflicts, has a hollow ring in the context of 
Ireland or the former Yugoslavia where powerful collective perceptions on both sides frame the 
opponent in ontological categories which defy facile solutions. Peacebuilders are more likely to be 
able to contribute in such settings, I believe, if their paradigm for analysis and action approaches the 
parties as "convictional communities". 
Another dimension of McClendon's definition of theology which parallels my own understanding of 
the nature of the task required of peacebuilders is his emphasis on the creative dimension of the 
effort. To "do theology" as a contribution to peace in settings of conflict is not merely to seek to 
discover and understand, it is also to transform. Such an assertion of course begs the question: 
towards what? Without addressing that question now I wish to highlight an important implication of 
the language of "transformation", namely, that peacebuilders have an agenda based on values 
important to them. Handling this constructively requires special care on the part of peacebuilders. 
Not only are they required to assist others in doing theology, they must also be disciplined in doing 
their own theology so as to be able to on one hand contribute their own values to the peacebuilding 
process but on the other hand do this consciously, openly and without manipulation. I develop this 
proposal further in the "Transformation" chapter and call it discernment. 
An Overview of This Thesis 
My goal is to propose a framework for peacebuilding based on my understandings and experiences as 
a religiously-motivated peacebuilder and to compare it with the experience of other religiously-
motivated peacebuilders. Rooted as it is in a tradition of faith and practice which like every other 
understands the world through its own beliefs and stories, this framework is openly selective, for it is 
based on a particular experience of life and God. In formulating it I have sought to reflect my own 
values and experiences which in turn reflect those of the Anabaptist/Mennonite community of faith 
rather than to develop a framework capable of describing or directing peacebuilding responses of 
l . . . I 37 re 1g1ous actors m genera . 
w;mts the window onen. the other wants it closed. A wise lihrarian intervenes bv asking each whv he insists on his 
position. The first replies that he needs fresh air; the second that the open window is creating a terrible draft over his desk. 
The librarian responds by closing the window currently open and opening another in the next room, bringing fresh air 
with no draft. 
Fisher and Ury suggest that in conflicts it is useful to separate positions from interests, ignore positions (since challenging 
peoples' positions or trying to get them to compromise only "locks them into" their positions), and focus on ways to meet 
interests (through creativity or application of standards of precedent or principle). 
37 Anabaptism was a church reform movement which originated in the 16th century as a part of the Protestant Reformation. 
The direct descendants of the Anabaptists are today known as Mennonites, after Menno Simons, a prominent Dutch 
Anabaptist active in the first half of the 16th century. However, Anabaptism has exercised significant influence in broader 
Protestant circles, notably in regards to the "free church" concepts of adult baptism and separation of church and state. 
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I present this framework, the heart of the thesis, in Section One in the form of seven themes each 
allocated a chapter as follows: 
Chapter One: Vision 
Chapter Two: Transformation 
Chapter Three: Vulnerah: ity 
Chapter Four: Engagement 
Chapter Five: Transformation and Structures 
Chapter Six: Reconciliation 
Chapter Seven: Community 
In order to provide a historical context against which to test my proposed theoretical framework for 
peacebuilding, Section Two presents an account of the work_ of three religiously-based peacebuilders 
Anabaptists placed great emphasis on discipleship, holding up the life and teachings of Jesus as the model for followers, 
particularly his teachings to care for the poor and love enemies, and they believed that discipleship was likely to place 
followers in sharp conflict with the way of life accepted in larger society. Menno Simons, Conrad Grebel, Felix Manz, 
and other early Anabaptist leaders argued that living in the way taught by Jesus is demanding and costly, and that 
therefore only adults making a free and conscious choice should be baptized. Having been already baptized as children, a 
practice adhered to by both Catholics and other Reformation groups, the first Anabaptists had themselves re-baptized as 
adults. For this reason they became known as Anabaptists, or "re-baptizers". Although substantial variation existed 
within the movement itself (including the disastrous Muenster incident in which a minority element of apocalyptic 
Anabaptists sought to establish the New Jerusalem by force in the city of Muenster, leading to a bloody battle in 1535 in 
which many residents losttheir lives, an event by which the entire movement was judged for centuries), common 
emphases in addition to those already mentioned included: 
* Rejection of the concept of sacred words, things, or persons in favor of a practical, instrumental understanding that each 
person has direct access to God. This included the concept of the priesthood of all believers. 
* Rejection of violence and refusal to participate in warfare. 
• Insistence on religious freedom. 
* Refusal to participate in the magistracy or other state offices as these were viewed as connected to the "kingdom of 
strife" rather than the "kingdom of peace" [Walter Klaassen, Anabaptism: Neither Catholic nor Protestant (Waterloo, 
Ontario: Conrad Press, 1981 ), 45]. 
* Emphasis on the church as a voluntary fellowship of those who had committed themselves to the new way of life taught 
by Jesus and to supporting each other in the demanding task of living in this way. 
A substantial body of scholarship documents the diverse historical and theological streams within the early Anabaptist 
movement. C. Arnold Snyder, Anabaptist History and Theology: An Introduction (Kitchener, Ontario: Pandora Press, 
1995) presents perhaps the best current introduction to historical Anabaptism and to scholarly sources. George H. 
Williams' encyclopedic work The Radical Reformation (Kirksville, Mo.: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, 1992) has 
long stood as a defining study of the "left wing" of the Reformation within which Anabaptism emerged, and includes 
substantial sections on Anabaptism. 
The writings of Mennonite scholar John Howard Yoder have deeply influenced Christian understandings of the social and 
political implications of Christian faith. See his The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1972); Nevertheless (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1971); The Original Revolution (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 
1971 ). Charles Scriven, The Transformation of Culture: Christian Social Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr (Scottdale: 
Herald Press, 1988) presents an insightful comparison of Anabaptist social ethics with H. Richard Niebuhr and influential 
interpreters of Niebuhr, characterizing Anabaptism as a theology of social transformation through political engagement 
(albeit by being an "alternative society" offering "transformative example" rather than through extensive involvement in 
existing political structures), universal loyalty; and non-violence. (Scriven, 167fl). See footnote 58 in Chapter One for 
additional citations to current writers presenting an Anabaptist emphasis. 
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prominent during the conflict in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in the period 1970-1979: the Roman Catholic 
Church, the Quakers, and Moral Re-Armament. This historical section however is instrumental to the 
larger primary purpose of the thesis. It is included merely to assist in the exploration of a theological 
and theoretical framework for guiding peacebuilding. 
Section Three presents then the fruit of the comparison between my framework and the activities 
of other peacebuilders, noting similarities and dissimilarities and summarizing conclusions. 
Audience 
To write with efficiency and clarity an author must choose an audience. Each category of reader 
brings its own presuppositions and critical concerns to an essay such as this; few writers, surely not 
this one, are effective in addressing all simultaneously. Within the larger field of conflict resolution 
there exists a subcategory of people, I believe, who share the following traits: 
1) Deep interest in and commitment to the possibility of resolving conflict justly and without 
violence; 
2) Openness to religious experience as a valid and pervasive category of human awareness, 
combined with an openness to learning from reflection on conflict resolution efforts rooted in 
religious experience; 
3) Awareness of human diversity and a commitment to dialogue with others from backgrounds 
different from their own about the possibilities for peaceful coexistence in our world; 
4) Appreciation of the fact that the only mode of dialogue capable of enabling this to happen is 
post-modem awareness, namely, awareness that reality is mediated to us through faith, by 
which I here mean taken-for-granted assumptions about reality and that no human community 
can make legitimate claims to universal truth. On one hand the dialogue on which the future 
of our world depends happens best when we openly identify and claim the sources of our 
faith. But on the other it is essential that when in the public arena we become skillful in, and 
indeed seek to be models of, the art of expressing particularity in the most universal mode 
possible. 
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understood from the experience of the Anabaptists or Mennonites, my imaginary audience includes 
many with other perspectives. Much as I hope that members of my own community will read and 
benefit from my reflections, much as I believe that the proposals developed here do not contradict our 
Mennonites today number about one million, scattered through North America, Africa, Latin America, Asia, and Europe. 
The Mennonite Central Committee is the primary institution through which Mennonites are involved in a variety of 
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own deepest understandings oflife and meaning but rather flow from them, it should also be clear 
that they do not exhaust my own understandings of Christian faith. That would be a conversation 
with a different purpose. 
peacebuilding and social transformation, development, and relief activities. 
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Section One 




It shall be established as the highest of the mountains, and shall be raised above the hills; 
and all nations shall flow to it, and many peoples shall come, and say: 
"Come, let us go up to the mountain of the Lord to the house of the God of Jacob; 
that [God] may teach us [God's] ways and that we may walk in [God's] paths." 
For out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem. 
[God] shall judge between the nations, and shall decide for many peoples; 
and they shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning hooks; 
nation shall not life up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. 38 
Isaiah 2:2-4 
The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor, 
He has sent me to proclaim release to the captives and recovering of sight to the blind, 
to set at liberty those who are oppressed, to proclaim the acceptable year of the Lord." 
Today this Scripture has been fulfilled in your hearing. 
Luke 4:18-19, 21 
But now in Christ Jesus you who once were far off have been brought near in the blood of Christ. 
For he is our peace, who has made us both one, and has broken down the dividing wall of hostility, 
by abolishing in his flesh the law of commandments and ordinances, 
that he might create in himself one new man in place of the two, so making peace, 
and might reconcile us both to God in one body through the cross 
thereby bringing the hostility to an end. 
And he came and preached peace to you who were far off and peace to those who were near. 
Eph. 2:13-17 
Vision as Starting Point 
How we respond to conflict, how we go about dealing with people who are in deadly disagreement is 
the practical expression of deeper, more abstract beliefs about the world, history, and the future of 
human society which in tum are formed by the stories and myths through which we bring meaning to 
our lives. 
As an example of the power of one such myth, consider the Babylon creation story. In Engaging the 
Powers, theologian Walter Wink asserts that the Babylon creation story, whose distinctive feature is 
the victory of order over chaos by means of violence, is the dominant myth in his country, exerting 
38 This and all Scripture quotes are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible. 
far more influence than Judaism or Christianity. In a sweeping review of American art, culture, and 
politics Wink shows the pervasive presence of this myth ofredemptive violence and its 
accompanying assumptions about human life which he summarizes as follows: 
Chaos and evil are the original, normative state of affairs in the universe and among 
human beings. 
Order and good can prevail only through the imposition of force and violence. 
Because chaos and evil are the norm, force and violence must be institutionalized in 
order to prevent the return of chaos. 
The world is divided in simple lines between people who serve good and those who 
serve evil. 
Good can prevail only if those who are good amass sufficient force to defeat and keep 
at bay those who are evil.39 
These beliefs lead Americans (it is clear that Wink believes that many other peoples share similar 
beliefs, but he focuses his analysis on his own country) to bring a simplistic "good guy/bad guy" 
analysis to every conflict, to assume that massive accumulation of weapons is essential for peace, and 
to seek domination in every sphere of life. 
The influence of the Babylonian creation myth can be found within the field of conflict resolution. 
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For example, some mediators view their task as being largely to broker a deal reflecting the prevailing 
balance of power at such point in time as the parties have bludgeoned each other into a "hurting 
stalemate"40 Others approach their task by injecting themselves in prominent roles as "good guys" 
who by heroic effort redeem situations of confrontation, bringing peace for a time but failing to equip 
the parties with means to address their own conflicts and neglecting to address the underlying causes 
so as to enable true resolution. After all, if "salvation" comes only through the vigilant presence of 
the "good guys", then peace efforts should be structured in ways that maintain the "good guys" in 
prominent roles and give them pre-eminence in the constant battle for visibility and credit for their 
cause. Seeking to structure peacebuilding in ways that empower others to work out their own 
39 Walter Wink, Engaging the Powers (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992), 13-31. Cf. John Howard Yoder, The 
()rivinnl Revnlutinn (Scottdale: Herald Press. 1971 ). 172. who without reference to the Babvlonian creation myth offers 
a similar analysis of the prevailing moral legend in Western culture. 
4° Cf., for example, I.W. Zartman, "The Strategy of Preventive Diplomacy in Third World Conflicts", in Managing US-
Soviet Rivalry, edited by A. George (Boulder: Westview, 1983), 341-364. Zartman proposes a "ripeness" theory of 
mediation, saying that the parties are ripe for mediation when a particular set of circumstances are simultaneously at work: 
When the parties are in a situation of deadlock and deadlines which create a sense of crisis, when unilateral solutions are 
blocked and joint solutions become conceivable, and when the party that previously held the upperhand has slipped from 
its dominant role and the weaker party is in ascendancy. Additionally, the parties need to believe that they are 
approaching a moment "when things will significantly get worse if they have not gotten better in ways that negotiation 
seeks to define." (354). While Zartman's theory is insightful, I think that he relies too heavily on the dynamics of power 
in his understanding of settlement of conflicts. 
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differences would be futile and fail to meet the need to score another visible triumph for the 
institutions of good.41 
Still others teach "win/win negotiations" but are notorious in their personal and professional lives for 
egocentrism and competitiveness, an anomaly that could be viewed as an expression of the dualistic 
understanding of good and evil underlying the Babylonian creation myth. The forces of good and 
evil are clearly separate; evil is at work only in others, not within the "good guys" themselves. 
Therefore there is no need to live a life of constant self examination to oppose the affects of evil on 
themselves. 
Wink's analysis demonstrates at one level the power of unacknowledged, accepted-by-faith narrative 
structures in determining practical human responses to mundane situations. Myth shapes our lives at 
fundamental levels, influencing what we believe to be real, what we deem to be the fundamental 
challenges of human existence, and what we believe to be appropriate ways to go about addressing 
those challenges. Wink also makes us aware that to the extent that we are unaware of the myths 
shaping our lives, we are at their mercy. Unexamined, they lead us to believe that there is only one 
way of understanding the events around us, and thus prevent us from responding in any ways other 
than those prescribed by the myth. More specifically as well, Wink introduces us to the impact of one 
particular, dominating myth on people's perceptions of conflict and how to respond to it. 
Thus to develop a comprehensive understanding of peacebuilding we must begin with myth, that is, 
with the accepted-by-faith narrative structures through which we apprehend "reality" and give 
meaning to the events around us. However, I prefer the term "vision" to "myth" because "vision" has 
a larger linguistic and moral horizon than "myth". The understanding ofreality which shapes the 
world as I know it is as concerned with the future and its possibilities as with the present and the past. 
Additionally, this vision makes constant normative claims on responses to the problems of the world 
in which we live. Not only does it shape what we see as key problems, it also provides a reference 
point for determining responses.42 
The questions this chapter addresses are: What is the vision governing my own understanding of 
reality? What are the implications of this vision for peacebuilding? My goal is not to "defend" the 
vision or prescribe it for others, but rather to establish a starting place from which to construct the 
approach to peacebuilding developed in this thesis. 
41 The highly-centralized, top-down involvement of American forces in Somalia under United Nations auspices provides one 
example of this understanding of making peace. 
42 Stanley Hauerwas develops this argument at some depth in his analysis of the role of"vision" in the novels of Iris 
Murdoch. See Hauerwas, "The Significance of Vision: Toward an Aesthetic Ethic", in his Vision and Virtue (Notre 
Dame: Fides Publishers, 1974), 30-47. See also Charles Scriven's analysis of this dimension ofHauerwas in Scriven, The 
Transformation of Culture: Christian Social Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr (Scottdale: Herald Press, 1988), 126-136. 
It is important to recognize at the outset that a vision for peace is per se unremarkable. Since at least 
the days of the "Pax Romana", which was created by the brutal subjugation of competing powers by 
the Roman Empire by Caesar Augustus, a great deal of warmaking has been justified in the name of 
establishing or preserving peace. The telling points about a vision for peace are the nature of the 
peace envisioned, the beneficiaries of that peace, and the means by which it is accomplished. 
The Vision of Shalom 
The foundation for the vision for human society which underlies this thesis is the conviction that God 
intends to establish peace on earth and that to work for peace is to co-labor with God in a task of 
highest significance. Supported by a substantial volume of research documenting the biblical origins 
of such a view and theological treatises by theologians from a variety of Christian backgrounds 
reflecting on its implications for social and political ethics, such an understanding is neither original 
nor unique. Therefore my purposes in this chapter are modest. First I wish to describe the vision of 
shalom in depth just sufficient to provide a context for the points which follow. I will undertake this 
description by reviewing the work of several biblical scholars and theologians who have been 
influential in articulating a vision of shalom. Secondly, I will highlight dimensions of this vision 
which I see as particularly significant in guiding the activities of peacebuilders. 
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Contemporary Christian understandings of the concept of shalom were significantly influenced by 
the work of the biblical theologian Gerhard van Rad, whose article on shalom in Kittel's Theological 
Dictionary of the New Testament in 1964 has been a common reference point for discussion and 
debate ever since. Von Rad's essay notes that shalom has a wide range of meanings which have to do 
with material, physical "well-being". He also argues that shalom is an "emphatically social concept" 
in that it most commonly refers to a group's prosperity or well-being rather than that of an 
individual. He concludes by pointing out that there is "no specific text in which it denotes the 
specifically spiritual attitude of inner peace" rather shalom "manifests itself in the form of external 
well-being." 43 
Kittel's understanding of shalom established an important precedent which has been supported by 
most biblical scholarship in recent decades. As a description of the state in which God intends 
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of quietude or bliss into the realm of human relations, society, economics, and politics. 
43 Gerhard van Rad, "Shalom" in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. II (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 
edited by Gerhard Kittel, 406. Cf. Perry Yoder's summary of von Rad in The Meaning of Peace: Biblical Studies, edited 
by Perry Yoder and Willard Swartley (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1992), 5. 
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In Shalom: The Bible's Word for Salvation, Justice, and Peace, a book that has unofficially become 
the "Mennonite statement" on the concept of shalom biblical scholar Perry Yoder outlines three 
dimensions of shalom as used in the Old Testament: 
1) material well-being and prosperity 
2) social and economic justice 
3) honesty, integrity, and straightforwardness44 
Stressing a point that has historically formed a central tenet of Anabaptist/Mennonite theology, Yoder 
cites large numbers of passages in the Bible which present God as a God who desires people to 
0 
experience this multi-dimensional state of well-being. The thrust of Yoder's argument is that shalom 
lies at the center of God's intentions for human beings and is in fact God's "ultimate will". Yoder 
supports this by examining concepts of sin and salvation and interpreting them in terms of the larger 
vision for shalom. Sin is "disobedience to God's intentions for shalom andjustice',45. Salvation is 
"freedom from bondage," "a process and struggle for both personal and social change", and 
"deliverance from the physical, material conditions of oppression and from the habits of thought 
which feed on and foster this oppression". Salvation "liberates people from their plight both through 
transformation of minds and hearts and through transformation of social structures."46. 
Walter Brueggemann's treatment of shalom in Living Toward A Vision: Biblical Reflections on 
Shalom is similar to Yoder's in that for him shalom forms the Leitmotif of theology. "The central 
vision of world history in the Bible is that all creation is one, every creature in community with every 
other, living in harmony and security towards the joy and well-being of every other creature." 47 This 





Abraham is father of all Israel and every person is his child (Genesis 15:5; Isaiah 41 :8; 51 :2) 
Isaiah has a vision of all being drawn into community around the will of God (Isaiah 2:2-4) 
In the New Testament, "the church has a parallel vision of all persons being drawn under the 
lordship and fellowship of Jesus (Mt. 28:16-20; John 12:32) and therefore into a single 
community (Acts 2:1-11)."48 
Throughout the Bible, "all persons are children of a single family, members of a single tribe, 
heirs of a single hope, and bearers of a single destiny namely, the care and management of all 
of God's creation. "49 
44 Perry Yoder, Shalom: The Bible's Word for Salvation, Justice, and Peace (Newton, Kansas: Faith and Life Press, 1987), 
5 lff. 
45 Ibid., 51. 
46 Ibid., 51-52. 
47 Walter Brueggemann, Living Toward A Vision: Biblical Reflections on Shalom (Philadelphia: United Church Press, 1976) 
15. 
48 Ibid., 15. 
49 Ibid., 15. 
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Brueggemann acknowledges that no single word or idea in the Bible captures the "persistent vision of 
joy, well-being, harmony, and prosperity" which the biblical vision conveys, and a cluster of words is 
required to express the dimensions and nuances of this vision: "love, loyalty, truth, grace, salvation, 
justice, blessing, righteousness". But "the term that in recent discussions has been used to summarize 
that controlling vision is shalom."50 It is in this sense that I use the word in this thesis, as a summary 
of the vision pervading the Bible for humanity to live as one community where justice and well-being 
characterize every relationship. 
One index of how broadly such an understanding of Christian faith has pervaded Christian thinking 
worldwide is the extended conversation undertaken by the World Council of Churches in its "Justice, 
Peace and Integrity of Creation" program. A process of global dialogue among Protestant, Orthodox, 
and Catholic Churches begun in 1983 under WCC auspices culminated in a "covenant" document 
approved by Christian representatives from around the world in 1990 in Seoul, affirming numerous 
themes outlined above. God is understood to be present in the world, particularly where there is 
suffering and pain, actively working for "the new heaven and the new earth which are to come"51 . 
Human beings are called into "covenant community" which is open to all. "Through the Spirit a new 
community is being gathered out of the dispersion and division of nations, religions, classes, sexes, 
ages and races." 52 "Jesus proclaims a permanent jubilee and thereby confronts the church with the 
constant task of witnessing to the demands of justice, reconciliation and the dignity and rights of 
nature."53 God's covenant "is open to all and holds the promise of life in wholeness and right 
relationships."54 "In Jesus Christ, God has broken through the bonds of hostility between nations and 
peoples, and even now offers us the gift of peace with justice. No wound, hostility or sinfulness is 
beyond the reach of the peace that passes understanding. For biblical faith, true peace means every 
human being dwelling in secure relatedness to God, neighbor, nature and self."55 
Shalom as a Guide in the Present 
While a substantial consensus has emerged within the larger Christian fellowship about the centrality 
of shalom to God's purposes in the world, much greater diversity exists about how to respond to that 
vision. In this regard, my understandings have been heavily influenced by the work of the 
Ima., lb. 
51 "Final Document: Entering into Covenant Solidarity for Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation", final document of 
the Commission on Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation issued at World Council of Churches world convocation in 
Seoul, Korea, March 5-12, 1990. Reproduced in D.P. Niles, Between the Flood and the Rainbow: Interpreting the 
Conciliar Process of Mutual Commitment to Justice, Peace and the Integrity of Creation (Geneva: WCC Publications, 
1992), 164-190. 
52 Ibid., 166. 
53 Ibid., 168. 
54 Ibid., 168. 
55 Ibid., 173. 
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Mennonite theologian, John Howard Yoder, whose groundbreaking essay, The Politics of Jesus56, 
first published in 1972 has formed a common reference point for a substantial group of theologians 
and ethicists influenced by his work.57 
A primary concern for J.H.Yoder are two prevalent misunderstandings of Jesus. One diminishes his 
significance to the realm of the purely personal, viewing salvation as saving the souls of individuals 
who are then freed as individuals to live with greater morality and tranquillity before God. Another, 
often related understanding of Jesus which Yoder targets de-historicizes his teachings on social 
conduct such as "love your enemy". These "hard sayings" are either dismissed as irrelevant to the 
current historical era, or at best acknowledged by Christian ethicists such as Reinhold Niebuhr as an 
inspiring but quaint and unrealistic Tolstoyian ideal. 
Yoder proposes an alternative understanding. Jesus' mission was to inaugurate the Kingdom, that is, 
to call human beings to a new way of living based on the Old Testament concept of shalom described 
above. He presented people in his day and now not with a pietistic call for individuals to engage in a 
transaction of the heart. Rather he called people to participate in a new reality of shalom which 
begins now within and between people, and in the structures of economics, politics and society which 
mediate human interaction. Jesus repeatedly used the term kingdom of God to refer to this reality, one 
of numerous ways in which he asserted the immediate, practical relevance of this new reality, and its 
claims for allegiance superseding current structures. The nature of this kingdom was that human 
beings lived in a state of justice and wholeness, where the old divisions of race, sex, social position, 
and national identity were irrelevant. 
Shalom As Call to the Struggle for Justice 
Justice is a central theme in the vision of shalom. The chorus of Hebrew prophets thundering for fair 
wages and regard for the poor is reinforced by the image of Jesus surrounded by revolutionaries 
waging a deadly struggle for justice. Not only did Jesus spend a great deal of time with the outcasts 
of society- beggars, tax collectors, and women, within the inner circle of his friends and supporters 
were also several revolutionaries. One respected biblical scholar has concluded that six out of Jesus' 
twelve disciples may have been Zealots, a group of revolutionaries who sought to overthrow Roman 
rule of the Hebrew people by guerrilla tactics.58 Since Jesus, like everyone else must have come to 
know his friends and disciples through a process of common social networks and interests, this offers 
56 John Howard Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1972). 
57 For example, Stanley Hauerwas, a Methodist ethicist who teaches at Duke University; Glenn Stassen, a Baptist ethicist at 
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary; Charles Scriven, a Seventh Day Adventist pastor and ethicist; James 
McClendon, a theologian teaching at Church Divinity School of the Pacific; Duane Friesen, a Mennonite who teaches 
Bible and religion at Bethel College; Perry Yoder, who teaches Bible at Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminaries. I 
draw on the work of all of these; for citations to their work see the Bibliography. 
58 Oscar Cullman, The State in the New Testament (New York: Scribner, 1956), 88ff. 
an important clue regarding Jesus' self-understanding of his calling.59 The prominence of Zealot 
disciples within his closest circle of friends suggests that his first step in living out the vision of 
shalom was to join the struggle for justice, developing such close friendships with people moving in 
"struggle" circles that they willingly dropped everything else at his invitation to join him. The first 
call of the vision of shalom, then, is to justice. 
Shalom as Means and End 
The second call of the vision of shalom is to work for justice in ways that truly transform rather than 
31 
merely bringing temporary relief. The means by which we seek to act in the complex arena of human 
affairs determine the ends at which we arrive. Violent revolution begets counter-revolution;60 
violence begets violence. The problem with revolutionary violence is not that it is radical, but that it 
is not radical enough, for it merely cuts off the weed at the ground rather than tearing it out at the 
radix. 
J.H. Yoder's work in New Testament has received widespread attention in circles of Christian 
theology in this regard. Jesus' intention, Yoder says, was to call people to a way of living with far-
reaching and indeed revolutionary implications for all dimensions of human existence, including 
social, political, and economic life. But the "kingdom" could be entered only through means 
consistent with its own values. Hence the title of the book, The Politics of Jesus, which emphasizes 
on one hand the political relevance of Jesus' life and death, but on the other hand highlights that 
Jesus' way of engaging in politics differed from that currently employed by political and social 
leadership. 
In the kingdom taught by Jesus, change takes place by means of solidarity with and elevation of those 
in need, and by transformation and conversion of those who dominate old structures, not through 
coercion. Thus although Jesus shared deeply the commitment for justice of his comrades, he rejected 
the Zealot option for liberation through violence and instead pointed to a different means. A central 
dimension of this was establishing an alternative social structure, symbolized in part by the choice of 
twelve disciples, a counterpart to the twelve tribes oflsrael. His identification with the poor and 
outcast, his "triumphal entry" into Jerusalem on the back of a donkey, and his death represent a 
critical dimension of the kingdom. that it is introduced through identification with the weak and 
vulnerable, through unconditional love of even the powerful, and through a willingness to accept and 
suffer loss and pain from the old reality rather than retaliate in kind. In the eyes of Christian faith 
then, Jesus' resurrection symbolizes the shattering of the cycle of violence and supports the assertion 
59 I am indebted to Ray Gingerich for this insight. 
60 See Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolutions (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), for a classic study of the phases of 
revolutionary violence. 
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that the means of creative, non-violent love are stronger than violence. The Roman empire, after all, 
is long since fallen; followers of Jesus populate the globe.61 
As an ethicist and theologian substantially influenced by Yoder's writing, Larry Rasmussen states the 
connection between means and ends as follows: 
To walk in "the way" as a 'people of the way' involves a moral style so intimately 
related to the destination itself that to wander from the way is also to miss the goal, 
which is a righteous life in a community faithful to God as a 'foretaste of the feast to 
come ..... The manner of the route and its travelers is as much a part of the pilgrimage 
as the final arrival and is in its own way a rehearsal for it. In moral terms, means are 
themselves 'the ends in process' (with thanks to Gandhi for the words and Jesus for 
the example)."62 
Implications for Peacebuilders 
Against this background I now wish to explore dimensions of the vision of shalom as described above 
that play a prominent role in the vision of peacebuilding which undergirds this thesis: 
Shalom as True Reality 
Conflict has a powerful capacity to dominate perceptions of reality and thereby create a pseudo-
real ity that exerts enormous influence on everyone it touches. This pseudo-reality not only convinces 
each party that the other is a bitter enemy deserving of death, it convinces many bystanders that 
peaceful resolution of conflicts is impossible 63 • Rather than apply the full power of their resources 
towards peaceful conflict resolution, parties and bystanders acquiesce to force and brutality as the 
only means of resolving conflict. Hope in the possibility of just and peaceful resolution of conflict is, 
then, the first and most critical casualty in violence, and reclamation of hope is the first step in 
peacebuilding. 
An essential element of the vision of shalom as outlined by the Yoders and others influenced by 
Anabaptist theology is that it falls in the category of realized eschatology. 64 That is, as a vision for 
life as it ought to be, it not only describes a future historical epoch, it speaks to the present and serves 
as a moral guide for life here and now. It is a vision for the end times which is realized already in the 
present. Life now is not yet fully "in the Kingdom", of course, for the world still lies in the grip of 
the pseudo-reality of antagonism, selfishness, hatred and patterns of domination which have 
61 These themes are developed in Yoder, The Politics of Jesus. 
62 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 139. 
63 Perhaps I should state explicitly my own understanding of the nature of evil: I do not believe evil has an ontological 
existence in its own right, but rather that its enormous destructive capacity exists through its ability to create the 
perception that reality is vicious and destructive. This perception leads people to respond in ways that correspond to this 
illusory reality; for example by investing heavily in weapons to defend themselves rather than focusing proactively on 
addressing the problems causing conflict or by seeking to eliminate people they are afraid of. Thus humans do evil things 
because they believe reality supports their evil acts. 
64 C.H. Dodd, The Coming of Christ (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1951), 15, 35. 
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characterized human behavior for most of history. Most people are unable to see more than the 
pseudo-reality and believe they have no choice but to accept it and operate in its terms. Therefore the 
pseudo-reality has real power through the acts of people under its illusion and causes enormous 
destruction. 
But the stories of Christian faith as understood in Anabaptist theology and which shape this thesis 
assert that shalom is the inevitable true reality, that this reality is already operating in the present, and 
that therefore shalom reality can and should govern decisionmaking in the present. Events or actions 
in the present which do not reflect or participate in this reality have no lasting historical significance. 
Stated in a positive sense, the only events and actions which have lasting significance in the present 
are those based on the shalom reality. 
John Howard Yoder makes this point in part by calling for a commitment to faithfulness, rather than 
effectiveness. To participate in the Kingdom requires that followers of Jesus make decisions on the 
basis of being faithful to or in accordance with the reality of that Kingdom, not on the basis of 
whether or not they appear effective by the criteria of current realities.65 
This understanding of reality and history offers a formidable base from which to operate as a 
peacebuilder. For one, it provides the peacebuilder with that element most essential to any effort in 
resolving conflict, an unshakable sense of hope. No matter how discouraging a situation may appear 
to others, a peacebuilder who believes that reality says that conflicts can be peacefully resolved and 
that any appearances to the contrary are mere illusions will never give up hope. 
A related and equally important contribution of this understanding of history is that it is well prepared 
for and therefore undaunted by "failure." It is taken for granted that pseudo-reality lingers and that 
the results even of actions grounded in true reality may not become apparent for a long time to come. 
Therefore "success" is measured according to criteria that are broader than immediate apparent 
impact. What is important is not that peacebuilding efforts yield obvious fruit now, but rather that the 
seeds of the future are cast in the present. A conflict may rage for years, decades, conceivably 
centuries. But the significance of peacebuilding efforts are judged according to whether or not these 
efforts have injected into the situation of conflict the dynamics of true reality: a call for justice, 
truthti.Ilness, mtegnty, love, and wllilngness to absoro pam 111 a comm1tmem to enamg rerniiarion. 
65 Yoder, The Politics of Jesus, 234, 235, 238; The Original Revolution (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1971 ), 81-82; 159ff. 
See Duane Friesen's summary of Yoder on this issue in his Christian Peacebui/ding and International Conflict: A Realist 
Pacifist Perspective (Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1986), 154-155. This concept might be viewed as parallel to Hindu 
understandings of the nature of karma. Liberation comes by not by a focus on action and results, for these only entrap the 
mind in an endless cycle of"desire, action, latent desire, further action." By dedicating action to God with no concern for 
a desired action the mind is liberated from karmic shackles. Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi, translated by A.R. 
Natarajan, Upadesa Saram (Essence of Teaching), (Bangalore: Ramana Mararshi Centre for Leaming, 1992), 3. 
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From this perspective all genuine peacebuilding efforts have intrinsic meaning and significance, even 
those which are costly to the peacebuilder or which appear futile by short-term criteria. 
Shalom Addresses All Dimensions of Human Life 
Shalom is a pervasive vision for the transformation of all dimensions of life towards justice, 
truthfulness, and full human potential. Therefore peacebuilding guided by this vision aspires to more 
than cutting deals between political or military elites enabling cessation of hostilities. Peacebuilders 
may of course begin at this level but their mission is at once both simpler and more complex. It is 
simpler in that they demand of themselves only that they interact with the situation in ways that 
reflect the values of the vision of shalom: with integrity, compassion, concern for those who are 
suffering, and forthrightness in advocating the quest for non-coercive measures. As we have seen 
earlier, whether or not the interaction based on these values leads to cessation of hostilities is not their 
criteria for success. 
But peacebuilding guided by shalom seeks more than agreements to end violence. It requires that 
peacebuilders also seek to introduce a new way of thinking and interacting among those in conflict 
that is based on shalom values of justice, compassion, truthfulness and well-being for all. This means 
that they will operate with a variety of concerns: 
• to foster justice so that structural inequities between the parties are addressed 
• to root the process of peacebuilding deeply in the societies involved so that patterns of 
decisionmaking and leadership can be supported which, rather than perpetuating 
domination by elites on each side, empower people at all levels to participate in the 
creation of their own future 
• to contribute to genuine reconciliation of the social relationships between the parties to 
support peace on the long-term 
• to support reflection and greater integrity at moral and spiritual levels among the people 
they interact with, so as to plant the seeds for transformation at the deepest levels of 
human functioning. 
These concerns address every dimension of human existence: the intrapersonal (the spiritual and 
psychological dimensions of individuals ), interpersonal (that which takes place in relationships 
between individuals), and structural (the realities of social, economic, and political conventions and 
structures which govern the lives of people in relationship to others). Thus peacebuilders must 
develop strategies for peacebuilding that acknowledge and address every level of human existence. 
In the chapters which follow I spell out the implications of this. 
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However one implication which deserves attention now regards language, specifically, the 
terminology used to describe efforts to make peace. In 1992 United Nations General Secretary 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali's published a proposal for peace efforts by the UN and the international 
community identifying four major tasks in responding to conflict. They were: preventive diplomacy 
which seeks to prevent disputes from arising and when they do, seeks to prevent escalation, using 
means such as fact-finding, early warning, preventive deployment and establishment of demilitarized 
zones; peacemaking which seeks to bring hostile parties to agreement through mediation and 
negotiation, adjudication at the World Court, humanitarian assistance, economic sanction; 
peacekeeping which seeks to prevent hostilities from recurring through deployment of United Nations 
(primarily military) personnel; and post-conflict peace-building seeks to consolidate peace at the 
social level by disarming warring parties, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections, supporting 
human rights, facilitating cooperation in development projects and cultural exchanges, etc.66 This set 
of terms has acquired wide usage in academic and media circles since 1992. 
The Boutros-Ghali proposal represents an important departure in international political circles for it 
defines the agenda for peace in terms broader than mere cessation of hostilities. But it remains less 
than satisfactory for my purposes. For one, it relies heavily on military measures as an integral 
dimension of peace efforts, devoting more attention to activities in this category of response than to 
any other. For another, the Boutros-Ghali proposal creates a problem for someone like myself 
seeking one over-arching term to describe the broad range of activities required to make peace. 
While taking the word "peacebuilding" which in previous general usage had broad connotations and 
defining it with a new and much narrower meaning, the proposal offers no alternative to it. 
Thus I will follow Lederach and Sampson in using the word peace building as a such a term. 
Lederach says: 
I am suggesting that peacebuilding be understood as a comprehensive term that 
encompasses the full array of states and approaches need to transform conflict toward 
sustainable, peaceful relationships and outcomes. Peacebuilding, thus, involves a 
wide range of activities and functions that both precede and follow formal peace 
accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in term or a condition. 
It is a dynamic social construct. Such conceptualization requires a process of 
building, involving investment and materials, architectural design, coordination of 
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maintenance. 67 
Sampson expands on Lederach's definition as follows: 
66 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacebuilding and Peacekeeping (New York: 
United Nations, 1992). 
67 Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, 14. 
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Peacebuilding ... spans a continuum of activity from conflict prevention, through the 
establishment of a just order and healthy civil society, to conflict transformation 
which, in its various stages (latent conflict, confrontation, negotiation, and post-
conflict) may involve the processes of education, advocacy, conflict resolution, 
reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development.}68 
Shalom requires that we frame the task in these broad terms. Hence for the remainder of this thesis I 
will use the terms peacebuilding and peacebuilder rather than the more conventional language of 
peacemaking and peacemaker which I have used up to this point. 
Conflict is Essential for Building Shalom 
A common misperception is that the goal for those who wish to work for peace is to end conflict. 
This is a damaging view, for the world reflects pervasive patterns of injustice that grip the majority of 
humankind in a state that is far from shalom. The goal for peacebuilders then cannot be merely 
"restoration of order" or "harmony" alone. These may of course be desirable, but only to the extent 
that they preserve a just order of life that supports the well-being of all creation. Where current 
structures are committed to less than this, the vision of shalom requires that peacebuilders welcome 
conflict as an essential ally in the struggle for change. 
It is significant that in the Judea-Christian theological traditions which have nurtured the vision of 
shalom I describe, conflict is a consistent companion to the inbreaking of God's intentions into 
human affairs. The Exodus event, for example, formative in the life and self-understanding of the 
God's people, came as a result of the crying out of Hebrew slaves for mercy from the oppression of 
the Pharoahs, and Moses' challenge commanded by God to the Pharaoh to release his people, The 
Hebrew prophets who pointed to God's intentions of shalom for his people were often out-spoken 
critics of existing practices and repeatedly got clashed with others around them. Jesus himself, the 
"Prince of Peace" confronted and alienated authorities of several kinds. The early church was 
repeatedly tested by conflict. 
What is more, a review of the New Testament and the history of the formation of Christian 
orthopraxis reveals that revelation in Christian theology emerges consistently in the arena of conflict 
and thus suggests the possibility of viewing conflict as a moment of supreme epistemological 
significance. Jesus' words brought consternation to the hearts of the existing guardians of truth, the 
religious authorities. The book of Luke-Acts records in detail the contest in the early church over the 
presence of Gentiles. The resolution of that conflict, accomplished in a universalizing of the scope of 
salvation, has ever since been accepted by Christians as one of God's most important revelations. 
68 Sampson, 6. 
Christian scriptures themselves were formed into a canon only after centuries of disputation. The 
study of "orthodoxy" is thus in reality the study of negotiated settlements to conflicts in which each 
word was carefully selected to address particular concerns. The processes for creating creeds and 
doctrinal formulas such as the Apostle's Creed, the Nicene Creed, the Chalcedonian formula, etc., 
were by current understandings of conflict resolution often adversarial and crude. But the point is 
not that followers of Jesus have been skillful in making peace, but rather to say that in this tradition 
there are no theological grounds to fear or avoid conflict. To the contrary, the Christian tradition 
offers good reason to view conflict positively and expectantly as the setting in which, by the 
testimony of our own Scriptures and traditions, we believe that God is most likely to reveal divine 
purposes. 
A strong tradition within the field of sociology supports a positive orientation towards conflict as 
well. Karl Marx, George Simmel, RalfDahrendorf, Lewis Coser, and others in the tradition of 
"conflict theory" explored extensively the role of conflict in societies. Although their explanations 
for conflict varied, these theorist share in common a conviction that conflict is an unavoidable and 
potentially highly constructive dimension of social life.69 Coser, for example, asserts that "conflict 
prevents the ossification of the social system by exerting pressure for innovation and creativity"70 
"The clash of values and interest, the tension between what is and what some groups feel ought to be, 
the conflict between vested interests and new strata and groups demanding their share of power, 
wealth and status, have been productive of vitality ... "71 One consequence of such conflict is that it 
"generates new norms and institutions"72 Similarly, the noted peace researcher Johannes Galtung 
believes that it is important "to distinguish between conflict and the consequences of conflict". 
73 
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This enables us to view conflict positively, as "a tremendous challenge both intellectually and 
emotionally to the parties", as "one of the major motivating forces in our existence, as both a cause, a 
concomitant and a consequence of change, as an element as necessary to social life as air to human 
life."74 
A concept developed by a number of conflict theorists is that conflict actually has potential to bind a 
society together So long as cleavages in a given society cut in different ways with different issues, 
69 See M. Francis Abraham, Modern Sociological Theory: An Introduction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 
105-242. 
7° Coser, quoted in Abraham, 135. 
71 Lewis Coser, "Social Conflict and the Theory of Social Change" in Clagett G. Smith, editor, Conflict Resolution: 
Contributions of the Behavioral Sciences (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 58. 
72 Coser, ibid. 
73 Johannes Galtung, Peace and Social Structure: Essays in Peace Research, Vol. III (Copenhagen: Christian Eljers, 1978), 
486. 
74 Ibid., 490. 
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the overall result is a cross-stitching effect, which actually strengthens a society and reduces the 
danger of violence. The key to enabling this to happen however is flexibility within societies and a 
positive attitude towards the expression of discontent.75 
Reflecting in the late 1980s on the possibilities for Christian churches to contribute to the struggle for 
justice in South Africa, Charles Villa-Vicencio saw a willingness to enter into the arena of social 
conflict as both a means to enable the church to rise above its own internal divisions as well as to 
contribute to laying the foundation for political renewal, creative restitution and genuine 
reconciliation. Acknowledging the insight emerging from the sociology-of-knowledge debate that all 
ideas, including religious ones, are shaped by the society within which they emerge, Villa-Vicencio 
believes that church members, like everyone else, are "locked into their own group-determined 
perception[ s ]" 76. 
Villa-Vicencio suggest that the only hope to rise above the limits of these contextually-influenced 
perception is for Christians to willingly enter into conflict with each other: "The most that can be 
hoped for is a situation in which our respective ideas and experiences are tested in relation to the 
ideas and experience of others. In so doing conflicting parties ... are afforded the possibility of 
confronting one another's gospel."77 Were the church able to accomplish this, it could have a 
powerful impact on the larger society. "The possibilities which can ... emerge from the dialectic of 
creative conflict is a component which a society facing the threat of violent destruction cannot afford 
to ignore either in a pre- or post-revolutionary era."78 
In summary then, peacebuilders should not be concerned about the presence of conflict per se. Our 
concern rather should be how to respond to conflict in ways that harness this powerful engine for 
change, directing the energies unleashed by conflict constructively towards realization of the vision of 
shalom. 
Shalom Requires Conversion, Not Coercion 
I noted earlier that a vision for peace is in itself unremarkable. Military leaders worldwide routinely 
describe their mission as "preserving the peace" and have encoded their vision in the phrase "if you 
want peace, prepare for war." A central feature of the vision underlying this thesis is the connection 
75 Lewis Coser developed this theory most extensively in The Functions of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 
1956), 72-80. Galtung, ibid., 521-522, reviews other theorists who have developed this idea. See also my essay and 
accompanying diagram in "'Cross-Stitching' Organisations: How Conflict Can Bind Them Into Stability" in Track Two, 
(August, 1993), Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town]: 7, 8. 
76 Villa-Vicencio, 20. 
77 Ibid., 20. 
78 Ibid., 21. 
between means and ends described earlier in Yoder. From this perspective it is impossible to achieve 
the vision of shalom through violence or domination. 
Coercion is taken for granted in many circles as an inevitable component of responding to conflict. 
Much of what passes for diplomacy is in fact coercion thinly cloaked in the political language of 
realpolitik. While I will not in this thesis attempt to argue in principle against the use of force by 
impartial external parties to separate warring parties and protect civilians, 79 I assert that such actions 
have little if anything to do with the vision of shalom described earlier. At their very best they might 
be likened to efforts by forest fire fighters whose only skills are "fighting fire with fire" by starting 
new backfires to limit the damage of old ones. With skill, discipline, and luck such firefighters may 
succeed in putting out old fires, but the costs and risks are high. Even in the best scenario, the real 
work of restoration only begins after the fire is out, and the skills demanded for restoration are far 
more complex than those of the firefighters. Unfortunately, often the work of military 
"peacekeeping" is viewed as the primary task in making peace, with the result that the difficult tasks 
of building genuine peace are ignored. 80 
The vision of shalom calls for peacebuilding efforts that fundamentally alter the perceptions and 
attitudes of the parties in conflict towards each other. Such changes cannot be achieved by mere 
coercion, it can be accomplished only by conversion, a process of encounter, dialogue, critical self-
examination, and voluntary change in the people involved in conflict. In the following chapter I call 
this "transformation" and propose strategies to accomplish it. 
Shalom Requires Universal Loyalty 
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The shalom vision proposes not only a new understanding of reality but also a new and transcending 
social identity which supersedes all loyalties of class, kin, race, or nation. The Apostle Paul spoke of 
a "new humanity" in which old divisions were removed. At the cost of considerable controversy 
early followers of Jesus removed the ethnic barriers between Jews and Gentiles in response to this 
vision of loyalty to a new universal people.81 The assumption at work here is that, in the words of 
Glenn Tinder, "the Lord of all time and existence has taken a personal interest in every human being, 
an interest that is compassionate and unwearying. The Christian universe is peopled exclusively with 
79 Cf. John Howard Yoder's catalogue and assessment of theories of religious pacifism, Nevertheless (Scottdale: Herald 
Press, 1971 ). 
80 See John Paul Lederach, "Ethical Dilemnas of Military Intervention in Disaster Relief, the Development of Cooperative 
Relationships for Long Term Rehabilitation and Development", June, 1993. Unpublished paper available from the 
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Transformation, Eastern Mennonite University, Harrisonburg, VA. 
81 Charles Scriven, The Transformation of Culture: Christian Social Ethics After H. Richard Niebuhr (Scottdale: Herald 
Press, 1988) 167-180, says that "universal loyalty" is one of three social virtues "implied by the Anabaptist idea of 
solidarity with Christ". The other two are political engagement and nonviolence. Scriven credits the specific term 
"universal loyalty" to H. Richard Niebuhr. 
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royalty." Because each person has been immeasurably dignified, all deserve attention, and without 
exception "no one is to be casually sacrificed." "No one should be left outside, an alien and a 
barbarian."82 No one can be "consigned to silence or deprived of those powers that mean full 
participation as members of the community."83 None can be indifferent to the destiny of anyone else 
anywhere on earth for all share equal status. 
The biggest challenge to the vision of universal loyalty today is that of nationality. Virtually all 
nations claim the highest loyalties of their citizens, expecting that citizens will be loyal to the nation's 
interest and serve it diligently in all situations.84 Even "Christian" nations assume that citizens will 
place loyalty to nation higher than loyalty to fellow believers by serving in armies in wartime and 
unquestioningly killing other Christian believers who happen to live in other nations. 85 But an 
ultimate commitment to a new and transcending order of human existence is likely to test other 
loyalties as well: institutional, economic, ethnic a'hd racial, professional, class, etc. The vision of 
shalom calls those committed to it to make decisions based on commitment to the new order, not to 
existing loyalties. 
The implications are multiple. For one, peacebuilding capable of bringing shalom can be undertaken 
only by peacebuilders who see clearly and continually resist the diverse, often subtle ways in which 
their own loyalties of race, religion, and nation impose claims on the peacebuilders themselves. If a 
great deal of peacebuilding is undertaken through coercive means, an equal amount is undertaken to 
support the partisan interests and prejudices of peacebuilders. A question peacebuilders need to 
continually ask themselves is this: Is our primary commitment to serving the interests of these parties 
and the larger vision of shalom, as versus serving our own institutional or national agenda? 
Peacebuilders do have an agenda of course, namely, the introduction of shalom to human 
relationships. But this is an agenda based on universal loyalty to the equal well-being of all. 
Additionally, as I will develop in detail later, the appropriate stance for peacebuilders is transparency 
regarding their own identity and values. This provides an important safeguard against the danger of 
manipulation of the trust placed in peacebuilders by the parties and the influence over the lives of 
others which results. 
82 Glenn Tinder, "Can We Be Good Without God?" Atlantic Monthly, (December 1989): 72. 
83 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 149. 
84 The concept of the nation-state is essentially European in origins. The fact that it is now the international norm is hardly 
testimony to its universal value as the basic unit for conceptualizing the organization of people. Rather it is one of the 
many legacies of the colonial era during which European political ideals pervaded the globe. 
85 While virtually all contemporary Anabaptist theologians acknowledge the need for and legitimacy of state structures in 
organizing human life, a central theme of Anabaptism from its earliest day has been the priority of loyalty to the kingdom 
of God over loyalty to nation, and an assumption that the two often stand in tension. 
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Another implication of universal loyalty is that it requires peace builders in a world dominated by 
structures with partisan loyalties to actively communicate to others the nature of their loyalty. To 
interact transformationally with people in conflict requires enormous trust on their part, and grasping 
the universal loyalty of peacebuilders is an important contribution towards building that trust; in the 
later Chapter on "Community" I point out the value of peace builders being rooted in a tradition of 
people who demonstrate universal loyalty as an essential resource in making such claims credible. In 
addition to enhancing the building of trust with people in conflict, by publicly articulating an identity 
that transcends loyalties of race and nation, peacebuilders strengthen their own ability to be faithful to 
that identity, for they are now publicly accountable to their own values. 
Finally, peacebuilding initiatives need to reflect in their own human composition the nature of the 
reality to which they testify by being staffed by people of diverse backgrounds. A group of 
peacebuilders consisting of men and women of various races is likely to have more credibility and 
effectiveness than a team of white men of European origins. If that team contains people from both 
sides of the conflict being addressed it may have even more impact. Partly this is a mere matter of 
faithfulness and integrity, of practicing what is preached. But it is also a matter of empathy, 
credibility and trust with the parties in conflict, and thus ultimately of effectiveness in interacting 
with them. Mistrust is after all probably the biggest handicap to peacebuilding in the model outlined 
here and mistrust is ubiquitous in conflict; cynicism about human motivations is the norm. Universal 
loyalty guides, then, in fundamental ways in decisionmaking about the formation of peace initiatives. 
Conclusion 
Is not the above utopian, "out of touch" with the political realities of the current world? Yes, it is 
utopian, in the sense that Beverly Harrison says, "as all good theology is, in that it envisages a 
society, a world, a cosmos, in which ... there are no 'excluded ones."'86 Let us also hope that it is not 
in step with current political realities, for ifthere is anything that can be said with confidence, it is 
that politics as they are currently engaged in do not serve the "excluded ones". The point of this 
chapter is not that peacebuilders must embody the full vision of shalom as a prerequisite for action. 
Rather it is that we need an explicit reference point to guide our decisionmaking, an overarching 
vision for human life which enables us to determine the direction in which we will invest our energies 
and to articulate to others what we are about so that we can be held accountable for our actions.
87 
If 
86 Beverly Wildung Harrison, Making the Connections: Essays in Feminist Social Ethics, edited by Carol S. Robb (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1985), 20; Harrison attributes the idea to Jules Girardi. 
87 Stephen R. Covey, The Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerfitl Lessons in Personal Change (New York: Simon and 
Shuster, 1990) 1-182, makes this point quite effectively, albeit in the context of personal life planning. The well-known 
Quaker peace activist Elise Boulding has conducted a large number of workshops based on a similar premise. See her 
book Building a Global Civic Culture: Education for an Interdependent World (New York and London: Teachers 
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our reference point is explicit rather than implicit, we are Jess vulnerable to making decisions 
according to values which we do not wish to serve, including quite possibly the same values which 
contributed to violence in the first place. 
From the standpoint of shalom, the goal is not to fine-tune a system which basically works well, it is 
to enable the abandonment of a set of assumptions and behaviors whose devastation to life on this 
planet is all too evident, and to introduce a new reality which nourishes and supports all. Larry 
Rasmussen says we accomplish this by living "as if': 
" ... as if God's exalting, leveling grace and its way mattered. It means living as if the 
barriers between rich, poor, and underclass were not the givens the present economy 
says they are; living as if the chief actor of the past two hundred years, the nation-
state, were no longer the only chief power, since it is now too large for local problems 
and too small for global ones; living as if the world were indeed a single public 
household or world house, to recall Martin Luther King's image; or in another of his 
images, living as if we constituted a single moral community wrapped in a common 
garment and shared destiny.88 
The challenge for peacebuilders is to operate in the current environment in ways that most effectively 
abandon the old and support the introduction of the new. That becomes possible only to the.extent 
that we have a clear understanding of the shape of the new and what it looks like in actual practice. 
College Press, 1988) 107-117, for a description of a workshop for "Imaging a World Without Weapons". The workshop 
begins by clarifying hopes for the kind of world participants would like to live in 30 years into the future and works 
backwards from there in five year increments so as to devise a strategic action plan of steps required to create such a 
world. 
88 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 149. 
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Chapter Two 
Transformation as the Path to Shalom 
I have argued that every actor in the arena of conflict operates from an often implicit vision of 
what the possibilities for dealing with conflict are. By setting the parameters of what is believed 
to be desirable or possible, this vision profoundly influences the attitudes and responses of each 
actor to the conflict. Therefore constructive response to conflict is more likely if decisionmakers 
state explicitly the source and nature of their vision. I pointed to the Judeo-Christian vision of 
shalom as the source of my own understanding of peace as a holistic state of well-being that 
includes dimensions of material well-being, justice, harmonious relationships, and moral/spiritual 
integrity. 
This raises a second question that is related to the question of vision, strategy. If vision answers 
the question "towards what?", strategy answers the question "how do we get there in ways 
consistent with the vision?" This and the chapters which follow in this section respond to the 
latter question. The current chapter addresses one particular aspect of it, the nature of the 
transaction which peacebuilders seek to facilitate in settings of conflict. 
Conflict arises from and causes a bewildering array of problems. In many situations of conflict, 
problems range from urgent short-term survival needs such as food, housing, and health care to 
highly complex, political and/or economic issues such as human rights, disputed national 
boundaries, ethnic and religious diversity, social and economic stratification, etc. Between these 
short-term and long-term problems lie the medium-term problems that any "normal" society 
wrestles with such as schooling, transport, human and economic development, environmental 
issues, etc. 
Thus peacebuilders need a way of allocating their time and resources most effectively. The 
challenge is not to identify one set of problems as more important than others, for in the end all 
problems need to be addressed. My goal in this chapter is rather to propose a general criterion for 
deciding which actions on the part of the peacebuilder are most likely to contribute to reaching the 
o vision of shalom. Drawing on the work of Robert Baruch Bush and Joseph Folger in their book 
The Promise of Mediation, I propose tranformation as that criterion. 
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Moral Transformation 
Writing in the American context, Bush and Folger outline four stories or paradigms of the 
mediation movement which they believe currently dominate thinking in their country about 
mediation: the Satisfaction Story, the Social Justice Story, the Oppression Story, and the 
Transformation Story. The Satisfaction Story views mediation "as creative problem solving, 
which produces settlements that satisfy disputing parties on all sides of conflicts." The Social 
Justice Story "sees mediation as helping to organize and build coalitions among individuals, so as 
to generate greater bargaining power for the 'have-nots."' The Transformation Story "pictures 
mediation as working to engender moral growth in disputing parties, thus producing stronger and 
more compassionate human beings out of the crucible of human conflict." The Oppression Story 
reflects the views of critics of mediation who oppose its use because they see mediation "as 
applying pressure and manipulation in ways that cause greater unfairness to the already 
disadvantaged. " 1 
Bush and Folger agree with some goals of all the stories. They agree for example that the goal of 
the Satisfaction Story, finding optimal solutions to the needs of all parties, is a good one. They 
also make clear that they are committed to the goal of the Social Justice and Oppression Story, 
namely to promote equality and justice. However they believe the most important goal should be 
"engendering moral growth and transforming human character, toward both greater strength and 
greater compassion." This is the Transformation Story, which "stresses mediation's capacity for 
fostering empowerment and recognition, because when these occur in conflict, it signifies that the 
ultimate goal of moral development has been attained to some degree by one or both parties."2 
Transformation via empowerment and recognition "should take precedence over the other goals 
mediation can be used to attain, even though those other goals are themselves important."3 
They argue that the goal of transformation has a unique character which sets its apart from other 
goals such as satisfaction or fairness. On the one hand, satisfying peoples' unmet needs is an 
important goal, as is "preventing unfairness, which usually also means reducing suffering." 4 But 
such goals do not go far enough, for 
1 Robert Bush and Joseph Folger, The Promise of Mediation: Responding to Conflict Through Empowerment and 
Recognition (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1994), 24. 
2 Ibid., 27. 
3 Ibid., 28-29. 
4 Ibid., 29 
both of these aims involve changing people's situations for the better. 
Transformation is a different kind of goal. It involves changing not just situations 
but people themselves, and thus the society as a whole. It aims at creating a 
'better world,' not just in the sense of a more smoothly or fairly working version 
of what now exists but in the sense of a different kind of world altogether. The 
goal is a world in which people are not just better off, but better: more human and 
more humane. Achieving this goal means transforming people from dependent 
beings concerned only with themselves (weak and selfish people) into secure and 
self-reliant beings willing to be concerned with and responsive to others (strong 
and caring people). The occurrence of this transformation brings out the intrinsic 
good, the highest level, within human beings. And with changed, better human 
beings, society as a whole becomes a changed, better place."5 
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The primary goal in transformative mediation then is not improving the parties' situation, but 
rather "improving the parties themselves from what they were before."6 This is accomplished by 
two primary strategies: empowellilent and recognition. 
Empowerment involves increasing peoples' sense of strength and ability to take control of their 
situation. People are empowered when they come to a clearer recognition or understanding of 
their goals, when they become more aware of their options and the degree of their own control 
over those options, when they increase their skills in conflict resolution, communication, problem-
solving, etc., when they gain new awareness of resources already within their possession or new 
sources of support; or when they increase their ability to make conscious, reflective decisions. 7 
Whenever these things occur in mediation, "the party experiences a greater sense of self-worth, 
security, self-determinations, and autonomy."8 
Bush and Folger are at pains to point out that "empowerment is independent of any particular 
outcome of the mediation", including an unfair or unwise outcome. They say that "even a 'poor 
outcome' produced by the party's own process of reflection and choice strengthens the self more 
than a 'good outcome' induced by the mediator's directiveness or imposition."9 
The other key factor in transformative mediation according to Bush and Folger is recognition, 
which involves moving beyond self-absorbed postures of defensiveness, suspicion, and hostility 
towards a stance of other-awareness. A party gives recognition in mediation when he stops 
thinking exclusively about his own situation and begins to focus to some degree on what the other 
party is going through, when she allows herself to see the other party in a new and more favorable 
light than before, or says or does things which indicate a new and more sympathetic view of the 
s Ibid., 29. 
6 Ibid., 84. 
7 Ibid., 87. 
8 Ibid., 87. 
9 Ibid., 88. 
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other party. Such moves enable a party to reach "beyond himself to relate to another person's 
common humanity in a concrete way. When the mediator helps to bring any of these kinds of 
things about in the mediation, the objective of recognition has been achieved to some degree. "10 
Success in mediation, then, is not judged according to whether the parties have reached accord. 
Rather mediation is successful to the extent that: 
1) "the parties have been made aware of the opportunities presented during the 
mediation for both empowerment and recognition;" 
2) "the parties have been helped to clarify goals, options, and resources, and then to 
make informed, deliberate, and free choices regarding how to proceed at every 
decision point;" and 
3) "the parties have been helped to give recognition wherever it was their decision to 
do so."11 
If these objectives are met, the parties "will experience both strengthening of self and greater 
actualization of their capacity for relating to others, and they will advance in both critical 
dimensions of moral development. Successful mediation will bring out the intrinsic strength and 
goodness that lie within the parties as human beings, to the fullest extent possible."12 
In practice, the challenge for mediators is to conduct themselves in relation to the parties in ways 
that "capture opportunities" to facilitate empowerment and recognition. Bush and Folger suggest 
three basic strategies for accomplishing this: 
1) Microfocusing on the Parties' Contributions. Mediators should scan every move 
by the parties - "their statements, challenges, questions, narrative - for the 
possibilities each affords for transformative opportunities."13 What they seek is 
"points where choices arise that the parties can be empowered to make ... " and 
"openings that afford disputants the chance to give recognition by acknowledging 
each other's perspectives. In general, mediators enter the session looking for, and 
expecting to find and capture, myriad opportunities for empowerment and 
recognition as the case unfolds in front of them." 
2) Encouraging Parties' Deliberation and Choice Making. This strategy flows from 
the commitment to empowerment. Mediators should "try to clarify parties' 
available choices at all key junctures and encourage parties to reflect and 
deliberate with full awareness of their options, goals, and resources. The parties' 
goals and choices are treated as central at all levels of decision making. Mediators 
consciously try to avoid shaping issues, proposals, or terms for settlement, or even 
pushing for the achievement of settlement at all. Instead, they encourage parties 
to define problems and find solutions for themselves, and they endorse and 
support the parties' own efforts to do so."14 
lO Ibid., 92. 
11 Ibid., 95. 
12 Ibid., 95. 
13 Ibid., 100. 
14 Ibid., 101. 
3) Encourage perspective taking. This strategy flows from the commitment to 
facilitating recognition. Mediators "actively explore each party's statements for 
openings that allow one party to consider the other's situation or self." "To aid 
perspective taking, mediators reinterpret, translate, and reframe parties' statements 
- not to shape issues or solutions but to help make each party more intelligible to 
the other."15 
Moral Transformation and Shalom 
Bush and Folger move far towards defining an approach to peacebuilding which is compatible 
with shalom. With its emphasis on supporting parties in conflict to reach towards their fullest 
potential while simultaneously acting in ways that are compassionate and considerate, moral 
transformation as they envision overlaps substantially with the vision for shalom outlined in the 
last chapter.16 
IS fbid., 101. 
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16 
In Just Peacebuilding: Transforming Initiatvies for Justice and Peace (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 
1992) 53-113, Glenn Stassen, a Baptist scholar, develops the concept of "transforming initiatives" as a key theological 
concept through exegesis of a number of key passages dealing with conflict in the New Testament. Stassen' s proposal 
is similar to Bush and Folger's concept of moral transformation in its commitment to changing the hearts of opponents. 
In the interests of addressing the broadest possible audience, I am building my case wherever possible on work outside 
of theology, hence my choice to structure my initial argument in this chapter around Bush and Folger rather than 
Stassen. Then too, Stassen addresses primarily situations where his audience are themselves parties to conflict rather 
than prospective peacebuilders. Nevertheless his work merits note here for it broadens the repertoire of strategies 
proposed by Bush and Folger for peacebuilding. 
Stassen begins by arguing at some length that Jesus' Sermon on the Mount is not a legalistic prescription of utopian 
answers for dealing with adversaries as it is widely understood. Instead it points to a new ethic for dealing with evil 
and injustice. Rather than respond in ways that lock us into the same behaviors as opponents, we should respond in 
creative and surprising ways that are capable of transforming not only the situation but the opponent as well, hence the 
name "transforming initiatives." Such an approach is well-demonstrated in the tactics of Gandhi, Martin Luther King, 
and others in the non-violence movement who have developed an extensive body of experience. 
Studying the experience of "die Wende", the end of a divided Germany, Stassen proposes seven steps for transforming 
initiatives, a number of which overlap with themes treated elsewhere in this thesis: 
I. Affirm the legitimate interests of opponents and acknowledge common security. Parties in conflict should seek 
ways to acknowledge the legitimate interests of their enemies and acknowledge that they have related security needs 
that will require cooperation to meet. 
2. Take independent initiatives. Parties can independently take initiatives intended to transform the perceptions of 
opponents by, for example shifting the focus of their military planning from offensive capacity towards defensive 
capacity. The goal is to establish each side's own positive intent by unilaterally taking steps that shift away from 
confrontation, but that do not put the party undertaking an initiative at risk. 
3. Talk with the enemy. Each side can commit itself to talking and negotiation as its preferred way of resolving 
conflict. 
4. Seek human rights and justice for all, especially the powerless, without double standard. Stassen's emphasis here is 
on each side taking responsibility for its own failures to act justly in a variety of relationships. By taking. measures to 
set its own house in order, each side can contribute to a larger atmosphere of just and principled behavior. 
5. Acknowledge vicious cycles; participate in peacebuilding processes. Each side should acknowledge the way in 
which all are caught in a spiral of escalation and seek to set in motion peace processes designed to de-escalate the 
conflict. 
6. End judgmental propaganda; make amends. Instead of judgmental propaganda, each side can acknowledge that it 
has caused hurt and wants to take action to do better. Stassen asserts that repressed guilt about its own destructive 
actions often distorts each side's perceptions and blocks trust on the part of others. 
7. Work with citizens' groups for the truth. Stassen's emphasis here is on empowering citizens groups on each side 
with accurate information and a voice in policy-making, as a corrective to the self-justifying and self-interested 
tendencies of governments. 
48 
Less apparent is another commonality their framework shares with the biblical vision of shalom: 
the priority it places on achieving the highest possible level of goodness in human relationships. 
This goal over-rides all other concerns that might commonly be viewed as acceptable. It is not 
enough, for example, simply to achieve justice, or merely to work out an efficient solution to a 
problem. Folger and Bush are more interested in whether or not the parties have changed in ways 
that enhance their general ability to function compassionately and to achieve their highest capacity 
as human beings. Although they use secular language, they reflect the commitment called for by 
shalom to guide response to problems according to a vision for the highest potential of human 
community. They superimpose this vision even on situations that might appear inconsequential 
and urge that it guide responses there, even if doing so reduces the chances of meeting other goals 
like gaining short-term settlement or achieving immediate justice. In the sense that they seek to 
guide present behavior by their understanding of a future reality, they operate from what Christian 
theologians call realized eschatology. 11 
The Value of Moral Transformation in Setting Priorities 
One of the most useful dimensions of the concept of moral transformation in peace building is its 
capacity to address the problem I identified earlier in this chapter, the need to set priorities. Much 
of the richness and power of the vision for shalom outlined in Chapter One is due to the fact that it 
is holistic, encompassing all dimensions of human life. But being holistic can be hazardous. 
Human beings and our institutions are limited in resources; it is impossible to do everything at 
once. Peacebuilders therefore need to set clear strategic priorities. 
Although the framework offered by Folger and Bush assumes and supports the broader goals of 
justice and restoration of relationships which are key elements of the vision of shalom, it gives 
priority to moral transformation, changing the way the parties think. What might such a priority 
look like in practice? 
I wish to examine here a specific peacebuilding effort undertaken by the Mennonite Central 
Committee, a religious actor which has strongly influenced my own understanding of 
peace building. Although the term "moral transformation" was not a part of the vocabulary of 
MCC planners, in retrospect it seems apparent that MCC's priority was indeed to contribute to the 
possibility of change in ways similar to "moral transformation". 
Part of the value of Stassen' s proposals is that whereas the strategies offered by Bush and Folger assume that the 
parties have already agreed to mediation, Stassen's work suggest responses which can contribute to the transformation 
of opponents even where there has been no agreement to mediate. 
17 Cf. footnote 64, Chapter One. 
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During and after the Viet Nam War, the American-based Mennonite Central Committee sent 
several shiploads of medical supplies and equipment to Hanoi as a gesture of love for the people of 
North Viet Nam, whom the US government at that time was fighting. Although the MCC was 
operating world-wide in many situations of desperate need, it chose to give to give special priority 
in fundraising and publicity to this effort. 18 
This effort suggests a number of guidelines with which to put the concept of moral transformation 
into practice in situations of conflict. 
Focus on moral transformation, not on right outcomes. 
The starting point of the Mennonite response was an assumption shared by Folger and Bush: the 
goal in peacebuilding is to impact the parties at the level of moral awareness, not to deliver or 
impose right outcomes. The amount of aid delivered by the MCC was small compared to the 
needs of the embargoed Vietnamese people. Any effort to calculate the utility of this response in 
terms of immediate outcomes would likely have judged this effort impractical and therefore ill-
advised. The goal in immediate terms was modest; not to set things "right" but to offer the parties 
opportunities to change the way they thought about the situation, and each other. 
Focus on activities which do not depend upon power for implementation 
Moral transformation can never be imposed. Recognition, one of the two essential dimensions of 
moral transformation "can only be achieved when parties willingly give it--either in response to a 
mediators' efforts or spontaneously."19 Therefore efforts imposed on the parties by power 
contribute little or nothing to the possibility of moral transformation. One implication of this is 
that peacebuilders need not hold positional power to be effective. Later we will see in fact that 
certain kinds of powerlessness can number among the peacebuilder's greatest assets. 
The Mennonites were few in number and MCC was a relatively small NGO. In terms of ability to 
impose any significant changes in behavior on either party, MCC was virtually powerless in the 
situation. But this practical powerlessness was no obstacle in finding a way to interact with the 
parties in a way that had a significant impact on both. 
View peacebui/ding as an incremental undertaking. 
The example illustrates another feature of the moral transformation vision that is valuable in 
strategy-setting: an incremental understanding of peace building. The Mennonite response met the 
18 See Robert Kreider and Rachel Goosen, Hungry, Thirsty, A Stranger: The MCC Experience (Scottdale: Pennsylvania: 
Herald Press, 1988), 139-162; and Luke S. Martin, An Evaluation of a Generation of Mennonite Mission, Service and 
Peacemaking in Viet Nam 1954-1976 (Akron, Pennsylvania: Viet Nam Study Project sponsored by Mennonite Central 
Committee and Eastern Mennonite Board of Missions and Charities: July, 1977), 108-114. 
19 Bush and Folger, 984. 
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parties where they were, seeking neither preconditions for implementation nor "settlements" as 
measures of a successful outcome. With Bush and Folger, those planning this response shared the 
awareness that even small changes in empowerment and recognition can eventually have a 
significant impact on the possibility of peace. But because the goal is to change the way people 
think, the practical results are often slow in appearing. 
Re-focus humanitarian efforts to meet the goal of moral transformation. 
This experience demonstrates the capacity of the moral tranformation goal to re-focus and give 
new meaning to a wide range of activities that in themselves are ordinary, thereby accomplishing 
something more significant. The actual amount of materiel sent was modest; surely it made little 
practical difference in the daily lives of most North Vietnamese. Nevertheless the gesture was 
transformative. By acknowledging the humanity of the North Vietnamese, the Mennonite effort 
presented an opportunity for recognition of their enemy to the American public in the form of a 
bold challenge to re-assess views of a people commonly known as "gooks", "VC", "Charlie", and 
"commies". Likewise the relief effort surely increased the sense, to recall a phrase from Bush and 
Folger, of"self-worth, security, self-determination and autonomy" of the North Vietnamese. The 
fact that the US government, fighting propaganda battles at every front, unsuccessfully sought to 
block shipment of the supplies is itself some indication of the power of the act. 
The goal of moral transformation then guides in setting priorities. Out of many needy areas in the 
world, the MCC chose to give priority to the Viet Nam situation because they wished to be a 
reconciling presence. In the language of Folger and Bush, the question implicitly being asked and 
answered by the MCC administrators was this: Which of the many situations of need and conflict 
in the world offers the most important opportunities for us to contribute to the moral 
transformation of the parties? 
Moral transformation also suggests useful questions after a situation has been selected. What 
activities are likely to maximize the possibility of moral transformation? As framed by Folger and 
Bush, the question would be: How could activities be undertaken in such a way that the parties are 
most likely to be empowered in terms of self-respect and self-initiative, and enabled to offer 
recognition to their opponents? 
Give priority to activity with symbolic impact. 
The case demonstrates a key reality in the practical application of the goal of moral 
transformation: much significant impact takes place at the level of the symbolic. No amount of 
relief to the people of North Viet Nam would have been adequate to truly empower them, nor 
capable of converting the prevailing American mindset against them. Nevertheless the token 
measures of the MCC made an impact on both parties. The shipments drew controversy in the 
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United States during the war years and formed an important part of a larger national outcry against 
the war which in the end led to its termination. For their part the North Vietnamese repeated 
expressed enormous gratitude to Mennonite representatives for the materiel provided and for the 
spirit of reconciliation in which it was offered and used the Mennonite Central Committee for 
several years after the war ended as its only channel of diplomatic interaction with the West. 
We see then the potential for a small action that is insignificant at the moment in terms of 
changing the balance of power to contribute to a deep shift in the way people think. This can lead 
eventually to changed actions so that ultimately the affect even at a practical level can be 
profound. 
Perhaps it goes without saying that many religions have a rich variety of resources to draw upon in 
selecting actions with symbolic value: sacred scriptures, liturgies, places and objects; rituals, 
pronouncements and acts of prophetic challenge, compassion and forgiveness; saints, clergy, 
institutional staff, and lay persons able to act in the name of a metaphysical calling, etc. What is 
more, religious symbols often command widespread recognition and respect. A cleric's collar or 
robe is likely to evoke a respectful response anywhere in the world, regardless of the religious 
environment. It is hardly chance that the world's two most prominent and respected disaster relief 
organizations, the International Red Cross and the International Red Crescent societies, have 
origins in and operate under the sacred symbols of Christianity and Islam, respectively. 
Conceptual Limits of Moral Transformation 
Despite its important strengths, the concept of moral transformation as understood by Bush and 
Folger requires substantial expansion in order to serve as an adequate guide for peacebuilding in 
the kinds of conflicts envisioned in this thesis. The concept of empowerment deserves to be 
extended to include the concept of responsibility, which embodies the ultimate, most mature 
form of empowerment. To the extent that people choose to take responsibility for their actions 
and the consequences of their actions, they are empowered to learn from the past and thus change 
in the ways Bush and Folger recognize as important. Similarly the concept of recognition 
deserves to be broadened to include the concept of forgiveness, which symbolically expresses the 
deepest possible recognition that one person can offer another person in conflict. By declining to 
hold specific mistakes and failures against those who have made them, people in conflict are able 
to recognize the underlying existential legitimacy of their opponents.20 
20 I am grateful to Larry Hoover for the points about recognition and forgiveness. As I will make clear in the later 
chapter on "Reconciliation", by suggesting the possibility of forgiveness I am not advocating amnesia or facile release 
from the past. 
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More fundamentally however, the framework as presented reflects a methodological discontinuity 
that corresponds to a conceptual gap in the thinking of many people in conflict as well as in many 
peacebuilders. That gap consists of a failure to develop meaningful strategic connections between 
the personal and the communal, between the dynamics of personal transformation and social 
transformation, between the ethics of individual relationships and public planning. 
Bush and Folger reflect awareness of systemic and public issues, but their book concerns itself 
with conflicts at the micro not at the macro level of society. The two case studies which they 
explore in depth to present their concepts, for example, are about tenants and landlords and angry 
neighbors operating as individuals, not as groups or classes. The mediation strategies they propose 
assume a small number of individuals sitting across a table representing themselves alone. 
The vision of shalom in contrast calls our attention to another reality: that humans are more than 
individuals, we live in societies which shape us profoundly and often in hidden ways. When 
communities and societies are shattered and sick they diminish the ability of individuals to relate 
humanely to others or become deeply moral beings. 21 Thus individuals are affected by forces 
much bigger than might appear from the image of a handful of people gathered around a mediation 
table. 
Let us say, for example, that recently a government bill was passed which raised taxes for working 
families but reduced them for owners of apartments. Neither party may be thinking about this as 
they face each other across a mediation table, yet the potential of this external economic dynamic 
to influence the ability of the parties to resolve this conflict is obvious. Or suppose one of the 
parties belongs to a racial or cultural group which others view in stereotypical ways as lazy, 
greedy, aggressive. This does not prevent a mediator from offering opportunities to the parties for 
moral transformation and in the best case, such opportunities may be accepted. But at the end of 
the session the people at the table must go home, to the fold of their own cultural or racial group. 
If stereotypes are strong here, it will be difficult for either party to sustain any attitudes of 
recognition they may have achieved at the table. Somehow people in conflict need to be enabled 
to become aware of and critically examine these larger systemic and structural issues, and to 
respond in ways that address them. 
We cannot hope to transform individuals unless we are acutely aware of the larger structures and 
social forces constantly at work whenever any two individuals interact. These forces are often not 
very visible, a fact which only increases their power, for if they are not seen they cannot be 
21 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, provides the best analysis I am aware of regarding the shattered 
nature of American society, and his analysis could be applied to many urban communities worldwide. 
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addressed. But in powerful ways they subtly mold the expectations and overall well-being of 
individuals long before and long after they may encounter each other at a mediation table. No 
matter how much improvement individuals may experience as moral beings, these larger forces 
are likely to keep them or others like them at cross purposes unless the moment for transformation 
occasioned by their conflict addresses structures as well.22 
To their credit, in their concluding analysis Bush and Folger are at pains to critique what they 
characterize as an "Individualist worldview" with a corresponding minimalist view of society as a 
"kind of referee or intermediary" whose primary task is to ensure the freedom and individuality of 
all. 
23 
The individualist worldview, they insightfully assert, "leads to a view of human nature that 
emphasizes separateness, autonomy, individuality, and self-interestedness".24 They propose as an 
alternative, the "relational worldview" whose most important value is transformation, "the 
achievement of human conduct that integrates strength of self and compassion toward others"25 
The central feature of human nature in this alternative worldview is the capacity to be both strong 
in oneself and compassionate to others, to be "simultaneously separated and connected, 
autonomous and linked, self-interested and self-transcending."26 The role of society and 
institutions, Bush and Folger say, is to enable transformation by helping individuals to master the 
tension between these two competing requirements of moral behavior. They stress that in contrast 
to the Individualist worldview, they believe that the role of society and institutions is not simply to 
allow individuals to be free and strong, rather these collective structures must actively help them 
to achieve the difficult balance that lies at the heart of the human transformation. 
This is good, so far as it goes. But it is too little if we wish to avoid the pitfalls of the Individualist 
worldview which Bush and Folger insightfully critique. The critical reality needing to be 
addressed is that how we live as individuals and whether or not we are capable of living in 
authentic human community is profoundly influenced by institutions and society. Bush and Folger 
acknowledge this and devote a paragraph - the on~alluded to above - to the need for institutions 
and society to actively help individuals to balance the tension inherent in moral transformation. 
But one paragraph to address what is arguably at least half the problem in accomplishing moral 
transformation? By failing to address the implications of the vision of moral transformation for 
22 Cf. David Tracy and John B. Cobb, Jr., Talking About God, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1983), 90, who write: 
"Do we change individuals through structural social changes? Or do we change society through changing individuals? 
The answer, of course, is that neither can occur effectively except in interaction with the other." 
23 Folger and Bush, 238. 
24 Ibid., 238. 
25 Ibid., 242. 
26 Ibid., 243. 
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how mediators interact with the realm of structures and collective life, Folger and Bush gravely 
jeopardize their aspiration to overcome separateness and autonomy.27 
Transformation as Goal 
If the "micro" focus of their study allowed Folger and Bush to avoid facing the need for 
addressing the transformation of institutions and societies, the topic here, war and conflict between 
large groups of people, does not. Granted, peacebuilding in the setting we have in mind involves 
interaction with individuals in the sense that all planning, decisionmaking, and negotiation require 
interaction between a small number of individual leaders or representatives. This fact redeems the 
work of Bush and Folger for our purposes, for the moment-by-moment interactions of 
peacebuilder with conflicting parties may often take place in the individual context assumed by 
these authors. 
But peacebuilding efforts in wars and group conflicts have credibility only to the extent that those 
individuals are connected to large collectivities; that connection comes via institutions. If 
peacebuilding is not rooted in institutions - whether grounded in formal, informal, symbolic, or 
legal realities will depend on the situation - it is a waste of time and worse, a fraud. Peace builders 
must have a clear sense of the structural dimensions of moral transformation ifwe intend our 
efforts to contribute to it. In the following chapters I spell this out in greater detail. 
In light of the above I propose then to use the simple term "transformation". The goal is not only 
moral transformation of the parties as proposed in Bush and Folger by providing them 
opportunities to become better people through empowerment and recognition, but also societal 
transformation by addressing the economic, political and social structures in which conflicts are 
embedded and the values reflected in those structures. The concepts of empowerment and 
recognition, writ large to the level of collectives, serve well in conceptualizing transformative 
strategies in this greater arena of awareness and action. Even in the arena of structural or political 
change, they capture the need to, on one hand, empower groups to become strong, self-reliant, and 
capable of asserting their needs and on the other, to enable them to recognize the legitimate needs 
ofother groups. 
The critical dimension of transformation that remains missing is an understanding of where and 
how empowerment and recognition are joined at the level of collectives and societies. To 
27 Larry Rasmussen makes a similar critique .of Carol Gilligan, from whom Bush and Folger borrow their basic 
framework of moral transformation: "We are left, then, with innumerable proposals for society that, like Daly and 
Cobb, take the requisite basic moral formation utterly for granted; and studies of moral development that, like 
Kohlberg, Fowler, and Gilligan, say too Httle about the necessary 'macro' social structures and the nature of morally 




elucidate this point, let us suppose that each party is indeed fully empowered and fully committed 
to recognition of each other. What then? What enables them to proceed from their separate states 
of empowerment and recognition to the essential task of jointly addressing the issues which stand 
between them? In mediation between individuals it may be sufficient to rely on a mediator. But 
groups or societies are complex, often paradoxical phenomena.28 Their differing structures for 
creating meaning cause them to react in diverse ways to the same event. Their identity and values, 
while powerful in influencing the response of members, are often unclear and in a process of on-
going transformation. Internal norms and structures of authority and decisionmaking often 
contradict key values. 
Minimally we can say that to interact transformationally with conflict in groups and societies 
requires peacebuilders to view their task in broad terms. John Paul Lederach offers a useful set of 
categories here, proposing that transformation_ involves promoting peaceful change in four spheres 
of human reality: 29 
Personal: Conflicts create enormous stress and trauma for individuals by disturbing or 
destroying routines of personal physical survival and social existence, by creating enormous 
fear, anxiety and often hatred; by limiting or destroying opportunities for education, work and 
personal development. Together the damage at these levels often precipitate emotional and 
spiritual crisis. A vision for holistic human well-being therefore requires that peacebuilders 
find ways to restore the structures of personal life and development and to enable healing from 
the traumas inflicted by conflict. 
Relational: Conflicts damage and often destroy relationships. Communication often 
functions poorly, expectations of the relationship often become mismatched, perceptions are 
often widely distorted, ability to cooperate even in non-conflictual areas is usually reduced. 
Special efforts are required to address these problem in order to establish or restore 
relationships. 
Structural: Conflicts often have their roots in social conditions or structures that block the 
meeting of basic human needs ( substantive justice) and the participation of people in decisions 
that affect them (procedural justice). Transformation at this level requires analysis of the 
structural causes of conflict and the creation of non-violent mechanisms to address them. 
28 See Kenwyn K. Smith and David N. Berg, Paradoxes of Group Life: Understanding Conflict, Paralysis, and 
Movement in Group Dynamics (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988), for a review of paradoxes inherent in 
group life. 
29 Revised from John Paul Lederach, "Conflict Transformation: A Working Definition", unpublished handout, 1994. 
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Cultural: Often cultural patterns exist that contribute towards violent expressions of conflict. 
Such destructive patterns often develop as a response to conflict as well, increasing the 
likelihood of future violence. The possibility of transformation requires an examination of 
culture, in order to identify patterns that contribute to violence as well to use it as a resource in 
promoting and building upon existing concepts and mechanisms for constructive response to 
conflict. 
If we place these four dimensions of involvement on a spectrum it becomes apparent that it is a 
broad one indeed. 
Personal Relational Structural Cultural 
Microanalysis <--------------------------------------------------------------------> Macroanalysis 
Spheres of Transformation 
But in addition to recognizing the broad understanding of human life required for transformation 
to be a possibility in social conflicts, I wish to define the essential nature of what needs to happen 
in order to enable transformation in these areas. In addressing this question, I turn to one of the 
most troublesome but powerfully healing responses to conflict and violence, apology, which 
provides an important insight here. 30 
Apology is widely recognized for its almost miraculous capacity to alter relationships,31 but the 
nature of its power is little understood. Nicholas Tavuchis points in the right direction in his 
discussion of diplomatic apology: 
... a collective mea culpa, publicly uttered in response to its own call, 
simultaneously bespeaks recognition and commitment to a normative domain 
beyond that of immediate self-interest and effectively shifts the moral burden onto 
the offended party by focusing upon the issue of forgiveness.32 
The power of sincere apology lies in the meta-message embedded within it that the apologizers 
have at least begun to guide their conduct by moral vision and principle rather than mere 
expediency and self-interest. Apology implies hope in the possibility of guiding human behavior 
by moral discernment, by "what is right" however undefined that is yet likely to be, rather than by 
"what is expedient". Apology also asserts a willingness to be self-critical in application of 
principles of "what is right" to one's own behavior. Because it is offered to another person or 
30 I say "troublesome" because apology is widely understood as a "magical" solution to problems or an easy way out. 
Cf. the later chapter on "Reconciliation". 
31 See, for example, Shriver, 220-224; Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation 
(Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991), 6. 
32 Tavuchis, 6. 
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group, apology additionally recognizes that moral discernment is a collective process in which 
groups have legitimate claims on each other; it is not merely a question of each group doing as it 
chooses. In summary, apology is powerful because it evokes the possibility of moral discernment 
as the governing response to conflict. Perhaps it goes without saying that such a possibility is 
central to shalom, which asserts that it is possible to guide human behavior by attending to a 
vision for what ought to be. 
The possibility of moral discernment lies at the heart then of the essential third dimension of 
transformation. Many practitioners will recognize how difficult it is to get people in conflict to 
even attempt to deal with their issues by a process of joint discussion and planning rather than 
through the unilateral strategies which typify almost all violent conflicts. Thus one of the first 
goals for peacebuilders is to enable groups in conflict to recover hope in the possibility of 
addressing their differences through a process of joint discussion, analysis, and planning rather 
than through coercion or unilateral action. 
But hope is only the beginning. Moral discernment implies the existence of norms. Who 
determines these? The only possible answer is those who are in conflict. Of course international 
law and concepts of human rights are useful and should play a central role in informing the 
response of people in conflict. But enforcing such norms in the global community has proven 
impossible. Philosophically, the quest for universal norms is increasingly recognized as fruitless 
as well.33 
Perhaps of greatest importance in my own frame of reference, transformation calls for working in 
ways that plant the seeds of peace through moral change, which direct responses away from 
coercion as a solution. Transformation cannot happen unless people in conflict choose to become 
moral. They must choose to respond to conflict in a process of reflection and decisionmaking that 




identify the deepest values at work in each side 
search for standards on which to base their behavior towards each other 
critically apply these standards in analyzing the conflict and in seeking 
solutions to it. 
This process, "discernment" as I will refer to it, assumes both empowerment and recognition as 
essential dimensions, but it adds dimensions of moral critique of self and context and of a joint 
morally-based quest for solutions. 
33 Cf. elaborati;n on this point in a critique of the concept of neutrality in Chapter Four. 
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Earlier I argued that the structures shaping the perceptions of people in most violent conflict are in 
Berger's definition of the term, religious in nature. To the extent that people are prepared to 
organize themselves in the application of violence to opponents, we can assume that the conflict is 
rooted in a religious framework of meaning. Human beings share in common, after all, a deep 
experiential awareness for the mystery and preciousness of life, evidenced by the power of the 
"will to live" pulsing in virtually every individual. We also possess powerful abilities to 
sympathize with others and recognize the presence of a similar will to live in them as well. Thus it 
seems reasonable to suggest that we intuitively understand that to destroy human life is an act of 
the gravest possible consequences. Only with cosmic sanction through the permission of a god or 
gods is it possible to contemplate the organization of violence against other human beings. Thus, 
if we are to work at the level of the deepest values at work in conflict, we are required to work 
with religious frames of meaning. We must, in short, do theology. 
Doing theology or discernment as here understood is of course very different from traditional 
theology. The most important difference is that whereas the latter was done in the service of 
particular gods and communities, discernment is theology undertaken in the service of several 
communities or indeed the entire human community. The language employed in discernment may 
be entirely secular, for as Berger points out, some powerful religious frames of reference are 
secular in character. This adds the complication of trying to engage in what is at heart theological 
discourse with people who do not see themselves or their motivations as religious. Obviously, the 
task is not an easy one. 
Probably the most important interactional skill is the ability to invite people to reflect deeply and 
self-critically. Framing meaningful questions, telling stories which move a conversation deeper, 
disclosing personal struggles, creating contexts for interaction which support introspection and 
reflection on deeper issues are all important means of accomplishing this. 
An additional requirement explored later in the chapters on "Engagement" and "Community" is 
that peacebuilders themselves must be explicitly rooted in communities of meaning. Post-modern 
awareness makes it possible to enter the arena of public moral discussion only through the 
doorway of particular communities of meaning or what Alasdair Macintyre calls "traditions of 
enquiry".34 Thus not only must peacebuilders be rooted in a community of meaning, we need to 
engage in our own on-going process of discernment as a part of the peace building task. 
34Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1988). Cf. 
discussion of Macintyre in Chapter Four. 
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Discernment does not necessarily call for an entirely novel set of procedures on the part of 
peacebuilders, but it gives new meaning and importance to ones familiar in the field of conflict 
resolution. "Entry" and "relationship-building" between peacebuilders and conflicting parties 
become more than simply gaining trust of the parties and understanding the issues and options,· 
they also become an important opportunity to foster hope in the possibility of moral discussion as 
a basis for addressing the conflict. In the next chapter I suggest, for example, that approaching 
potentially hostile people in conflict unarmed may help to send an important message from 
peacebuilders that they have faith that moral awareness still resides in the people they are meeting 
with. Asserting that faith in such a powerful though unspoken way often succeeds in enabling 
peacebuilders to begin interacting with people in conflict at precisely the desired level of 
interaction. 
"Hearing each side's perspective" becomes more than simply hearing a recital of facts and 
positions, rather it takes focus around a goal on the part of peace builders to discover the internal 
frames of meaning governing each side, and to uncover the values on which those frames of 
meaning are based. Awareness that such values often have religious roots calls peacebuilders to 
special alertness in such discussions: to ask questions that.invite reflection at deeper levels, to not 
rest content with superficial answers, to demonstrate great care and sensitivity in dealing with such 
matters. 
Because peace builders understand that part of their task of peacebuilding is to assist people in 
conflict to do their own theology they will seek to foster deep reflection as an on-going dimension 
of internal discussion within each side. In the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle which we examine 
later, for example, for many whites and some blacks, white racism was a hidden god. For many 
whites, racism crowded out the Judea-Christian God who thundered for justice, and was capable of 
doing so because it never claimed to be a god, and in fact claimed to come in the service of the 
Judea-Christian God. Some blacks also succumbed to the god of white racism as the recurrent 
message of black inferiority took its toll on the consciousness of blacks and acquired the power of 
an ontological truth. Discernment in such a context could be facilitated through a variety of 
strategies including reflective one-on-one interaction, problem-solving workshops, community 
organizing, and conscientization strategies.35 
35 Quaker peacebuilder Adam Curle was among the first in conflict resolution circles to articulate an understanding of 
peacebuilding which linked awareness-creating strategies with negotiations as a peacebuilding response to conflict, 
proposing a series of steps for peacebuilders to follow in settings where injustice is high and awareness is low. In 
such situations peacebuilding must begin with what Curle called education. This may lead to confrontation, which 
may in turn eventually lead to the possibility of negotiation and finally to sustainable peace.· Curie's work on this, 
Making Peace (London: Tavistock Publications, 1971) has been out of print for many years. Cf. Lederach's 
discussion of Curle in Lederach's Preparing for Peace, 12-14. 
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The moments in which the interaction is undertaken in explicitly theological language are likely to 
be rare. What these activities have in common is their capacity to bring to awareness the nature of 
previously hidden assumptions about the nature of reality, what is ultimately meaningful, and the 
implications of these assumptions for the one or ones en~aged in reflection. 
One common result of making their assumptions at this level explicit is that people for the first 
time recognize the nature of the gods they have in reality but perhaps not in name been serving. 
Now more fully aware of the reality of their lives they are in a better position to explore 
possibilities to organize their lives according to different priorities if they wish to do so. In some 
instances this may mean greater conflict with opponents, in other cases it may reduce conflict with 
opponents. 
Aware that a key dimension of doing theology is being self-critical, peacebuilders will seek to 
encourage this as well, perhaps, like Moral Re-Armament in the study following in Section Two, 
by first of all demonstrating the capacity to be self-critical of themselves. Additionally 
peacebuilders will seek to evoke reflection within each group about the resources within their own 
traditions and beliefs for addressing conflicts through discussion and dialogue rather than 
violence. 
In discussion with each side about the other side, peacebuilders will seek to foster awareness of 
moral awareness and concern on the other side as a way of keeping alive the hope for 
relinquishing violence and moving to dialogue as a means of addressing problems. Later we will 
see ways in which the Quakers sought to support awareness of moral sensitivity among the 
combatants in Rhodesia by facilitating the release of prisoners. 
Sometimes peacebuilders may initiate actions intended to introduce or strengthen principled 
behavior in the conflict in hopes of establishing a foundation for further interaction at this level. 
Recognizing that joint moral discernment is not possible unless both sides are prepared to take 
responsibility for their own actions, peacebuilders in certain circumstances might challenge 
behaviors which by their own values are outrageous, as did the Catholic Church in Rhodesia with 
both sides in regards to atrocities. They might also explore possibilities such as apologies, 
prisoner exchanges, agreements regarding treatment of civilians, or problem-solving workshops.36 
36 The use of off-the-record workshops involving well-placed people from both sides of a conflict is well-established. 
Typically participants are "second-tier" actors, that is, people with access to key leaders on their own side, but 
sufficiently distant institutionally to avoid implying official backing for the discussion. This is advantageous for it 
makes it easier to get participants to attend and allows greater freedom in exploring the roots of conflict and 
possibilities for resolution. See Herbert C. Kelman, "The Problem-Solving Workshop in Conflict Resolution" in 
Maureen Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, editors, Unofficial Diplomats (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1977), 168-200. See also Ronald Fisher's review of various problem-solving workshops, "Interactive Conflict 
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To their interaction with those in conflict, peacebuilders bring a fundamental agenda: identifying 
and supporting that which is life-giving within the worldview of the parties. 31 In other words, 
peacebuilders listen not only for the "interests" underlying the positions of the people in conflict38, 
they also listen for values and beliefs which support the possibility of peace and well-being of all 
those affected by the conflict. 
What is the meaning of "life-giving"? Modesty about the limitations of their own experience 
rules out the possibility that peacebuilders seek to issue a definitive answer. However precisely 
this refusal to define for others what is "life-giving" places peacebuilders in the position essential 
to facilitate common exploration of the question among others. Modesty is an essential asset for 
peacebuilders and provides them with a focusing question in their interaction with people in 
conflict: what are the themes, commitments, and insights of your community which you believe 
are capable of supporting just and peaceful life for all? 
But on the other hand, the influence of peace builders is inescapable and in fact essential to this 
discussion. The dimensions of a group's worldview that are "life-giving", after all, are rarely 
presented in lists or concise summaries. They emerge in bits and pieces scattered through the 
narrative structure of often lengthy and laborious interaction, like tarnished gems dispersed in a 
truckload of gravel. To even recognize concepts and possibilities which may be candidates for the 
category of"life-giving" peacebuilders must have their own understanding of"life-giving". From 
a clear understanding of what they believe to be life-giving, peacebuilders can invite others to 
clarify what they understand to be life-giving. By being models of willingness to consider the 
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value of other people's understandings of "life-giving" they seek to establish an atmosphere of 
mutual discernment. 
My own understanding of "life-giving" is grounded in the vision of shalom as described in the last 
chapter. Those dimensions of religious understanding are life-giving which recognize every 
person as equal and precious in their differentness, which recognize that all are bonded in such a 
way that none can be whole until all are whole, which acknowledge a powerful human inclination 
towards confusion and self-deception particularly in regards to our inclination to deify our own 
perceptions and frames of meaning; which therefore assume the necessity of self-critical reflection 
and confession; which take for granted that in the matters that really count there is more than 
enough for all, which take seriously the current historical realm as the place and time to act 
Resolution" in Handbook in International Conflict Resolution (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 
forthcoming in 1996.) 
37 I credit Ray Gingerich for this idea, as well as for the larger proposal that peacebuilding is to a substantial degree a 
matter of facilitating theological discernment among the people involved in conflict. 
38 Cf. the footnote to Roger Fisher and Bill Ury's popular book Getting to Yes in the Introduction. 
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decisively on all the above affirmations; which address matters of ownership and possessions in 
their rightful place, namely, subsequent to affirmation of all the above. 
Such a list raises the possibility that peacebuilders may find little that is life-giving in the gods 
being served by people in conflict. Discernment of the gods of Hitler's National Socialism, for 
example, would have revealed little that was life-giving as defined here. In such a case 
peacebuilders are called to confront and oppose the gods of death by broadening the process of 
discernment to include larger numbers of people involved in and affected by the conflict. Many 
"good" people in Germany, we know, failed to see the true gods of National Socialism and their 
death-dealing nature. Although a small number of Christian theologians through their own 
process of discernment eventually came to see the death-dealing nature of the Nazi regime and 
sought to engage the larger Christian community in a discernment process by publishing the 
"Barmen Confession"39 the rise of National Socialism was due in part to a massive neglect of 
discernment on the part of German Christians. 
But in most cases things are less clear-cut. More typical is a situation where discernment reveals 
the presence of some values and commitments which are life-giving and some which seem death-
dealing. The Nationalist Party in South Africa in mid-1990, for example, presented a 
contradictory picture of the values at work within it. On one hand its history as architect and 
implementer of apartheid contradicted the understandings of life-giving as defined above. But on 
the other hand, Nelson Mandela had just been released, the ANC unbanned, and President de 
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Klerk promised negotiation for changes. Thoughtful people committed to racial justice agonized: 
should they continue to oppose the Nationalist Party or should they now offer cautious support? 
Whether the situation seems clear-cut or ambiguous, discernment remains a relevant response on 
the part of peacebuilders. To a situation of conflict they bring the persistent quest for clarification 
about the nature of the gods being served by those in conflict, a focusing mission to identify 
understandings and possible responses for each side which are life-giving, and the catalyzing role 
of their own thoughtfully articulated understandings of values which are life-giving. 
The goal of discernment is insight and awareness, not necessarily to end a conflict. It is likely to 
lead in many cases to opportunities for empowerment and recognition. Having engaged in deeper 
reflection about the nature of the gods at work - both their own and those of others - people in 
conflict are likely to arrive at a broader awareness of the options for response open to them and a 
deeper understanding of their opponents. 
39 The Barmen Confession was a declaration of resistance to National Socialism that resulted from a meeting of German 
Protestant leaders at Barmen in the Ruhr, in May 1934. 
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Summary 0 
In its emphasis on laying the foundation for change by changing the people in a conflict rather 
than focusing on particular outcomes, moral transformation is a valuable concept in working for 
shalom. However, as a philosophy of conflict and mediation which addresses micro-conflict, 
moral transformation as defined by Bush and Folger fails to acknowledge the structural 
dimensions of conflict and suggests no strategies for peacebuilding capable of guiding response to 
macro-conflicts. The vision of shalom requires that we frame the task of peace building more 
broadly to transformation and that we add to it a dimension that addresses the structural nature of 
many conflicts. 
I called the key dimension of this broadened understanding of transformation discernment, 
defining it as a strategy to enable people in conflict to address the problems and issues that divide 
them through a process of collective moral discussion and decisionmaking. This process is 
theological in the sense that it requires engaging the people in conflict at the level of their deepest 
frameworks of meaning. 
The chapters which follow describe additional dimensions of transformation. Chapter Three 
proposes an epistemological reference point for guiding peacebuilders. Chapter Four describes the 
kind of relationship between peace builders and parties which is required by the vision of shalom. 
Chapter Five reviews strategies for operating as peacebuilders in ways that maximize the 
possibility for transformation. Chapter Six develops the concept of reconciliation as central to 
transformation. Chapter Seven makes the case that peacebuilding in the model of shalom cannot 




Vulnerability: Marker of Reality in the Path to Shalom 
The Problem 
Conflict presents powerful and competing claims on perceptions of reality, for each side has its own 
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self-justifying narrative through which it imposes meaning on the welter of events that comprise 
conflict. Thus the peacebuilder is presented with difficult questions: Which story is true? In the 
midst of competing claims on reality, to whom do we give credence? 
These questions loom all the more important in light of the discussion in the last chapter. The 
proposal that an important part of transformation is drawing the parties into deep moral reflection or 
discernment and that peacebuilders must actively participate in this process requires that we articulate 
the criteria which guide us in responding to the competing claims we face. 
One common way of dealing with competing claims on reality is to launch a forensic investigation to 
determine truth. This is the approach undertaken by the judicial system which has established · 
elaborate procedures for determining truth. But such an approach is futile in the chaotic and complex 
environment of most conflicts. What court could determine the "truth" of the centuries old struggle in 
Ireland? Even if it were possible to determine the "truth", the odds of such a determination being 
accepted by both sides or of it leading to an effective solution would be small. While each side needs 
to be supported in telling the subjective truth of its own experience of reality, a quest for "objective 
Truth" is unlikely to contribute much to the resolution of many conflicts. 
Nevertheless, peacebuilders need a way of interacting with the competing claims for Truth which they 
invariably encounter at every step of their involvement. Partly this is a matter of determining with 
whom to meet to gain an understanding of the conflict. It is never possible to speak with everyone, 
after all, and peacebuilders must in the end rely on the perceptions of a few in forming their 
understanding of what is happening. Whom they interact with profoundly shapes their understanding 
of the issues at stake. A military official, whether heading a guerrilla army or government forces, for 
example, is likely to have an entirely different understanding of what is real, true, and significant than 
a peasant on whose land a struggle for political power is being waged. 
In addition to determining with whom to speak, peacebuilders must make decisions about how to 
respond, and this inevitably requires weighing competing claims. It would not be constructive, for 
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example, to simply take the attitude that "truth cannot be determined, therefore we must act as though 
both sides are equally right or wrong." Without pretending to have discovered "objective Truth" 
regarding a situation of conflict, peacebuilders nevertheless need to interact with widely diverse 
perceptions, decide which perceptions to weigh most heavily in forming their own assessment of a 
conflict, and then determine appropriate responses. 
Vulnerability as Epistemological Marker 
My proposal is that peacebuilders view weakness, vulnerability, and suffering as "markers" in 
defining what is "real", that is, in shaping their understanding of what the key issues in the conflict 
and what should be done about them. 
This proposal is supported at the epistemological level by work in the field of critical theory which 
has advanced awareness in recent decades of the impossibility of unbiased observation and social 
analysis 1• The question is not whether or not we bring a bias to our understanding of situations of 
conflict, but what that bias is, and whether we are aware of it. From the standpoint of the vision of 
shalom and its calls for justice and well-being for all people, it seems obvious that if we have no 
choice but to choose a "bias" we should choose one which supports those who are the least well off. 
In the field of sociology, Weber concluded that modem society was trapped in an "iron cage of 
history" by the "bureaucratic manipulation and routine of the dominant center."2 The structures of 
society, in his view, control and direct human beings to serve their own purposes. The only 
possibility for escape is through religion, "not that of the dominant ecclesial organization and 
bureaucracy" but that of marginal elements in society, a religion that is spontaneous, heroic, 
prophetic.3 Charles Villa-Vicencio sees Weber's understanding of the kind of religion capable of 
releasing society from its own cage of bureaucratization as similar to the prophetic tradition in the 
Bible. Such a religion "is dysfunctional and asocial in terms of society's dominant values, given at 
times to emotionalism and prophetic movements bordering on what society regards as pathological."4 
But for Weber, only from here, at the fringes of the controlling, regulating, dominant society, can new 
ideas and visions emerge capable of leading society beyond the grip of its own self-constructed 
conventions and restraints. 
I See M.L. Lamb, "Critical Theory and the End of Intellectual Innocence" in his book Solidarity With Victims: Toward a 
Theology of Social Transformation (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1982), 28-60, which provides a helpful 
overview of the work of the Frankfurt School and Habermas in exposing the individual, group, and social biases and 
interests which inescapably influence and distort analysis and communication 
2 Charles Villa-Vicencio, Trapped in Apartheid (New York: Orbis Books, 1988), 184. See also Arthur Mitzman, The Iron 
Cage: An Historical Interpretation of Max Weber (New York: Knopf Books, 1979), 5, 181-92. 
3 For this quote and the summary of Weber's thought I am indebted to Villa-Vicencio, ibid., 187. 
4 Ibid., 187. 
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Situations of conflict are a far cry, of course, from the kind of stable, routinized societies Weber had 
in mind in his writings. Nevertheless, even in the chaos of conflict the same kind of self-serving, self-
perpetuating dynamics are at work within the ranks of each protagonist which Weber saw operating in 
tum-of-the-century European societies. As evidence of such an assertion one need only visit any 
society recently emerged from "revolutionary" change and witness the number of former 
revolutionaries now driving Mercedes Benz and living in opulent houses. Then too, we must 
remember that to engage in warfare requires institutions, arguably ones even more rigid and self-
justifying than those required in the humdrum of routine social existence. 
Thus the political and military institutions which normally dictate the response of all factions in 
conflict may be the places least capable of offering hope for a new response to the devastation of 
violence. The greatest potential for gaining a deep understanding of the issues at stake in conflict and 
the possibilities for their resolution may reside, not with those who stand at the pinnacle of the 
institutions purporting to speak for others but rather with those who are weakest and most marginal in 
the struggles for power usually at work within the ranks of each antagonist. 
At a biblical and theological level, liberation theology has mounted a powerful argument for the 
"option for the poor", documenting the prominence of concern for the poor in biblical accounts of the 
gathering of God's people, the calls of the prophets, Jesus' life and teachings, and the concerns of the 
early church.5 Its concern, in the words of Gutierrez, is to begin "from the questions asked by the 
poor and plundered of the world, by 'those without a history', by those who are oppressed and 
marginalized .... "6 In an argument that in effect reiterates Weber's in theological language, Oli 
Testament theologian Walter Brueggemann draws a similar conclusion, asserting that "the history-
making process in ancient Israel is done through the voice of marginality which is carried by 
prophetic figures and those with whom they make common cause."7 
For Brueggemann the question is not only a matter of doing justice, but also of hope, and the 
possibility of opening historical experience to transcendence. Those who are comfortable and well-
served in the existing structures seek to maintain their monopoly and thus seek certitude and control. 
They do this in part by silencing the voices of those who are in pain, for exposure of this dark face of 
human experience threatens their ability to remain in domination. In so doing, the dominant ones 
5 See for example, Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1983); Thomas 
Hanks D. Hanks, God So Loved the Third World: The Bible, the Reformation, and Liberation Theologies (Maryknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1983); Sr. Marie Augusta Neal, A Socio-Theology of Letting Go: The Role of a First World Church Facing 
Third World Peoples (New York: Paulist Press, 1977). 
6 Gutierrez, 212. 
7 Walter Brueggemann, Hope within History, (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1987), 55. 
"want to stop the free play of the historical process" 8 and in effect obstruct the possibility of the in-
breaking of God's kingdom, thus they are "history-preventers." The "real historical process" in 
contrast "has as its function to disclose, to open, to reveal, to permit the exercise of free choice and 
the practice of new possibility".9 
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The insights from Weber and Brueggemann clarify then the purpose of seeking out those who are 
vulnerable in peace building. The motivation is not mere class analysis and a reversal of power, but 
rather a particular understanding of the historical process and what is necessary to enable the 
transformative vision to unfold. Historical transformation can take place only to the extent that 
human processes acknowledge and give voice to the "dark" side of human experience, that which is 
painful, tragic, and hence at root uncontrollable and unpredictable. The point is not that pain and 
tragedy are intrinsically desirable, but rather that in acknowledging and disclosing them and 
consciously conducting planning and decisionmaking in their shadow, we open ourselves and history 
to the realm of things beyond our control. 10 It is only from this shadowy realm, normally at the 
margin of historical awareness, that hope can emerge. Here resides the possibility that something 
genuinely new may break forth capable of breaking the existing rigid patterns of aggression and 
revenge, patterns whose very existence depends on the deep-rooted assumption that it is possible to 
control the historical outcome of human action. 11 
By supporting acknowledgment of the dark face of contingency, vulnerability, and uncertainty within 
the arena of negotiations, then, peacebuilders become advocates of transcendence and hope. To the 
extent that the parties open themselves to this realm, moral and social transformation become not only 
an opportunity, but a likelihood. To the extent that peacebuilders are connected to those who are 
marginal and vulnerable, they are in a position to facilitate communication processes capable of 
bringing transformation. 
8 Ibid., 57. 
9 Ibid., 57. 
10 Miguel Bonino makes a similar point in Toward a Christian Political Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983), 43. 
"The poor are not morally or spiritually superior to others, but they see reality from a different angle or location - and 
therefore differently." 
11 Cf. Robert Schreiter, Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 
who suggests that in Christianity the cross "challenges the understandings of what constitutes power in this world" for in it 
God reveals power where the least powerful expect it. Reconciliation for Schreiter begins with the victim, whose 
humanity must be restored as a first step ( 43). Thus Schreiter says that "those who are weak, broken, and oppressed show 
the way to those who had wielded power" (61). 
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The Vulnerable as Guides to Reality 
With whom should peacebuilders talk? In the face of conflicting accounts, who should they believe? 
My proposal is that peacebuilders seek out and view the testimony of the vulnerable as more 
important than that of anyone else in conflict. 
In Chapter Five I assert that peacebuilding as widely practiced is an exercise in elitism. While elites 
cannot be left out of peace building efforts, their experience of the realities of the conflict situation is 
by definition of their role, usually limited. While others face hardship and death on a daily basis, 
leaders at the highest level usually live in relatively safety and comfort, shielded from the existential 
costs of war. 
Even when elites are deeply in touch with the suffering of war and eager to bring peace, they are often 
prevented by their role from doing so. Often they have arisen to power through taking a combative 
stance vis a vis opponents and have been rewarded for such a stance. Thus their entire political 
experience may argue against anything less than outspoken aggressiveness. Even if they wanted to 
explore peace, they may need to adhere to a combative position in order to maintain their power base 
with constituents over against internal opposition.12 
The vision of shalom calls for the well-being of all, and as we saw earlier, displays particular concern 
for the disenfranchised. This means that peacebuilders must operate in ways that access the realities 
of ordinary people, who in most situations of conflict are disenfranchised, and support the emergence 
of structures of decisionmaking which empower them. Although spending time with elites can be an 
essential part of peace building, peace builders committed to transformation and shalom should bring a 
fundamental bias against relying on such discussions to shape their perceptions or define the scope of 
their activities. Instead they should give greatest weight to the perceptions of those who are weakest 
and most vulnerable to the costs of conflict. Later we will consider an example of such a stance in the 
efforts of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace to hear the stories of thousands of ordinary 
Rhodesians and convey the reality of their experience to an international audience. 
Vulnerability as Access to Reality 
The argument thus far emphasizes the importance of peacebuilders connecting with a certain kind of 
person, the weak and vulnerable. But at some level, all human beings are vulnerable, weak, and 
fearful. Social and political elites are able to reduce their exposure to physical danger and suffering, 
but even they are not immune from it. What is more, they are as vulnerable as everyone else to fear, 
and conceivably even more so, for they have more to lose than most people and less experience in 
12 Cf. Lederach, "Structure: Lenses for the Big Picture", Building Peace, 18. 
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dealing with hardship. Therefore, while maintaining a bias towards seeking out and hearing the 
experiences of those who are most vulnerable to the costs of conflict, peace builders must nevertheless 
bear in mind that vulnerability defies simplistic definitions. 
The point is important not merely because it brings the powerful into the fold of those with whom 
peacebuilders need to seek compassionate interaction, but also because it provides a useful reference 
point in determining what to talk about and what to weigh most heavily in evaluating the significance 
of such discussions. Specifically, my proposal is that in meeting with people at all levels of conflict, 
peace builders should assume that discussion of the fears, suffering, and vulnerabilities of disputing 
parties and accounts of specific incidents of trauma and suffering they have experienced provide more 
trustworthy access to the realities driving the conflict and the possibilities for resolution than 
discussion of demands or statements of intent. In at least two ways this assertion is supported by 
work in the broader field of conflict resolution. 
One is work on the role of perception and image in international relations. In his study of the 
superpower conflict, R.K. White, for example, concluded that exaggerated fear resulting in 
"defensively motivated aggression" was the dynamic driving both the Americans and the Russians in 
their arms race which brought the world to the brink of doom. 13 For the Russians, the trauma of 
massive invasion of the motherland during World War II resulted in a determination never again to be 
vulnerable to such attack. Fearing that the Russians intended to dominate the world and to destroy 
their own way of life, the Americans sought to contain Russian power through counterforce, leading 
to an inevitable spiral of weapons-building. Had each party sought to understand and respond to the 
conflict through the lens of the fears and traumas of the other side rather than reacting to the public 
face of belligerence each presented to the world, the world might have been spared the most 
expensive and dangerous arms race in history. 
''Needs theory" provides another theoretical framework within the field of conflict resolution 
supporting a proposal that peacebuilders give priority to discussion of fear and suffering. One of the 
primary contributions of "needs theory" is the understanding that conflicts are rooted in more than 
thirst for power as proposed by the realist school of international relations, namely in the drive to 
meet basic human needs. 14 Burton and Azar, among others, have argued that a characteristic common 
in protracted social conflict is the denial of needs that are essential for the development and well-
being of all people. Exactly what those needs consist of is a matter of debate among theoreticians, but 
13 R.K. White, Fearful Warriors: A Psychological Profile of US-Soviet Relations (New York: The Free Press, 1984). 
14 See John Burton, editor, Conflict: Human Needs Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990) for a collection of essays 
on the topic. See Ronald J. Fisher, The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution (New 
York: Springer-Verlag, 1990) 146-149 for a summary of needs theory and reference to writers. 
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those most commonly identified as essential for individuals and groups to function constructively are: 
security, identity, recognition and respect from others, and participation in decisionmaking.15 People 
are driven at a deep ontological level by the need to satisfy these requirements, and will often fight at 
staggering costs against impossible odds in a struggle to meet their needs. Only when these needs are 
identified and met is it possible to resolve a conflict. So long as agreements satisfy these basic needs, 
parties often prove surprisingly flexible regarding the precise nature of solutions .. 
In practice, needs theory calls for delaying the articulation and negotiation of "demands" during the 
peacebuilding process, for these are recognized to be merely avenues to addressing deeper needs. 
Conflict resolution efforts should focus first on identifying needs, and when this is done, a wide 
variety of possible ways to address them are likely to become apparent. 
The connection to the current discussion is that identification of blocked needs is by definition a 
discussion of fear, resentment, humiliation, weakness and trauma. Only by describing this dark and 
painful side of their experience are people able to identify the unmet needs which underlie their fears 
and resentments. Only when these needs are acknowledged is it possible to begin efficient and 
constructive discussion about meeting those needs. From its location at the intersection of social and 
political science, needs theory thus provides a theoretical framework to support a bias towards 
vulnerability as an epistemological marker of the real. 
My initial experience with the power of vulnerability came in years of work with conflicted religious 
congregations. With a predictability that surprised me I discovered that a major breakthrough in 
understanding frequently took place within a matter of minutes after somebody broke into tears 
during a discussion of difficult issues. There were exceptions in which tears seemed disingenuous 
and manipulative, to be sure. But in the majority of experiences it quickly became apparent that when 
a baseline of vulnerability was established, greater honesty entered the conversation, and the "real" 
issues came to the fore. 
Scott Peck writes that "as long as we look at each other only through the masks of our composure, we 
are looking through hard eyes. But as the masks drop and we see the suffering and courage and 
brokenness and deeper dignity underneath, we truly start to respect each other as fellow human 
beings."16 How to enable people embittered by conflict to experience this with each other is of · 
course a difficult challenge. But the starting place is for peacebuilders to connect to the people 
behind the masks through attention to those who are most vulnerable. 
15 Fisher, 147. 
16 Scott Peck, The Different Drum: Community Making and Peace (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987) 69. 
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From a number of standpoints then we are able to affirm an understanding long present within the 
Christian vision: Unusually important arid life-'giving dimensions of reality are apprehended through 
encounter with the experience of weakness. Hearing and addressing this reality provides an important 
guide in determining response to conflicts. 
Vulnerability and Power Struggles 
An issue that cannot be avoided in peacebuilding work is power and decisionmaking. In many 
situations of conflict it quickly becomes apparent that those suffering are trapped because they 
exercise little power. They are poor economically, but more importantly, they have no access to 
decisionmaking over their lives. What is the responsibility of peacebuilders in this situation? 
The goal of moral transformation suggests two simultaneous responses. On the one hand, 
peacemakers should seek to empower the parties, that is, support them in exploring the fullest range 
of options available to them for responding to the situation they are in. Given that those who are 
relatively powerful already have adequate resources for identifying their own options in a situation, an 
empowerment response is likely to be particularly beneficial to those who are most vulnerable. 
Simultaneously, moral transformation calls for offering the parties opportunities to recognize the 
legitimacy of the other party's concerns. Again, such a response is likely to most directly support 
those who are most vulnerable, for the powerful are often able to proceed with unilateral solutions to a 
problem regardless of the wishes of others. 
Reflection on the nature of power provides an additional way of conceptualizing the response of 
peacebuilders. Larry Rasmussen suggests that all power, whether coercive or persuasive in nature, is 
relational in the sense that the goal is to have influence on the object of our power. However, most 
current understandings of power are "calculatedly non-mutual", that is, people "seek maximum 
influence on the other with minimum influence upon [them]selves."17 Rasmussen suggests that as an 
alternative we still view power as relational, but as characterized by mutuality rather than sovereignty. 
Instead of "mastery" we can then achieve "meeting" and in place of distance and domination, we 
experience "intimacy, vulnerability, and exchange"18. 
This alternative opens a new understanding of how to deal with power struggles and imba~ances in 
peacebuilding. Rather than viewing their task as to create a balance of power, mediators might view 
17 Larry Rasmussen, "Jesus and Power", address given at Union Theological Seminary, New York, Sept. 12, 1985, quoted in 
Pedagogies/or the Non-Poor, by Alice Frazer Evans, Robert A. Evans, and William Bean Kennedy (Mruyknoll, NY: 
Orbis Books, 1990), 271. 
18 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 272. 
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it as seeking to create mutuality and balance ofvulnerability. 19 A substantial amount of the work of 
the religious actors in this study can be understood in this modality. By seeking to establish close, 
intimate conversations among individuals from very diverse backgrounds, for example, Moral Re-
Armament can be seen to be seeking to increase the sense of understanding and respect on both sides 
for the concerns of the other side. By interpreting the actions and concerns of the various parties to 
each other, the Quakers can be seen to be working for the same goal. By stressing the suffering of 
ordinary citizens to both parties and issuing a call in the name of God to end the war, the Catholic 
Church can be understood to be seeking to create a sense of mutual culpability and responsibility in 
the parties to find a speedy political solution to the military struggle. 
It would be too much to say that exposing vulnerability is always desirable or that it necessarily leads 
to constructive exchanges, for vulnerability that is rejected or exploited only deepens the divide 
between people in conflict. James Laue and Gerald Cormick, American pioneers in the field of 
conflict resolution rightly cautioned against the use of "sensitivity group" techniques particularly in 
situations of unequal power, noting that powerful "in-groups" often use information gathered through 
such experiences to increase their power.20 Therefore peacebuilders must exercise great care in 
handling the expression of vulnerability in any setting. 
But on the other hand, transformation cannot take place unless the deep wounds of conflict are 
acknowledged, followed to the important insights about issues central to long-term peace they 
invariably contain, and exposed to a process of healing. In summary, a focus on vulnerability offers 
one effective approach in dealing with power imbalances that may be particularly useful in 
accomplishing transformation. To the extent that the parties are able to acknowledge and expose 
their fears, hurts, and resentments they open windows of insight to others regarding issues essential to 
any resolution of conflict. 
Conclusion 
The assertion that vulnerability is the most reliable "guide to the real" has numerous implications for 
peacebuilders. One is they need to consciously seek out the weakest and most vulnerable in situations 
of conflict and find ways not only to hear them but to enable them to be heard by others. We will 
later see the Catholic Church involved extensively in this in its role as "Truthteller" in the 
19 Cf. the chapter "Power" by Joyce L. Hocker and William W. Wilmot in their book Interpersonal Conflict: Fourth Edition 
(Madison: Brown & Benchmark, 1995), 69-94. Hocker and Wilmot call for balancing power as a key strategy, but they 
define power and how to balance it broadly, thus I see their argument as compatible with Rasmussen's. 
20 James Laue and Gerald Cormick, "The Ethics ofintervention in Community Disputes", from The Ethics of Social 
Intervention, edited by Gordan Bermant, Herbert C. Kelman, and Donald P. Warwick (Washington DC: Halsted Press, 
1978), 205-232. 
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Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. Another is that peacebuilders need language and communication skills 
that make talking about weakness, fear, and vulnerability a natural part of interaction with others. 
Because such topics are often avoided, this means that the peacebuilders themselves will likely be 
required to initiate discussion at this level. They need to be able to do this in ways that are credible 
and have integrity in the eyes of others. In the second part of the thesis I will describe ways in which 
the Quakers, Catholics and Moral Re-Armament accomplished this. 
But the most important implication addresses the structure of relationships through which 
peacebuilders seek to relate to parties. To the extent that peacebuilders operate from structures which 
appear distant, powerful, and invulnerable to the parties they are unlikely to be able to access the 




Engagement as Basis for Peacebuilding 
The last chapter proposed that peace builders use the concept of vulnerability to guide their 
decisionmaking regarding whom to seek out and what topics to give special weight to in pursuing an 
understanding of the realities of conflict. However vulnerability, as one group of authors put it, is a 
"two-way street"1• People typically hide their vulnerabilities from others if at all possible. To reveal 
fear, insecurity and weakness requires an unusual kind of relationship. Thus this section examines the 
nature of the relationship between peace builders and conflicting parties and argues that peace building 
requires a particular kind of relationship that differs from that held in common understandings of 
peacebuilding. 
The Peacebuilder as Neutral 
One common understanding of peacebuilding regards the third-party as a neutral, who seeks at all 
times to keep his or her own values hidden from the parties and detached from the discussion at hand. 
The following quotes from people in situations of conflict illustrate this understanding: 
Keep your opinions to yourself. What the parties decide to do is their responsibility. You should 
be entirely neutral at all times. (Advice from a labor mediator to a student intern) 
The duty of the churches is to be agents of reconciliation. That means we must avoid taking sides 
and be neutral. (Statement by a church leader about a community conflict) 
Yes, I am aware that one side has launched most of the attacks against the other side. But we are 
trying to make peace here and that means we must maintain our neutrality. (Mediator responding 
to concerns raised by community leaders about violence initiated by one party to an on-going 
negotiation) 
I Donald P. McNeil!, Douglas A. Morrison, and Henri J.M. Nouwen, Compassion: A Reflection on the Christian Life (New 
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1982), 69. 
Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach characterize this understanding of the peace builder as that of an 
"outsider-neutral". The mediator's effectiveness is understood as rooted in 
externality ( coming from outside the conflict situation) and neutrality (having no 
connection or commitment to either side in the conflict.) In the North American field 
of intergroup and interpersonal conflict management, for example, mediation is 
commonly defined as a rather narrow, formal activity in which an impartial, neutral 
third party facilitates direct negotiation. Mediator neutrality is reinforced by their 
coming from outside the conflict, facilitating settlement, then leaving."2 
Critique of Neutrality 
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Is neutrality ever a constructive goal in conflict? I believe the answer is no; that in fact the notion of 
neutrality has caused much injury to the cause of peace building. It confuses many mediators with a 
false understanding of their task; it blocks many sincere leaders from acting on their own deeply-held 
principles of justice; it damages the credibility of the entire enterprise of peace building in the larger 
community. 
The notion of neutrality assumes a Newtonian world in which humans are capable of standing outside 
time and space and making judgments untainted by their own location in reality. However across a 
variety of disciplines a growing consensus holds that the Einsteinian awareness of the physical 
universe applies to the social realm as well.3 This view asserts that the concept of neutrality is an 
illusion, that there is no such thing as a detached or objective observer. In the field of mediation such 
awareness leads to the conclusion that "mediators participate in the construction and consolidation of 
interpretive frames and relational patterns, forever enmeshed and emersed within communicative 
patterns that, in tum, structure the participation of disputants and mediators alike.',4 
A vigorous philosophical critique of neutrality is found in Alasdair Maclntyre's study Whose Justice? 
Whose Rationality? in which the author demonstrates the role of "traditions of enquiry" in 
philosophical debate. Macintyre shows that understandings of justice and rationality are tautological 
in that every position in the time-worn philosophical debate on these issues assumes a particular 
understanding of the nature of social order and the good life, an understanding based on a particular 
set of historical experiences and conveyed in a particular set of linguistic terms. 
.. 
2Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach, "Mediating Conflict in Central America", Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 28, No. 1, 
(February 1991): 86. 
3 A friend tells me that in fact it was Heisenberg's uncertainty principle which proposed that it is not possible to make a sharp 
distinction at the sub-atomic level between the observer, his observation, and the system observed. Einstein himself 
refused to accept the philosophy of complementarity, he says, i.e.: a scientist in making measurements interacted with the 
observed object and thus caused it to be revealed not in itself but as a function of measurement. Whatever the actual case 
may be, I use the term "Einsteinian awareness" in its popular understanding as defined in the text. Cf. Sara Cobb, 
"Einsteinian Practice and Newtownian Discourse: An Ethical Crisis in Mediation." Negotiation Journal, Vol. 7, Number 
1 (January 1991): 90. 
4 Cobb, ibid. Any reader who like me thought that "emersed" is a misprint is to consult a dictionary! 
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Macintyre goes further to argue that the very ability to come up with answers to key questions ' 
requires being rooted in one or another such tradition of enquiry. 
The person outside all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources for enquiry and a 
fortiori for enquiry into what tradition is to be rationally preferred. He or she has not 
adequate relevant means of rational evaluation and hence can come to no well-
grounded conclusion, including the conclusion that no tradition can vindicate itself 
against any other. To be outside all traditions is to be a stranger to enquiry; it is to be 
in a state of intellectual and moral destitution .... 5 
Similarly 
We, whoever we are, can only begin enquiry from the vantage point afforded by our 
relationship to some specific social and intellectual past through which we have 
affiliated ourselves to some particular tradition of enquiry, extending the history of 
that enquiry into the present.. .. "6 
Macintyre is particularly critical of the liberal tradition which in the debate about justice and 
rationality posits the existence of "a neutral tradition-independent ground from which a verdict may 
be passed upon the rival claims of conflicting traditions .... " While acknowledging that liberalis~ is 
"by far the strongest claimant" on the horizon to providing such grounds, Macintyre demonstrat~s its 
failure to do so, and faults liberalism for never recognizing that it "turns out itself to be just one more 
such tradition with its own highly contestable conceptions of practical rationality and justice .... "7 
Without claiming that Macintyre's argument made in the context of philosophical enquiry transposes 
fully into a discussion of negotiations, we must nevertheless recognize it as an insightful one for the 
task of peacebuilding. Of course, advocates of neutrality in mediation might claim immunity from 
Macintyre's assertions, insisting that they avoid "passing verdicts" on the issues under debate in 
conflict. But in fact the decision to take a stance of neutrality itself presupposes numerous 
assumptions on the part of the "neutral". Perhaps the most important is the assumption that the best 
way to resolve the conflict is through engagement between the present protagonists rather than others 
who are invariably implicated in one way or another. This rules out the possibility of confronting 
negotiators with the need to bring people to the table who may not be there but ought to be. Political 
parties at the bargaining table often seek to work out deals between them so as to enable a cease-fire, 
for example, but fail to take into account the daily needs of civilians in the affected area. 
5 Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? Whose Rationality? (Notre Drune: University of Notre Drune, 1988), 367. 
6 Ibid., 401. 
7 Ibid., 346. Macintyre comments intriguingly on mechanisms of conflict resolution: "And the mark of a liberal order i~ to 
refer its conflicts for their resolution, not to those debates, but to the verdicts of its legal system. The lawyers, not the 
philosophers, are the clergy of liberalism." Ibid, 344. I suspect that the current conflict resolution "fad" is deeply rooted 
in the liberal vision of society. This would help to account for the superficiality of many approaches to conflict, 
particularly the facile assumption that "win/win" techniques of conflict resolution are adequate to addressing conflicts 
with profound social, economic, and political roots. I understand Maclntyre's comment to be highlighting the inclination 
of liberal societies to apply technical or situation-specific responses to problems rather than to wrestle with the deeper 
issues at stake, a proclivity widely apparent in the field of conflict resolution. 
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A related assumption of those who advocate neutrality is that the negotiators present at the table are 
willing to and capable of addressing the issues which ought to be addressed in resolving the conflict. 
Peace researcher Maire Dugan provides an illustration of violent conflict at a local school between 
gangs of black and white youths which opens our awareness to the limitations of this assumption. 
Response to such a conflict could focus on at least four levels, Dugan points out. One would be an 
issue focus: resolve the issue, whether turf or property or behavior, which sparked the fight. Another 
response would be a relationship focus: address the underlying relationship between the youth with 
prejudice reduction training, relationship-building, etc. A third response might focus on subsystem: 
address the fact that teachers and staff are intolerant of cultures different from their own and foster 
similar attitudes in students. A fourth response might focus on system: address the racism in the 
larger community and society of which this incident is only one small symptom.8 
A consistent "neutral" stance in a conflict such as this would require mediators to simply work with 
the conflict in the terms presented by the people in immediate confrontation. In the example Dugan 
. cites this would probably mean responding at the level of the issue or relationship. But if problems in 
the larger system and subsystem are ignored, work at lower levels may be futile. Does the mediator 
pay attention to this fact or ignore it? Awarely or not, mediators are grounded in a "tradition of 
enquiry" which enables them to make decisions about such issues. 
Another objection to neutrality is that, in the words of Albert Nolan of the Institute for Contextual 
Theology in Johannesburg, "it makes reconciliation an absolute principle that must be applied in all 
cases of conflict."Neutrality, says Nolan, assumes that all conflicts are based on misunderstandings, 
that blame lies equally on both sides, and that all that is needed is to bring the two parties together and 
the misunderstanding will be rectified. In fact, Nolan points out, these assumptions are wrong in 
some conflicts. Sometimes "one side is right and the other wrong, one side is being unjust and 
oppressive and the other is suffering injustice and oppression. In such a case ... not taking sides would 
be quite wrong." 9 
Michael Lapsley provides a case study of such a situation in his study of the response of the Anglican 
Church in Rhodesia to the civil war there. 10 The stance of the Anglican church throughout the war 
was "neutrality". The text of one church pronouncement issued in 1972, for example, asserted that 
8 Maire Dugan, Making the Connection: Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution(Unpublished Manuscript, 1994). Cited in 
Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Development in Divided Societies, 30-32. 
9 Albert Nolan, OP, in "Taking Sides", an essay distributed in a variety of forms by the Catholic Institute for International 
Relations in London. A copy can be obtained from the Institute for Contextual Theology, Braamfontein. 
10 Michael Lapsley, Neutrality or Cooption? Anglican Church and State from 1964 until the Independence a/Zimbabwe 
(Gweru: Mambo Press, 1986). 
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"The Church should on no account be partisan in its statements, it should not support one political 
party or race to the exclusion of the others."11 Although such a statement appears reasonable, in the 
context, its practical result was iniquitous. The status quo in Rhodesia was a situation where the 
existing economic, political, and legislative structures were unjust, and the Anglican Church was 
deeply invested in this reality through its unquestioned recognition of the legitimacy of the state, its 
concern for "order" at a time when justice called for disorder, its patronage of Armed Forces through 
provision of chaplains, etc. To take a stance of "neutrality" in such a setting in fact amounted to 
partisanship, for it only prolonged the existence of highly prejudicial structures. 
Writing in the South African context, Anthony Balcomb in Third Way Theology draws similar 
conclusion about efforts in South Africa theology in the 1980s to articulate a "third way". 
[The South African church in the 1980s] attempted to follow the narrow way between 
the forces of liberation on the one hand and the forces of preservation on the other. 
To do this it constructed its own myth of neutrality. It believed and hoped that it 
could somehow escape the power struggle that was raging between state and 
revolution. [But] it could not. It failed to understand the political implications of the 
third way within the particular context of the South African situation during the 
decade of the eighties and beyond. This caused it to play a role in the political power 
game without acknowledging this role. 12 
Reasons exist, of course, for seeking a "neutral" stance in conflict. The most compelling argument is 
based on the essential need for credibility and trust. If either party believe mediators favor the other 
side, they may reject the mediators and refuse to work with them. However credibility and trust 
derive from a variety of sources. Neutrality is but one possible source of credibility that has emerged 
in a particular historical context - western, urban, professional culture - where relationships are often 
narrowly defined according to task and expertise rather than broader identity and relationships. 
As an alternative, I propose engagement later in this chapter as a source of credibility and trust, a 
source that in many settings is more effective and appropriate than neutrality, that enables a 
transparent and consistent moral posture on the part of peacebuilders, and that capitalizes on identity, 
one of the most important resources of religiously-based peace builders. 
The "Clout" Mediator 
Another understanding of relationship common particularly in peace building efforts in international 
settings places the mediator in a position of power over the parties. Whether formally acknowledged 
or not, the "clout" mediator almost always represents a nation or group of nations, and this status 
provides a means to pressure the parties into agreements. Lord Carrington, who mediated the 
11 Ibid., 43. 
12 Anthony Balcomb, Third Way Theology, (Pietermaritzburg: Cluster Publications, 1993), 247. 
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Lancaster House talks examined later in this study provides a rather extreme example of a clout 
mediator operating formally in the name of a government. Because the British government held legal 
authority as the colonial ruler of Rhodesia, the Lancaster House talks were convened by the British 
government and Lord Carrington was appointed by the British Prime Minister to facilitate the talks. 
Carrington repeatedly used the power this gave him to cudgel the parties at points of impasse, 
threatening on several occasions to throw the weight of the UK government behind the position of one 
party, leaving the other party in the cold. 13 
Former US President Jimmy Carter provides an illustration of a "clout mediator" operating as an 
informal representative of a nation. In his recent mediation efforts in Ethiopia, Haiti, Korea, Bosnia, 
and other places, Carter bore no official mandate from the United States government. Nevertheless, 
due to his status as a former US president, his ready access to current US policy makers, and his high 
visibility in the international media, Carter wields enormous influence over parties.14 
Critique of the Clout Mediator 
The clout mediator displays a number of unique characteristics that to its proponents are valuable 
assets in peacebuilding: easy access to leaders and to data, an ability to borrow infrastructure support 
from other organizations that would be much less inclineq_,to offer support to a less-imminent person, 
and ready access to media attention. 15 In their summary of Carter's mediation efforts in the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict, his mediation colleagues concluded that "the influence of former President 
Carter was most likely a major determinant for why we got as far as we did, even though ultimately 
we were not successful in resolving the conflict."16 
But from the standpoint of the vision of shalom clout mediation carries more liabilities than assets. In 
an analysis of Carter's efforts in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Nairobi-based mediator Hezkias Assefa questions 
the assertion that the characteristics of the clout mediator had a positive influence on that mediation 
effort. The intense media attention to the work of a former United States president - attention that 
was further heightened by press interviews by members of Carter's team before the mediation effort 
began - was in Assefa's assessment a detriment to the negotiation process. Standing in the limelight 
13 See S.J. Stedman's analysis ofCarrington's role in Peacebui/ding in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 
1974-1980 (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1991), 165-204. See also Jeffrey Davidow, "The 
Lancaster House Negotiations" in Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr., Perspectives on Negotiation: Four 
Case Studies and Interpretations (Washington DC: Foreign Service Institute, 1986), 170-187. 
14 See "Closing the Mediation Gap: The Ethiopia/Eritrea Experience" by Dayle E. Spencer and William J. Spencer with 
Honggang Yang, in Security Dialogue, Vol. 23[3] (1992): 89-99, for a description of Carter's involvement in the 
Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict. 
15 Spencer and Spencer view these three assets as "unique characteristics" of the "eminent-persons strategy" which former 
US President Jimmy Carter uses in his work with the International Negotiation Network, formed by Carter to deploy 
"eminent persons" in international conflicts. Spencer and Spencer, 95. 
16 Spencer and Spencer, 95. 
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of world attention, "it became impossible to create 'safe space' for the parties to bare their souls, get 
to the bottom of the conflict and address the real issues or to admit their faults and recognize the 
possible legitimacy of the adversary's claims."17 Media attention increased intransigence by 
providing strong incentives for the parties to score propaganda points and engage in posturing 
designed to impress constituencies back home.18 Additionally, it heightened the mediators' own stake 
in the conflict, increasing the danger that their own desire for gaining maximum positive public 
exposure for themselves or their own institution became a significant matter in their handling of the 
conflict. 19 
In Assefa's view, involvement of highly influential persons also increases the likelihood that the 
parties may participate for the sake of good appearance and the tactical advantages of cooperating 
with a renowned personage rather than out of a sincere desire to solve conflict. The presence of such 
ulterior motives is in itself not objectionable "as an entry point to start the conciliation process."20 
But no serious progress is likely in such a scenario until trust is established between the parties and 
mediator. Such trust is difficult to build when the pressures of limited time, busy schedules, and 
intense media scrutiny are great, pressures which almost inevitably accompany the presence of 
• . . 21 1mmment persons. 
Spencer and Spencer reported with satisfaction that "with President Carter at the helm of the INN, we 
are able to have direct contact with heads of state, ambassadors, political party leaders, religious 
leaders and many others who can influence mediation initiatives as well as affect global opinions." 22 
But Assefa challenges the value of such leverage, suggesting that the mediator's leverage might have 
created "distance and suspicion rather than the necessary trust and openness".23 The carefully 
managed links held by the Carter team "with powerful international actors who have their own 
agendas and preferred outcomes" may have aroused suspicion about its motives and neutrality and 
caused fears of manipulation. Such fears reduce the willingness of parties to be open and trusting, 
h . d" ti ~ t us 1mpe mg prospects or progress. 
17 Hezkias Assefa, "The Challenge of Mediation in Internal Wars: Reflections on the INN Experience in the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean Conflict", Security Dialogue, Vol. 23(3) [1992]: 102. 
18 Ibid., 102. 
19 Ibid., 102. 
20 Ibid., 103. 
21 Assefa suggests that at a minimum eminent persons need to engage in extensive pre-negotiation talks so as to shield as 
much of the negotiation process as possible from these pressures. But he also stresses the need for clout mediators to be 
prepared to withdraw from their role at the end of the pre-negotiation stage if it becomes apparent that a different mediator 
might be able to function more effectively. Ibid., 103. 
22 Spencer and Spencer, 33. 
23 Assefa, 104. 
24 Ibid., 104. 
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In addition to Assefa's concerns, points made in the last chapter on ''Vulnerability" could be made 
regarding clout mediation as well. Namely, by its very definition, clout mediation trades on 
positional power as its primary resource in attempting broker agreements. This means that almost 
invariably it is conducted exclusively through arranging encounters among those who hold political or 
military power. The likelihood that the self-perpetuating interests of those persons and structures 
define the dynamics of such encounters and their outcomes is high. 
In summary, then, the features which make "clout" mediation model attractive on the surface, tum out 
to present serious problems as well. These problems do not rule out the possibility that clout 
mediation may in some circumstances contribute to important breakthroughs. But if our goal is 
transformation, they point us towards finding a way of conceptualizing relationships with the parties 
that supports the highest possible levels of understanding and trust, that fosters decisionmaking based 
on principle and mutuality rather than on concession to power, and that works as much as possible 
through free choice by the parties rather than through pressure. 
Engagement: The Peacebuilder as Connected, Located, and Vulnerable 
I now outline a conception of the peace builder which combines features of the neutrality and clout 
models of peacebuilding in forming an alternative which I call the "engaged" peacebuilder. Unlike 
the "neutral" but like the "clout" mediator, the "engaged" peacebuilder operates from a known 
identity and values. Like the "neutral" but unlike the "clout" mediator, the engaged peacebuilder 
refuses to impose his or her own solutions to the conflict on the parties. He or she instead is a 
process advocate, advocating a particular way of interacting between the parties which is based on 
values of justice and peace. By operating from a clear base of values but holding open the element of 
choice at all times to the parties, the engaged peacebuilder is able to maximize the possibility of 
transformation of the parties. 
Three essential attributes characterize the engaged peacebuilder: connection, location, and 
vulnerability. 
Peacebuilding through Connection 
Rather than seeking a distant, narrowly-defined professional relationship to the parties, the vision of 
shalom suggests that peace builders view close relationships with the parties as one of their primary 
assets. 
Why emphasize connection and relationship? If peace builders are to comprehend the nature of the 
conflicts they seek to address, they have no choice but to connect closely to the communities affected 
by those conflicts. Only through in-depth understanding of the needs driving the parties are 
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peacebuil_ders in a position to assist them in shifting from the dynamics of posturing and polarization 
to a deeper analysis which can ultimately enable cooperation. Conflicts normally focus at surfa~e 
level on demands for land, power, or resources, but in fact the parties are often driven by deeper needs 
for identity, recognition, respect, security, etc.
25 
Only in a context of safety and trust are parties likely 
to divulge these deeper needs and be open to exploration of ways to meet them that differ from their 
1 
publicly stated demands. 
Secondly, trust is an essential prerequisite to the possibility of facilitating transformation in oth~rs. In 
terms of Bush and Folger's model, no party is likely to take offers of empowerment or recogniti~n of 
others seriously if they come from a third-party they do not trust. Parties need to know that 
peacebuilders understand their suffering, hopes, fears, and dilemnas if there is to be any possibility for 
them to respond positively to opportunities for transformation offered by peacebuilders. 
Thirdly, at a symbolic level the relationship between the peacebuilder and disputing parties makes an 
important statement of hope about human relationships. A critical assumption underlying 
I 
peacebuilding efforts, after all, is that human beings can bridge significant gaps and find common 
meaning. War might be viewed as the consequence of loss of this hope. Wherever there is violent 
conflict, hope in this possibility is severely tested. Thus an important part of the peacebuilder' s ~ask 
is to restore hope in the possibility of human community. No act on the part of peacebuilders is 'likely 
I 
to have greater impact on the parties in this regard than establishing a relationship with the parti~s 
which demonstrates genuine interest in their well-being. An illustration of this impact is found in the 
comment of a Burundian Quaker regarding the visit of a group of international Quakers to his country 
I 
in the wake of the first round of violence in 1994: "Since they came I've never returned to hiding. 
We felt somebody, somewhere, loved us." 26 ! 
I 
Finally, an understanding of peacebuilders as engaged relationally with the parties is culturally the 
only acceptable basis of peacebuilding in many cultures. In the Latin American setting for example, 
there is a preference for what John Paul Lederach calls the "insider-partial", "whose acceptability to 
the conflictants is rooted not in distance from the conflict or objectivity regarding the issues, but· 
rather in connectedness and trusted relationships with the conflict parties."27 
25John Burton has been at the forefront of efforts to articulate a theory of conflict and practitioner response to "deep-rooted 
conflicts". See his Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987). See also 
his later trilogy which substantially expands on the ideas first laid out in rudimentary form in the 1987 handbook: 
Conflict: Resolution and Provention (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990). 
26 "Let Go of Fear", August 5, 1994 edition of the Quaker magazine The Friend. 
27 Wehr and Lederach,. 87. 
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The trust which is the primary asset of the engaged peace builder can emerge from a variety of 
sources: 
Long-standing Relationships 
Whereas the "neutral" peacebuilder often views it as undesirable to have known the parties well prior 
to mediation, for the engaged peacebuilder this is an asset. Only because one or both parties have 
known and respected the mediator for a period of years and therefore have come to trust in his or her 
integrity is there willingness to work with the peacebuilder in an intermediary capacity. We will see 
in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe case study how important this factor was in the ability of the religious 
peacemakers to contribute to the resolution of the conflict. 
Holistic relationships 
Whereas the "neutral" peacebuilder usually prefers to keep the relationship narrowly focused around 
the content of negotiations, the engaged peacebuilder relates to the parties in a holistic way, often 
providing assistance or counsel in things that are unrelated to the substance of negotiations. The 
engaged peacebuilder does not view the disputants primarily as parties to a conflict which requires 
mediation, but rather as human beings who deserve respect and support in wrestling with a painful 
struggle. 
Expressed in the well-known categories of Martin Buber, the neutral mediator relates to the disputants 
in an "I/It" relationship where the disputants are objects in the mediators' larger project of mediating 
a conflict. The engaged mediator in contrast seeks an "I/Thou" relationship with each party and holds 
a genuine concern for the general well-being of each party regardless of the outcome of the mediation 
effort. 28 This factor also characterized the relationship of the religiously-based peacemakers in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. 
Vulnerability 
The "neutral" mediator maintains a distance not only from too-close engagement with the parties, but 
usually also from the dangers and costs of the conflict as well. For the engaged mediator, it would be 
impossible to do this and maintain integrity for he or she is committed to a deep relationship with the 
people involved in conflict. This commitment makes it impossible to stand in isolation from the 
hurts, dangers, and costs of the conflict. I develop this further later in the chapter, but note it now as 
an important dimension in building trust. We will see that some of the religiously-based peacemakers 
in this study were extremely vulnerable and in fact lost their lives. 
28 Martin Buber, I and Thou, translated by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970). Buber's postscript 




A common characteristic of the engaged peacebuilder is a profound commitment to engaging the 
disputing parties and their constituencies through listening. This commitment grows out of the desire 
to be in long-standing, holistic, supportive relationships with people29 and reflects a further 
understanding as well: Suffering people need to speak about their suffering in order to gain healing. 
Listening therefore is one of the most powerful tools available for drawing people into internal 
healing processes.30 I point out later that listening formed the primary strategy for "entry" of all three 
of the religiously-based actors in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe study. 
Examples of Peacebuilding on the Basis of Connection 
An example of the insider-partial described by Wehr and Lederach is the role of Roman Catholic 
Cardinal Obando y Bravo who was chosen to head a National Reconciliation Commission which 
mediated between Nicaragua's Sandinistas and Contras in the years 1988-1990. The Cardinal "was 
not selected for his neutrality," Wehr and Lederach point out. "His hostility toward the Sandinistas 
was well known. But his status as spiritual leader, his close connections with resistance elements and 
his visibility as a national symbol all suggested his usefulness as intermediary .... Each time he 
intervened ... a major, durable agreement issued from the negotiation."31 
29 Adam Curle, Tools for Transformation: A Personal Study (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 1990), 49-51. Curle views listening as 
a powerful tool in enabling us to communicate with others "through our true nature", and to "reach the part of the other 
person that is really able to make peace .... " Ibid., 51. 
3° Carl Rogers of course is the father of listening as a therapeutic tool. Cf. his Client-Centered Therapy, its Current Practice, 
Implications, and Theory (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951 ). Of the many authors and schools of thought which advocate 
the importance and power oflistening as a tool for healing, none is more cogent than the writings of Harvey Jackins, 
pioneer in an approach to personal and social healing known as Re-Evaluation Counseling. Because Jackins' connection 
between personal and social healing supports arguments I have made elsewhere I summarize his approach here. 
Jackins says that within each individual reside powerful natural healing processes, namely, laughing, crying, angry raging, 
cold sweating (which results from and heals fear), flushing (which results from and heals embarrassment), yawning, and 
animated talking. Children, who have not yet learned from social conditioning to close down these natural healing 
processes, can be reliably observed to engage them whenever they experience distress, This demonstrates what Jackins 
says is a natural, spontaneous, healthy, and universal healing process. Children also demonstrate another key requirement 
for this healing process to work: invariably they seek the attention of another human being as they begin "discharging" 
their distress. Based on these observations Jackins develops a model of healing whose foundation is listening, or as he 
would put it, offering "complete attention" to a person whom one wishes to assist in healing. This provides the safe space 
required for a "client" (not a professional client but anyone whom one chooses to support), to encounter inner distress and 
engage the natural healing mechanism. Jackins is similar to Rogers in his commitment to listening as a fundamental 
strategy of healing, but he goes well beyond Rogers: in proposing a number of additional techniques for working with 
material that emerges in listening and in his insistence on a direct link between the realm of the personal and the 
social/political/economic/class spheres. In Jackin's view it is impossible to experience complete personal healing without 
explicitly dealing with and responding to the traumas inflicted by the structures of society. If personal "healing" does not 
lead to awareness of and commitment to addressing structural injustices, it is a sign that it has not been successful. See 
Harvey Jackins, The Art of Listening (Seattle: Rational Island Publishers, 1981 ), and The Upward Trend (Seattle: Rational 
Island Publishers, 1977). See also Gwen Brown, "We Who Were Raised Poor: Ending the Oppression of Classism" 
(Seattle: Rational Island Publishers, 1994). 
Finally, Stephen R. Covey's insights on the importance of listening and how to do it are particularly useful. Covey, The 
Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1990), 7, 237-
260. 
31 Wehr and Lederach, 91. 
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In another example of the insider-partial model from Nicaragua, Wehr and Lederach recount the work 
of the Moravian Church in mediating negotiations between the Sandinista government and 
Y AT AMA, an armed resistance movement whose members came from Indian communities on the 
Atlantic Coast. Due to the extensive, long-standing relationships the Moravians had built up with the 
Indians of the Atlantic Coast through years of work there, Y AT AMA asked the Moravian Church to 
serve as an intermediary in extensive talks with the Sandinista government that began in 1988. The 
government "accepted the Moravians in this role, while acknowledging that they were neither neutral 
nor impartial."32 The success of these talks 
depended not on neutrality or externality but on continuing relationships of trust its 
members had with the conflictants. Commission members lived side by side with 
YATAMA leaders. They ate and relaxed with both sides together. Their knowledge 
and connections were used by each side to explain its views and objectives to the 
other. The Commission, therefore, was much more connected to disputants than in 
neutrality-based mediation. Its functions were broad rather than narrow. Its range of 
tasks stretched from arranging travel and daily schedules for disputants and resolving 
their family problems to negotiating a cease-fire in a war involving several national 
governments."33 
South Africa's Archbishop Desmond Tutu often functioned as a mediator in the "insider partial" 
model. In the years of unrest prior to the 1994 elections, he was frequently called upon to mediate 
discussions between protesters and police or other authorities. As a leading voice in the national anti-
apartheid struggle, the Archbishop openly identified with the cause of the protesters. His success in 
defusing numerous potentially violent situations doubtless happened not in spite of but because of this 
engagement with one side. It is unlikely that demonstrators would have agreed to enter into 
negotiations with authorities had they not been encouraged to do so by someone they trusted as fully 
as the Archbishop. 
The churches of East Germany in the changes of 1989-90 provide yet another example of the insider-
partial mediation role. In the period 1987-89, the church had increasingly become a voice for protest 
against the moribund state with the consequence that church-state relations stood at one of the 
chilliest points since 1978. Nevertheless church representatives were extensively involved in 
facilitating discussions between opposition groups and officials at local and national levels.34 
32 Wehr and Lederach, 92. Cf. John de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), 152-156, which parallels Wehr and Lederach's assessment and additionally enumerates the ways in which the 
Cardinal. had established his partiality against the Sandinistas and for the Contras. 
33 Wehr and Lederach, 94. 
34 David Steele, "At the Front Lines of the Revolution: East Germany's Churches Give Sanctuary and Succor to the 
Purveyors of Change", in Johnston and Sampson, 119-154. See also John de Gruchy, Christianity and Democracy: A 
Theology for a Just World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 194-204. De Gruchy highlights the 
role of the Lutheran Church in "creating space" for the revolution by keeping alive a vision of a just, human society and 
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Peacebuilding through Location 
Rather than pretending to have no values or to be unconcerned about their application, peacebuilders 
should "locate" themselves in terms of their values in the context of the conflicts they operate in. 
This requires peacebuilders to be conscious of and reflective about: 1) why they seek involvement in 
conflict in general and what values they hope to serve; and 2) why they have chosen a particular role 
in each conflict in which they are involved and what values they hope to serve with that role. 
Why emphasize location? One answer is credibility. In 1990, in the still early days of the South 
African political transition, I was invited to lead a workshop for local members of the youth 
organization of the South African Pan Africanist Congress. I began the workshop as I was 
accustomed in the United States, with introductions. I asked each of the twenty people present to 
introduce themselves, gave a five minute introduction of myself as trainer, and then proceded to a 
sheet of newsprint to review the contents of the workhop. But before I had completed my first 
sentence about the workshop a senior member of the group interupted me. In a voice firm to the point 
of hostility he said, "Excuse me, but we have some questions for you." There was an awkward pause, 
then in an unfriendly voice someone asked, "Why did you come to South Africa?" No sooner had I 
responded than someone else asked in a skeptical voice what I thought about violence as a tool of 
liberation. Someone wondered what I thought about Ronald Reagan. For a chilly half hour I was 
grilled about who I was, what I had done, and what I believed. Then as unexpectedly as he had 
begun the interrogation, the apparent leader turned to his colleagues, "Hey, let's get on with the 
workshop .... " The mood changed from skepticism to intense interest, and for the rest of the workshop 
I was treated as an "insider." 
I experienced this ritual repeatedly in South Africa whenever I led workshops predominated by black 
activists. Though I found it initially somewhat unnerving, I eventually came to appreciate the upfront 
nature of the questions raised by people who had every reason to be suspicious of me, for I learned 
that when the questions were finished, a bond of trust and acceptance followed that took much longer 
to earn in other settings. I also discovered that I could to a substantial extent pre-empt the 
interrogation by taking more time to introduce myself. By telling stories about myself and my own 
formative experiences I discovered that I could provide groups with what they clearly viewed as of 
pivotal importance to my credibility: some understanding of my values and commitments. 
In settings where trust is less an issue than in South Africa, such questions may not have mattered a 
great deal to the participants of workshops. But many situations of conflict are like South Africa. 
becoming a meetingpoint for critics to gather and organize. The church was tolerated in this by the state because it had 
chosen to engage in dialogue with socialism. 
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People want to know about more than a facilitator's professional credentials, they want to know who 
he or she is, and what he or she believes in. 
Another reason why location is important is the philosophical one already outlined earlier in this 
chapter, that we cannot escape being located. Therefore we are most honest and more capable of 
facilitating insightful dialogue among others if we openly acknowledge our own values. 
A third reason why location is important is that it is not possible to support transformation in others 
unless we ourselves are clear about our own values. A peacebuilder, for example, who values 
harmony and stability more than transformation may contentedly assist the parties in a conflict to 
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settle on terms which are manifestly disempowering to one of the parties because this settlement 
seems likely to bring peace. But if she believes that transformation through creating opportunities for 
empowerment and recognition is the most important value in mediation, she will actively seek ways 
to ensure that both parties are able to examine the full range of options available to them and that take 
seriously the legitimate concerns of the other. 
Two strategies deserve particular attention as means for locating peacebuilders: role selection and 
process advocacy. 
Role Selection as a Strategy for Location 
In a seminal 1978 essay, American conflict practitioners James Laue and Gerald Cormick suggest that 
any social intervention should be guided by core values of freedom, justice, and empowerment. Of 
these criteria, justice is the primary one, since freedom and empowerment are actually instrumental 
values leading to the creation of justice. For Laue and Cormick, "the single ethical question that 
must be asked of every intervenor in community disputes at every decision-making point in the 
intervention is: Does the intervention contribute to the ability of relatively powerless individuals and 
groups in the situation to determine their own destinies to the greatest extent consistent with the 
common good?"35 
This is a fundamentally different starting point than "neutrality" and the accompanying assumption 
identified by Nolan that all conflicts are the same. From Laue and Cormick's perspective, every 
conflict is different and must be approached with circumspection to determine the dynamics at work. 
Because conflicts differ from one another, appropriate intervenor response also varies. Laue and 
35 James Laue and Gerald Connick, "The Ethics oflntervention in Community Disputes", in Gordan Bermant, Herbert C. 




Connick identify five roles played by intervenors: activist, advocate, mediator, researcher, and 
enforcer.36 
The activist works closely with the powerless or non-establishment party in a conflict. He or she 
is usually either a member of the non-establishment group37 or is so closely aligned that he or she 
"fully merges his or her identity with the powerless party." Activists' skills typically include 
organizing, public speaking, devising strategy, and the ability to rally a following. 
The advocate plays a similar role to the activist in the sense that he or she promotes the interests 
of a particular side. But the advocate functions from a more detached standpoint, serving as an 
advisor or consultant to the group, rather than identifying personally with the group he or she 
serves. "The typical advocate for the establishment party is the management consultant, while the 
community organizer is the most frequent type of out-party advocate. A negotiator representing 
any of the parties also exemplifies this role type." 
Mediators "do not have their base in any of the disputing parties and thus have a more general, 
less party-parochial view of the conflict." The mediator is also "acceptable at some level of 
confidence to all of the disputing parties."38 
The researcher may be "a social scientist, a policy analyst, a media representative, or a trained lay 
observer, who provides an independent evaluation of a given conflict situation .. The researcher 
perceives the conflict in its broadest context and is able to empathize with all positions"39 
The enforcer brings formal coercive power to the conflict. The enforcer is often "a formal agency 
of social control in the larger system within which the conflict is set - the police or the courts - or 
perhaps ... a funding agency or an arbitrator." Though elements of this role appear in many 
conflicts, one rarely sees it in pure form. "The web of issues and parties usually is so complex 
that no single person or agency has an appropriate base to command allegiance to an imposed 
solution ... "40 
The challenge from this perspective, then, is to choose the role most likely to lead to justice, freedom, 
and empowerment. Mediation may often be the role needed, but in some situations a greater need 
exists for an activist or advocate. Laue and Cormick observe that people performing other roles often 
36 Ibid., 212ff 
37 Establishment groups of course also have people who play a role in counterpart to that of activists. Laue and Connick 
designate them as "re-activists". 
38 Ibid., 214. 
39 Ibid, 214. 
40 Ibid., 215. 
call themselves "mediators", thus perpetuating the widespread misperception that mediation is the 
only useful intervention role. They also believe that at times mediators can combine several roles, 
functioning even while mediating as advocates for one side in order to ensure that the real issues at 
the root of a conflict are addressed. 
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No intervenor then should assume that the only constructive response to conflict is to mediate. The 
question peacebuilders in conflict situations should ask themselves is not - how can we mediate in this 
situation, but rather - what roles are most needed here to move this situation towards a just resolution 
acquired through free choice and empowerment of those involved? This calls for recognizing that 
mediation is by no means the only legitimate role for people seeking to contribute to the 
reconciliation of communities. In fact, one of the questions that we must place of any effort at 
mediation will be: was this the most effective role in the situation? Or do the outcomes suggest that 
intervenors made the wrong response by attempting to mediate? 
Even in the instances when mediation is deemed the best response, it is critical to get beyond the 
stereotype of the mediator as a "neutral." Neutral implies having no values, which as liberation 
theologians and critics of neutrality like Nolan rightly point out, is surely the antithesis of what 
Christian faith is about. Quite the opposite of being neutral, intervenors must at all times make 
decisions and under-take actions which reflect a clear set of values. If intervenors are not clear in 
their own values nor self-critical in assessing what values their actions actually support in a situation, 
they are vulnerable to being used by the more powerful party to serve unjust purposes. The goal 
should not be to be neutral, but rather to be ethical: to be conscious of one's own values and the likely 
outcome of one's action so that the intervenor can make appropriate choices. 
How to determine what is ethical? Laue and ~ormick say that justice should be the end goal of all 
social intervention. But Bush and Folger make us aware that justice is not adequate as a sole criteria, 
for if the parties themselves remain unchanged, any progress towards justice is likely to be temporary. 
Thus we must add an important set of questions to Laue and Cormick's framework of roles. Not only 
should peacebuilders ask themselves which role is most likely to contribute to justice in the situation 
under scrutiny. They should additionally ask: which role is most likely to contribute to the possibility 
of transformation of the people involved in this situation and how can we go about relating to the 
parties within the role we have chosen in ways that maximize possibilities for transformation? 
This may require, for example, that if peacebuilders have chosen the role of advocate they may 
choose to conduct their advocacy in special ways. Rather than intentionally antagonizing opponents, 
for example, in order to prod them into an over-reaction which will then make it easier to organize 
90 
one's own side, as advocated by classic Alinsky strategists41 , an advocate committed to 
transformation may seek to maintain open lines of communication even with an "oppressive" 
opponent, in hopes of "converting" the opponent. 
If peacebuilders have chosen a mediating role, their commitment to transformation may lead them to 
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do things whi~h a "neutral" peacebuilder would never do. If one of the parties is much weaker than 
the other party, for example, and is unaware of resources and alternatives available to them, mediators 
committed to transformation should feel ethically compelled to assist that party in identifying 
resources and alternatives. The mediators would make no secret or apologies for such actions, for 
they would already have "located" themselves ethically in the eyes of the parties: Their goal is justice 
achieved via transformation and one of the requirements for this is that the parties be fully aware of 
resources and alternatives available to them. 
Process Advocacy as a Strategy for Location 
Another strategy for locating the peace builder in terms of values begins with the definition of , 
advocacy and is particularly useful in providing a framework for peacebuilders who are in the role of 
mediation. Beginning with the same assertion made earlier in this chapter, author Jim Laue says that 
"every act of intervention alters the power configuration in the social system in which it occurs, and 
therefore every intervenor is an advocate - for party, outcome, and/or process.',42 
A party advocate takes the side of one party and loyally pushes for its advantage. "My party right or 
wrong." An outcome advocate champions an outcome he or she deems desirable, without regard as to 
who happens to benefit from this outcome. A process advocate promotes neither party nor out<?ome, 
but rather a particular way of deciding things or getting things done. 
From this perspective mediators should view themselves as process advocates. Any time 
negotiations take place or decisions are made in any setting, key choices must be made that reflect 
important values. An example of one such process choice would be: Who is deemed an adequate 
representative of the people affected by issues under negotiation? What levels of consultation with 
and accountability to those people are required? In order to maintain the trust of the parties in the 
conflict, mediators often need to avoid "taking sides" in the sense of advocating the solutions of one 
side over the other side. But the discussion process is deeply value-laden and this presents mediators 
41 Cf. Saul Alinsky's classic work, Rules/or Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1971). 
42 James Laue, "Ethical Considerations in Choosing Intervention Roles", Peace and Change, Vol. VIII, No. 2/3 (Summer, 
1992): 30. 
with not only an opportunity but also an obligation to clearly state and advocate values supporting 
transformation. 
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This requires first of all internal clarity on the part of mediators regarding the nature of the processes 
they seek to facilitate. After all, if mediators are unclear about what they view as important 
components in negotiation processes, they will be unable to make clear choices or advocate them 
effectively. They should be prepared to walk away decisively, if necessary, from any situation which 
does not support the values they stand for. Their commitment to justice, freedom, and empowerment 
will enable them to take a clear and explicit stand on a variety of principles regarding any process 
which they facilitate. 
As a way of demonstrating the significance of this approach in practical terms, I review a number of 
specific process issues which typically arise in mediation and suggest guidelines reflecting values I 
see as important. 
• Conduct of participants: Negotiations should take place in ways that respect the dignity and 
equality of all persons in the negotiations as well as those effected by the negotiations. By 
ensuring these conditions, mediators contribute to the goals of empowerment and recognition. 
• Parties represented at the table: No negotiations should proceed if serious effort has not been 
made to involve all parties with a legitimate interest at stake. 
• Negotiator mandates: Negotiators must hold a genuine mandate to negotiate on behalf of the 
people they claim to represent. 
• Access of constituencies to decision-making: Negotiations must place final decision-making 
power in the hands of the people most affected by decisions taken at the mediation table, 
either by direct involvement in decision-making processes or through legitimate forms of 
representation. 
• Access of negotiators to constituencies: Negotiators must have free access to the people they 
are representing. 
• Power: Must be relatively equal if conflicts are to be genuinely resolved rather than merely 
temporarily suppressed. Mediators must acknowledge the realities of power and recognize 
that power is a relative and constantly changing phenomenon deriving from many sources. 
(Sometimes, for example, apparently "powerless" groups actually have a great deal of power.) 
Mediators should analyze carefully the timing of their efforts so as to ensure relatively equal 
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power. They should also recognize and support the necessary role of activists and advocates, 
and be ready to decline to mediate if power imbalances are too high. 
• Problem-Solving Approaches: Mediators should be articulate and pursuasive in advocating 
processes of negotiation and decision-making that shift the dynamics of interaction between 
the parties from simple positional power maneuvering (which only postpone real resolution) 
to genuine grappling with the legitimate needs of each side. For example, the mediator can 
guide the parties through analytical exercises which raise the issues of basic human needs 
which underlie most social and political conflicts, and which enable the parties to reflect on 
the long-term consequences of not meeting these needs. 
• Information: All parties should have equal access to critical information. 
• Accountability: A mediator should hold all parties accountable: to other parties at the table in 
living up to agreements and in being honest about extent to which they can make binding 
commitments; also to their own constituencies in accurately and competently representing 
constituency concerns and interests, and in keeping constituencies informed and appropriately 
involved in the decision-making process. 
Mediators wield enormous influence regarding how all of these process issues are dealt with by 
parties engaged in negotiations. By advocating approaches which support both empowerment and 
recognition of all parties, mediators can contribute significantly to opportunities for justice through 
transformation of the parties. Thus process advocacy offers a potent strategy for transformation and 
gives mediators many opportunities to locate themselves in terms of deeper values. 
Peacebuilding through Vulnerability 
One of the most critical issues for any actor in the social and political arena is power. By what means 
does one seek to accomplish the goals one views as important? In this section I argue that 
peace builders can contribute to the possibility of transformation by consciously choosing 
vulnerability on their part in their relationships with people in conflict. 
One expression of vulnerability is positional powerlessness, that is, an inability or refusal to impose 
solutions on the people in conflict without their consent. This by no means rules out influence. On 
the contrary, the goal is to influence others in the most ambitious way possible, by changing the way 
they think and make decisions. However this is accomplished not by dominating people or forcing 
compromise, but rather by moral suasion through example, good communication, appeals to 
conscience, ethical reasoning, and good relationships. 
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Another expression of vulnerability is voluntary exposure to danger. Mennonite Central Committee 
in 1995 placed North American church workers in Burundian villages susceptible to armed attacks. 
This proposal drew skepticism from some who pointed out the dangers in a country teetering on civil 
war. But MCC staff believe that this form of vulnerability sends an important message of solidarity 
to people in the villages and empowers Burundians to "come out ofhiding."43 
Why would any organization choose to place the lives of its personnel at risk by intentionally sending 
them without armed security into dangerous places? The most important answer is that voluntarily-
chosen vulnerability is a powerful symbolic statement of hope in the possibility of transformation. In 
the last section I said that from the standpoint of shalom, the most tragic casualty of violence is loss of 
faith in the possibility of resolving conflicts through moral community, that is, through principled 
discussion between people in conflict. For anyone to voluntarily enter a situation of armed conflict 
unarmed is a bold re-assertion of hope in such a possibility. The implication is: "We believe that the 
people in this situation are moral enough to recognize our good will and not to kill us. We are so 
committed to and hopeful about the possibility of grounding human interaction in morality rather than 
hatred that we are prepared to risk our own lives for this possibility." 
When peacebuilders become vulnerable they assert that the apparent existing reality of hatred and fear 
is not the highest reality. By giving people in conflict a chance to respond to them as moral beings 
rather than as murderers, they invite them to join in one dimension of that new reality where 
transformation is indeed possible, the circle of principled moral reflection as a response to conflict. 
Change that is based on coercion, after all, is not transformation, rather it is accommodation and as 
such is likely to be unsustainable or even lead to exacerbated conflict on the long term. In order to 
enable transformation, peacebuilders must find ways of communicating with the parties about the 
issues and underlying values in ways that preserve the parties' freedom of choice. The only position 
from which they can effectively pursue this goal is from a position of powerlessness. 
Chapter Three pointed to vulnerability as a source of hope, arguing that only to the extent that people 
are capable of letting go of their desire to control the situation of conflict do they become open to the 
possibility of new insights and possibilities that transcend old competition and resentment. By 
choosing powerlessness in relationship to the parties, peacebuilders acknowledge this reality and in 
effect invite the parties to do so as well.44 Conversely, if peacebuilders operate from a base of 
43 Personal conversation with Harold Otto, former MCC worker in Burundi, Harrisonburg, VA, 8/22/96. 
44 Cf. Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 160. 
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coercive power, they reinforce the assumption that coercion is the only way of addressing problems, 
and thus they strengthen precisely the forces which have led to vi&lence in the first place. 
Peace building from the standpoint of vulnerability also flows logically from the commitment to 
relationship discussed in a preceding section of this chapter. Relationships of deep encounter, in the 
mold of Buber's "I/Thou" relationships, cannot result from coercion, which makes one party an object 
of the wishes or commitments of the other. They can flow only from mutual choice and reciprocity.45 
Jurgen Moltman takes the point a step further, arguing that the powerlessness of Jesus in the 
divine/human relationship was the ultimate expression of solidarity with the human condition: "The 
passionately loving Christ, the persecuted Christ, the lonely Christ, the Christ despairing over God's 
silence, the Christ who in dying was so totally forsaken, for us and for our sakes, is like the brother or 
the friend to whom one can confide everything, because he knows everything and has suffered 
everything that can happen to us - and more."46 
To draw on one of Bush and Folger's categories, conducting peacebuilding from a position of 
vulnerability is a potent display of recognition. When peacebuilders are power-laden, their motives 
can be easily assessed and dismissed. But when they place the success of their efforts, and quite 
possibly their lives as well, in the hands of others, purely for the sake of others, they model 
recognition of the legitimacy of the needs of others in the purest way possible. The Christian story 
makes clear that to enter the arena of human alienation from a stance of vulnerability is costly. Thus 
to choose this stance, is more than an act of recognition, it is an act of love, for in so doing 
peacebuilders choose to put the well-being of others ahead of their own 47• 
If there is one act or strategy on the part of peace builders which is capable, then, of qualitatively 
transforming the atmosphere of their relationships with the parties, it is a choice to act from a position 
of vulnerability. In this moment, peace building in the vision of shalom moves beyond the reliance on 
facilitation exercises and negotiation strategies which characterizes most other understandings of 
peacebuilding. What does it look like in practice? Later examination of the work of the religious 
actors in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe will yield some specific examples. But for purposes of generic over-
view, Larry Rasmussen's catalog of what he terms "weapons of the weak" is insightful: 
45 Buber says relationships are characterized by "reciprocity": "_My You acts on me as I act on it." Buber, 66-67. Similarly, 
"Every means is an obstacle. Only where all means have disintegrated encounters occur." Buber, 63. 
46 Jurgen Moltman, The Power of the Powerless (New York: Harper and Row Publisher, 1987), 120. 
41 Cf. the definition of love by Scott Peck later in this thesis in the chapter on Community. 
other-regarding morality (the community, not the individual self, is the primary moral 
unit); a 'subversive' memory; projection of a powerful vision, the presence of 
persons of such integrity and depth they will extend themselves to the point of 
sacrifice, even risking death, to live toward the vision and keep faith with the 
remembered; a set of alternative institutions ... , and an ability, when conditions permit, 
to leverage even towering institutions. 48 
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So long as the parties are surrounded by actors who perform according to the calculus of power they 
are in familiar terrain which leaves unchallenged their most fundamental assumptions about the 
human community. But the presence of people whose actions are based on love rather than power 
introduces an unfamiliar and unpredictable factor into conflict. The experience of the religious actors 
in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict suggests that the parties were sometimes uncomfortable with such 
a factor. But to a surprising degree, they were open to conversations with religious actors, and as we 
shall see, at key moments were significantly influenced by its presence. 
Summary 
In addressing the relationship between peacebuilders and people in conflict I examined and discarded 
two common approaches to mediation: "clout" mediation and "neutral" mediation. As an alternative, 
I proposed peacebuilding from a standpoint of engagement. Mediators can enter into a relationship of 
engagement with those in conflict by locating themselves in terms of their own values, by connecting 
with people in conflict through deep relationship, and by accepting personal vulnerability as an 
inescapable dimension of their role. 
48 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 160-161. 
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Chapter Five 
Transformation and Structures 
The vision of shalom requires peacebuilders to understand their task more broadly, I have argued, 
than negotiating agreements between powerholders. Shalom holds out the possibility of a holistic 
state of human well-being that is not dependent on coercion but that is rather attained through 
transformation, that is, social change accomplished through moral discernment and decisionmaking. 
Such a goal has important implications for how to proceed in the task of peace building. In this 
chapter I explore these in the context of the relationship of peace building efforts to social and political 
structures: · 
1) The Social Location of Peacebuilding Activities 
2) Ownership of Peace building Activities 
3) Timeframe of Peacebuilding Activities 
The question I seek to address is how to conceptualize peacebuilding efforts in ways that maximize 
the possibilities for interacting transformationally with the social and political structures present in 
situations of conflict. 
The Social Location of Peacebuilding Activities 
Who counts? Who is deemed worthy of fullest recognition as a human being? The question cuts to 
the heart of much human conflict and suffering, for a common thread in many situations of struggle 
and violence is that parties do not count each other as human equals and at the same time resent that 
others do not count them as such. The field of conflict resolution has captured an important insight in 
this regard with the maxim "process matters more than outcome." In many situations, what people 
care about most is not the final decision or outcome, rather they are concerned about the way in which 
that outcome is reached, about the process. So long as they feel that they have been consulted in 
appropriate ways about plans to construct new houses or schools in their community, for example, 
people often will accept a wide variety of possible decisions about housing and education, including 
decisions which they dislike. Conversely, they may object strenuously to plans for their community 
which in practical terms offer much benefit, because a process of decisionmaking was used in which 
they felt they were not consulted about decisions that affect their lives. 
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The reason people often care more about process than about outcome is that embedded in process are 
implicit statements about human worth, about who counts. People who are not consulted feel for 
good reasons that they do not count, and it is this belief that accounts for reactions which are 
sometimes explosive. 1 
Unfortunately peacebuilding as it is widely attempted is an exercise in elitism, paying little attention 
to the implications of the way in which peace is pursued for social and political ethics. Typical 
negotiation efforts concentrate on getting top-level leadership around a bargaining table, assuming 
that peace there is sufficient to bring peace for everyone affected by the conflict. The underlying 
assumption is a "trickle down" theory of negotiations, a theory based on several key assumptions: 
* That representative leaders can be identified;2 
* That they will articulate and advocate for the concerns of those they purport to represent;3 
• That each side is monolithic; that is, that no significant differences exist within each side or 
that to the extent that they do leaders possess the power and influence to secure support for 
agreements worked out at the table; or 
• That decisionmaking is hierarchical; that is, that commitments made by negotiators at the 
table and/or the leaders they represent will reliably be accepted by their constituencies at 
home; 
• That the key requirement for peace is a product in the form of agreements which satisfy key 
demands of the parties. 
On examination these assumptions prove unreliable. Whether we consider the Middle East, South 
Africa, Ireland, or Bosnia, a common feature of all is serious internal conflict within each party to the 
conflict. In reality, each party to a conflict is made up of many different and complex groupings with 
diverse needs and perceptions of the conflict. Even in the most authoritarian setting, decision making 
is rarely hierarchical. Rather, a complex power struggle is almost always at work within each party 
and this power struggle invariably intensifies at the point that resolution of conflict with an external 
enemy appears imminent. Finally, peace is about more than satisfying material demands of parties. It 
I See my book Development, Conflict, and the RDP: A Handbook on Process-Centred Development (Pretoria: HSRC 
Publishers, 1996, In Press), which explores this question in substantial depth in the context of community development. 
2 Cf. Lederach, Building Peace, 22, who identifies a somewhat different but related set of assumptions that he believes 
accompany "trickle-down" understandings of negotiation: 1), that representative leaders can be identified; 2), that they 
will articulate and advocate for the concerns of those they purport to represent; and 3), that they possess the power or 
influence within their own constituencies required for implementation of agreements. 
3 Ibid 
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is equally about meeting basic needs for recognition, identity, and participation in decisions affecting 
one's own future - even if only vicariously through trusted representatives.
4 
Perhaps most objectionable of all in the terms of this thesis, the "trickle down" theory prevents the 
possibility of transformation of groups and societies at war with each other. Because peace efforts are 
confined to discussion among elites who act on behalf of or impose their decisions on their own 
constituencies, the element of involvement and choice is removed from the masses. For the masses 
within each party, "peace" is at best an unearned outcome handed from above. It may also be 
something much worse, the result of coercion by their own leaders. In either case "peace" is unlikely 
to reflect any increase in the moral capacity of the societies involved to reflect on their own deepest 
values and their implications for the conflict, to recognize the needs and concerns of opponents or to 
make conscious choices about their own future. 
The vision of shalom calls us to approach peacebuilding in ways that address not only the reality of 
most conflicts in today's world, but which also provide maximum opportunity for transformation at 
broad levels of the societies involved. This points beyond exercises in high-level negotiations 
towards more comprehensive approaches, towards processes that value all people equally and support 
the possibility of broad social transformation. 
In Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societiei, the Mennonite practitioner and 
theoretician of conflict resolution John Paul Lederach outlines a multi-tiered approach to conflict 
resolution and proposes to accomplish this through what he calls "middle range approaches to peace". 
Lederach points out three levels in a triangle of leadership which could provide the location for 
peacebuilding efforts: at the pinnacle is top level leadership, at the base is grassroots leadership; 
between the two is middle range leadership.6 Top level leaders, the ruling political and military 
elites, are highly visible and for this reason are often limited in their ability to actively support peace 
initiatives for fear of being perceived as weak or compromising. Equally problematic, they usually 
understand society in hierarchical terms and have little understanding or patience for the need for 
involving other levels of society in peace processes. 
Grassroots leadership are in touch with the masses at the base of society. They usually have direct 
personal experience of the suffering and bitterness of war and an immediate understanding of the 
4 Cf. the discussion in my chapter on "Reconciliation" on the work of John Burton, who argues for the "ontological priority" 
of what he calls "basic human needs" such as recognition, identity, and participation as a driving force in human 
motivation over material desires such as wealth or comfort. 
5 Lederach, Building Peace, 22. 
6 Ibid., 17-29. 
aspirations, needs and prejudices of the masses. But they are often trapped in the daily struggle for 
survival and have little access to information about the bigger picture in the struggle. 
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Middle Range leadership hold significant positions of leadership which are not necessarily controlled 
by top level leaders. They are respected for their leadership in sectors like education, business, 
agriculture, health, religion, etc. For several reasons they offer a highly effective entry point for 
peacebuilding initiatives. For one, they are likely to know and be known by the top level leadership 
as well as grassroots level leadership. For another, their own position is usually not based on military 
or political power, nor do they aspire to this. Rather they operate on the basis of relationships and 
professional interest which often extend across the lines of conflict to counterparts on the other side. 
For these reasons middle range leaders tend to be more flexible in their openness to exploring options 
for settlement, in their ability to physically move around without immediately drawing attention, and 
in their capacity to interact with people on the other side of the conflict. 
For reasons similar to those outlined above regarding "trickle down" approaches to negotiations, 
Lederach is skeptical about the effectiveness of peacebuilding initiatives which focus exclusively on 
the top level of leadership. On the other hand, he is keenly interested in initiatives focusing on a 
"bottom-up approach", suggesting that "virtually all of the recent transitions toward peace such as 
those in El Salvador, Ethiopia, or the earlier one in the Philippines were due in large part to the 
pressure for change that was bubbling up from the grassroots."7 
He offers as an example of such an approach an initiative taken in Somaliland: 
In brief, the bottom-up approach involved a process of first achieving agreements to end the 
fighting at local peace conferences, which brought together and were guided by the elders of 
contiguous and interdependent sub-clans. These conferences not only dealt with immediate 
issues of concern at local levels, but also served to place responsibility for interclan fighting 
on the shoulders of local leaders and helped identify the persons who are considered to be 
rightful representatives of those clans' concerns. Having achieved this initial agreement, it 
was then possible to repeat the same process at a higher level with a broader set of clans. 
Characteristic of these processes were the reliance on elders, lengthy oral deliberations ( often 
months on end), the creation of a forum or assembly of elders (known in some parts of the 
country as guurti), and the careful negotiation over access to resources and payments for 
deaths that would reestablish a balance among the clans. 8 
Lederach also cites examples of "bottom-up peacebuilding" from Mozambique. In one, the Christian 
Council of Mozambique initiated a program entitled "Preparing People for Peace" in the early 1990s 
which brought church representatives together from all the provinces in a series of 2 weeks of 
7 Ibid., 27. 
8 Ibid., 28. 
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workshops on a variety of topics related to war and peace. Over the course of 16 month more than 
700 people participated.9 Another example from Mozambique is found in a UNICEF project, "Circus 
of Peace", which fielded a traveling show and "wove drama and arts into community fora to express 
the nature and challenges of war and conflict and the possibilities of reconciliation, including the 
skills of resolving conflict. The traveling show had not only captivated audiences, but served as a 
way for them to publicly grieve over the tragic losses their country had suffered, address the people's 
concerns and set the stage for changes and movement toward peace."
10 
But it is the middle level which holds "the most potential for establishing an infrastructure that 
sustains the peace building process over the long term .... " Approaches at this level 
are informed by deeper systemic analysis but provide practical initiatives for 
addressing immediate issues, and are able to draw on human resources, tap into and 
take maximum benefit from institutional, cultural and informal networks that cut 
across the lines of conflict, and connect the levels of peace activity within the 
population .... [M]iddle range actors ... hold the most potential for practical, immediate 
action and sustainable long term transformation in the setting."11 
One of the most commonly used examples of peacebuilding conducted at this level cited by Lederach 
is the problem-solving workshop. Used extensively in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, as well as 
Cypress, the Basque region in Spain, and other places, problem-solving workshops typically bring 
together second-tier leadership from all sides of a conflict for week-long off-the-record meeting in an 
informal or academic environment. The goal is not to resolve the conflict by negotiating agreements 
then and there, but rather to enable thoughtful, in-depth analysis of the issues at stake.12 
Another strategy which Lederach believes is particularly effective in conducting mid-level 
peacebuilding is conflict resolution training. In South Africa the National Peace Accord provided 
auspices under which thousands of people from a wide variety of political backgrounds participated in 
workshops designed to introduce concepts of negotiation and mediation at local and regional levels. 13 
9 Ibid., 28-29. 
10 Ibid. , 29. 
11 Ibid., 34. 
12 See John Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict: A Handbook (University Press of America, 1987; Jay Rothman, 
"Supplementing Tradition: A Theoretical and Practical Typology for International Conflict Management", Negotiation 
Journal, July 1989; Michael Banks and Chris Mitchell, A Handbook of the Analytical Problem-Solving Approach 
(Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1992). 
13 In my view one of the mostly unrecognized tragedies of the South African transition was the abandonment of the 
structures of the National Peace Accord which represented the world's largest conflict resolution organization and the only 
national bipartisan mechanism ever created for dealing with political violence. In my assessment the primary blame for 
this lies with senior staff of the organization who despite repeated efforts on the part of people deeply committed to the 
NP A refused to recognize important but by no means fatal weaknesses in the structure. The incoming coalition 
government responded by cutting off funding. For this and other reasons little documentation is available regarding the 
efforts of the NPA. I make the assertion in the text above in my own capacity as a former member of the NPA's Training 
Committee, on which I served from 1992 till the demise of the NPA in 1995. 
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Elsewhere in Africa, "middle-range leaders from the church communities who found themselves on 
different sides of the conflicts in countries such as Mozambique and Angola, were brought together to 
share their perceptions and experiences of the conflict and their role in it, and develop approaches for 
encouraging and supporting reconciliation in their countries."14 In Northern Ireland a wide variety of 
training workshops have been held for similar purposes. 
Peace commissions offer yet a third model for pursuing peace through mid-level efforts.15 Lederach 
cites the work of the National Peace Accord in South Africa as one example here, an institution which 
created a dozen regional Peace Committees and over 50 local ones to address political violence from 
1992 to 1994. He also points to the work of a Conciliation Commission established in Nicaragua in 
the late 1980s to prepare and facilitate negotiations between the Sandinista government and Yatama, 
one of the resistance movements on the East Coast. This Commission consisted of top leadership 
from two Nicaraguan religious bodies and facilitated a lengthy series of negotiations between Yatama 
and the government. 16 
Lederach' s "theory of the middle-range" offers important insights in addressing the question of where 
to locate peacebuilding initiatives. His bias towards grassroots and mid-range locations supports our 
commitment to maximizing the possibility of transformation in the broader society by increasing the 
number of people who are involved in peace initiatives. While recognizing that no single model of 
response can be prescribed for every situation, his suggestion that the mid-range offers the greatest 
potential for transformation provides a valuable starting point in planning peace strategies. 
Ownership of Peacebuilding Activities 
The vision of shalom implies an understanding of peace building that is holistic and addresses all 
aspects of social and political reality. I have argued that peace defined in this way is possible only as 
a consequence of transformation, that is, as a result of changes in the way the warring parties think 
about themselves and others. Obviously, such a peace cannot be imposed or constructed by outsiders. 
It is a possibility only to the extent that the parties themselves choose it. In the absence of free 
choice, after all, "good" behavior is merely yielding to pressure. Thus a fundamental concern for the 
peacebuilder must be how to operate in ways that maximize the element of choice for peace by the 
parties and how to create institutions which continue to support transformation on an ongoing basis. 
To a certain extent, commitment to involving those in conflict in choices about the conflict is widely 
held in the broader field of peacebuilding. For example, mediators often work hard to find and 
14 Lederach, Building Peace, 25. 
IS Ibid., 25. 
16 Ibid, 26 
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present attractive choices to parties about how to resolve political conflicts. This strategy is based on 
classic "win/win" bargaining theory which seeks to maximize the benefits for both sides so that 
everyone wins. 
This is constructive so far as it goes. But if peacebuilders focus only on peaceful outcomes, their 
ability to contribute to transformation is limited. They can introduce a substantially greater element 
of choice - and hence responsibility and greater possibility for transformation - by placing ownership 
of the peace building enterprise itself in the hands of conflicting parties. In other words, to build 
shalom, the parties need to take responsibility themselves for maintaining the processes and structures 
which work for peace. 
One obvious limitation makes this difficult in the early stages of peacebuilding. Warring parties 
engaged in hostilities are unlikely to be interested in jointly sponsoring peace initiatives. Even if 
leaders are interested in supporting peace initiatives, to admit this is often politically impossible. For 
this reason, "deniability" is one of the greatest assets of externally initiated peace efforts. This allows 
leaders to engage in serious exploration of prospects for peace in private discussion with external 
initiators, yet publicly deny any responsibility for or interest in peace efforts, if required to do so to 
remain politically credible with their own constituencies. For this reason, it is often desirable or 
unavoidable that peace efforts begin at the initiative of outsiders. 
However if peace efforts must sometimes begin under external initiative, they need not and should not 
end there. As a guiding principle, peacebuilding should be conducted under auspices as close to local 
ownership as possible. This principle has several ramifications. 
Use Locally Based Peacemakers 
The ideal situation would be one where no outside personnel are required at all. Rather than sending 
in external facilitators, for example, moderates on both sides of a conflict could be encouraged or 
supported to initiate peace efforts. Thus the first line of response on the part of peace builders in any 
situation of conflict ought to be to explore the availability of internally-based peacebuilders. Lederach 
has commented in this regard, "I have never been in any setting, no matter how severe, from Central 
America to the Hom of Africa, where there have not been people who had a vision for peace, 
emerging often from their own experience of pain. However, far too often, these same people are 
overlooked and disempowered ... "17 
This point also underscores the priority of training and consultancy work in peace building. If the goal 
of peacebuilders is to support the emergence of peacebuilding initiatives controlled by others, a major 
17 Ibid., 63. 
task then must be to direct peacebuilding resources towards the preparation and support of such 
initiatives rather than towards the front-line work of mediating itself. 
Use Regional Resources 
If it proves impossible to initiate peace efforts except via external actors, the next line of response 
should be to explore the possibility of initiating peace efforts under the auspices of external actors 
who are located near the scene of conflict. 
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Let us say we are concerned about conflict in Burundi but it is apparent that the Burundians are too 
polarized to initiate peace efforts. Other considerations being equal, it is better for peace initiatives to 
emerge from South Africa than from London, for this brings the element of choice for and 
commitment to peacebuilding, and hence the capacity for transformation, much closer to Burundi, 
within the continent of Africa. But it would be much better yet were the initiative to emerge from a 
base within the region itself, thus bringing the opportunities and responsibilities of peace building 
closer home. 
Where regional organizations lack the staff and expertise to mount a peace initiative, if their profile 
and reputation make them a strong candidate for peace initiatives, even peace initiative iniatives 
staffed by "outsiders" might still be conducted under the auspices of a regional organization so that 
credit accrues to regional organizations. 
When Beginning Externally, Seek Opportunities to Shift to Local Ownership 
Regardless of who the initiator is, peacebuilders should at all times seek and capitalize upon 
opportunities to move the ownership of peace processes and structures as close to the conflict parties 
as possible, and ideally into their hands. 
To return to the Burundi example, initial peace talks might be undertaken by a team of South Africans 
and Kenyans operating under auspices of the All-Africa Council of Churches. But after working out 
the terms of a cease-fire between rival Burundian factions, they might encourage the factions to 
establish a National Peace Commission to coordinate on-going peace efforts. The expatriates would 
remain involved behind the scenes, providing training and on-going consultation for key people in the 
Burundian National Peace Commission, assisting with regional workshops, and helping to-raise funds 
to support the Burundian Commission. But the control of and credit for the initiative would be 
directed towards the national body. 
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Creating Institutional Bases for Peacebuilding. 
One implication of the above is that creating new institutions for peace is a central part of the task of 
peacebuilding. Such an emphasis contradicts common patterns of international aid and development. 
One veteran US diplomat reported recently that in the last several years the US government had 
invested more than one billion dollars of aid in the Hom of Africa, but had not created one institution 
to facilitate the ongoing impact .of this aid. 18 
Obviously there are dangers in emphasizing the importance of institution-building.· Institutions often 
become more concerned with their own survival than with carrying out the mission for which they 
were created. But nothing survives on the long-term unless people and money are allocated 
specifically to it. If we believe that peace building is important and that it is a task that needs ongoing 
attention, we have no choice but to create institutions to sustain it. 
The matter of institution-building highlights previous points in this section. Societies are up.likely to 
invest in institutions perceived to be created by or serving the interests of outsiders. Thus it becomes 
apparent that structuring peace initiatives so that they are "owned" locally is a critical step towards 
building structures for peacebuilding. Similarly, a commitment to institution-building highlights the 
significance of training as a central part of the overall mission of peacebuilding. Institutions cannot 
thrive unless people are available with vision and skills to carry out the mission of the institution. 
Gathering the resources necessary for building institutions of peace thus is an essential task for 
peace builders. Lederach suggests that there are two key dimensions of this task, socio-economic and 
socio-cultural. 
Socio-Economic Resources 
Much of the challenge in addressing the socio-economic dime~sion of gathering resources for 
peacebuilding is changing the way people think. Planners and funders have had so little 
understanding of or commitment to peacebuilding that they aren't even aware of the possibilities. 
Thus, for example, part of the task is to get intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies to 
"create specific categories of funding related to conflict resolution and peacebuilding."19 
This presents several challenges to peacebuilders. One is that the response of international 
organizations to conflict has been dominated by a '"natural disaster' understanding of need and 
outcome."20 This model is reactive rather than proactive, short-term in timeframe, and oriented 
18 Ambassador John McDonald, of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy in Washington DC, speaking at a workshop on 
conflict and reconciliation convened by his organization in Washington in July, 1995. 
19 Lederach, Building Peace, 59. 
20 Ibid., 60. 
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towards centralizing vulnerable people. These characteristics are unsuited to conflict resolution. 
Lederach argues, for example, that bringing people in the Somalia conflict into central locations 
might have initially facilitated the delivery of relief supplies, but ultimately this strategy exacerbated 
the conflict when protected corridors of travel had to be created, displacing militias and increasing 
instability in areas not previously affected. Thus, peacebuilders need to assist organizations who 
often mobilize massive resources in meeting the humanitarian crises created by war to allocate their 
resources in ways which are sensitive to the requirements of peace building. 
Another challenge is funding priorities. Lederach notes that funding is often relatively easy to secure 
for formal, top-level initiatives and observes that military peacekeeping has also attracted substantial 
funding. "Far more difficult is the funding of middle-range initiatives, capacity-and infrastructure-
building for conflict resolution and grassroots projects .... "21 This suggests that the problem is less a 
lack ofresources for responding to the problems of war and conflict, rather it is a lack of 
understanding of and commitment to, broadly-based peace processes. He suggests that relief 
organizations create a "self-tax" of five percent of relief budgets, designated for conflict resolution 
and peacebuilding activities in the areas in which they operate. 
Socio-Cultural Resources 
A second critical dimension of resource gathering is socio-cultural resources. Lederach observes that 
"the general tendency is to think of peacebuilding being initiated with outside resources, whether 
money or personnel. But the inverse is true. The greatest resource for sustaining peace in the long-
term is always rooted in the people and their culture."22 A basic shift in thinking needs to happen 
here, says Lederach, from viewing people in the setting of conflict as recipients to resources. 
An important task in drawing on the resources of local people is building a peace constituency. This 
begins by identifying local resource people who already have a vision for peace. These people need 
to be assisted in connecting with others like themselves both within their side of the conflict as well as 
across the lines of conflict. Equally important, the international community needs to recognize the 
validity of these actors and in so doing, provide the legitimation necessary for them to operate. 
Another important task is mobilizing cultural resources for peacebuilding, that is, identifying 
concepts, structures, and institutions for peacebuilding that exist within every culture and building 
upon them. The conflict resolution movement as a whole has been characterized by powerful 
tendencies to package techniques and skills in Western, urban settings and impose them prescriptively 
21 Ibid., 62. 
22 Ibid., 62. 
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worldwide in training workshops. In contrast to this, Lederach calls for elicitive approaches to 
training which engage workshop participants in reflection on their cultural understandings of how to 
deal with conflict.23 
Peacebuilding as an Activity Extended over Time 
Scholars of conflict have long recognized that conflict unfolds in stages and that this suggests that 
each stage calls for a different response on the part of peace builders. 24 However there is little 
evidence that this awareness informs many peacebuilding efforts. Often peacebuilding is undertaken 
only after a conflict has reached crisis proportion and an urgent humanitarian response is called for to 
cope with the victims of a war. The requirements of meeting a large-scale humanitarian disaster then 
often dominate the framework of peacebuilding efforts. The result is not peacebuilding capable of 
bringing transformation of the conflict, but rather crisis management: "(W]aiting until a situation has 
reached the proportions of a humanitarian disaster ... creates a crisis mentality that is driven by a 
disaster-management frame of reference and the urgent need to find a quick-fix political solution."25 
As a result, in part, of decades of experience in a wide variety of conflict situations worldwide, a 
strong bias has developed among Mennonite development and peace workers away from short-term, 
episodic interventions, towards projects that enable extensive relationship building and sustain peace 
efforts through several stages of transformation. Lederach captures this bias diagrammatically in 
what he calls a "nested paradigm" linking time frame with suggested peacebuilding activities.26 
23 Lederach's book Preparing/or Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1995), lays out a theoretical base for elicitive training and offers practical suggestions for how to conduct it. This 
approach to training has been employed for some years by the Mennonite Central Committee in training initiatives in a 
number of places worldwide, including Ireland, the Philippines, several African countries, and numerous Latin and Central 
American countries. 
24 Louis Kriesberg, The Sociology of Social Conflicts (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973); Adam Curle, ibid.; Laue and 
Cormick; ibid., Lederach, Building Peace, ibid.; Chris Mitchell, "The Process and Stages of Mediation: Two Sudanese 
Cases" in David Smock, editor, Making Peace and Waging War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1993), 
139-159. 
25 Lederach, Building Peace, 38. 
26 lbid, 39. 
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LONGTERM 
(1-2 years) (5-10 years) (20+ years) 
Approach (peacebuilding activities appropriate to each corresponding dimension of timeframe above) 
Crisis Intervention Preparation/Training Social-Change Design System/Relationship 
Goals/Outcome 
Crisis intervention concerns itself with a time frame of weeks or months and addresses questions such 
as: How can we alleviate the excruciating suffering? How can we get a cease-fire agreement to open 
up space for negotiations? Lederach supports the legitimacy of such efforts, but stresses that they 
"must not be viewed separately from the longer-term goals of sustainable outcome."27 The choice of 
a "nested" paradigm underscores this concern. Crisis intervention, like each other activity in the 
paradigm, is likely to be successful only if it is viewed as the more immediate expression of a project 
that ultimately addresses the many issues at stake in building peace. In Lederach' s words, " .. while 
achieving a cease-fire and feeding and sheltering fleeing refugees are immediate necessities, these 
goals must not be mistaken for, nor replace the broader framework of peacebuilding activity. Rather, 
a sustainable transformative approach suggests that the key lies in transforming the relationship of the 
conflicting parties, with all that the term encompasses at the spiritual, psychological, social, 
economic, political, and military levels."28 
The preparation\training response moves beyond urgent pain-reduction measures and seeks to equip 
people who are in or very close to the crisis situation with concepts and skills for assessing and 
responding to the situation they face. 
At the far right of the paradigm lies a long-term perspective "driven by a vision of socially desirable 
outcomes, such as a significant structural and systemic change".29 Questions often asked in this 
response are: what type of future will we leave our children? What type of change is necessary to 
prevent a similar crisis from happening again? Goals typically include sustainable development, self-
27 Ibid, 39. 
28 Ibid., 40. 
29 Ibid, 40. 
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sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet basic human needs, establishing respectful and 
interdependent relationships among the diverse groups affected by the conflict. 
Between the long-term vision of structural change and the short-term capacity-building emphasis of 
preparation and training lies the medium range concern of designing social change. The focus is on 
putting in place mechanisms or a sustainable process that will enable a transition from the current 
state of crisis or conflict or injustice to the desired state. Lederach views this stage as a key "bridging" 
point that poses a question linking present and future: "How do we get the desired change from this 
crisis?"30 Because of its capacity to provide guidance in responding to both the immediate crisis as 
well as to problems, Lederach views the middle range time frame as the most useful lens through 
which to focus analysis of a conflict. 
However, to employ a middle-range analysis requires several things of peacebuilders. For one, they 
need to develop the capacity to design and implement social change over a long period of time, a 
period which Lederach says needs to be counted "in time-units of decades" in order to "derive and 
translate the lessons of the crisis into a constructive process of sustainable transformation" 31 
Secondly, they must learn to recognize the systemic roots of many crises and develop approaches to 
crises that address those roots. Thirdly, they need to work with middle range actors whose locus 
within the affected populace make them particularly effective in and important systemic changes on 
the. 
Summary 
In order to work for shalom through transformation, peacebuilding needs to be undertaken in ways 
that maximize opportunities to penetrate all levels of societies in conflict, that place ownership of 
peacebuilding initiatives as close as possible to the conflicting parties themselves, and that create on-
going institutional bases to support peacebuilding on the long-term. Only by going about 
peacebuilding in ways that plant the seeds of involvement in and ownership of peacebuilding in the 
hands of large numbers of people, and which direct resources towards the sustenance of on-going 
peace efforts is it possible to move towards the comprehensive vision of shalom. Peacebuilding is by 
necessity a protracted effort and peacebuilders need to conceptualize even short-term crisis responses 
within the context of long-range structures. 
30 Ibid, 47 




Central to the vision of shalom is an understanding of human beings living in one community. In the 
new heaven and earth, all are members of the same family, united by a common commitment to care 
for creation.1 This vision requires that strategies for creating peace do more than eliminate conflict 
and violence, impose justice, or broker deals, none of which can alone create bonds of community. 
Rather peacebuilders must invite and support people in conflict to enter a process of ongoing, joint 
moral discernment as a means of addressing their differences. 
War exacts a staggering toll, not only physically and economically, but also socially, morally, and 
spiritually, leaving a vast wake of alienation and hatred. Strategies for dealing with conflict which 
address only the dimensions of disputed physical resources and power are incapable of addressing this 
bitter legacy. This requires that peacebuilding efforts consciously strategize efforts to enable social 
and relational healing from the trauma of violence and war. This chapter reviews the limits of 
bargaining in peacebuilding and explore reconciliation as a more comprehensive model for 
peace building 
The Limits of Bargaining 
Almost all conflicts are played out as a contest for control over power and resources. Whether the 
issues being fought over are land, ideology, ethnic identity, or human rights, invariably they express 
themselves in a struggle for control over power and resources. The latter, after all, are the means by 
which people attain the things they desire. The dominance of realpolitik as the defining basis for 
international conduct elevates this instrumental reality to a normative political theory, legitimizing 
reliance on coercive power alone as the basis for behavior by political actors. 
It should come as no surprise then that conventional understandings of peace building and diplomacy 
focus almost exclusively on division of power and resources. The Lancaster House negotiations 
examined in the Zimbabwe case study later offer a classic illustration here. Peace talks centered on 
the contents of a new constitution, arrangements for the transitional period between the end of talks 
I Cf. D.P. Niles, Between the Flood and the Rainbow, 164-190. 
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and the holding of elections, and the details of a cease-fire. Although a variety of accounts now 
document the content of these discussions, there is no evidence that any formal discussion ever took 
place at Lancaster House acknowledging the social and relational damage of the war, much less the 
question of how the realities of bitterness and hatred that separated blacks from whites might be 
addressed in order to enable people to work together in the new political dispensation being 
hammered out by negotiators. The new government of Robert Mugabe took important steps, of 
course, towards reconciliation later, after the elections.2 But the people who gathered at Lancaster 
House for peace talks apparently assumed that the only task facing them was working out a new 
division of power and resources. 
It is true of course that issues of power and resources sometimes have to be dealt with first before 
discussion of relationships. It is difficult to imagine significant progress on restoration of 
relationships at Lancaster House before a new division of power had been worked out. In this 
instance the peace talks probably began at the right place. But did they end at the right place? 
Without denying the fundamental importance of bargaining over power and resources, the vision of 
shalom points beyond them to the human community and the quality ofrelationships there. We 
might view this schematically as follows: 
This diagram places human relationships at the center of the peace building task. Structures - by 
which I refer to the human institutions which formalize power to make decisions and mobilize 
resources - are here viewed as an outgrowth and expression of the nature of the relationships between 
people. Resources of wealth, land, property, information are viewed as the means by which structures 
fire able to accomplish the things deemed important by the people controlling them. 
Conflicts tend to focus on allocation of resources and control of structures; these are the things that 
people in conflict fight over. Consequently, peace talks often focus here too, for this appears to be the 
source of the problem. While acknowledging that these are critical dimensions of human life, by 
2 Cf. Victor de Waal, "The Quest for Unity", in his The Politics of Reconciliation: Zimbabwe's First Decade (London: Hurst 
and Co., 1990), 89-99. 
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beginning with an ontological statement about the familihood of all people, the vision of shalom 
points us beyond them to the nature of relationships with others as the heart of the problem needing to 
be addressed. Resources and structures are secondary expressions of the relationships which lie at the 
center of conflict; problems in these outer spheres are mere symptoms of underlying causes in the 
inner sphere. They are painful and extremely costly symptoms to be sure, and sometimes they are the 
only place accessible to efforts to begin addressing the central problem. But if the problem of 
alienation and exclusion at the relationship level is not somehow addressed, discussions about 
structures and resources are incapable of leading to shalom. 
The nature of human interaction required to constructively address each sphere varies. As an 
instrumental realm expressing the values and commitments of the inner spheres, the realm of 
resources lends itself well to classic bargaining approaches, by which I refer to pragmatic, object-
focused discussion about how to allocate goods or power, such as was used at Lancaster House. 3 The 
realm of structures calls for the three-fold activities of transformation discussed earlier: 
empowerment, recognition, and discernment. But neither set of activities is capable of addressing the 
emotional and spiritual damage of conflict which stand in the way of relationships. This realm calls 
for a set of activities which I call reconciliation. 
O Like negotiators at most political bargaining tables, the negotiators at Lancaster seemed to assume 
that reconciliation would take place naturally without the kind of joint planning and discussion 
required to alter the structures of power. Clearly they assumed this was not their current brief, and 
nothing suggests they viewed it as important to make it anybody else's brief later. Both the people in 
the conflict and those facilitating the negotiations appear to have assumed that politics was both the 
problem and the solution, and that addressing relationships was not a part of doing politics. 
The vision of shalom reverses these assumptions. The purpose of politics is relationships. Politics 
must concern itself with allocation of resources and structures of power, of course, for these influence 
the possibilities for relationships in fundamental ways. But they are not ends in themselves, their 
purpose is to support just and satisfying relationships. Peacebuilding then, like all political activities, 
ought never be conducted in the assumption that relationships will "take care of themselves". 
Shalom calls for us to consciously conduct politics in the service of relationships. This means that 
formal, joint, proactive attention to the question of reconciliation in relationships is a matter of 
3 Cf. John Burton, Conflict: Resolution and Provention (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 1-3, who differentiates 
between disputes and conflicts. Disputes are relatively uncomplicated matters, in Burton's view, amenable to division of 
resources through classic bargaining strategies. Conflicts are more complicated for they are "deeply rooted in basic human 
needs" and thus require complex strategies to analyze and address. 
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highest on-going priority in peacebuilding. To the extent that people in conflict recognize the 
importance of reconciliation, genuine social transformation is possible. To the extent that they ignore 
it, even "revolutionary" changes in the structures of political power are unlikely to lead to significant 
improvement in the lives of people in societies affected by conflict.4 . . 
Why Reconciliation? 
The discussion thus far is presented in terms of the vision of shalom. But the case can be made on 
the grounds of practical realities of peace building as well. 
Viability of Settlements 
Daniel Smith, a student of the conflict in the Middle East, concludes that some sort of healing 
processes are essential to the viability of any agreements addressing the conflict there: "The language 
of forgiveness and reconciliation expresses the inevitable fact that the parties involved not only need 
to 'resolve a conflict' or 'reach a settlement' but must also live together in some form of socio-
O political relationship that is on-going and continuous."5 
From his experiences in Africa, where the majority of conflicts have been civil wars, Hezkias Assefa 
makes a similar point: 
"Although the antagonists in civil wars may be bitterly alienated by conflict, their 
lives are inextricably intertwined with each other through ties in culture, geographic 
proximity, social interdependence, etc. Under those conditions, it is not enough for 
the mediator to aim merely for the cessation of violence between the protagonists, or 
for management of the conflict so that it does not get out of hand. The mediator must 
aim as much as possible towards a reconciliation where the parties are helped not 
only to stop the violence but also to feel positively towards each other so that their 
disrupted but inescapable relationship can begin to function amicably again. "6 
Traditional diplomacy pays little attention to the reality of on-going relationships and the need for 
healing within these relationships from the emotional and relational damage of conflicts. This seems 
a remarkable oversight, given the obvious need of those in conflict to cooperate in art ongoing way in 
the implementation of many settlements. We might speculate that the inclination to ignore the need 
for reconciliation is an anachronism that lingers from an era when conflicts were less complicated and 
the parties had fewer options for prolonging hostilities than today. As a consequence of global 
interdependence, parties in conflict today wage battles not only on military fronts, but also on 
4 Crane Brinton's classic study of the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions documents the ambiguous, largely 
unforeseen, and often overstated results of "revolutionary" change. See his Anatomy of a Revolution (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1965). 
5 Daniel L. Smith, "The Rewards of Allah," Journal of Peace Research 26, No. 4 (1989): 386. Quoted by Alice Ackerman, 
in "Reconciliation as a Peace-Building Process in Postwar Europe: The Franco-German Case", Peace and Change, Vol. 
19, Number 3, July 1994: 230. 
6 Hizkias Assefa, "The Challenge of Mediation in Internal Wars: Reflections on the INN Experience in the 
Ethiopian/Eritrean Conflict", Security Dialogue, Vol. 23(3), 1992: 101-106 
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economic and propaganda fronts. It is no longer remarkable for a party which is weak in military 
power to sustain and even win a lengthy contest with an opponent that is far stronger militarily. 
Because parties in conflict have more options available at all stages of hostilities, hostilities can more 
easily be prolonged or resumed in the event of breakdown in agreements than in the past. 
Consequently, truly resolving a conflict and establishing the basis for cooperation between the parties 
is even more important than in the past. 
Not only do the parties have more options for continuation of conflict available, they also have less 
opportunity to avoid each other than in the past. The interdependence of trade, communication, 
technology, transport, and labor make it impossible for the parties in most serious conflicts today to 
simply withdraw and ignore their opponent. They must relate to each other if they wish to prosper. 
Reconciliation as Essential to Settlement 
In some situations even short-term agreements are unlikely to be reached unless the parties are 
assisted in experiencing a reconciliation process enabling at least some release from the trauma of 
extended violence. A veteran observer of the devastation in the former Yugoslavia describes the 
current war there as a "repetition of archetypic epic warfare" in which all rationality has been 
destroyed. Reviewing the many rounds of violence that have shattered the region and the way in 
which this history of devastation has pervaded and now shapes social consciousness through poetry, 
mythology, and song, Thomas Butler concludes: "If anything in this terrible picture is clear to me, 
after years of studying these cultures, it is that the vicious conflict we are witnessing cannot be 
explained solely in terms of history, or of competing economic needs. I think we have to tum to 
psychiatry for insight." 7 
Reflecting on the situation in light of Carl Jung's concept of the archetypal Shadow in human 
consciousness, Butler asks: "Is there any way to lead these modem-day epic warriors out of their 
narcissism, their obsession with past tribal losses, their feeling of being eternal victims?" It won't be 
easy, he says, quoting Joseph Montville, a well-known political scientist and founder of the 
International Society for Political Psychology: "Victimhood and the violence associated with it 
usually defy traditional diplomatic attempts to resolve it. There is a strong case to be made that the 
sense ofvictimhood can only be relieved through the experience of profound psychological 
processes." Butler agrees with Montville's assessment, adding: "In such an irrational situation as 
prevails in Bosnia today, the only cure can be the irrational - a homeopathy for sick souls, with 
mutual forgiveness as its goal."8 
7 Thomas Butler, "Forgiveness in Bosnia", The Boston Book Review, September 5, 1994 
8 Ibid. 
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Like the concept of deterrence, most bargaining theories take it for granted that a basic strata of 
rationality governs the behavior of combatants. The underlying assumption is that opponents in battle 
make rational analyses of the costs and benefits of the strategic choices they face and respond 
accordingly. Leaders faced with the likelihood of losses in battle are expected to shrink from warfare 
and choose peace, even at unfavorable terms, for the costs of war would be higher than the benefits. 
But if anything has become apparent in the ethnic struggles of recent decades, it is that parties in such 
conflicts ignore what to others seems obvious, and they plunge into battle heedless of the costs. They 
are driven, not by rational reflection on material issues, but rather by what the noted conflict 
resolution theorist John Burton calls "basic human needs", 9 needs for identity, respect, participation, 
and a sense of security. Such needs are fundamental to human well-being and they drive people at 
levels not vulnerable to rational analysis. When their basic human needs are blocked, people in 
Ireland, the Middle East, and other situations of deep-rooted conflict have repeatedly demonstrated 
they are prepared to sacrifice everything in order to attack what they see as obstacles to meeting these 
needs, with little regard to the balance of costs and benefits. 
In such situations, processes capable of leading to peace need to be implemented that function at 
levels other than the rationally-based give-and-take bargaining which typically characterizes the quest 
for negotiated settlements. Rational bargaining must of course enter the picture at some point, but 
often it needs to be preceded with, or at least accompanied by, reconciliation processes that operate at 
an entirely different level than bargaining. 
The Damage of Violence and the Nature of Reconciliation 
The damage of violence between groups in immediate terms of lives, property, and disruption is 
devastating. But the most enduring damage is the destruction it causes to moral vision and capacity 
for the creation of human community. At best, to use violence is to give up, even if only temporarily, 
on the possibility of transformation as a means of addressing problems and effecting change in a 
particular situation. More commonly, violence represents a reckless insistence on the priority of its 
own interests by one group of people over against those of another. 
At a symbolic level, then, violence represents a fundamental attack on the vision for human co-
habitation. In a world of diversity, after all, the only hope for working together is if people can agree 
to be accountable to some form of problem solving higher than mere pursuit of self-interest. This 
willingness to be governed by an at least implicit, voluntary social contract lies at the heart of modern 
understandings of society. Beyond the fears for immediate security that accompany violence, then, 
9 Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflicts. Cf. my description of Burton in the chapter on "Engagement". 
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human beings intuitively sense the deeper threat which it represents. By setting aside or rejecting the 
possibility of moral discernment as the basis for problem-solving, violence poses the threat of the 
descent of the larger human community into chaos. 
If we are guided by the vision of shalom, a number of things must happen in enabling healing from 
conflict. At a most obvious level, people need healing from the trauma of anger and grief which 
inevitably accompany large-scale violence. But more is needed: the recovery of hope for the 
possibility of human community, which is a possibility only when people are willing to be governed 
by moral vision rather than unbridled self-interest. The significance of this point will be evident in 
the latter stages of the reconciliation process outlined below. 
Forgiveness and Reconciliation as Process 
One of the most important and least understood dimensions of reconciliation is that it is a process, 
not an event. The following recounts a personal experience in South Africa which taught me a great 
deal about the importance of viewing reconciliation in this way. 
"I wish to ask forgiveness for my role in the creation of apartheid, a system which I 
now believe to be sinful." The speaker was a well-known white professor of theology 
and dominee in the Dutch Reformed Church addressing a multi-racial gathering of 
church leaders at Rustenburg in 1991. A few minutes later delegates broke up for 
small group discussion of the morning's events. I joined with eagerness the group to 
which I had been assigned, feeling that a major watershed had just been passed. 
"Wasn't that terrible!" said a "colored" woman as we sat down. "I knew this was 
going to happen," agreed an African pastor sitting next to me to headnodding all 
around. Stunned, I listened in silence as the mostly black members of my group 
criticized a confession which I had thought to be a constructive step forward. 
As I listened, I learned much about the complex nature of the task of reconciliation 
from bitter conflict. My colleagues in the group viewed the confession as a bid for 
cheap grace. "They've taken everything from us," one member put it, "now they 
think that all they need to do is say they're sorry, and we'll say 'you're forgiven' and 
then they can go their merry way, released of all further obligations." Another said, 
"I don't want nice apologies so white people can feel good. What I want is for whites 
to join us in the struggle to dismantle apartheid and create justice."10 
Exactly what understanding ofreconciliation the professor of theology held was unclear. But the 
skeptics in the discussion group thought that he sought an easy way out. They feared that having 
created a comfortable life for themselves at the cost of the blacks, whites would now offer hasty · 
apologies, request forgiveness, and tum their backs to the cost of their action. They knew that the 
shattered foundations of education, employment, and self-esteem which undergird the well-being of 
modem people would take many decades to re-build, and their sense of justice required that whites 
10 Ron Kraybill, '"Neutralising History': Moving Past Old Hurt," Track Two, Vol. 3, No. 3 (May/September 1994): 40. 
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share their wealth in accomplishing this. In short, they intuitively understood that for them to 
experience reconciliation with former oppressors, a series of actions needed to take place that 
involved much more than apologies and forgiveness. 
Rather than appearing "magically" from a profound event, reconciliation is accomplished only 
through hard work, that unfolds in stages over time. The following "stage model" represents an 
effort to identify key stages of such a process. Of course, reality almost never corresponds to models 
such as this one and it would be unrealistic to view this model as offering a formula for reconciliation 
in all circumstances. Neverthless, it enables us to dissect the complex nature of reconciliation and to 
reflect on the range of needs encountered by people moving through a process of healing from the 
trauma of bitter conflict. 
1. Vulnerable Relationship 
Before considering hurt and healing from it, we do well to consider the nature of "normal" 
relationships which are healthy by the standards of shalom. The key point for this discussion is that 
vulnerability is an essential part of such relationships. This is so because in order to experience the 
fullest potential in relationships, there needs to be trust, which enables people to share openly about 
themselves, make and accept promises without fear, share resources, etc. Trust takes time and effort 
to build, and the only way to build it is through taking risks. In the beginning, trust may be low, so 
risks that are taken are low too. But as trust grows, bigger risks are taken, leading to increased trust. 
Where people live in a state of shalom, risk and trust expand in an on-going cycle, and the 
relationship moves to an ever deepening plane. 
To choose to enter a state of risk in relationship to others makes a symbolic statement about vision for 
human community and resolution of differences. Persons or groups which choose to place themselves 
at the risk of injury or disappointment by others in hopes of moving towards peace in the context of a 
conflict state, by implication, that relationships (and thereby, accountability and moral discernment 
which become the basis for resolving differences when relationships are good) are important as the 
basis for working out differences, so important as to merit taking this risk. 
From this perspective, the only way to "enter" the reality of shalom is through voluntarily-chosen 
vulnerability, and insistence on absolute "security" is an obstacle to shalom. Wild leaps of risk are 
not the goal, but the reconciliation process can move faster and farther if people accept the principle 
of vulnerability as an essential dimension of all constructiv.e relationships. 11 This is difficult, for 
11 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas' argument that trust is the basis of true moral community. Hauerwas, A Community of Character, 
l l. See also J. Peter Cordelia, "Reconciliation and the Mutualist Model of Community" in Harold E. Pepinsky and 
Richard Quinney, editors, Criminology as Peacemaking (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), who sees lack of 
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people who have been injured by others understandably wish to avoid risk. I will return later to this 
question. 
2. Injury 
At some point expectations are not met. One party insults, exploits, betrays, attacks, invades the 
other, or is perceived as having done so. Risk has been rewarded, not with good outcomes and greater 
trust, but with injury. 
3. Withdrawal to Safety 
Withdrawal from risk follows injury. Frequently the withdrawal is physical: Individuals may turn 
their back or leave the room; groups may depart the region or the nation. Even when withdrawal is 
not physical, emotional withdrawal always takes place as people pull back into themselves to escape 
further injury and assess. Withdrawal may last for a second or a century. If people stay stuck in 
withdrawal it means the loss of relationships and opportunities for human and growth, but as a 
preliminary response to injury, it represents health and life, and often provides the first signal that 
something is not right. 
What happens after people are in the withdrawal stage is pivotal if genuine reconciliation is to occur. 
People are particularly vulnerable in this stage to the desire to take short-cuts that appear to bypass the 
hard work essential to return to shalom. In her work with individuals who had been victims of 
violence, author Judith Lewis Herman concluded that the "fantasy of magical resolution" is one of 
the most common causes of stagnation in the recovery process of such individuals.12 Herman 
believes this fantasy takes 3 common forms: the fantasy of revenge, the fantasy of forgiveness, and 
the fantasy of compensation, each of which are often thought to be capable of freeing victims from 
the lingering trauma of violence. So long as victims cling to the belief that any of these fantasies 
can accomplish the healing they seek, they remain frozen in the recovery process. 
The fantasy of revenge suggests that if like suffering is inflicted on the perpetrator of injury, victims 
will be freed from the trauma of the harm they have been dealt. But in fact, the opposite is true. 
Herman cites research showing that people who actually commit acts of revenge do not rid 
themselves of their pain, "rather, they seem to suffer the most severe and intractable disturbances."13 
We should note that the fantasy of revenge often comes cloaked in the language of justice. 
Sometimes calls for justice imply the existence of metaphysical laws approving the rightness of 
trust as a consequence of contractual understandings of society (33), and believes that "the first and foremost task of 
reconciliation is to restore trust." (42). 
12 Judith Lewis Hennan, Trauma and Recovery (Basic Books, 1992), 189. 
13 Ibid, 189. 
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retribution; sometimes they appeal to the common wisdom that punishment is necessary as a 
deterrent. From the standpoint of shalom, neither understanding of justice is helpful. Shalom does 
not assert the existence of metaphysical rights to maintain a balance of wrong, rather it calls people 
into a new way of relating to each other. Far from leading people into this new way, revenge locks 
people into the old in an escalating spiral of violence. 
The theory that punishment is necessary to deter future bad behavior undergirds the criminal justice 
system operating in most countries of the world today but the evidence supporting such an assertion is 
limited. Some evidence exists to show that the use of the death penalty, in fact, actually increases the 
inclination of people to kill. Apparently the message heard by some potential offenders when capital 
punishment is practiced "is not that killing is wrong, but that those who wrong us deserve to die. The 
message that offenders must get their due, and that what they are due is punishment, may teach a 
lesson quite different than what we intend."14 
To challenge revenge and its civilized cousin, punitive justice, is in no sense to give up on holding 
people responsible for their action and on the commitment to justice. The goal is rather to work for 
justice in ways that are transformative, that yield people and societies that are genuinely better and 
therefore no longer locked into cycles of violence. 
In a very different way from revenge, the fantasy of forgiveness is also often invoked by people in the 
withdrawal stage as a short-cut to reconciliation. Herman views forgiveness as an effort to 
"transcend ... rage and erase the impact of the trauma through a willful, defiant act oflove." But 
forgiveness often becomes "a cruel torture", she says, because "it remains out of reach of most 
ordinary human beings. Folk wisdom recognizes that to forgive is divine. And even divine 
forgiveness, in most religious systems, is not unconditional. True forgiveness cannot be granted until 
the perpetrator has sought and earned it through confession, repentance, and restitution."15 Later I 
will argue for the importance of forgiveness as an essential part of reconciliation at the appropriate 
point in the process. But as the initial response to violence it belongs in the category of fantasy where 
Herman puts it. 
The fantasy of compensation is another common block to reconciliation. Herman identifies it as a 
potential trap because it is often a form of denial. "Prolonged, fruitless struggles to wrest 
compensation from the perpetrator or from others may represent a defense against facing the full 
reality of what was lost. Mourning is the only way to give due honor to loss; there is no adequate 
14 Howard Zehr, Changing Lenses: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Scottdale PA: Herald Press, 1990), 77. 
15 Hennan, Trauma and Recovery, 190. 
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compensation."16 Again, I will later call for the possibility of compensation at a subsequent point in 
the reconciliation process, but if it is viewed in itself as the answer to injury, it blocks true 
reconciliation and the possibility of shalom. 
What can peacebuilders contribute to people needing reconciliation who are at the stage of 
withdrawal? The primary requirement is creating safety so that people are able to respond to the 
powerful drive present in all traumatized people to tell the story of their experience and wrestle with 
its meaning. At the most basic level, creating physical safety is a first step towards reconciliation. 
Ways in which peacebuilders have sought to create this include: 
• removing people from the site of conflict 
• inter-positioning themselves between warring parties 
• living with one or both sides of a conflict in order to reduce the likelihood of attack 
• arranging for visits by outsiders from media or other influential organizations 
Once safe from the threat of immediate harm, people need to experience "social safety", offered by 
relationships where they are supported in talking about traumatic experiences without fear of 
judgment or rejection. This kind of safety addresses the fundamental human need for recognition and 
respect by others17• Without it, people "freeze" at emotional and moral levels, withdrawing into 
isolation and removing themselves from the kinds of interaction which might bring true 
reconciliation. Peacebuilders have sought to offer this kind of safe social space to parties in conflict 
in a variety of ways: 
• by developing close relationships with key leaders in situations of conflict 
• by conducting off-the-record workshops for leaders that give them opportunity to reflect on 
issues related to their conflict situation, but which are removed from the scrutiny of the press 
and the public 
• by meeting with victims of violent conflict in a setting where they are free to speak about the 
trauma of their experience without fear of derision or reprisal 
Providing safety is something which many religious organizations are good at. Religious institutions 
are rarely perceived as powerful or dangerous or as competitors for political power. They also often 
represent priestly qualities of acceptance, grace and forgiveness, and they rarely have power to 
punish. Additionally, religious leader are often well-situated to help people in conflict to see through 
16 Ibid., 190. 
17 Cf. Burton, Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict, 11-28. 
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the fantasies of forgiveness, revenge, and compensation because calls for revenge and forgiveness 
frequently appeal to the realm of the divine. Religiously-based peacebuilders may hold special 
credibility in such discussions. 
4. Truth-Telling: Naming and Knowing the Experience of Suffering 
If people are to move beyond the grip of grief, anger and trauma, they must go through the stage of 
truth-telling and tell the truth as they experienced it. This is a different exercise than "establishing the 
truth." By "truth-telling" I refer to a narrative endeavor whose focus is on documenting and 
conveying reality as experienced by the narrator or those on whose behalf the narrator speaks. That 
reality is unique to them, for it consists of more than the "facts" of what happened, it also includes the 
emotional impact and social and spiritual significance of the events in question. 
"Establishing the truth" is a different enterprise whose purpose is to determine "objective" truth in a 
setting where facts are contested and it is deemed necessary to determine factuality. Its focus is less 
on the impact and significance of the events in question for those who experienced them, and more on 
the events themselves. While not ruling out the possibility that establishing the truth may assist 
reconciliation in some settings, truth-telling is always a necessary step in reconciliation and often 
obviates the need for establishing the truth. Establishing the truth, on the other hand, is often 
unnecessary, so long as truth-telling takes place18. Indeed, it may block reconciliation because it so 
easily becomes a substitute for truth-telling. That this is so becomes apparent when we understand 
fully the requirements of healing. 
In order to e~perience healing from past trauma, human beings need not only to remember, but also to 
integrate those memories and their implications into the present. Herman says, "The goal of 
recounting the trauma story is integration, not exorcism. In the process of reconstruction, the trauma 
story does undergo a transformation, but only in the sense of becoming more present and more real." 
She quotes trauma counselor Richard Mollica who describes the integrated and transformed trauma 
story as "a new story" which is "no longer about shame and humiliation" but rather "about dignity 
anovirtue." Through the process of storytelling, Mollica says his refugee patients "regain the world 
they have lost."19 
18 An important exception to this is situations where many people have "disappeared", and no specific information is 
available about what happened to them. In this case relatives and friends have powerful needs for information about the 
fate of their loved ones in order to make sense of their loss and properly mourn. Thus in South Africa and Argentine 
"truth commissions" have been established with power to grant immunity to individuals coming forward to testify about 
their involvement in atrocities. I believe that such commissions can be an important step in moving a society towards the 
essential task of truth-telling at many levels, so long as it is recognized that their work is a prelude or catalyst for a task 
that belongs to everyone, and cannot be a substitute for it. 
19 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 181, quoting Richard Mollica, "The Trauma Story: The Psychiatric Care of Refugee 
Survivors of Violence and Torture" in F. Ochberg, editor, Post-Traumatic Therapy and Victims of Violence (New York: 
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Healing capable of bringing shalom requires people to grapple with the meaning of the experience of 
trauma and pain for their life and beliefs, and by definition this is an exercise in truth-telling. The 
forensic enterprise of establishing the truth is less demanding and less painful than truth-telling, for it 
locates the quest for meaning in a new and current conflict that is external to each party, in the 
hearing chambers of a "truth commission". To be sure, the struggle for meaning can be informed and 
even assisted by the findings of such a commission, but it can never be replaced by it. 
Truth-telling as Remembering, Reconstructing, and Integrating 
Truth-telling may involve a number of tasks. At a minimum, it requires remembering and 
reconstructing the events of trauma in a narrative account to attentive and supportive listeners.20 The 
deepest psychic destruction of violence lies in its capacity to destroy the sense of trust and security 
which lies at the heart of human community, thereby separating and isolating the victim from 
others.21 By telling their story to attentive and supportive others, victims reduce its power to isolate 
them, and begin the slow and difficult task ofreestablishing bonds of community in the face of their 
trauma. 
When people remember and tell traumatic stories, they begin encountering deep emotions, 
particularly anger and grief Sometimes they resist this. Herman notes that although "the descent 
into mourning" is the most necessary task at this stage of recovery, it is also the most dreaded. Her 
patients often fear that "the task is insurmountable, that once they allow themselves to start grieving, 
they will never stop."22 For some, to resist mourning is a way of denying victory to the perpetrator. 
In this case Herman seeks to "reframe the patient's mourning as an act of courage rather than 
humiliation. "To the extent that the patient is unable to grieve, she is cut off from a part of herself and 
robbed of an important part of her healing. Reclaiming the ability to feel the full range of emotions, 
including grief, must be understood as an act of resistance rather than submission to the perpetrator's 
intent. Only through mourning everything she has lost can the patient discover her indestructible 
inner life." 23 
Brunner/Maze), 1988), 295-314. Cf. Robert Schreiter, Reconciliation: Mission and Ministry in a Changing Social Order 
(Mruyknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 34ff., who says that the destructive power of violence lies in its ability to destroy the 
narratives through which people sustain their life and faith and replace them with narratives of its own, which he calls 
"narratives of the lie". Schreiter's understanding of healing is similar to parallels that Herman's. The goal is to disengage 
the original, true narrative from the acts of violence. This is done by "repeating the narrative of the violence over and over 
again to ease the burden of trauma that it carries. Such an activity begins to put a boundruy around the violence, as it 
were, to separate it from memory." (p. 38) 
20 Ibid., 176ff. 
21 Schreiter, 37-38. 
22 Ibid., 188. 
23 Ibid., 188. 
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Inviting story-telling and listening uncritically are the foundation of any effort to enable truth-telling. 
Traumatized people presented with such an offer carefully monitor and determine the amount of 
social safety being offered by the listener as they speak. To the extent that they feel that the social 
space is "safe" they are likely to go deeper with their narrative. Thus inviting truth-telling and 
0 
responding supportively to it are closely linked to the needs for safety discussed in the previous stage. 
One important way to provide safety is through "group mourning." Walter Brueggemann has 
highlighted for the field of biblical studies the role that sacred rituals oflament and rage played in the 
life of the Hebrew people.24 Similarly, psychiatrist Vamik Volkan has documented the power of 
collective mourning through public rituals to legitimize grieving, thereby enabling traumatized 
societies to move beyond the past. 25 
Truth-telling is facilitated by truth-hearing, that is, an ability to listen well coupled with a keen sense 
of the deeper issues behind the stories being told, and an ability to ask questions that invite further 
truth-telling about those issues. Behind an account of imprisonment, for example, might lie a deeper 
truth, about the prisoner's loss of faith in family and friends, about a struggle with the use of violence 
as a means of resisting evil, about loss of faith in a deeply held vision for a multi-ethnic society, about 
an inner conflict over the role of the divine in history. 
The need to wrestle with such issues is another task often required in truth-telling. Herman says that 
many people need to conduct a systematic review of the meaning of the events both to the victim and 
to the important people in the victim's life. Where the trauma is particularly deep, the experience of 
remembering present a victim with the need 
to articulate the values and beliefs that she once held and that the trauma destroyed. 
She stands mute before the emptiness of evil, feeling the insufficiency of any known 
system of explanation. Survivors of atrocity of every age and every culture come to a 
point in their testimony where all questions are reduced to one, spoken more in 
bewilderment than in outrage: Why? The answer is beyond human understanding. 
Beyond this unfathomable question, the survivor confronts another, equally 
incomprehensible question: Why me? The arbitrary, random quality of her fate defies 
the basic human faith in a just or even predictable world order. In order to develop a 
full understanding of the trauma story, the survivor must examine the moral questions 
of guilt and responsibility and reconstruct a system of belief that makes sense of her 
undeserved suffering. Finally, the survivor cannot reconstruct a sense of meaning by 
24 Cf. Walter Brueggemann, The Message of the Psalms: A Theological Commentary (Minneapolis: Augsberg House, 1984), 
particularly his section on "Communal Laments", 67ff. 
25 V amik Volkan, "Psychological Concepts Useful in the Building of Political Foundations", Journal of the American 
Psychoanalytic Association 35: 903-935. See also Joseph Montville, "Psychoanalytic Enlightenment and the Greening 
of Diplomacy", in Volkan, Montville, and Demetrios Julius, The Psychodynamics of International Relationships 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1991), 177-192. 
the exercise of thought alone. The remed6 for injustice also requires action. The survivor must decide what is to be done.2 
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Such questions invariably lurk beneath the surface of bitter conflict. A listener who is aware that 
wrestling with these questions is an important part of healing for individuals and groups, and who 
listens carefully for them, can often bring them to the surface for explicit discussion. The point is not 
to answer the questions, but to assist in articulating them. 
Truth-telling as Knowing the Truth 
In addition to remembering and reintegrating, another requirement common among people who have 
been victimized is the need to know the truth. Many victims of crime demonstrate strong desires to 
know more information about the crime itself as they seek to work through the trauma of the 
experience. "Why was I picked? How did the offender get into my house? What did he do with the 
stolen items?" Information about such practical questions seems to meet an important need in victims 
f · · · 27 o cnmes m recuperatmg. 
It seems reasonable to expect that a similar need is likely to be present among victims of political 
violence as well. The obsession of many in the United States with determining the fate of 
unaccounted-for American servicemen who disappeared during the Viet Nam war as well as the 
phenomenon of American servicemen returning in substantial numbers in the 1990s to visit Viet Nam 
and sites of battles and imprisonment might be viewed as evidence of such a need. Simply providing 
accurate information to such persons may thus be an important step towards healing. More 
ambitiously, peacebuilders might seek to arrange opportunities for victims of trauma to meet people 
from "the other side" to assist in providing such information. 
In summary, although it is not adequate in itself to accomplish reconciliation, truth-telling is one of 
the most important steps in the journey of healing. By helping victims to begin regaining a sense of 
inner security it opens the possibility of reclaiming hope, re-establishing deep connections with other 
human beings, and even entering a constructive relationship with the enemy. It accomplishes this by 
giving people linguistic expression and control over reality as they narrate their experience to 
sympathetic listeners, thereby incorporating terrifying experiences into the safety of current reality 
and existing relationships. 
26 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, 178. 
27 Howard Zehr, in lectures given at Eastern Mennonite University, Harrisonburg, VA, November 2, 1995 and January 24, 
1996. Zehr identifies six key questions which recur among victims of crimes in their recovery from the trauma of their 
experiences: 1) What happened? 2) Why did it happen? 3) Why did I react as I did at the time? 4) Why have I acted as I 
have acted since the incident? 5) What will I do if this happens again? 6) What does this experience mean for my outlook 
on life? See also Herman, ibid .. , 158. 
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5. Identity Work 
Truth-telling reduces the power of trauma by giving its victims narrative control over chaos, but it 
still leaves much work to be done. The challenge is to move beyond the wreckage of the past 
remembered in truth-telling. This requires a sense of identity that includes the past but also 
transcends it. This is difficult, for prolonged, intensive conflict alters people's sense of reality and of 
their own role in it, to a point that their own identity is shaped largely by the struggle with an 
opponent. 
A common characteristic of such a situation is that parties are far more articulate about what they are 
against than about what they are for. In post-apartheid South Africa, for example, it has become 
apparent that the primary identity of many groups and organizations was that they were anti-
apartheid. As soon as the apartheid government was dissolved, the majority of such groups fell into 
disarray and conflict over their new identity. Their identity was, in effect, rooted in the past and 
depended in substantial part on the old conflict. Until a new identity is worked out, such groups are 
able to accomplish little; they are prone in fact to seek to re-create the dynamics of the old conflict as 
a way of perpetuating unity within themselves. 
Violent conflict is devastating to the identity of all parties, and the primary task of peace builders at 
this stage will almost always be to strengthen a sense of healthy group identity. The point seems 
obvious enough with those who have been deeply oppressed over a period of decades such as blacks 
in South Africa or Palestinians in the West Bank. It also seems obvious in regards to those who 
"lose" in a protracted struggle as they could be expected to suffer a deep crisis in identity as they 
come to grips with the reality of having wagered everything and lost. 
But what about "winners"? The truth is that the majority of the wars fought in today's world are 
between parties who are highly interdependent and therefore unable to attain a decisive win. In most 
conflicts the economic, social, and political costs are staggeringly high, and even that which is "won" 
is ambiguous. An internal crisis of identity is thus likely for both sides irt the transition from 
hostilities to peace. 
Reclaiming identity must begin in caucus, with each group gathering within the safety of a closed 
circle of those who share common perceptions. Victims of rape are not expected to work through the 
pain of this tragedy in the presence of the public, let alone the rapist. Neither should groups of people 
who have been deeply damaged as a collective be expected to work through the meaning of this 
experience in the presence of other groups. In this sense, it is a paradoxical phase, for it appears to 
be retrogressive, moving in the opposite direction of the ultimate goal of open interaction with other 
groups. But any group which neglects this essential stage, or is denied the social space, 
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understanding, and respect necessary to go through it, is likely to become frozen in a permanent quest 
for identity that often expresses itself eventually in rigid and aggressive forms of ethnicism or 
nationalism. Eastern Europe today, where expressions of ethnic identity were repressed for decades, 
is a case in point. 
From this perspective we can see that Black Consciousness as known in South Africa and some other 
African settings in fact represents a necessary and healthy phase in the healing process of blacks from 
the devastation of colonialism. Similarly, the efforts of some whites in South Africa to withdraw into 
white enclaves represents a necessary stage in the process of developing a new identity there. What 
separatists of all stripes require to move beyond dogmatic isolation is not sneers or admonition about 
tolerance and pluralism. Rather they need uncritical support in reclaiming their threatened identity. 
Support does not mean tolerating abuse by one group of other groups, or acceding to demands to 
institutionalize isolation in every phase of life but it does mean giving space for withdrawal at some 
levels. Above all, it means social and physical safety and complete, authentic respect for the identity 
and basic human needs of the group in question. 
One of the most important dimensions of this stage is acknowledging and wrestling with the dark side 
of group identity. Lurking in the historical background of virtually every group involved in 
significant conflict are experiences which inflicted a great deal of pain or self-doubt, often both. It is 
widely recognized by historians, for example, that the roots of Nazism lay in the humiliation 
experienced by Germany at the end of World War One, leading to a deep desire on the part of German 
citizens to reclaim their shattered identity as a people.28 Similarly, apartheid in South Africa can be 
understood in part as a determined effort on the part of white Afrikaaners to recover their sense of 
pride as a people after being humiliated by the British in the Boer Wars at the tum of the twentieth 
century. 
Such experiences of collective trauma deeply damage the psyche of a people, leaving self-doubt, 
guilt, and insecurity in their wake. If these feelings are acknowledged openly they are likely to lose 
their power. If they are not - as they were not in Germany and South Africa - they root themselves in 
the hidden recesses of group awareness and often grow with time to monstrous proportions, 
expressing themselves in negative attitudes towards other groups, stereotyping, and hostility that can 
easily be transmuted into hatred, bellicosity, and aggressiveness.29 
28 See for example, Donald W. Shriver, Jr., An Ethic for Enemies: Forgiveness in Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 12. 
29 See Ronald J. Fisher, The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International Conflict Resolution (New York: Springer-
Verlag, 1990), 59-85, for a review of the substantial body of literature supporting this assertion. See also Eileen Borris, -
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One of the most useful psychological concepts for understanding the power of past pain to block 
peace is that of projection, a process whereby people attribute to others those feelings or desires 
which they prefer not to recognize or admit. In projection we "deny our feelings of guilt, those 
painful negative thoughts and feelings we have about ourselves, and instead only see them in someone 
else. Thus we attack and blame others for the weaknesses we cannot accept in ourselves, becoming 
blind to our own shortcoming."30 The consequence, in Jung's words, is that "projections change the 
world into replicas of one's own face". 31 
Projection depends on denial and lack of awareness for its power. By acknowledging the existence of 
self-doubt or guilt, a group decreases its tendency to project negative images onto others. Old hatreds 
are likely to dissipate and new hostilities are less likely to develop.32 
Supporting the struggle for identity, then, is an essential dimension of peacebuilding in the vision of 
shalom. Rather than planting deep seeds of future conflict by pushing painful dimensions of the 
struggle for meaning underground, identity work prepares the way for peace by wrestling openly with 
them. To the extent that both parties take seriously the need to do identity work, the possibilities for 
transformation are greatly enhanced. 
In many respects facilitating identity work in the context of group conflict resembles the effort to 
reach what western psychology in the context of individual therapy calls ".self-awareness" and calls 
for similar skills. A major goal is to explore and bring to conscious awareness the diverse realities of 
the group's collective "self'. By exploring its strengths and weaknesses, its faces of darkness and 
light, a group comes to understand itself better, arrives at a point where it is more able to make 
conscious choices, and thus for the first time is able to take full, conscious moral responsibility for its 
actions. The widely recognized skills of thoughtful query, careful listening, and interaction as a "non-
"The Healing Power of Forgiveness", unpublished paper distributed by Peace Initiatives (6450 East Hummingbird Lane, 
Paradise Valley, Arizona, US 85253), for an insightful discussion of projection as the mechanism underlying this link. 
30 Ibid, 11. 
31 Ibid., 11. .. 
32 Ken Wapnick suggests that forgiveness is a matter of reversing the process of projection. Instead of projecting negative 
feelings about self onto others, in forgiveness we recognize the source of those bad feelings within ourselves and thus 
"own" them. Ken Wapnick, Forgiveness and Jesus (Farmingdale, NY: Coleman Publishing, 1983), quoted in Borris, -
"The Healing Power of Forgiveness", 12. This proposal need not be understood as implying that all source of injustice 
lies within, but rather that we often fail to see clearly what is happening, to grasp all the options for response available to 
us, or to understand the motivations and needs of others because we project our bad feelings about self onto others. Rather 
than understand others as human beings with weaknesses and vulnerabilities, we demonize them and develop deep 
hatreds. By coming to greater clarity about its own identity, and particularly in addressing its guilt, a group decreases its 
tendency to project negative images onto others and cling to hatred. This allows the group to interact more openly with 




employed by counselors seeking to facilitate self-awareness in individuals will go 
a long way towards supporting the struggle for collective identity or awareness. 
But to become "aware" at the level of the collective requires reflection at a level of existential depth 
rarely implied by western notions of individual "awareness". In terms of Berger's framework 
described in the Introduction, individuals exist in a larger social context which provides a collective 
framework of cosmic meaning. The popular concept of "self-awareness" is often content to focus on 
individual behavior and emotions and ignores deeper issues. If a group or nation is to reflect on and 
grow from the experience of large scale violence, it cannot evade these larger cosmic questions. 
Again we see the peacebuilder called upon to assist in "doing theology". 
As in doing theology anywhere, half of the challenge in doing theology in the context of identity work 
is to identify the critical questions and frame them in ways that those most in need of such reflection 
see the relevance of the exercise. Thus truth-hearing is the starting place for the "peacebuilder as 
theologian". The challenge is to recognize the issues of identity which every violent conflict poses 
for those involved, and to pose them for discussion at the moment when people are ready to wrestle 
with them. The deeper truth, for example, behind a leader's long account of atrocities, may be an 
existential crisis of survival for his people. Acknowledging and naming this crisis may give that 
leader the sense that for the first time someone outside his own party "understands" what is happening 
to them and that in fact his people still exist in the eyes of others. Alternatively, it might lead to 
discussion about what is fueling his massive buildup in arms, or set the stage for discussion about how 
the survival of his people might better be ensured through peaceful means. 
One set of potentially useful questions has to do with the group's identity in relation to other groups: 
How are we perceived in the eyes of others outside the conflict? 
What is our role in the post-conflict era in relation both to former enemies as well as to other 
groups or nations? 
Who are we; what beyond our struggle against an "enemy'' defines us as a group? 
To the extent that the parties are interdependent (and the chances are high that this will be the 
case), what aspects of our identity support the validity of cooperating with someone we 
previously viewed as an enemy? What aspects of our previous identity may we need to 
relinquish? 
But these questions point to a deeper level of often unconscious assumptions about the nature of 
reality and meaning which are fundamentally religious in nature. 
What is the meaning of history? 
33 Cf. Edwin H. Friedman, Generation to Generation: Family Process in Church and Synagogue (New York: Guilford 
Press, 1985), 208; and C. Margaret Hall, The Bowen Family Theory and Its Use (New York: Jason Aronson, 1983). 
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How do we explain the reality of darkness - pain, tragedy, evil, etc.? 
What is our vision for humanity and particularly, how is humanity to be freed from the reality of 
darkness? 
What is our role/status as a group in history? How are we called upon to respond to the reality of 
darkness? How are we to participate in gaining freedom from the darkness? What resources do 
our deepest traditions of faith offer as we respond? 
The answers to these questions "write the map" of group identity and substantially determine how 
people respond to those whom they encounter, particularly in the setting of conflict. If, for example, 
the meaning of history is understood to be that some god of divinity or economics must conquer all, 
the reality of darkness is understood as due to a particular category of humanity (sinners, elites, 
communists, capitalists, etc.) and freedom from darkness is believed to come only by defeating and 
eliminating people belonging to this category, the identity of the group holding such beliefs is likely 
to be deeply invested in war, violence, and weapons. 
Are these truly the understandings of meaning, history and the role of humanity in them required by 
your god? This is a question a peacebuilder might ask of such a group. If the answer were 
affirmative, the task is to find ways to challenge such understandings.34 
What militia leader in Liberia, what politician in Ireland, what freedom fighter from anywhere will 
participate in such discussion? It is important to acknowledge that discussion of this kind may take 
place infrequently and only in the context of intensive relationship. Obviously interaction of this 
nature is not the only goal of peacebuilders. But to experience transformation, individuals and 
societies must at some point wrestle with questions at this level. As peacebuilders we seek to move in 
this direction, in full knowledge that in any given interaction we may not be able to go as far as 
desirable. 
The goal of discernment underscores a previous point that peacebuilding capable of yielding shalom, 
by definition, needs to move beyond the narrow circles of political and military elites who usually 
control power but hold the least interest in such issues. The gods, after all, have often dealt kindly 
with such people, and they may have no reason to question them. To be catalysts of discernment 
presses peacebuilders, figuratively speaking, into the marketplace of societies in conflict. Here 
34 This underscores a point made previously about discernment. To contribute to reflection at this level peacebuilders cannot 
enter a conflict as "neutrals" defined only by professional values. Partly this is a matter of having some grounds from 
which to recognize issues: Unless we hold our own deeply-rooted identity we have no standpoint from which to raise 
questions that ought to be raised. Partly also this is a matter of credibility. To ask questions of this nature implies values 
on the part of the questioner. The deeper our interaction becomes, the more likely others are to sense that our attention to 
these issues reflects our own deep interest in the agendas at hand. Claims to being neutral would thus rightly be perceived 
as disingenuous and manipulative. The only credible stance on the part of peacebuilders is to approach such questions 
openly as people with their own clear values who are nevertheless keenly interested in reflection in a joint quest for further 
insight. 
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matters of meaning, like everything else, are openly up for grabs and people with unusual questions 
are more likely to arouse interest rather than suspicion. 
Then too, we can taice a cue from Folger and Bush. In their discussion of transformation, the 
recurring phrase which brings their strategies for human transformation within reach of mediators at 
work in the grim realities of 1995 is "presenting opportunities." For them, mediators do not 
"empower'' others or engage in recognition "for" them, they merely "present opportunities" for others 
to grasp if they so choose. The task for the "peacebuilder as theologian" is not to force theological 
reflection down anybody's throat, but rather to seek to do theology in ways that articulate the 
unspoken but deeply-felt questions burning in the hearts of all, most of all those trapped in the 
devastation of conflict. 
6. Re-Connection: Acknowledgment of Interdependence and Return of Risk 
As questions of meaning and their own identity are dealt with, people in conflict move to a more 
secure level of awareness. This enables them to begin shifting from the purely defensive postures 
which have characterized them up to this point, and to begin expanding their horizons. In most 
conflicts one of the first outcomes will be an awareness that they do not exist independently of their 
opponent and cannot thrive without cooperation. 
This raises a difficult reality which often demands a courageous choice to overcome. To pursue their 
own well-being requires people to cooperate with opponents, and this inevitably means taking risks. 
Such risks might include loss of face and influence within one's own camp for being "soft'' on the 
enemy, the possibility of being outmaneuvered or deceived at the bargaining table, the possibility of 
losing military advantage while engaged in bargaining, etc. 
0 
Having suffered in the past, injured parties are understandably wary of risking further loss at the 
hands of opponents. But as we saw in the first stage of the cycle, risk is the foundation of all 
relationships. If people are to proceed further in the reconciliation process they must accept the 
reality of risk. The hardest part is often accepting the principle of risk. Once this is done, the specific 
choice regarding what risk to take is often easier. Initially, of course, the risk should be small. But if 
there is openness to reconciliation on both sides, a small risk can lead to sufficient trust to undertake a 
somewhat larger risk, and the possibility now exists for constructing high levels of trust over time. 
7. Restorative Negotiations 
So far we have addressed the social and relational dimensions of reconciliation. But practical issues 
are at staice as well. By this I refer not to the routine list of issues requiring negotiation in any major 
conflict, such as cease-fires, boundaries, political arrangements, etc. A variety of texts already 
+ 
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address the challenge of negotiating these matters from the standpoint of classic bargaining theory. 
My concern is rather with demands to right the wrongs of the past, calls for ''justice", "reparations", 
compensation. How can we respond to these? 
As a starting point, it is important to acknowledge that the paradigm usually dominating 
understandings of ''justice" in such conversations is the western legal model of criminal justice. This 
model of "retributive justice" is punitive in nature. Its primary concerns are determining blame about 
past events and allocating punishment, and doing this in ways that are fair, impartial, and "rational"35. 
Current and future needs of the parties are secondary. Rather than "raising" either party, the goal is 
to establish a sense of balance by "lowering" the offender through punishment.36 The relationship 
between the individuals involved is of no concern; the goal is simply to determine blame and 
administer pain fairly. 
This paradigm depends heavily, of course, on post-enlightenment liberal thought which looks to well-
crafted, impartial social institutions as the key to a just society in which individuals are free to pursue 
self-interest. In this view of society, people do not need a shared history or a shared future, "all they 
need is a system of rules that will constitute procedures for resolving disputes as they pursue their 
various interests."37 Responsibility for justice resides solely with society. Thus when, for example, a 
robber is prosecuted, his prosecutor is not the individual whom he robbed, but rather the state. The 
individuals affected by a crime have a role only to the extent that they are needed to present evidence 
for prosecution by the state. 
In contrast to retributive justice, criminologist Howard Zehr develops a proposal for what he calls 
"restorative justice". Rather than punishing, restorative justice is primarily concerned with problem~ 
solving. The focus is on addressing present and future needs of the people connected to a crime, 
rather than on allocating blame regarding events of the past. Restitution is a part of the picture in 
restoring a sense of balance between the parties, but its purpose is not punitive, rather it is undertaken 
as part of a larger effort to "raise" both victim and offender. 38 The context and the goal of restorative 
justice, in short, is relationships. The criteria for success is not whether a previously-agreed system 
35 In its emphasis on impartial, rational imposition of punishment, retributive justice is heavily indebted to the influen~~ of 
liberalism on legal thought. John Rawls' A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) is the best-
known exposition of this tradition. See Jonathan Burnside, "Tension and Tradition in the Pursuit of Justice" in Jonathan 
Burnside and Nicola Baker, editors, Relational Justice: Repairing the Breach (Winchester, UK: Waterside Press, 1994), 
42-52, for a summary of understandings of justice at work in the field of criminal justice. 
36 These are Howard Zehr's terms. Cf. his Changing Lenses: A New Focus in Crime and Justice (Scottdale, PA: Herald 
Press, 1993), 191-214. 
37 Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1980), 78. 
38 Zehr, 191-214. 
has been fairly applied but whether the needs of the people involved have been met in the best way 
possible. 
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For a variety of reasons, "restorative justice" offers a more appropriate model of re-dressing wrong in 
the context of many political and international conflicts than retributive justice. 39 Retribution has 
limited ability to change behavior and even less to improve the moral capacity of human beings.40 At 
best, it deters bad behavior. But even where it succeeds in this, by institutionalizing deterrence rather 
than calling people to the more difficult responses of empowerment, recognition, and ethical 
reflection, it freezes societies at the lowest levels of moral functioning. Almost without exception, 
retribution increases levels of bitterness and hostility, leading to more conflict and reduced moral 
reflectivity. From the standpoint of the transformative vision of shalom, retribution only prolongs the 
dawn of a new era. 
What is more, the nature of the relationship between parties in most violent conflicts differs 
profoundly from that envisioned by modem legal theory. At one level they are less committed, less 
bound by a sense of common consent to a social contract recognized by all to provide the essential 
framework for public well-being, a loyalty taken for granted by liberal democracy. Groups and 
nations go to war because they lack such a contract. 
At the same time, groups locked in communal conflict are usually more interdependent, less capable 
of ignoring each other and pursuing their own interests unilaterally than individuals are assumed to be 
in the vision of liberal democracy. Recent scholarly reflection on "deep-rooted" or "protracted" 
conflict supports this assertion, high-lighting inter-dependency as a prominent feature of the world's 
most notorious conflicts. Such conflicts are bitter and prolonged partly because the groups involved 
are deeply inter-twined historically, economically, geographically, etc. For better or for worse, the 
fates of the diverse groups that make up Ireland, South Africa, or the former Yugoslavia are 
profoundly linked. No single group is likely to be able to sustain a secure and prosperous life for a 
lengthy period of time so long as any other group in this settings is deprived of the means to meet its 
basic human needs.41 
39 Cf. the long-standing effort to establish a United Nations War Tribunal which would presumably operate in the same kinds 
of conflict situations we here envision. This effort, misguidedly I believe, assumes the model of Western criminal justice 
systems in its approach, proposing a system of judges, prosecutors, rules of evidence, a specified range of penalties, etc. 
Conversation with Howard Zehr, November 2, 1995, in Harrisonburg, Virginia. 
40 Zehr, Changing Lenses, 63-82. 
41 This assumption pervades the writings of John Burton. See also Ron Kraybill, "Negotiating to Meet Basic Human Needs", 
paper presented at the Conference on Conflicts and Negotiations, University of South Africa, Pretoria, August 29-21, 
1991; and Jay Rothman, "Supplementing Tradition: A Theoretical and Practical Typology for International Conflict 
Management", Negotiation Journal, Vol. 5., Number 3 (July 1989): 265-277. 
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We already know that the infliction of punishment in current criminal justice systems results in 
enormous amounts of bitterness on the part of those "punished". Societies are able to ignore the costs 
of this bitterness because they are dispersed and borne by the entire society. But bitterness on the 
part of a large group of people towards those "punishing" them could not be ignored, particularly 
when "punisher" and "punished" are interdependent. 
The interests of all are likely to be served best by an understanding of justice which focuses on 
meeting real and current needs rather than on inflicting pain. Restoration seeks to address the cry for 
righting the wrongs of the past by calling people into face-to-face encounter to negotiate ways to do 
this. Such "restorative negotiations" might at key points look familiar. For example, financial 
reparations for war damage might be a part of the agenda, a Truth Commission might be established 
to verify reports of atrocities. But restorative negotiations would be distinguished by several features: 
• Restoration of relationships would be recognized as the primary goal of justice and serve as 
the yardstick for evaluating proposals. 
• Transformation of the people and societies involved would provide a related, secondary 
criteria, pointing beyond mere deterrence of future bad behavior. 
• It would be recognized that the people in conflict need to work out their own answers 
regarding how to serve justice in response to a particular conflict, that no independent 
external criteria or mechanisms are capable of determining this. Of course, where they exist, 
standards of law could be recognized as of value in determining a just response. But these 
would serve as useful strands in a larger process of dialogue and discernment undertaken by 
those in conflict, not as final arbiters of justice. 
• As a relational process, other tasks described in this chapter would play an important, 
strategic role. If the requirements of justice are determined by the people involved in conflict, 
they are likely to be significantly affected by truth-telling, identity work, or apologies. 
8. Apology and Forgiveness 
Violent conflict imposes irreparable losses on all it touches in terms of disruption, fear and anxiety, 
and most of all the loss of human life. No material compensation is capable of addressing these losses. 
Yet former enemies have enormous power to assist each other in healing the gaping wounds of 
violence they have inflicted upon each other. By choosing to participate in acts of apology and 
forgiveness they can cooperate in enabling the healing of that which is unrestorable. 
Those who have inflicted tragic losses on others can acknowledge the hurt that their actions have 
caused, even if they continue to feel that they had no other choice at the time. If they engage in 
activities of the nature described in this chapter they are likely to have become aware of mistakes 
which their side made. Confessing these is likely to have a profound affect on the other party, 
particularly if there has been progress in restorative negotiations. 
Forgiveness as Openness to Risk 
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As the receiving side of apology, forgiveness indicates the willingness of the forgiver not to be bound 
in future relationships by memories of the past. One of its costliest requirements is willingness to 
entertain risk at the hands of people who in the past have inflicted deep injury. "We can forgive but 
we cannot forget," people sometimes say. In essence, such a stance usually means, "We are not 
prepared to become vulnerable again". Where this is so, forgiveness has not yet been achieved. 
The timing of apologies thus becomes essential in order to recognize that to forgive requires people to 
return to a state of vulnerability. Apologies have the greatest capacity to move a conflict towards 
shalom if they follow restorative negotiations. This sequence enables them to accomplish their fullest 
potential as a symbolic extension of previous hard work on practical issues into the realm of that 
which io no longer accessible to negotiations. If apology is offered without any experience to suggest 
that the apologizers recognize the cost of their actions to others, how can "forgivers" be expected to 
entertain risks in the future? 
Apology as Commitment to Moral Vision 
In the chapter on Transformation I suggested that the power of apology is due in part to the implicit 
statement that the apologizers intend to guide their conduct by moral vision and principle rather than 
expedient self-interest. To apologize is to affirm a central dimension of the vision of shalom, 
namely, that it is possible to guide human behavior by moral discernment, by "what is right" rather 
than "what is expedient". It is the assertion of such a hope in the context of human brokenness which 
makes apology powerful. 
Asserting that hope invokes potent moral claims on others. Earlier I recounted an experience of black 
South Africans who reacted with anger to the apology of a white theology professor for apartheid, 
because they suspected he sought easy release for his people from the damages of apartheid. We can 
now describe their response in different terms: They were angry because they intuitively recognized 
the power of apology to lay moral claims on them to do something they were not yet ready to do. The 
professor's apology, though well-intended, came too early. His listeners had no way of assessing his 
commitment to engaging in the difficult work of restoration which ought to have preceded apology. 
Though this incident for this reason didn't "succeed" in creating a strong immediate sense of hope for 
reconciliation, it nevertheless offers strong witness to the power of apology to evoke encounter at the 
level of moral discernment. 
+ 
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In my view then, apology is the supreme strategic move towards reconciliation, capturing better than 
any other human response the potential for transformation towards shalom. In one symbolic 
maneuver it recognizes the realm of moral discernment as the desired grounds for response to 
conflict, expresses hope in the possibility that such a realm could become the dominant realm of 
encounter for addressing the conflict at hand, makes a noncontingent offer on the part of apologizer to 
enter that realm and be judged by it, and invites the opponent to respond by entering that realm as 
well. 
Apology and Forgiveness in International Politics? 
Are apology and forgiveness realistic possibilities in the world of international politics? The question 
can be answered in several ways. At a rhetorical level, we might reply that they are the only realistic 
solution to situations where the devastation of conflict is great. Pursuit of revenge or retributive 
justice implies that the losses can somehow be made up for or made right, an obvious illusion when 
human lives are destroyed. If the criteria for action is realism and pragmatism, then the case for 
forgiveness already seems adequately established by the irreversibility of the most costly losses of 
war. 
At a historical level, we can point out that confession and forgiveness, while almost non-existent as 
categories of political behavior, are nevertheless well-documented in political affairs and international 
relations.42 In the case which we will examine later, they in fact played an important role in the lives 
of individuals with access to key figures on both sides of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations and 
implicitly at least, in exchanges between the leading protagonists, Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe. 
At a procedural level, confession and forgiveness become more realistic responses when they are 
understood as an integral part of a larger framework of reconciliation tasks such as that sketched 
above. Within such a framework we are able to recognize that contrary to common misperception, 
these acts of the heart are possible only as a culmination of other practical work. While magic and 
transcendent grace often accompany them, confession and forgiveness begin at a much more mundane 
level, with the gritty tasks of truth-telling, identity work, and restorative negotiations. 
Forgiveness as Gift 
The above notwithstanding, it would be less than fair to human experience not to point out that people 
who achieve forgiveness often report an awareness of the necessity of what Eileen Borris calls a 
42 Cf. Bryan Hamlin, Forgiveness in International Affairs (London: Grosvenor Books, 1992), a 36 page pamphlet describing 
experiences of forgiveness in international politics in which Moral Re-Armament has been involved. See also Shriver, 
ibid., who develops three in-depth case studies ofreconciliation involving the US. Nicholas Tavuchis' thoughtful work, 
ibid., contains many examples of apologies in a wide variety of contexts. Brian Frost in The Politics of Peace (London: 
Darton, Longman and Todd, 1991) recounts experiences from throughout the world. 
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"third factor", an external force capable of empowering the forgiver. "Because we are so enmeshed in 
our ego we need an outside 'third factor"', writes Borris, "which enables us to step out of one system 
of thinking based in fear and guilt to a new system of thinking which enables us to see the world 
differently.',43 The "third factor" 
may be a specific element of strength, faith, or trust which makes us sufficiently free from the 
feelings of guilt, shame, anger, and distrust so we can be at peace with ourselves. [It] may be 
characterized as the transcending and contingent element in interpersonal relationships, the 
spark of courage to jump over the barrier. It is this surprising energy which dismantles the 
dividing walls between us. Call it God, or the Holy Spirit, or compassion, or faith in our 
common humanity, we need this factor to complete the forgiveness process. We can only 
prepare our mind by recognizing what we do not want, and then invite this third factor to help 
us transcend our fearful ways of thinking and acting. It is in our communion with this third 
force that we experience an internal emotional release which frees us from the past and brings 
inner peace to our lives. ,,44 
Part of the task for peacebuilders is to present the concept of forgiveness in ways that people in 
conflicts see its relevance for them. Borris' concept of a "third factor" is useful in accomplishing this, 
for it points to the possible of transcendence without prescribing the source. Her proposal also points 
towards discernment as an essential task in reconciliation. To rise above the past, people in conflict 
need to explore their own faith and values for those dimensions capable of bringing transcendence. 
Conclusion 
At the heart of shalom lies a vision for human beings to address their conflicts through collective 
moral discernment for human life rather than through unprincipled self-interest. The first casualty of 
violence is faith in the possibility of such a vision. Ultimately this is the most tragic casualty as well 
for its loss undermines the only basis on which it is possible for human beings to build the kind of 
community required for survival and prosperity. The task of peacebuilders is to interact with people 
in conflict in ways that enables restoration of this hope and assists them to act on it. 
Bargaining alone is incapable of doing this, for it ignores the powerful emotional and social injuries 
inflicted by violence, injuries which block the wells of trust and faith essential for any community to 
commit itself to moral discernment with opponents as the strategy for dealing with conflict. 
Healing of such injuries is a process involving numerous activities. Some, such as some dimensions 
of truth-telling and identity work, may appear to contradict the goal of reconciliation. But if 
peacebuilders grasp the processual nature of reconciliation and the importance of supporting people in 
43 Borris, "The Healing Power of Forgiveness", 15. 
44 Ibid, 15-16. Cf. Geiko Muller-Fahrenholtz, "Is Forgiveness in Politics Possible", presentation to 25th Anniversary 
Conference of the International Peace Research Association, July, 1990, Groningen, Netherlands, who says "Although 
forgiveness is a process between two conflictive partners it is dependent on a third factor which can be called the 
+ 
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conflict in accomplishing key reconciliation tasks, they are in a better position to assist. They may 
also be better equipped to help convince those who argue for purely "political" solutions to conflicts -
meaning bargaining and other structurally-oriented approaches - to recognize the importance of 
broadening their understanding of "political". The goal should be the reconciliation of the entire 
polis, and that requires strategies which acknowledge the complex nature of the reality of conflict and 
of the steps needed for healing from it. 
transcending element. Hence forgiveness is of a triadic nature." Prof. Muller-Fahrenholz teaches at the University for 




Earlier I said that the shalom vision is eschatological in that it develops strategy in light of a 
reality that is begun but not yet fully present. To say that this is an ambitious agenda is an 
understatement. Paul, the first Christian theologian, acknowledged that the Christian vision which 
understood divine nature as operating through solidarity, vulnerability, invitation, creative 
initiatives to restore relationships, and willingness to suffer to the point of death while 
accomplishing these was sheer "foolishness" .1 Although I have attempted to demonstrate that 
these understandings in fact make sense as guiding themes in the task of peace building, it would 
probably be a betrayal of the vision itself to try to make the whole project look "sensible" in terms 
of current understandings of politics and society. If we believe that the world around us is sick 
and destructive - a conclusion which seems inescapable just from the number of children who 
daily die of hunger or toil as slave laborers not to mention the many other indexes of suffering 
available - we can hardly expect to judge the reconciling potential of a proposed response 
according to whether or not it seems "sensible" by the lights of the ideologies of domination which 
govern current political and economic thinking. 
My proposal is that the vision of shalom cannot be understood except in the context of community 
of reconciliation~ that is, a group of people bonded by a common vision for shalom and 
accountable to each other in decisionmaking about the meaning of that vision.2 In the following 
sections I expand this proposal with the following assertions: 
That it is impossible to sustain a vision for the possibility of a "new world" or for genuinely 
transformed people and structures without community; 
That community is essential in the development and preparation of peacebuilders. 
That the realities in which conflicts are rooted are community realities and that this requires 
that peacebuilders likewise be rooted in community. 
1 I Corinthians I and 2. 
2 Cf. John Paul Lederach and Ron Kraybill, "The Paradox of Popular Justice: A Practitioner's View", in Sally Merry and 
Neal Milner, The Possibility of Popular Justice: A Case Study of Community Mediation in the United States (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 359. 
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That the concept of community provides important insights in guiding the strategizing of 
peacebuilders. 
As background I begin by critiquing an approach widely visible in the field of conflict resolution 
which exemplifies part of the problem I seek to address in this section. 
The Peacebuilder as Lone Cowboy 
A common approach to peacebuilding might be characterized as the lone cowboy model of 
peacebuilding. More a frame of mind than a description of actual practice or social form 3, the 
lone cowboy phenomenon appears in several variations. It appears commonly among the ranks of 
professional short-term service providers, those individuals who carry a package of skills into 
situations of conflict and seek places to market them, often at substantial fees. It also appears 
among the ranks of service workers, who take up residence in a conflicted area for a period of 
time, but who in some cases nevertheless function atomistically, with little counsel or support 
from others. The cowboy phenomenon is often evident among the ranks of famous personages 
who trade on personal reputation to intervene in conflict situations. Finally it makes its 
appearance in a different social form in the world of large professional organizations, in the shape 
of organizations (whose values are shaped of course by the individuals prominent in them) for 
whom a desire to gain prestige, pre-eminence, a "corner on the market", in a given sector of the 
field or a specific region of the world is nearly as strong and sometimes stronger than the 
commitment to serve the needs of others. 
In whatever setting it appears, the marks of the lone cowboy mentality are individualism, self-
interested conduct, and often competitiveness towards others. As professional service provider or 
famous personage, the cowboy is often self-anointed and frequently spends a great deal of time 
marketing himself or his skills to others 4• He is often accountable to no one other than perhaps an 
organization which he founded and controls. Often the cowboy works alone. Support staff may 
accompany and assist or even carry out important activities in his name, but the enterprise often 
trades on the name of an individual. Organizations run on the cowboy model may have several 
strong leaders, but are opportunistic, competitive in attitude towards other organizations, and .. 
3 I stress this point for I do not wish to suggest that every solo peacebuilder is by definition a lone cowboy. 
4 I use the male pronoun here without apology because in fact it is most commonly men who are described by this 
caricature. 
aggressively expansionist, flitting from one arena of activity to another in breathless pursuit of 
funds. 
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The lone cowboy is a representative in the field of peace building of the processes of 
modernization which have been at work in our world since at least the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648, which marks the beginning of the modem experiment to replace community with the nation-
state as the reference point for political life.5 A key dimension of this complex process has been a 
shift in understanding away from accountability to a collective or community as the object of life 
towards viewing the individual as the primary unit and goal of human consciousness. Larry 
Rasmussen points out that by the end of the twentieth century this shift in understanding had 
culminated in a way of life and style of thinking "that regarded persons in largely economic terms; 
that is, as autonomous creatures who, on the basis of their own wants and preferences, fashion 
their own world in a series of relationships they themselves make and unmake. "6 The 
consequence of this shift in attention from communities to individuals, Rasmussen says, has been 
the dissolution of communities in modem society and the destruction of the only means for 
developing citizens capable of moral reflection and behavior. It has also led to a loss of concern 
for the collective good and for public life itself. 
Rasmussen's analysis suggests that the modem understanding of human beings is inimical to the 
vision of shalom, which understands human beings as accountable to each other and guides human 
behavior by a vision that includes the needs of all. It also suggests that the "peacebuilder as lone 
cowboy" is a contradiction in terms, for the cowboy's understanding of the world is rooted in 
precisely the forces of atomization which are so disastrously dividing our world. 7 Peace builders 
need an alternative understanding of the essence of human reality and the basis of human action if 
we seek to build shalom. In my view, that understanding is community, a collective social reality 
whose function and ideal character in peacebuilding are described in the remainder of this chapter. 
Community as Sustainer of the Vision of Peace 
Shalom as Alternative Reality 
The possibility towards which shalom points is community, a place, in broadest terms, where 
decisions are made with commitment to the welfare of all. Shalom not only begins with a vision 
for life in community, it leads to community, which in tum carries the vision and sustains those 
5 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 34. 
6 Ibid, 31. 
7 Cf. Ibid, 31. 
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who seek to live by it. This becomes apparent as we realize that one of the immediate 
consequences of efforts to live out the vision is the creation of practices and institutions based on 
values that differ significantly from existing society. Those committed to these practices and 
institution have an alternative reading of history, a different set of stories through which they 
convey their own understanding of life and its meaning, and it is these stories which preserve the 
vision for community. 
As an alternative reading of history, the vision of shalom directly challenges dominant 
understandings. It subverts nationalism and the claims of absolute loyalty to citizenship on which 
nations worldwide rely for their strength, by calling for people to give highest loyalty to a global 
peoplehood rather than to the parochial self-interest of individual nation states. Similarly, it 
challenges ethnic and local identity. At a different level, by insisting that means and ends are 
indivisible, shalom challenges the reliance on coercion and competition which characterize 
political and economic structures. 
To hold out for the possibility of genuine transformation of the people in conflict rather than 
merely restraining or eliminating them, to seek to view reality through the experience of those who 
are weak and vulnerable rather than those who are powerful and dominant, to seek not only to 
work in solidarity with those in need but to reduce their dependency on outside help, to point 
beyond political settlements to the messy reality of reconciling relationships through truth-telling, 
identity work, and forgiveness - all contradict the visions of reality held not only by people 
engaged in armed combat but also by most political leaders worldwide. 
The costs of living in ways that contradict and threaten the most basic assumptions of social and 
political structures can be high, higher than any individual can alone absorb. To live under the call 
of shalom is to live out of step with the ethos of most societies, and the result may be 
marginalization and ostracism. At extremes, people who resist the claims of identity placed upon 
them by dominant society may be viewed as traitors, a status which often evokes harsh measures 
of ostracism and retaliation. Only in the context of a community does it become conceivable to 
absorb these costs. 
Community as Source of Alternative Imagination 
To live by the vision for shalom requires powerful imagination, the capacity to conceive of human 
o life in ways that are rarely thought of by others and to live practically in light of the imagined 
possibilities. To sustain a vision sufficiently powerful to accomplish this requires community. 
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Like all images of reality, the shalom image is socially constituted through the processes by which 
people erect structures of meaning to interact with and ultimately create the world they live in. 8 
The key word here is "socially". Individuals are not capable of creating or sustaining such 
structures of meaning for the processes of "constructing a world"9 are complex, lengthy, and 
intrinsically social in nature. 
The work of Stanley Hauerwas in articulating the need for narrative in doing ethics is illuminating 
here. Understandings ofreality, Hauerwas says, are "narrative dependent". 10 They exist only as a 
result of the effort of particular groups of people to express the meaning of their experiences 
through stories and images, thereby remembering their origins and sustaining their identity. To 
the extent that a given individual or group lack their own "master story" their life is likely to be 
"written" by the story of the dominant culture in which they live. Hauerwas sounds a particular 
note of alarm in regards to the inability of professional values to provide an adequate framework 
from which to address the moral issues presented by life. He recalls that Alfred Speer, the 
German architect who ended up in charge of public works under Hitler, concluded in a 1970 
autobiography that it was his desire to simply be an architect and to avoid political issues that led 
to his failure to address the moral issues presented by the Third Reich. 
Becoming a human being, Hauerwas says, "requires stories and images a good deal richer than 
professional ones, ifwe are to be equipped to deal with the powers of this 'world."'11 This is so, 
he says, for we need a master story that is capable of subordinating all else in our lives. Not to 
have a master story puts us in danger of being overtaken, like Speer, by a highly destructive story. 
People who think "they need no story or skills beyond their profession ... are open to manipulation 
by anyone who offers them a compelling vision of how that skill can be used. We all require a 
sense of worth, a sense of place in the human enterprise, and the person with no story beyond his 
or her role yearns to be so placed by another. We yearn for a cause in which we can lose 
ourselves."12 Hauerwas is concerned most of all by those who are content with conventional roles 
and professions: " ... The warning is directed more accurately against those who feel they need no 
images and symbols beyond those offered by conventional roles to give coherence to their lives. 
8 Cf. my discussion of Peter Berger in the Introduction. 
9 I refer here to the ideas of Peter Berger summarized in the Introduction to this thesis. 
10 Hauerwas, A Community of Character, 10. 
11 Stanley Hauerwas, "Self-Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on Speer's Inside the Third Reich", in Hauerwas, 
Tragedy and Truthfulness (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 93. 
12 Ibid., 94. 
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We have thought that the way to drive out the evil gods was to deny the existence-of all gods. In 
fact, however, we have found ourselves serving a false god that is all the more powerful because 
we fail to recognize it as a god."13 
The stories waiting to "write" the efforts of peace builders by shaping how we respond to conflicts 
are many. The story of modem professionalism asserts that all that is required to address human 
problems is the organized application of technical knowledge and skill, without critical 
examination of the underlying political and economic interests and the values which they serve.14 
The story of liberal democracy suggests that the only significant goal is the creation of a society 
where individuals are free to do as they please, particularly to pursue material acquisitions. 15 The 
Babylonian creation myth which Walter Wink believes underlies the political consciousness of 
most people in the world today asserts that peace is not actually possible, that the only solution to 
conflict is the application of force by "good" people.16 
In summary then, the vision for transformation and the capacity to sustain it while engaged 
intensively with conflict require the existence of a story which is at least as profound and 
meaningful as any at work in our world today. Not to have such a story places peacebuilders in 
constant danger of having the story of their own life and values constantly re-written by others. 
Such a story emerges and is sustainable only through the collective experience of a community. 
Community as Preparation for Peacebuilding 
Peacebuilding as an Exercise in Love 
Chapter Two called for activities designed to enable people in conflict to reflect consciously on 
the deeper values in their understanding of life and meaning. I called this discernment, for the 
intention is to draw on the deepest resources of people in conflict in reflecting on what is taking 
place, on what they would like to take place, and on their current options for responding. The 
purpose of providing opportunities for empowerment, recognition, and theological discernment is 
to contribute to fundamental moral changes in the people and social structures involved in conflict 
enabling genuine resolution of the conflict 
13 Ibid., 95. 
14 Cf. Hauerwas, Truthfulness ... , 82-98. 
15 Hauerwas, "The Church and Liberal Democracy: The Moral Limits of a Secular Polity", Community ... , 72-86. 
16 Cf. my summary of Wink in Chapter One. 
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To do this requires peacebuilders to stand close to people who are likely to be in a great struggle of 
the mind, heart, and spirit. This is true of course for any kind of negotiations, but peacebuilding as 
understood here engages peacebuilders more deeply in the perceptions and responses of the people 
involved in conflict than most forms of mediation .. 
To be a resource to people in conflict who face this struggle, the outcome of which has such great 
import for themselves and others is one of the most difficult tasks any human being can undertake. 
It requires awareness of self, sensitivity and interpersonal skill. Most of all, it requires love, love 
as defined by Scott Peck as "the will to extend oneself for the purpose of nurturing one's own or 
the spiritual growth of another"17 To love others in this way, Peck says, is not a matter of good 
feelings or attraction, rather it is demanding, self-giving, and often painful. "Since it requires the 
extension of ourselves, love is always either work or courage." 
Peck's outline of the costs and demands of love merits study in grasping the complexity of the task 
of transformation of conflict, for all the demands of love are found in peacebuilding as well. One 
of the first requirements of love as he defines it, Peck says, is attention. To nurture spiritual 
growth in others requires that we pay careful attention to them in order to understand their 
situation, the dilemnas they are wrestling with, the perspectives they hold, the opportunities and 
limitations they face. Listening is the form of attention which Peck sees as one of the most 
important and difficult expressions of love. One reason listening is so difficult is that it requires 
setting aside one's own thoughts and perceptions in order to truly encounter those of another. In 
Peck's words: 
An essential part of true listening is the discipline of bracketing, the temporary 
giving up or setting aside of one's own prejudices, frames of reference and desires 
so as to experience as far as possible the speaker's world from the inside, stepping 
inside his or her shoes. This unification of speaker and listener is actually an 
extension and enlargement of ourself, and new knowledge is always gained from 
this .... The energy required for the discipline of bracketing and the focusing of total 
attention is so great that it can be accomplished only through love, by the will to 
extend oneself for mutual growth. 18 
Another cost of love is commitment, which Peck sees as inherent in any loving relationship. 
"Anyone who is truly concerned for the spiritual growth of another knows, consciously or 
instinctively, that he or she can significantly foster that growth only through a relationship of 
17 Scott Peck, The Road Less Traveled (New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1978), 83. 
18 Ibid., 128. 
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constancy."19 Commitment is a matter not only of being physically and emotionally available to 
others, it is also a matter of being committed to taking risks with others. 
An important risk which we must be prepared to take in order to love others is the risk of 
confrontation which Peck also characterizes as the risk of exercising power with humility. In 
order to contribute to the moral or spiritual growth of others we must be prepared to confront them 
at times. Such confrontation may come in the form of direct criticism, but it can also come in 
other ways such as seeking to change people through story-telling or other forms of persuasion. 
At root confrontation involves the exercise of power, for it is an attempt to influence the course of 
actions or events according to directions that we believe appropriate. 
Peck points out that to do this is in effect to say "I am right and you are wrong." To take such a 
posture does not come easily for a loving person, for such a person is fully aware of the grave risk 
of arrogance. 
The truly loving person, valuing the uniqueness and differentness of [the other] 
will be reluctant indeed to assume, 'I am right, you are wrong; I know better than 
you what is good for you.' But the reality of life is such that at times one person 
does know better than the other what is good for the other, and in actuality is in a 
position of superior knowledge or wisdom in regard to the matter at hand. Under 
these circumstances the wiser of the two does in fact have an obligation out of 
loving concern for the spiritual growth of the other to confront the other with the 
problem.20 
To love another, then, often places the loving person in a difficult dilemma, between "loving 
respect for the [other's] own path in life and a responsibility to exercise loving leadership when 
the beloved appears to need such leadership." The only way out of the dilemma, Peck says, is 
painful self-scrutiny, in which the loving person "stringently examines" the worth of his or her 
own "wisdom", and the motives behind the need to confront.21 
Even when such examination confirms the rightness and the appropriateness of confrontation, the 
loving person still faces the difficult question of how to confront in ways most likely to be 
effective. This requires careful thought about the character of the person involved, about the 
context in which to confront, about how to act or speak in ways that are most likely to be heard 
and understood, etc. Furthermore, in the course of confrontation, a truly loving person must 
19 Ibid., 140. 
20 Ibid., 151. 
21 Ibid., 151. 
constantly be open to gaining new information and insight which would reveal that the 
confrontation is in fact unnecessary, misdirected, or counter-productive. 
Peck returns repeatedly to the danger of arrogance. 
The problem is, the more loving one is, the more humble one is; yet the more 
humble one is, the more one is awed by the potential for arrogance in exercising 
power. Who am I to influence the course of human events? By what authority am 
I entitled to decide what is best for my child, my spouse, my country or the human 
race? .... Who am I to play God?" But in the end, he says, there is no alternative to 
playing God other than inaction and impotence. "Love compels us to play God 
with full consciousness of the enormity of the fact that that is just what we are 
doing. With this consciousness the loving person assumes the responsibility of 
attempting to be God and not to carelessly play God, to fulfill God's will without 
mistake. We arrive, then, at ret another paradox: only out of the humility of love 
can humans dare to be God. 2 
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Although Peck's comments are addressed primarily to the realm of personal and interpersonal 
growth, they are equally if not more relevant to the task of peace building where the issues are 
often systemic and structural. The risks and costs of love in the exercise of peacebuilding are 
substantially higher than those envisioned by Peck, for peacebuilders face the same issues on 
larger scale in a far more insecure environment. Typically peacebuilders must interact with 
substantial numbers of people within a fairly narrow timeframe. Frequently these people are 
skeptical of the possibilities of peace; sometimes they are hostile towards the peace builders 
themselves. Their objective is not personal or social growth, but rather to defeat a bitter opponent. 
They often view the world in highly polarized fashion and feel "either you are for us or against 
us." Any words or actions on the part of peacebuilders which challenge their usually simplistic 
and one-sided analysis of the conflict may bring an explosive reaction. 
Peck rightly prescribes self-awareness and self-scrutiny as essentials in dealing with the risks and 
costs of loving engagement with others. But for those operating in the arena of peace building such 
a prescription is superficial. The volume and intensity of demands on time and attention, the · 
complexity of the issues, and the power of the emotional fields which surround each party to draw 
an isolated individual into their own reality-shaping vortex make it impossible for any individual 
to sustain loving attention over a long period of time. 
22 Ibid., 155. 
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Peacebuilding as a Spiritual Journey 
This has several important implications. One is that peacebuilding as understood here is unlikely 
to be undertaken except by people committed to a deep spiritual journey. The only motivation 
powerful enough to sustain peacebuilders is a conviction that their deepest commitments call them 
into the work in which they are engaged, and that hence their own spiritual integrity is at stake in 
the choice to enter the disciplines of extending themselves in love to others. 
We can make the point more starkly yet. Peacebuilding as here understood cannot be undertaken 
except by people committed to themselves participating in a deep personal spiritual journey. To 
love others in the ways outlined by Peck by definition places us in the path of spiritual struggle in 
the best of circumstances. But in situations of conflict, the struggle is particularly poignant. To 
love people who have lost family members to violence is to be brokenhearted with them; to love 
people who are suspicious of all outsiders is to be prepared to be misunderstood and rejected; to 
love people who have grown hateful and bitter and prejudiced requires constant watchfulness for 
ways to help them see the humanity of their enemies. 
Only if peace builders are prepared to enter into this struggle, to appreciate and value it because of 
its potential to heal and for its intrinsic worth for the growth of their own souls,23 are they capable 
of loving others fully and contributing to their transformation. There are many paths by which to 
take the spiritual journey and we cannot prescribe the path required. But we fail to grasp the 
nature of peace building itself if we do not acknowledge the struggle imposed by a commitment to 
transformation on those who seek to facilitate it in others. 
Community as Essential for the Spiritual Journey 
The only place it is possible to undertake the spiritual journey required of peacebuilders is in 
community, for only in community are we faced with something similar to the challenge 
peacebuilders face, the requirement to act in ways that are loving while being connected, located, 
and vulnerable to a group of people over an extended period of time. 
23 Cf. Thomas Moore, Care of the Soul: A Guide for Cultivating Depth and Sacredness in Everyday Life (New York: 
Harper Collins, 1992). Moore observes that western society has adopted a quick-fix attitude towards every human 
dilemma, an obsession with "working through" and grasping solutions to life's difficult issues as a way of avoiding 
pain. Moore argues that many human problems cannot and should not be solved, that rather they present issues 
intrinsic to the human condition and more importantly, opportunities for growth of the soul. By entering into these 
problems, experiencing and accepting the pain we encounter there, and waiting for answers to emerge from within the 
problem situation itself, Moore argues, humans grow spiritually. Paradoxically, when we take this response, many 
problems turn out not to be problems after all. Moore's concern is with personal problems and I do not mean to 
suggest that merely waiting for solutions to emerge is an appropriate response for typical situations of violence. 
Nevertheless I think his point is insightful for coping with the inevitable spiritual pain and struggle at a personal level 
that people deeply involved in conflict situations as peacebuilders universally experience. 
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Learning to be loving in such a setting requires enormous effort and maturity. Peck says the 
struggle for growth is difficult because it is conducted "against a natural resistance, against a 
natural inclination to keep things the way they were, to cling to the old maps and old ways of 
doing things, to take the easy path."24 Learning to love involves a lifelong growth process that 
continues only if people are deeply committed to others and are willing to repeatedly pay the costs 
demanded by loving behavior. 
It is not surprising then that according to sociologist Robert Wuthnow, studies suggest that 
religious motivation per se is not a decisive predictor of other-regarding behavior. Such studies 
indicate that "spirituality begins to move people toward being compassionate only when a 
threshold of involvement in some kind of collective religious activity has been reached."25 The 
significance for this discussion is that religious vision alone is incapable to equip peacebuilders 
with the love required by the vision of shalom.. Only when religious vision occurs in the context 
of community is it capable of fostering a commitment beyond self-centeredness to the welfare of 
others. In Larry Rasmussen's words, "privatized religion apparently dampens concern for others, 
while commitment to a community sets in motion those dynamics that draw us into the webs of 
association that bind us together, sensitize us to needs beyond our own, and call forth active 
response to and with others."26 
There are many forms of community, and it would be arrogant to prescribe one form of 
community as the correct form. However I wish to describe characteristics of the kind of 
community which is most likely to support peacebuilders in building shalom. 
The Nature of Community Required 
What is the nature of the community required to sustain and act upon the alternative understanding 
of reality offered by shalom? Firstly, it must be a story-telling community, in order to sustain the 
awareness that it was formed in ways that make it different from most other communities. My 
interest here is not to create barriers or encourage isolation, but rather to highlight that the power 
of such a community resides in the fact that it adheres to a different reality than that widely held in 
the world. As the primary structure for shaping and preserving reality, narrative is essential in the 
24 Peck, 266. 
25 Robert Wuthnow, Caring/or Others and Helping Ourselves (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 155. 
26 Rasmussen, Moral Fragments and Moral Community, 105. Rasmussen is here summarizing Wuthnow's findings. 
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life of any community committed to sustaining and acting on a vision which differs in 
fundamental ways from that of other communities.27 
Secondly, it must be a discerning community in the sense proposed in Chapter Two, a community 
that consciously reflects on the values at work in its own life and the lives of surrounding 
communities, a community that with great intentionality seeks to bring its vision for life into 
conversation with the issues of everyday life. To penetrate to the heart of these issues, such 
discernment needs to be undertaken in awareness described in the Introduction, that human beings 
and the systems of meaning by which we operate are religious in nature. 
Thirdly, it must be a community that is politically engaged. I use political in its broadest sense 
here, the polis as that public location where the interests and needs of the human collectivity are 
addressed. Any vision for human life must emerge out of deep struggle with the issues day to day 
reality of the many. Without suggesting that the best way to engage in that struggle is necessarily 
through participation in current political structures, I nevertheless believe that it is essential to be 
working in the arena of human need in which political structures operate. 
Fourthly, it must be a community with universal loyalty. While grounding itself in a clear sense 
of the richness and particularity of its stories, a community capable of contributing to peace must 
hold itself loyal to all human communities. It must adopt the stance that all people, all 
communities bear the same precious value in the universe. None can be sacrificed in the interests 
of others.28 None can be excluded from the scope of concern and caring which motivate such a 
community. To fail on this point is adopt the same exclusivist mode which forms the foundation 
of the many alienating stories of our world. 
Fifthly, it must be a transformed community. A vision for peace is pure idealism with little 
capacity to touch real life unless it is rooted in a concrete, here-and-now reality. Thus 
peacebuilders need to be rooted in a community where people are actively living according to the 
vision they point to. By committing themselves to living out the vision of shalom in the ordinary 
tests of day-to-day living, people are transformed and ultimately a transformed community 
emerges. One consequence is that by modeling the kind of life it holds to be real and life-giving, a 
community adds credibility to its claim that the reality which points to indeed has great relevance 
27 Cf. Stanley Hauerwas, "A Story-Formed Community: Reflections on Waters hip Down". in A Community of Character, 
9-35. 
28 Cf. Bloesch, 170-173. 
for human life. Another consequence is that the effort to live by its own standards is the most 
important strategy for critical strategy for preparing peacebuilders.29 
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No commitment is more important in enabling transformation of such a community and the 
individuals in it than a commitment to critical thought, particularly applied to self. Because 
spiritual growth is difficult the major part of the challenge lies in overcoming our own inner 
resistances to it. Whether we attribute that resistance to laziness, as does Peck30, to original sin, as 
do many Christians, or to ignorance and unawareness, as do many Buddhists and Hindus, any 
community capable of facilitating its own spiritual maturation and that of its members must have 
language and structures which make self-critical reflection a routine part of group and individual 
life. Such reflection can be painful, for none wish to admit that we have failed. But it is precisely 
the commitment to accept such pain, to indeed invite it by supporting the structures of self-critique 
which periodically administer it, that is essential for spiritual growth. 
Like other dimensions of community life, the capacity to be self-critical and acknowledge errors 
or mistakes is important not only as part of the preparation of peace builders but also as an 
essential dimension of the peacebuilding task itself. The Nobel poet Octavio Paz believes that 
community as a social unit, braced by critical thought, along with "the examination of conscience 
and the remorse that accompanies0 it" is "the most powerful remedy against the ills of our 
civilization".31 Making a similar point to a Christian audience, Nairobi-based mediator Hezkias 
Assefa writes: 
Particularly in societies with on-going conflicts, the Church can cultivate or 
prepare the ground for social reconciliation .. .Instead of always pointing to what 
others have done to us, the spirit of repentance and self-examination should enable 
us to identify behavior in ourselves which incites others to behave the way they do 
towards us. The Church could spread the message of self-reflection and self-
criticism at the behavior, group, community, and national levels through its 
pastoral and prophetic activities .... However, in order to be a credible actor the 
Church needs to begin with itself and lead by example. It must recognize and 
confess the role it has played in contributing to injustice and conflict. It needs to 
find mechanisms to foster the spirit of confession within its congregations and call 
h . . f d c. . 32 t em mto a commumty o repentance an 1org1veness. 
29 Stanley Hauerwas has written extensively as a Christian ethicist and theologian on community as the essential 
location for forming character and virtue which he views as the foundation of moral life. See especially his A 
Community of Character, ibid. 
30 Peck, The Road Less Traveled, 16. 
31 Octavio Paz, "Poetry and the Free Market," The New York Times Book Review, 8 December 1991, sec .. 7, 36. 
32 Assefa, "The Challenge of Mediation in Internal Wars", 20-21. 
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Later we will see the way in which Moral Re-Armament employed self-critical reflection in the 
spiritual formation of its own members, and used confession as a way of inviting others to engage 
in a similar discipline. 
Sixthly, it must be a community formed around foundational issues. Peck states flatly that spiritual 
growth comes only through suffering, through entering into the inevitable problems and dilemnas 
that accompany existence and human diversity and learning to work through them .. 33 It seems 
apparent that the "community" of neigHbors cooperating in a neighborhood association in an urban 
suburb, for example, is unlikely to enable spiritual growth understood in this way. 
A community capable of facilitating the spiritual maturation process required of peace builders 
must have structures capable of bringing human struggles into sharp focus. This contradicts one 
of the key dimensions of modem urban, industrial societies where individuals are presented with 
manifold options regarding where to work, live, and devote their life energies. Rather than stay 
and work through the struggles inherent in relationships and essential to spiritual maturation, many 
people simply "move on" and evade the struggle of true community. The task of spiritual 
preparation of peacebuilders requires that they root themselves in a community which has a clear 
identity, which is formed in terms of common commitment to foundational issues such as the 
meaning and purpose of life and which seeks to integrate those issues into daily living rather than 
in terms of segmentai34 or peripheral issues such as professional advancement, neighborhood 
concerns, recreation, etc. In such a context the challenges of community are harder to evade and 
the odds of genuine spiritual growth are correspondingly higher. 
Community as Asset in Working with Communities 
My argument here begins from the intercommunal nature of the conflicts assumed in this thesis. 
Communities are in confrontation; it is the diverse realities created and sustained in communities 
that peacebuilders must interact with. 
The chapter on "Engagement" cites Maclntyre's argument that insightful philosophical work can 
be done only when consciously rooted in a "tradition of enquiry". A parallel point follows: that to 
33 Peck, The Road Less Traveled, 15-18, 83. 
34 Cf. Robert Selmick who distinguishes between "core" communities and "segmental" communities. Selmick, Moral 
Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992) 184-
193. 
• work insightfully with communities requires that peacebuilders themselves be rooted in 
communities. 
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Although he makes his argument in terms of the more academically-oriented concept of 
"traditions of enquiry", Macintyre repeatedly points out the historical groundings of such 
traditions in particular histories, circumstances, linguistic sets, the interplay of personalities, etc. 
Thus to speak of a "tradition of enquiry" assumes the presence of at least a certain kind of 
community. I will later call for a kind of community that is more cohesive than that necessarily 
implied by a "tradition of enquiry", but it is at least worth noting the direction in which 
Maclntyre's argument points us. To the extent that peacebuilding engages in the task of 
discernment which I called for in the chapter in "Transformation", this point becomes increasingly 
significant, for to that extent the contribution of peacebuilders moves directly onto Maclntyre's 
territory of moral enquiry. 
But the present argument can be made on other grounds. People in social conflicts virtually 
always view themselves as connected to communities. The grammar of negotiations is plural, 
"we". The concerns of the representatives at the table are usually for a large group of people with 
a long history. Just as it is difficult to understand culture-shock until one has experienced it, so it 
is difficult to understand the nature of communities in conflict unless one has a deep personal 
experience of community. To understand another community requires being in a community. 
The latter does not guarantee the former, of course, but it is an enormous asset if not a pre-
requisite for it. Macintyre speaks of the "fundamental incoherence" which often afflicts people, 
particularly those shaped by the liberal individualist worldview, who are confronted with 
conflicting moral claims from competing traditions. Such individuals lack the kind of self-
knowledge which would provide them first with an awareness of the "specific character of their 
own incoherence", and then with "a metaphysical, moral, and political schema of classification 
and explanation" by which to account for the particular character of their incoherence.35 In order 
to apprehend a phenomenon, then, we need a perceptual framework enabling us to engage it. The · 
greater the gap between our own experience and that which we seek to understand, the harder it is 
to even become aware of the full realities of that which we seek to study, let alone to understand it. 
This means that the capacity of individuals whose primary social experience has been that of 
35 Macintyre, 398. 
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modem liberal societies to grasp the issues driving many of the conflicts in our world is likely to 
be limited. 
Finally, to be able to participate meaningfully in conversation with others about that which is "life-
giving" as I called for in the chapter on Transformation is greatly enhanced by connections to a 
community whose worldview is shaped by deep encounter with suffering. I recall in this regard a 
three-day workshop by an American professor, Dudley Weeks, in 1993 to a group of South 
African young people in Cape Town. Weeks began the workshop by relating at some length his 
experience ofliving in South America, working with the poor in a barrio, of being detained and 
physically abused during several days of interrogation. It was this experience which opened his 
eyes to the reality of injustice, the need for a struggle for social change, and eventually the 
importance of negotiation skills to capitalize on gains from the struggle. In a country flooded and 
bored with visiting Americans, Weeks gained the rapt attention of his audience in a matter of 
minutes, held it for the remainder of the workshop, and laid the foundation for a long-term 
relationship which to my knowledge continues to the present. 
It seemed apparent that Weeks sensed that he needed to establish his identity with his audience in 
terms of a community of people, and that that community needed to be something other than an 
American university community, which was his professional base. His story "located" him for the 
group in terms of his values and gave him credibility as someone with experiences similar to 
theirs. The only thing that would have made it more credible would have been had he been able 
to tell the story in the present tense. Nevertheless the passion with which he told this story made it 
clear that people in the story still shaped his understandings of life. 
It was also apparent that it was through his deep affiliation with a marginalized community that 
Weeks came to clarity about his own understanding of "life-giving". The word "marginalized" is 
essential here, for I do not believe it was chance that his ability to talk with others about values 
which are life-giving resulted from his experience with people who are poor. Dominant, 
mainstream communities almost by definition have little reason to maintain deep concern about 
justice, tolerance, or the importance oflooking after the interests of all. Because they are 
dominant they are able to structure social and political life in ways that support their interests. I 
do not mean to say that such communities or the people based in them cannot be tolerant and 
deeply committed to the interests of all, but rather that· the life experience of people in such 
communities mitigates against the formation of values and awarenesses that support life for all. 
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The values which are "life-giving" in situations of conflict are not likely to emerge from the 
experience of people whose primary understanding of the world is rooted in realities of dominant 
social groups. Rather they are likely to emerge from deep affiliation with a community which 
understands the pain of being dominated by others and has an intuitive understanding of the 
underdog. 
It is important to add, however, that experiences of pain, injustice, and oppression alone are 
incapable of providing a core of life-giving values from which to interact constructively with other 
communities. I recall a conversation with a senior leader in one of the paramilitary groups of 
North Ireland who was interested in hearing about events in South Africa. It became clear within 
a matter of minutes that he had decided who was "right" and who was "wrong" in South Africa 
based on his projections of the Irish situation and that he had no capacity to recognize life-giving 
dimensions emerging at that time from both sides of the South African scene. 
For this man to arrive at a point where he could assist in discernment as a peacebuilder would 
require him to have a profound experience of a response to struggle and conflict quite different 
from the one of violence, retribution, and hatred he had thus far experienced. Ayear ofretreat in 
a comfortable suburb or London or Los Angeles would not be adequate for it would be too 
removed from the reality of his past to enable significant growth and change. Individual study or 
therapy might be useful, but no lone individual has the resources to alone find healing from the 
trauma of his own experiences with conflict and simultaneously formulate an adequate alternative 
to old responses. The human institution most likely to facilitate the growth required in him to 
engage in discernment is a community of people who share a vision for responding to conflict 
transformationally, who are profoundly connected to the suffering in which so many in our world 
live and seek to shape their lives in response to it, and who recognize that to do so requires them to 
interact with each in ways not characteristic of modem urban societies, namely by encountering 
and supporting each other with the disciplines of love. 
Community as Strategy in Peacebuilding 
So far I have dealt with community as essential in preparing and sustaining peacemakers. In the 
final section I reflect on community as a theme guiding the strategizing of peace builders. 
Build a Community of Peacebuilding Communities 
To attempt to respond to conflicts of the nature we are wrestling with by structures which are at 
root individualistic would reflect a grave miscalculation of the dimensions of the task of 
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peace building. Not even a community can alone meet the requirements of peace building as here 
understood. Only a community of peacebuilding communities could hope to make a significant 
contribution to the transformation of societies in conflict. 
This calls for a different understanding of the most critical dimension of peacemaking. Rather 
than facilitating agreements between warring parties as commonly understood, the most important 
task in peacemaking should be seen as building a network of communities who with time become 
a community of peacebuilders. This community of communities would be united by a common 
vision for peacebuilding, and the activities of each would be guided by the larger vision. The 
practical strategies and areas of focus taken up by each community would be different, enabling 
each peacebuilding community to draw on its own unique resources. But each community would 
be accountable for its responses to the larger community of peacebuilders, thus enabling the 
differing responses to be complementary. 
Root Peacebui/ding in Local Communities 
Chapter Five called for peacebuilding to be conducted "under auspices as close to local ownership 
as possible". A different way of making the same point would be to say that peacebuilders should 
seek to base peace initiatives in local communities rather than on external bases. The consequence 
is transformation in the fullest sense, the empowerment of such communities to undertake 
responsibility to address their own conflicts rather than to rely on outsiders. 
The Mennonite Central Committee, for example, chose not to fund the International Conciliation 
Service it established in 1990 with a program budget, on the grounds that this was likely to lead to 
peace initiatives undertaken autonomously without support from its own personnel at regional and 
grassroots levels, other NGOs, and additional actors from the local scene. The reasoning was that 
peace initiatives that are well-supported at "community" level, that is, by people close to the 
conflict itself, were unlikely to experience great difficulty in securing funding for many funders 
recognize how rare such initiatives are and are eager to support them. To date, this reasoning has 
proven correct, and peace initiatives in which the MCC has played an important role, notably in 
Ethiopia, have succeeded in attracting funding from a variety of sources. MCC's role in such 
initiatives has been to encourage and support the gathering of a variety of actors, as many as 
possible with a local base and credibility, with MCC serving as consultant and assistant to such 
initiatives. 36 
36 Interview with John Paul Lederach, International Conciliation Service director, 9/6/95, Harrisonburg VA. 
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With such an approach peacebuilding becomes an exercise in community-building. Individuals 
and groups with diverse perspectives on the local scene are compelled to set aside partisanship and 
work together to accomplish the larger goal of facilitating a peace initiative. 
Ensure that Peacebuilders are Accountability to Community 
Regardless of the auspices of peace building efforts, the individuals who undertake the mission 
itself need to be accountable to a community of person and operate in ways that make this 
accountability visible to the parties themselves, rather than function as isolated individuals. 
Partly this is a matter of competence and survival. The sheer logistical demands of meeting with 
numerous often emotional parties are enormous, not to mention the impossibility of one person 
single-handedly being able to decipher the complex web of personalities, social and political 
forces, perceptions and historical data which surround any violent conflict. We will see in the 
later case study how heavily all three of the actors in study of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe depended on a 
community of peace builders. 
But even more important, undertaking peacebuilding in visible accountability to a community of 
peacebuilders makes an important symbolic statement. A common factor in most conflicts is that 
one or both parties have lost awareness of the fundamental basis of shalom, the rule of community, 
the reality that human beings are deeply interconnected and cannot separate their own fate from 
that of others. The likelihood of peace often hangs on whether or not the parties are able to 
regain some awareness of this reality. 
Thus peace building at its best is substantially more than a practical task of working out deals to 
maximize gains or reflect a balance of power, it is rather a battle for the minds and hearts of the 
combatants. Peacebuilders need to structure themselves in ways that reflect and communicate 
their understanding of reality, and that support the possibility of a new vision for human 
relationships. What better way to assert the possibility that diverse human beings can set aside 
personal needs and wishes in order to accomplish important tasks than a peacebuilding mission 
made up of diverse individuals, each of whom is clearly accountable to the group, none acting in 
ways that betray a need for personal recognition or control? 
Summary· 
This chapter argues that transformation requires more than a particular approach to conflict, it also 
requires a particular kind of peacebuilders, people who are rooted in community. The very 
possibility of sustaining a moral vision for shalom assumes the capacity to view reality differently 
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than most in our world, and to have this capacity requires community. The spiritual maturity 
required of peacebuilders is attainable only through the nurturing disciplines provided by 
community. Identification with a community makes it easier to understand and work effectively 
with people in many conflicts, who are themselves embedded in communities. Creating a 
community of communities, that is, forging cooperation among communities committed to 
peacebuilding is the only way to ensure that peacebuilding is sustained on the long-term. 
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Section Two 
Peacebuilding in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe"' 
"' A preliminary version of Section Two was published, with full knowledge and approval of my thesis advisor, 
Professor John de Gruchy, as a chapter entitled "Transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe: The Role of Religious 
Actors", in Religion: The Missing Dimension of Statecraft (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), edited by 
Douglas Johnston and Cynthia Sampson, 208-257. Oxford University Press has granted permission to the University 
of Cape Town to publish this case study in whole or in part, so long as acknowledgment to the original publication in 
the above cited book is made. 
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Introduction to the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe Case Study 
Rhodesia 1 in 1979 was a nightmare. By the estimates of some, twenty thousand people2, many of 
them civilians, had already died in a costly war for liberation now frozen in a deadly stalemate. 
The issue, at first glance at any rate, was simple. Black Africans, numbering nearly 90 per cent of 
the population, wanted majority rule from a government clinging at all cost to white control and 
privilege. 
The future, without a doubt, belonged to Africa. Old-style colonialism teetered on the brink of its 
own grave; England, formally Rhodesia's ruler3, chafed to complete the painful process begun 
more than 20 years earlier of shedding its ill-acquired African colonies. Neighboring Zambia had 
been independent since 1964, Botswana since 1966. Angola and Mozambique had just gained 
their independence from Portugal in 1975. Rhodesia was the obvious next candidate to bear the 
torch of African nationalism. Oddly enough, even South Africa, long a backer of Salisbury's war 
efforts, had in 1976 begun withdrawing financial support and pressuring for reform. White leaders 
in Pretoria remained committed, to be sure, to an apartheid system even more comprehensively 
racist than Rhodesia's. 
But South African Prime Minister John Vorster was playing shrewdly to win a long-term game of 
realpolitik. Already in 1962 he had counseled Rhodesian Prime Minister Winston Field against a 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence from England, on the grounds that, unlike South Africa, 
Rhodesia's African majority was so vast as to rule out the possibility of a white-ruled state. Black 
rule in Rhodesia, Vorster maintained, was inevitable, and it would be better for Rhodesian whites 
1 The Patriotic Front called the country Zimbabwe, and the Muzorewa government called it Zimbabwe-Rhodesia For 
simplicity, in this study we will refer to the country as Rhodesia until the time of formal independence and takeover 
by a bona fide government on April 18, 1980, and thereafter as Zimbabwe. The conflict itself will be referred to as 
the "Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict". 
2 M. Kuchera, Zimbabwe Council of Churches, interviewed by the author, Harare, August 19, 1992 
3 Unlike other African colonies, Rhodesia had been granted status as a "self-governing colony" in 1923, but in an effort 
to "restrain the racist excesses of the settlers" England still retained a right of veto over aspects of governance, 
particularly those having to do with black rights. Cf.: Anthony J. Chennells, "White Rhodesian Nationalism -The 
Mistaken Years", in Canaan S. Banana, Editor, Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-1990 (Harare: College Press, 
1989), 123-137. 
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to move cautiously and cultivate a moderate black leadership.4 Furthermore, strategists in Pretoria 
contemplating the lessons of a post-1975 Mozambique gone fanatically Marxist had concluded 
that prolonged guerrilla warfare created radical nationalism. Thus white racism to the north 
increasingly looked de-stabilizing for the region to Pretoria. Much better to succor instead the 
emergence of a pliable client state like Malawi. That required, not arms for fellow white racists, 
but rather black faces in government offices in Salisbury. 
Within Rhodesia, the forces of liberation held the upper hand as well. After 14 years of warfare, 
guerrilla troops now roamed large areas of the country and maintained a steady barrage of attacks 
on white farms, government offices, and outlying security establishments. The economy lay in 
ruins from heavy military expenditures and 13 years of economic sanctions by the outside world. 
Emotionally, whites were exhausted by the war. Not only had they lost sons in the fighting, they 
had lost faith in their future. Thousands had already fled to South Africa and elsewhere; many 
more contemplated leaving as well. The question in 1979 was not if black Africans would gain 
their rightful place in the nation, but rather when. 
The discouraging part for the majority of Rhodesians was that the experience of the last decade 
suggested the moment of true African rule might still be a long and costly way off. Salisbury was 
on the defensive, militarily, economically and politically, but it still possessed a deadly modern 
military machine and the will, evidently, to use it for a long time to come. Not only had Prime 
Minister Ian Smith earned a reputation for being bull-headed, he had proven cunning at political 
maneuvering in the ancient method of "salami-style" negotiation. When stonewall and steel failed 
to contain the forces seeking to snatch the prize he held, Smith more than once yielded. It was a 
stingy slice of political power he offered to Bishop Abel Muzorewa and two other blacks in the 
1978 Internal Settlement but it gave what he doubtless sought: deep division in the camp of 
African nationalists and a black leader willing to go to Washington and London in defense of a 
government still controlled by whites.5 
Meanwhile, as usual in war, it was the civilians who suffered the most. One in six Africans had 
been displaced by the war; one in ten lived in forced government resettlement camps w_here they 
4 Letter from journalist Colin Legum, who interviewed Field on this question, to the author, November 20, 1992. 
5 Muzorewa was brought into politics dragging his feet with reluctance in 1971 because his non-political background 
made him acceptable as leader to the several factions of nationalists seeking to oppose an agreement worked out 
between the British and Ian Smith. But by 1975 he was thoroughly despised by ZANU and ZAPU, the external 
liberation fronts, for entering into negotiations with Ian Smith against the wishes of fellow nationalists. 
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were vulnerable not only to diseases but also to harassment by hostile government forces. 6 Many 
thousands more lived in refugee camps in the bordering states of Mozambique, Botswana and 
Zambia.7 Agriculture proved difficult and in many places impossible, leading to widespread 
hunger and impoverishment. Even worse for many was the calamity of getting caught in the 
crossfire of a vicious war. Since control of territory changes constantly in guerrilla warfare, 
"neutrality" on the part of civilians offers the only means of survival. But as thousands of 
unfortunate victims discovered, neutrality is a difficult act to maintain. Killings, torture, rape, and 
pillage became commonplace for villagers. 
If Rhodesia was a nightmare for its citizens, it was also a graveyard of failed peace initiatives. 
Between 1966 and the end of 1978 some twenty efforts had been launched, most involving 
governments outside Rhodesia in a brokering role. Some of the world's best known politicians and 
mediators were involved. British Prime Minister Wilson and his advisor, Lord Goodman; British 
Foreign Secretary David Owen, United States Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and Cyrus 
Vance, US Ambassador Andrew Young, Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda- all invested 
substantial efforts to secure peace in Rhodesia, and all failed. 
But in September, 1979, following a pivotal Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka two months 
previously, the impossible happened. Meeting in London at Lancaster House with the British 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington as mediator, the warring parties negotiated for thirteen 
weeks without a pause. Returning home just before Christmas, they carried to Salisbury the 
welcome news of a cease-fire, agreements on a transitional government, and settlement on a new 
constitution. For many Rhodesians, the possibility of genuine peace seemed incredible. Many 
thought whichever side lost in the elections slated for the early new year would take to the 
battlefields again. General Peter Walls, commander of the Rhodesian Security Forces, was said to 
have a coup prepared in the event that the election turned against the white minority. The guerrilla 
forces of the Patriotic Front led by nationalists Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo8 were rumored 
6 Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for Zimbabwe (London: Longman, 1980), 272. 
7 In Zambia one camp alone contained 6000 boys who had been separated from their parents. Source: Trevor Jepson, 
interview with the author, July 7, 1991, Wales. 
8 The Patriotic Front actually consisted of two liberation movements: the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), 
headed by Robert Mugabe and based in Maputo, and the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union (ZAPU), headed by 
Joshua Nkomo and based in Lusaka. In 1976, at the urging of leaders from surrounding African states, the 
movements joined forces in an uneasy alliance and formed the Patriotic Front. The two movements had differing 
political orientations, different sponsors, differing instincts about when and on what issues to compromise with the 
Rhodesian government, and both sought pre-eminence in the eventual new Zimbabwe. The resulting tension 
constantly threatened their ability to collaborate during the war, at Lancaster House, and after Independence, and 
culminated in the Matebeleland catastrophe in the early 1980s. 
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to have kept men and weapons in reserve as well, outside the gathering points where the liberation 
armies were supposed to convene and lay down arms to a Commonwealth Monitoring Force of 
fifteen hundred men. The South African army moved three divisions to the border.9 
In February, 1980 an independently monitored election was held and ZANU leader Robert 
Mugabe won a clear majority. This was the outcome whites dreaded the most. Misled by the 
propaganda of Smith and Muzorewa, most had thought a Mugabe win highly unlikely. But just in 
case, many had packed their cars in readiness to leave the country if Mugabe won 1°. Their fears 
were understandable - their government had long demonized Mugabe as a bloodthirsty, atheistic 
communist. ZANU's actions hadn't helped either. Just over a year previously, a "death list" had 
circulated from ZANU headquarters in Maputo, naming individuals with Government connections 
for execution.11 Though surely a minority, some young militants confided in later years that as the 
brutal war drew to a close, they were waiting with "pangas in hand to kill every white in sight" if 
h d · 12 t e wor were given. 
What the citizens of Rhodesia, soon to become Zimbabwe, experienced during the first week of 
March shocked people in all camps. Lord Christopher Soames, the British representative charged 
with governing the country during the transition period, announced on Tuesday morning, March 
4, that Mugabe had won. That evening Mugabe, Grim Reaper of the guerrilla war, addressed the 
nation in a new persona. Zimbabweans, he said, must now "beat their swords into plow shares." 
"I urge you," he said, "whether you are black or white to join me in a new phase to forget our 
grave past. Forgive others and forget. Join hands in a new amity and work together, 
Zimbabweans .... "13 On Friday, March 7, Ian Smith made a public announcement indicating that 
he accepted the election results. What is more, Smith announced, he had met with Mugabe on 
Monday, the day before election results were announced and found him to be "forthright and 
reasonable, as he was in his address to the nation on Tuesday night"14• Rather than make a hasty 
9 Stedman, Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-1980 (Boulder and London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1991), 201. 
10 Ian Robertson, interview with the author, May 25, 1991, Harare. Robertson is a Scottish-born biologist who moved 
to Rhodesia in 1977 to assist MRA activities and has been deeply involved in MRA work there ever since. 
II ZANU Death List, issued by Dr. Edison Zvobgo, Deputy Secretary for Information and Publicity in Maputo 13 
November 1978. 
12 Interview with MRA worker Ian Robertson, May 25, 1991, Harare. 
13 Rhodesia Herald, March 5, 1980. 
14 Cf. the account by Alec Smith that Ian Smith's public statement took place on Tuesday, the same day as Mugabe's 
speech, in Smith, ibid. No records exist of any public statements by the elder Smith until the 7th, when he held a 
press conference in which he spoke positively of Mugabe. Alec has the timing oflan's statement confused, and the 
speech he attributes to Mugabe was actually one given several months later at the time of formal independence. 
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departure, Smith urged whites to "wait and see" and he encouraged all to "work together with our 
fellow countrymen to try to make a success of this new venture." In the following days, Mugabe 
announced the appointment of two whites to his Cabinet and of General Walls to continue as head 
of the armed forces. 
Arriving back in London with duties completed several months later, Lord Soames groped for 
words to explain what was taking place in Zimbabwe. "Every time we thought the thing would 
explode in our faces, some miracle came about," he reflected. "When we went out there I was not 
one who believed in miracles. I think I am reversing my position now."15 
Without a doubt, something remarkable took place in 1979 - 1980. Although there were tragic 
exceptions in later years16, a generally peaceful outcome was attained in a situation that looked 
dismal. What is more, religious influence was pervasive, not only in the historical development of 
the country -- Jesuits played a key role in the early colonizing efforts of the British in the late 
1800s, and the Catholic Church provided moral blessing for the status quo until well into the 
1950s -- but also in the personal lives of many key leaders in the conflict. 17 At the grassroots level, 
liberation fighters turned in large numbers to spirit mediums for guidance and protection during 
the war, 18, while thousands of Christians participated in special "Days of Prayer" over the time of 
Lancaster House and the subsequent elections. 19 
15 Speaking on his arrival at Heathrow Airport on 19 April 1980. From Hugh Elliottt, Dawn in Zimbabwe: Concept 
for a Nation (London: Grosvenor Books 1980), 9. 
16 Since 1980, Zimbabwe has experienced crises that belie Mugabe's noble words. The conflict in Matebeleland in the 
early 1980s was particularly tragic, an African ethnic conflict writ large in a struggle for political power that cost 
thousands of lives. But given the recent background of a high-stakes and divisive war of liberation, the sense of 
reconciliation that still characterizes the country is remarkable; equally remarkable are the consistent efforts to 
restore unity with former opponents after each crisis. Joshua Nkomo, former ZAPU leader and Mugabe's rival 
during the war for the mantle of chief nationalist, was the instigator of the Matabeleland conflict, but was later 
brought back into government as a result of a lengthy series of negotiations mediated by Methodist minister and 
former President Canaan Banana from 1983 to 1987. Nkomo currently serves as Vice President under President 
Mugabe. So consistent has been the theme of reconciliation that one author, Victor de Waal, called his study of the 
first decade of Zimbabwe's history, The Politics of Reconciliation (London: Hurst and Co., 1990; also Cape Town: 
David Philip Publishers, 1990). 
17 To list just a few examples: Canaan Banana, the first president of the country (1980-1987), is an ordained Methodist 
minister. Current Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, like many other liberation leaders was educated in Catholic 
mission schools, and maintained active communication with Catholic leaders throughout the war. Nationalists Abel 
Muzorewa and Ndabaningi Sithole, who in the end discredited themselves in a fatal alliance with Smith were both 
ordained ministers. 
18 See David Lan' s fascinating account, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe (Berkeley and LA: 
University of California Press 1985). 
19 Gary Strong, Keys to Effective Prayer (Basingstoke: Marshalls, 1985) 11-24. 
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Not only were religious influences explicitly present at all levels in the Zimbabwe struggle, to an 
unusual degree religiously-based peacemakers - virtually all Christian in orientation - were at 
work as well. Most prominent of these was the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace which, 
beginning in 1972, played an active role both within Rhodesia and internationally. Initially it 
functioned almost exclusively in the role of advocate, attacking the Salisbury regime for its 
abuses. But in 1978, as the war escalated and the suffering of civilians became intolerable, the 
Commission along with other Catholic agencies mounted a global campaign to get the parties to 
the negotiating table. 
Moral Re-Armament, a world-wide network of individuals committed to the concept of social and 
political change through personal transformation, was also involved in peace efforts in the 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict from 1975 through 1980. MRA workers, in fact, arranged a final-
hour face-to-face meeting between Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith one day before Mugabe's 
remarkable speech on 4 March, 1980. The spirit ofreconciliation that astonished the world on that 
day is evidence, MRA workers believe, of the power of a spiritually-based approach to bring 
change. 
Operating quietly from a London base, the Quakers too were deeply involved in negotiation 
efforts, plying skills grounded in a 300 year-old tradition of Christian pacifism and radical 
equality, and well-honed by several decades of non-governmental peacemaking efforts. Like 
MRA, the Quakers had a team of workers present both at unsuccessful peace talks held in Geneva 
in 1976 and the 1979 Lancaster House negotiations. In between, Quaker teams made several trips 
to Africa, visiting government leaders in' Salisbury, liberation leaders in Maputo and Lusaka, and 
leaders of the Frontline States2°, seeking to get negotiations started. 
20 The Frontline States consisted of Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Botswana, and Angola, a "closely-knit 
caucus within the Organization of African States" formed in 1974 to achieve majority rule in southern Africa. Their 
influence on the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle was critical, particularly because of the Zambians and Mozambicans, 
both of whom were hosting a Zimbabwean liberation army. See Colin Legum' s encyclopedic work, The Battlefronts 
of Southern Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1988), 26ff. for more. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Role of the Catholic Church 
Largest, longest, and most complex of any religious response to the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict 
was that of the Catholic Church. There is good reason for this: Jesuit missionaries were among the 
first white settlers in the 1890s and in the first half of the twentieth century Catholics erected most 
of the country's infrastructure of schools and hospitals. By the time the liberation struggle had 
begun, the Catholic Church claimed the allegiance of nearly ten per cent of the populace, in a 
nation in which twenty five per cent of the people are reckoned as Christian. 
Until the 1950s the Catholic Church assumed an uncritical role as sanctifier of the white-
dominated status quo. Archbishop Aston Chichester, who headed the Church from 1931 till the 
mid-1950s, captured the spirit of the era in his consecration speech, expressing appreciation for 
"the fine relationship that existed between the Church and the civil authorities, for both were 
striving for the welfare of the same people." At public functions, the Archbishop was accorded a 
special seat next to the Governor-General. 
During the fifties the African nationalist movement was making rapid grounds and for the first 
time Catholic leaders were confronted with an articulate challenge from their own laity. "Only 
very seldom do we hear the Church raising her voice against the prevailing economic, social, and 
0 
political injustices," complained Lawrence Vambe, editor-in-chief of the Salisbury African 
Newspapers. "The silence is, rightly or wrongly,interpreted by the sophisticated African as 
acquiescence on the part of the Church in things which militate against their own interest."1 A 
month later, in February 1959, came the first major reaction by the Rhodesian state against the 
nationalist movement. The government declared a State of Emergency, banned the fledgling. 
African National Congress, and detained five hundred of its members 
1 Kapungu, Rhodesia: The Struggle for Freedom (Orbis, 1974), 50, quoting from the Rhodesia Herald, January 28, 
1959. 
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But it was white right-wingers who in the end shook the Catholic Church out of its lethargic role 
as cosmic umbrella for the white government. Ian Smith's Rhodesia Front came to power in 1962 
and in 1965 announced a Unilateral Declaration of Independence from Britain. One motivation 
for the UDI was perhaps garden-variety aspiration to self-rule. But Smith was open about another 
goal: he would save whites from the horrors of Kenya and the Congo by halting any advance 
towards majority rule by Africans. As Smith implemented one piece of racist legislation after 
another, the Catholic Bishops reacted, issuing a series of pastoral letters that publicly confronted 
RF policies. For example, following the UDI in November, 1965, they appealed for attention to 
the needs of Africans: "Look at the inequitable distribution of land in this country; the scandal of 
those working conditions in which normal family life is made impossible; the often inadequate 
wages paid to servants, the humiliation of discriminatory legislation, the inequalities of 
opportunity in education. "2 
In 1969 the Church was provoked into open disobedience by the Land Tenure Act, which gave the 
State power to impose absolute separation of races not only in public institutions, but in Catholic 
missions, schools and hospitals. The Church along with some Protestant counterparts refused to 
comply, threatened to close its vast network of schools and hospitals, and denounced the Act and 
the new Constitution which accompanied it as "in many respects completely contrary to Christian 
teaching".3 
In the end, an accommodation was negotiated, "a white man's agreement" in the parlance of 
African nationalists. The government agreed not to enforce all provisions of the Act; the churches 
in exchange withdrew their opposition. But the event marked a new era for the Church and thus 
the entry point for this study, for the viability of the Church's own institutions had come under 
. threat by the State. The days of neutrality and easy co-existence with the status quo were past. 
From a half century as sanctifier of the status quo, the Church had in the fifties and early sixties 
shifted to uneasy critic. Now came a foretaste of a new role which was to pre-dominate in the 
seventies. The Church was under attack by the State, and in later years many in the Church were 
to fall victim to those attacks. From this point onward the Catholic Church became a persistent 
and aggressive critic of the Salisbury government. 
2 Ibid, 93. 
3 Ibid., 95. 
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Truth-Telling to the Nation and the World 
Establishing the Commission on Justice and Peace 
Catholic involvement in the Rhodesia conflict initially revolved around confrontation between the 
Bishops and the Rhodesia Front. But as it became apparent that the State was committed to its 
policies, a disquieted Conference of Bishops institutionalized their concern, establishing a 
Commission on Justice and Peace. This was a turning point for the Rhodesian Catholic Church, 
"the first formal structural commitment to social justice made by the hierarchy."4 Initially 
dominated by whites and perceived as an extension of Church hierarchy, the Justice and Peace 
Commission (hereafter JPC) soon established a reputation in its own right that ultimately out-
shadowed all other institutions in the large network of Catholic hierarchies, orders, and missions. 5 
The primary role of the JPC was that of "truth-telling", conveying the reality of what was 
happening in Rhodesia to the nation and the world. The context was a battle the Salisbury 
government was fighting not only in the field but also in the media. "The government propaganda 
machine was advertising, publicizing the atrocities of the guerrillas wholesale and never admitting 
any of their own atrocities or [that they were] doing anything wrong at all," recalls one Catholic 
worker.6 Central in the Catholic response was a long-distance liaison between the JPC based in 
Salisbury, and the Catholic Institute for International Relations based in London. 
It is the truth-telling role of the JPC for which Zimbabwe's pre-eminent historian, former President 
Canaan Banana, remembers Catholic involvements during the liberation struggle. The JPC, wrote 
Banana in 1989, "played an invaluable role of publicizing and condemning the excesses of the 
Rhodesian army in its conduct of the war. In this way atrocities of the Rhodesian security forces 
were effectively disclosed and the psychological warfare counteracted."7 
But truth-telling implies a prior activity. Listening to the victims of the war was a major activity 
of the JPC through-out these years. As news of the Commission filtered out through the townships 
in the early 1970's to the Tribal Trust Lands, writes Linden, 
4 Linden, 163. 
5 Minutes of an Executive Committee Meeting of the Social Communications Commission of the Catholic Church, 
November 23, 1977, RCBC, December 5, 1977. Annotation from Linden, 262. 
6 Sr. Janice McLaughlin, interviewed by the author, 6 May 1991, Harare. 
7 Canaan Banana, Turmoil and Tenacity (Harare: College Press, 1989), 205. 
Africans grew to see in it a major means at their disposal to speak of their 
oppression. Although they could have had little understanding to what they were 
addressing themselves, villagers, sometimes directed by the German Jesuits and 
Catholic teachers in Sinoira, or hearing from relatives in town, trekked to 
Salisbury to tell the Commission of their plight. Often there was no thought of 
redress, simply the quest for someone who would listen, see the wounds, and 
understand what was happening in the guerrilla war. It was strangely not so much 
a quest for justice and peace as a quest for truth. And it was ultimately truth, 
rather than justice and peace that the Commission achieved and will be 
remembered for. 8 
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Of course, the JPC was by no means the only Catholic institution listening to the African 
community. Many rural Catholic missionaries throughout the war were intimately connected to 
the agony of the communities they served as much and more so than members of the JPC staff and 
board who were mostly Harare-based. Priests and sisters were increasingly radicalized by the 
stories brought to them daily by parishioners; several openly sided with the liberation movements. 
The JPC relied heavily on this well-grounded and far-reaching "listening Church" (as it came to be 
known in contrast to the "teaching Church" based in traditional hierarchy) for access to the 
experiences of Africans in the townships and rural areas. The point is not that the JPC single-
handedly became the "listening ear" of the Church, but rather that it came to symbolize a new 
reality in Zimbabwe. For the first time, Rhodesia's largest religious body was perceived as 
exercising active interest in the pain of the country's African majority. The "listeners" themselves 
operated from diverse Catholic organizations; but because it made hearing the voice of the people 
an official part of its task, the JPC came to symbolize a listening presence. 
Confronting the State 
Emboldened by the stories it was hearing, the JPC was not content merely to listen. In a series of 
hard-hitting publications and well-orchestrated lobbying efforts domestically and abroad, the 
Commission actively conveyed the stories of injustice it was documenting to anyone who would 
listen. In March 1973, the Commission sent a delegation to Ian Smith to "express concern over 
certain methods allegedly used by the Security Forces and the possible deterioration ofrace 
relations.9 For a year the Commission delayed further action, waiting for Smith and the Minister 
of Justice to act on the complaints of Security Force atrocities. After a second meeting· with Smith 
8 Linden, 196. 
9 RCBD April 25, 1973, quoted in Linden, 190. 
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in which he promised to investigate the charges but then did nothing, the Commission began 
pursuing other means. 
After a briefing by the Commission, a Member of Parliament called in March 1974 for an 
independent commission of inquiry. Two days later, 29 March 1974, the Commission ran a large 
advertisement in the Rhodesia Herald supporting the call for an independent inquiry. 10 In August 
an interdenominational "Appeal to Conscience" sent the Commission's dossier of allegations of 
Security Forces atrocities to five hundred prominent Rhodesians and the Catholic hierarchy issued 
a statement objecting to "the use of inhumane methods to elicit information from the civilian 
populace and of brutal assaults, by certain members of the Rhodesian security forces ... " on 
innocents. 11 
The Catholic newspaper Mato played a significant role from 1960 till its banning in 1974 as well. 
Initially limited in circulation and cautious in outlook, by 1973 the paper was a weekly with a 
readership of 17 ,000 operating "within a paragraph or two of banning" .12 In 1971 the paper played 
a significant role in articulating the objections of Africans to the Smith-Home Agreement which 
would have entrenched Smith's racist government in power by offering formal British recognition 
of Rhodesia as an independent state. In 1974 Mato repeatedly drew attention to FRELIMO 
0 
successes in Mozambique. But in September 1974 the government banned Mato for 
"dissemination of inflammatory and subversive statements."13• 
Efforts by the Salisbury government to counter the truth-telling efforts of the JPC and CUR only 
increased the pressure. For example, for several years the JPC had pursued the Minister of Law 
and Order in court for conduct of the war. With procedural delays exhausted, the state in 
September 1975 enacted an "Indemnity and Compensation Act", sheltering government employees 
from liability for actions committed in the war.14 This amounted to a virtual carte blanche from 
the RF to its military personnel regarding conduct in the field. Given the widespread and well-
documented abuses already taking place, this response only underscored the moral vacuity of the 
Salisbury government. The measure was met with increased pressure from domestic and overseas 
critics. 
10 Linden, 190, 193 
11 Ibid., 197. 
12 Ibid., 164. 
13 Quote from Minister of Law and Order Lardner-Burke in Parliament, Sept. 27, 1974, quoted by Linden, 199. 
14 Linden, 210. 
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The London-Salisbury Connection 
The most important ally of the JPC was the Catholic Institute for International Relations in 
London. The fate of Rhodesia, after all, was subject to decisions in England, the legal ruler of the 
colony.15 Thus, informing the British public and decision-makers about the realities of Rhodesia 
became a critical aspect of the Catholic struggle against a racist regime. CIIR involvement on 
behalf of Rhodesia had begun in 1972 when it led an ecumenical "Justice for Rhodesia 
Campaign". Over the next several years the connection forged between Rhodesian Catholics and 
British policy-makers via the JPC and CIIR was to become a critical aspect of the struggle for 
Zimbabwe, bringing events in Rhodesia "home to Whitehall, and the world, with a rapidity and 
accuracy that was acutely damaging to the image of the Rhodesian Front."16 
Joint International Lobbying Efforts 
Part of the strategy was arranging meetings between prominent Rhodesian Catholics with British 
politicians. As early as April 1972 the CIIR arranged a meeting between Bishop Lamont, and 
British politicians. These included Prime Minister Wilson and Foreign Minister James Callaghan, 
and several Members of Parliament17• Between 1975 and 1979 there was a steady stream of 
Catholic delegations to London and other capitols. In June, 1975 Lamont made a second trip to 
London where he met with the Minister of State of the British Foreign Office and other political 
leaders. In October he traveled to France and Germany where he met statesmen and lectured to 
large audiences. While Lamont was in Europe, the JPC hosted a visit by the Secretary-General of 
the International Commission of Jurists. 18 
15 Whites had viewed themselves as subjects of the Crown from the time Cecil Rhodes' Pioneer Column arrived from 
British-ruled South Africa in 1890. Running up the Union Jack on Harare Hill in Salisbury, the settlers had, in the 
name of Queen Victoria, claimed possession ofMashonaland plus "all other unpossessed land in South-Central Africa 
that should be found desirable to add to the Empire." Britain had indicated already in the 1950s her intent to offer 
independence to Rhodesia but had made clear in 1956 that she would not allow political groups which were racist to 
come to power. Smith's Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965 was thus a brazen tweak of the nose against 
the British. As Smith rightly calculated, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson chose not to respond militarily. 
What Smith had not anticipated was that his "independent" Rhodesia would remain economically and politically at 
the mercy of the British. Wilson imposed selective economic sanctions, and in 1966 the United Nations followed 
suit. By 1970 it was apparent that without the blessing of the British - and increasingly that meant the whole 
Commonwealth as well - Rhodesia was destined to become an isolated and economically handicapped pariah, all but 
surrounded by hostile African states. 
16 Ibid., 208 
17 Ibid., 166, in footnote. 
18 Ibid., 213. 
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In 1978 and again in 1979 Catholic delegations traveled to London and Washington to caution 
against acceptance of the Internal Settlement and lifting of sanctions.19 The JPC also mobilized a 
major international lobbying effort in 1979 (see below) to pressure all parties to engage in 
negotiations. 
Publications 
The response that proved most potent was the capacity of the Salisbury-London alliance to gather 
detailed information on the ground and disseminate it in London and elsewhere. The first major 
Catholic publication was The Man in the Middle which described the plight of Rhodesian villagers 
forced into "protected villages1120 by the Security Forces to simplify their struggle with the 
guerrillas. It also documented torture and indiscriminate killing of villagers by the Rhodesian 
Security Forces. Along with other churches, Catholic agencies had organized relief- blankets, 
0 
clothing, milk, medical treatment - to make the life of villagers in the "protected villages" 
bearable.21 But unlike their Protestant counterparts, the Catholics decided to document the 
suffering in writing and publish it far and wide. 
Published in London in 1975 The Man in the Middle gained wide attention in British daily . 
newspapers and stirred great controversy in Salisbury.22 In November 1976, again through the 
CIIR, the JPC published Civil War in Rhodesia, a further dossier of brutalities by the Defense 
Forces. Even more than the earlier book, this work received extensive press coverage in Europe 
O and Canada. 
23 
With an eye to influencing an Anglo-American peace initiative underway at the time, in 1977 the 
0 
JPC published Rhodesia: The Propaganda War. This detailed further the devastating impact of 
the "protected villages" as well as the widespread use of torture by Rhodesian Security Forces and 
the misuse of security legislation by the Salisbury government. "We prepared the papers because 
we felt that when Andrew Young and David Owen met with the government they would only hear 
19 Ibid., 13 and Auret interview, ibid. In the US visit, the JPC was assisted by the Commission for Justice and Peace 
of the US Catholic Conference of Bishops in opposing the Byrd Amendment, which would have allowed the US to 
import strategic minerals from Rhodesia in contravention of United Nations sanctions. 
20 In July, 1974, Smith made a strong showing at the whites-only polls, and interpreted this as a mandate to escalate the 
war against the liberation armies. Part of the escalation was an aggressive counter-insurgency campaign which 
moved villagers out of their home areas and sequestered them in centralized "protected villages." By the end of 1974, 
36 such camps existed, holding 70,000 people. This campaign of forced removal imposed enormous suffering on 
villagers for whom normal life was impossible. Occupants in many of the camps lived without water or sewerage 
facilities and were unable to cultivate food. 
21 Ibid., 207. 
22 Ibid., 209. 
23 Ibid., 229. 
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one side," recalls Sr. Janice McLaughlin, a Catholic nun deeply involved in writing the document. 
"We knew we weren't being balanced. We were only giving one side very deliberately because the 
other side was quite well presented and distorted by the government. "24 
Following the Internal Settlement in 1978, an ill-fated alliance between a desperate Ian Smith and 
a compromising Abel Muzorewa25, press censorship in Rhodesia tightened even further. The 
country was isolated from more than superficial scrutiny by the outside world. "Reliable 
information about life in the war zones and protected villages now came almost exclusively 
through Church channels, often deported missionaries and Church workers. 1126 
Once again the link to London via the CIIR proved decisive. "We had something the press didn't 
have," recalls the director of the CIIR in London at the time. Through the JPC and the Catholic 
network in Rhodesia, CIIR had "access to the situation on the ground that was denied the media."27 
Several London newspapers reprinted information provided by the CIIR from Rhodesian sources. 
The JPC and CIIR also jointly published several documents critically assessing the Internal 
Settlement.28 These reports circulated widely and succeeded in influencing many British 
Members of Parliament and strengthening the hand of British Foreign Secretary David Owen and 
American United Nations Ambassador Andrew Young in their opposition to the Internal 
Settlement. 
24 McLaughlin, ibid. 
25 In March, 1978, Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith entered into the Internal Settlement, an arrangement which repla~ed 
Smith with a four-member Executive Council until elections. The Council consisted of Smith and Muzorewa, plus 
two other Rhodesia-based black leaders, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief JAS. Chirau. The Internal Settlement provided 
for a Parliament to be established at elections to be held within a year, in which twenty-eight seats were guaranteed for 
whites in a body of 100 members. The externally-based Patriotic Front, who had not been consulted in this 
arrangement, immediately rejected this proposal for diluted majority rule, as did the United Nations and surrounding 
African states. Many others, including the Catholic Bishops, were initially ambivalent. The new leaders were 
installed, but it soon became apparent to outsiders that the three black "Prime Ministers" were mere puppets in a 
quartet controlled by Smith. By June, 1978, the Catholic Bishops and numerous other groups had rejected the 
arrangement. Meanwhile, the war continued to escalate, often with Muzorewa at the forefront in castigating the 
Patriotic Front. On one occasion he appeared on TV brandishing a machine gun, and on another he was quoted as 
saying that news of Rhodesian Forces bombing Nkomo's forces in Lusaka was a great start to-his day. Cf. Linden, 
277. 
26 Linden, 264-265. 
27 Mildred Neville, Director of the CIIR throughout the war years, interview with the author, July 8, 1991, London. 
28 The CIIR published "Comment #34" and the JPC published "An Analysis of the Salisbury Agreement". The 
Rhodesian Bishops wavered on whether to support or reject the Internal Settlement and asked the JPC to withhold 
publication of the latter booklet in April 1978. But after two massacres had taken place and it became apparent that 
the Internal Settlement would not end the war, the Bishops supported the release of the booklet in July 1978. 
Source: Michael Auret, secretary and primary staffperson of the JPC from 1974 to present, interviews with the 
author, Harare, June, 1991 and July, 1992. Cf.: Linden, 274. 
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Voice of Moral Conscience 
While Catholic efforts centered around truth-telling by documenting the realities of suffering on 
the ground to the nation and the world; the Church also sought to be a moral conscience. Assisted 
by the JPC, the Catholic Bishops released 10 pastoral statements between 1961 and 1980 calling 
for racial justice and, as the war escalated, for principled behavior on the part of the combatants. 
Additionally, the Bishops released 2 study documents in 1976.29 
The thrust of the Bishops' statements, like the truth-telling campaign of the JPC, was largely 
directly against the Rhodesian State. But Catholic structures addressed the liberation forces as 
well. In December 1976, the Bishops publicly deplored guerrilla atrocities and in the same month, 
during the Geneva Talks, the JPC sent a private memorandum , "To all the African Nationalist 
Leaders in Geneva." The latter expressed "grave concern about the apparently growing incidence 
of guerrilla atrocities", noting as an example that burial had been denied certain victims. The 
letter was received "with cold hostility" by members of the two liberation armies in Geneva.30 
Later, during mediation efforts in 1978, the Catholic delegation again raised the issue of atrocities 
committed by liberation forces with Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, and urged that special 
measures be undertaken to avoid harm to civilians.31 On this occasion Mugabe admitted the 
occurrence of atrocities due to the difficulties of maintaining discipline over remote groups of 
guerrillas, stated his regret, and requested the Church bring any future cases that arose to his 
attention.32 
Advocate of Negotiations 
Awareness of the massive scale of human suffering prompted a shift in emphasis in 1977 within 
the Commission for Justice and Peace, a shift that placed the JPC and the Catholic hierarchy in a 
new role in the Rhodesian struggle, that of actively advocating for negotiations. "We decided that 
because the suffering was so great in the country, the suffering of all people, black and white, 
whether they deserved it or not..., our direction must now be towards actively searching for 
peace," recalls Michael Auret, a key staffperson at the JPC. 33 
29RH. Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985), 197-214. 
30 Linden, 250. 
31 This was done in a prepared speech delivered to both ZANU in Maputo and ZAPU in Lusaka by Archbishop 
Chakaipa. Report on meetings with the Patriotic Front August 13-21, 1978; quoted in Linden, 278. 
32 Interviews with Auret. The JPC acted on Mugabe's request shortly after this meeting when guerrillas massacred 16 
overseas Pentecostal missionaries. According to Auret, the JPC felt satisfied with the ZANU response. 
33 Interviews with Auret. 
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In the first week of July, 1978, the Catholic Bishops' Conference convened and issued a statement 
of alarm. "Members of the Transitional Government, both Blacks and Whites, appear to be more 
concerned with restoring White morale and confidence than with guiding all the people of this 
country towards a new social order." The statement went on to say that, "instead of leading to a 
cease-fire, the signing of the Salisbury Agreement has caused an escalation of the war with the 
added risk of further internationalizing of the conflict. 1134 
Still in conference, the Bishops issued another statement on 6 July offering "our services to do 
whatever we can to assist in the process of reconciliation." "We the Catholic Bishops of Rhodesia 
are appalled at the continuance of bloodshed in this country which has led to the death of 
thousands of innocent people. We believe that our horror is shared by the mass of the people and 
by the political leaders. We therefore call on all the leaders to come together now to discuss the 
means of bringing about an end to bloodshed and achieving enduring peace and justice in this 
country." This statement was followed by a public statement by the Christian Council of Rhodesia 
urging the Government to accept the Anglo-American proposals for an all-party conference.35 
The possibility of a meeting between Catholics and the representatives of the liberation 
organizations was suggested by the JPC and the idea accepted in principle by the Bishops in 
December, 1977. The Archbishop of Maputo and the Apostolic Delegate in Lusaka were 
contacted soon thereafter to explore such a meeting, but the initiative became frozen in Church 
protocol. In June, 1978, the Commission was given permission to request the CIIR in London to 
initiate contacts with the two liberation movements. Meanwhile the JPC had met with 
representatives of the three internal nationalist factions, and had been addressed by Josiah 
Chinamano of ZAPU in Salisbury. 1136 
On 13 August 1978 a 6 person delegation made up of Archbishop Patrick Chakaipa, Monsignor 
Helmut Reckter SJ. (president of the JPC), Mike Auret (secretary of the JPC), Brother Fidelis 
Mukonori, Ishmael Muvingi and Father Bernard Ndlovu traveled to Lusaka. There they met with 
the executive committee of the ZAPU liberation army, visited with Pres. Kaunda, and 
accompanied by Joshua Nkomo, visited Zimbabwe House, a resource center for exiles from 
Rhodesia, and refugee camps. 
34 Linden, 273-74. 
35 Ibid., 250. 
36 Ibid., 275-276. 
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Their purpose, as they explained it to the ZAPU executive was two-fold: 1) "To share views with 
you on the situation in Zimbabwe as it affects the people, and the position of the Church in that 
situation." 2) To "consult with you about the role of the Church in the new Zimbabwe. "37 "The 
Church delegation presented a straightforward account of the anarchy within Rhodesia. 
Monsignor Reclcter suggested that ZAPU forces should concentrate on the Security Forces and 
their installations in order to avoid harming the civilian population."38 Nkomo explained why the 
war was neces~ary, and proposed that the delegation could help in several ways. They could 1) 
"persuade the Internal Leaders to attend a Conference"; 2) Try to "overcome white fears so as to 
show whites that they are welcome as Zimbabweans if they will accept people as people." 3) Keep 
mission stations etc., open as far as possible. "39 Nkomo went on to clarify that "under no 
circumstances" had orders been given by the Patriotic Front Leadership for attacks on 
missionaries, "in fact, quite the reverse. 1140 
The delegation then waited for four days to discover the whereabouts of Robert Mugabe of ZAND. 
When he finally arrived on Friday, it turned out that a few days previously he had gone to Nigeria 
at the urgent request of the then-leader of Nigeria, Brigadier Garba. Garba had informed him that 
Nkomo was that week meeting secretly with Smith, and that another such meeting with Smith 
including Mugabe had been scheduled for Friday of the same week, August 20. Mugabe was 
furious about this tum of events which threatened to sever the already-shaky alliance between 
ZAND and ZAPU, and he declined to meet with Smith. Instead he returned to Lusaka enroute to 
Maputo, and still visibly angry, met with the Catholic delegation in Lusaka.41 
In the meeting Mugabe explained the conflict in Rhodesia, "as a just war undertaken only when all 
else had failed. He felt it unfortunate that the Church had gone along with 'the system' in the past 
but pointed to the work of the Justice and Peace Commission which he described as 'well-known 
and appreciated'. "42 After meeting Mugabe, the JPC met again with Nkomo. 
The secretary of the JPC, Mike Auret, recalled the input of the delegation with both leaders as 
focusing on "the extent of the suffering in the country." The primary message was "we must move 
37 Ibid, 278. 
38 From a prepared speech delivered to both ZANU and ZAPU by Archbishop Chakaipa, report on a meeting with the 
Patriotic Front 13-21 August, 1978 MS. Quoted in ibid., 278. 
39 Ibid., 278. 
40 Ibid, 279. 
41 Reconstructed from ibid., 279 and interview with Auret. 
42 Ibid., 279. 
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towards peace" and they made it clear that they would be meeting with the internal leaders as well. 
Auret came away deeply impressed with Mugabe - his ability to listen well and respond point by 
point to the Catholic presentation; his candor in admitting that despite ZANU policy atrocities had 
occurred; his openness in requesting that Catholics contact him immediately if further atrocities 
came to light, a promise which Mugabe fulfilled shortly thereafter when the Eden massacres took 
place.43 
The result of these meetings was "to reinforce the commitment of the commission to act as a force 
for reconciliation. "44 A series of meetings followed. The delegation met in Salisbury with 
Sithole, Muzorewa, Chirau, and Deputy Prime Minister Davidson to explore the possibility of an 
all-party conference. Smith refused to meet. 45 They met as well with Commanders Wall and 
McLean of the Army, stressing the desperateness of the situation and urging that they use their 
influence with the government to end the war. "We wanted to make sure what we had done out of 
the country we were doing inside," recalls Auret.46 Representations were also made to Dr. David 
Owen of the British Foreign Office "to underline the gravity of the situation. 1147 
In addition, the Church devoted greater attention, as requested by the Patriotic Front leadership, 
"to the growing problem of refugees outside the country in camps in Mozambique, Botswana, and 
Zambia."48 Michael Traber, a member of the Bethlehem Fathers with many close friendships in 
top ZANU circles, went to Maputo and helped set up the Zimbabwe Project, which responded to 
needs of Rhodesians fleeing the violence in their homeland. Traber also met with Mugabe and 
secured permission to place a Catholic worker in the camps of the ZANU forces. 
But in the weeks after the meetings with the political leaders, the possibility of negotiations 
appeared more remote than ever. The Executive Committee of ZANU, whose army accounted for 
eighty-five per cent of the guerrillas operating inside Rhodesia, refused to meet with Smith unless 
the British Foreign Secretary, legally the representative for Rhodesia, was also present.49 
What is more, long-simmering tensions between ZANU and ZAPU flared into the open at a 
meeting of the Frontline States in September. Nkomo's private meeting with Smith had aroused 
43 Interviews with Auret. 
44 Linden, 280. 
45 Interviews with Auret. 
46 Interviews with Auret. 
47 Linden, 280. 
48 Ibid., 280. 
49 Ibid., 280. 
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anger and new suspicion in the ZANU camp, and dissension over this issue dominated the meeting 
of supposed allies. To make matters even worse, while the Frontline States were still in session, 
Nkomo's forces shot down a commercial Air Rhodesia Viscount aircraft and then slaughtered 10 
of the 18 survivors on the ground. Government troops had in the past visited massacres on a far 
larger scale on Africans, of course but the white reaction in Rhodesia and abroad was visceral 
horror. 
The war continued to escalate. In October Rhodesian forces raided Nkomo's camps in Zambia, 
killing 1500 people.50 In addition to the government forces, there now roamed, virtually at will, 
private armies established by Muzorewa, Chirau, and Sithole. In some of the Tribal Trust Lands, 
five different sets of African militias fought for control.51 The first famine deaths were beginning 
to occur. 
Meeting with the Pope 
Despairing of results from efforts to work directly with the political leaders involved, the JPC 
shifted course and moved once again to the world stage in a truth-telling role. The goal: "to alert 
world opinion to the tragedy of an anarchic collapse into famine and increased bloodshed. "52 
Circumventing protocols normally requiring six weeks advance contact, staff at the Vatican 
arranged an urgent meeting with Pope John Paul II on a few days' notice in early April 1979.53 A 
delegation make up of Bishop ~higinya, Monsignor Recktor, and Mike Auret of the JPC met for 
an hour with the Pope in Rome in early April, 1979, urging the prelate to use Vatican influence to 
pressure all parties to enter negotiations. The Pope responded vigorously to their plea. Before the 
three left Rome, he had contacted diplomats in Italy, United States, Britain, France, and 
Germany54 to urge British intervention in Rhodesia. Individuals from the trio followed up with 
personal visits to diplomats in Germany, Britain, and the US, and found in each case that the 
contact from the Pope had left a mark. The message to Western diplomats was the same as to the 
parties themselves: the suffering must end. The goal of the lobbying was "pressure, more pressure 
on Smith, more pressure on the guerrilla forces to negotiate. "55 
50 Ibid., 284. 
51 Ibid., 284. 
52 Ibid., 284. 




In April, 1979, the election took place and Bishop Muzorewa won an absolute majority of fifty-
two seats under the terms negotiated in the Internal Settlement. The JPC and CIIR lobbied in 
Washington and London against the sending of official delegates to the election. Lord Chitness, a 
Catholic layman, came from London as an election observer under Church auspices. In contrast to 
other observers, by working through Catholic networks Chitness accumulated a substantial dossier 
of government intimidation and coerced voting. 
In August the breakthrough came. At the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka, British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher encountered virtually unanimous opposition from the Commonwealth 
nations to her oft-reiterated position of support for the Muzorewa government.56 Bowing to a 
consensus forged by the joint efforts of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Prime Minister 
Malcolm Fraser of Australia, Thatcher agreed to reject the Internal Settlement government and to 
convene a constitutional convention under British auspices as soon as possible. 
Lancaster House and the Transition Period 
Catholics were in the background at Lancaster House and sought no direct role in the negotiations. 
But staff from the CIIR picked up their previous role as truth-teller and published five public 
briefing documents on key issues. For their part the Bishops' Conference issued a public appeal to 
all leaders to put the good of the whole nation before personal or party interests, for the sake of the 
people's suffering."57 
The meetings that did take place had overtones of self-interested lobbying on behalf of Catholic 
Q 
interests in the new dispensation. Bishop Lamont, now living in Ireland, met with ZANU and 
ZAPU leaders, urging them not to outlaw Christianity and not to conduct a Nuremburg-type trial.58 
The Bethlehem Fathers met with the liberation fronts as well to discuss the closing by guerrillas of 
several schools they ran and to express concern about incidents of guerrilla misconduct.59 
Several individuals from JPC met with ZANU and ZAPU.60 
In the transition period between the Lancaster House settlement and elections, the JPC and 
observers sent from CIIR in London used their intimate knowledge of the country and access to 
key leaders to support the tenuous peace. Lord Soames, sent from England to serve as· Governor 
56 Only Malawi, Uncle Tom of the continent, favored recognition ofMuzorewa. 
57 Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe, 36. 




of the country until the election, held the unenviable task of maintaining order in a political 
tinderbox with a small Commonwealth Monitoring Force. Several bombings, multiple 
assassination attempts on the life of Mugabe, roving bands of armed men, and ceaseless rumors 
threatened to plunge the country at any moment into renewed warfare. Soames relied in part on 
the corps of international observers present to inform his decisions. Lord Chitness and Eileen 
Sudworth, British observers sent by the CIIR, drew extensively on Church knowledge and 
resources in assisting other observers, providing transportation, arranging for observers to meet 
key people, and writing reports for the press.61 
For example, there were persistent reports of misconduct by armed men in the northern and 
eastern regions of Rhodesia. Soames had been told that ZANLA, the military wing of Mugabe's 
ZANU party, was responsible and threatened several times tci outlaw the presence of ZANLA in 
certain areas. From their extensive networks, Catholic observers knew that in fact the perpetrators 
were not ZANLA forces, but rather the auxiliary forces of Muzorewa. Archbishop Chakaipa took 
this information to Soames who accepted it as credible and ended his criticism of ZANLA.62 
Partisan and Victim Roles 
At no time was it church policy to support the war effort of either side, but in reality large amounts 
of Catholic resources contributed to the support of both sides. Individuals and in some instances 
groups of Catholic workers actively supported the guerrilla cause. Some of the rural Catholic 
missions provided medicine, food, clothing, money, and rest to the guerrillas.63 Notable here 
were the Burgos Fathers, a Spanish-based order still radicalized by their experience with the 
Fascists in Spain, and with an emphasis on living simply in close connection to the people they 
served. Many in this order "actively supported the guerrillas and were positively hostile to the 
Security Forces."64 One Catholic worker interviewed six amputees at random at a Red Cross unit 
in Maputo, and discovered that all six ZANLA soldiers owed their lives to Catholic missionaries, 
each in a different incident. 65 
A minority of Catholic workers, on the other hand, openly supported the government. A 




64 Linden, 270 
0 
65 Interview with Sr. Janice McLaughlin in October 1978, reported in Linden, 270 
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a struggle between the State and terrorism" and maintained friendly contacts with the Security 
Forces.66 What is more, decades of coziness between church and state had established 
conventions of cooperation that the Church never challenged. The Catholic Church provided 
chaplains for the Security Forces through-out the war, and never reciprocated with the guerrilla 
forces. 67 Though some Catholic leaders denounced the legitimacy of the State, none ever called 
for a boycott of payme?it of taxes. Catholic laypeople thus were a large and compliant source of 
funding of the war efforts of the Salisbury Government through-out. 68 
The Rhodesian Security Forces, of course, had been hostile from the early stages of Catholic 
opposition. Putting a gun behind one African priest's ear, a member of the Security Forces gave a 
command that seemed to capture a common attitude: "You black bastard, speak up, one dead 
missionary is better than one hundred dead terrorists. "69 But combatants on both sides of the 
conflict perceived the Church as partisan. The national network of Catholic schools, missions, and 
hospitals put Catholic workers at great risk and numbers suffered severely. Between December, 
1976, and February, 1980, a total of twenty-five Catholic expatriate missionaries were killed; and 
as noted earlier, eighteen were deported.70 Nineteen Catholic-run secondary schools were closed 
as a result of harassment by guerrilla fore.es; and an even larger number of primary schools.71 
0 
Summary and Assessment ., 
In its efforts to interact with people in a position to influence the conflict, the common theme in 
ii 
Catholic responses was an effort to be a voice of morality. Church representatives either stressed 
the immense scale of human suffering or they appealed for more humane conduct of the war by 
the fighting forces. Even the major effort in mid-1978 to get talks started was pitched at the level 
of moral concern. A delegation was sent, which in itself implies an intent to register a message 
with the parties rather than to attempt the more facultative tasks of practical negotiation where one 
or two are quite enough to accomplish the purpose of the meeting. No effort was made to convey 
messages between parties or to draw the parties into the practical issues of "getting to the table". 
66 Linden, 270 
67 However, the Jesuits sent a worker in a chaplaincy-oriented role to work in a ZANU refugee camp in Zambia in 
early 1979. Source, Auret 
68 However, a small number of Catholics refused to pay the 5 per cent defense surtax which Salisbury imposed towards 
the end of the war to finance the war effort. Source: Michael Auret. 
69 Daily News of Tanzania, 12 May 1977. Quoted in Linden, 252 
70 Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe, 220 .. Randolph gives no indication as to how many native Zimbabwean Catholic 
workers died in the war. 
71 Linden, 271. 
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The message from the Catholic delegation was not "we want to mediate"; rather it was "this war is 
devastating the people; please end it quickly." Similarly, in the 1979 effort, the JPC staff members 
made no effort to work through the parties. They went directly to outside pressure groups. In 
short, Catholics were lobbyists on behalf of moral concerns, not mediators. 
Because the target audience of Catholic involvements was so vast - the entire public sphere in 
Rhodesia and abroad - it would be impossible to measure the full impact of the Catholic efforts. 
But leaders in present-day Zimbabwe credit the Catholic Church for a major contribution. In 1980 
President Robert Mugabe commented: "I think the Catholic Church played a very significant role 
in the liberation struggle. Not that they fought with arms as we did, but they opposed racialism, 
and refused to be made an agent of the Government implementing racial policies. We valued the 
support which the Church gave us as it helped to internationalize our grievances and helped to 
mobilize international support for us. Within the country it gave us a broader base than the one 
which we ourselves, acting entirely on our own, could have created."72 
Former President Canaan Banana and pre-eminent historian of the Zimbabwe struggle, concluded 
in a 1989 essay that the JPC "played an invaluable role of publicizing and condemning the 
excesses of the Rhodesian army in its conduct of the war. In this way atrocities of the Rhodesian 
security forces were effectively disclosed and the psychological warfare counteracted."73 
For the scholar of conflict resolution, the Catholic involvements are a remarkable essay in the 
potential and limitations of a religious organization to contribute to the resolution of a national 
conflict. The Church's roles as truth-teller, moral conscience, and advocate of negotiations 
depended on each of several key factors: 
Transcendent value system: A value system in which survival and power were not the 
ultimate goal, but rather faithfulness to transcendent goals which included justice, 
truthfulness, and service to others. This led Catholic workers to enter into ... 
Engagement with victims of the war. Catholics saw and acted upon the issues destroying 
the people of Rhodesia. Not only did Catholics see the issues, their far-flung church 
system provided an unparalleled .... 
Information-gathering network making it possible to compile information essential for 
mobilizing domestic and world opinion. When it came to influencing decision-makers, 
the Catholic efforts depended upon an ... 
72 Interview on UK ITV Religious Program, broadcast 30 November 1980, quoted in Randolph. Dawn in Zimbabwe, 
57-58. 
73 Canaan Banana, "The Role of the Church in the Struggle for Liberation in Zimbabwe", Tu~moil and Tenacity, 
(Harare: College Press, 1989); 205. 
International structure for collecting, analyzing and disseminating information and ... 
Ready entre to political figures and media channels, domestically and abroad. 
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With the possible exception of the first, none of these characteristics is "religious" per se, but in 
Rhodesia, the Catholic Church was the only institution that embodied all of them. In this regard 
the case study illustrates the Church at her best potential for peacemaking. 
A fundamental part of the problem in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe struggle was the apathy of the white 
ruling elite to the injustice of their own government. Like ruling elites almost everywhere, they 
believed the propaganda of their government. Rhodesia thus demonstrated a generic problem: the 
opiate of patriotism makes it harder for citizens to see the moral issues at stake in national 
conflicts with the clarity available to those at a distance. The Catholic Church, like other white-
led churches and institutions in Rhodesia, was for many years lethargic in the face of massive 
injustice. But two fundamental differences set Catholics apart from other churches. One was that 
Catholic ecclesiology supports a global rather than a national orientation by placing final fiscal, 
theological, and organizational authority in an extra-national agency, the Vatican. The other was 
that the worldwide Catholic church was in the midst of a major renewal at every level in the 
aftermath of Vatican Two, and one result of the renewal was unprecedented commitment to 
supporting efforts for structural justice. 
Consequently, the individuals within Rhodesian Catholic structures who challenged the injustice 
of their political system had access to a massive global structure that "leveraged" their efforts, 
even though they were a minority in their country and, initially at least, within their own Church. 
At the individual level, Bishop Lamont and priests more radical than he, were buoyed by the 
trends of the global Catholic Church in confronting the many in Catholic structures who supported 
Salisbury. At the institutional level, the Commission for Justice and Peace found a ready and 
powerful ally in the London-based CUR long before many Rhodesian Catholics supported a 
position that, to blind patriots, looked subversive. To the extent, then, that injustice imposed by 
ruling elites is part of a conflict--and surely it is in many national conflicts--the Catholic Church in 
Rhodesia demonstrates the potential ofreligious organizations to cut through the lethargy of blind 
patriotism to a genuinely moral base of analysis and action. 
On the other hand, the Catholic Church also demonstrates the limits of a massive, institution-
bound religious structure as a base of response to conflict. In Rhodesia the Church had for 
decades cultivated a cozy alliance with the State. In providing a "cosmic umbrella" for an unjust 
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social and political structure the Church stood culpable as a contributing cause of the war. As 
individuals and agencies within the Church finally began awakening to reality, they faced 
debilitating resistance from within the Church itself to confronting the actions of the State. 
Though the Church found her way in the end to outspoken resistance to white privilege, one must 
ask why it took so long. African nationalism was already rocking the Catholic boat in the early 
1950s, but it wasn't until 1969 that the Catholic Bishops disengaged themselves from the embrace 
of the State, and not until 1972 that they established a structure mandated to respond to the racial 
injustices that undergirded the society. Even then these actions came only after much anguished 
debate, arousing enormous ambivalence among the Bishops and great resistance within the 
Church. 
Thus if the global orientation and networking capacity of international Catholic structures proved 
an enormous asset in mobilizing a response to the Rhodesian conflict, the institutional inertia and 
patriotic bent of domestic Catholics nearly paralyzed initial responses. It took many years for the 
Church to come to a point of sufficient clarity about its own moral position that it could begin 
mobilizing its far-flung resources effectively. 
As will be seen in the case of the Quakers, the roles undertaken by the Catholic Church could 
0 
perhaps have been undertaken by anyone. But no organization without a spiritual identity could 
have had an impact comparable to that of the Catholic Church. The point here is that roles and 
responses per se are not the key to understanding what religiously-based actors do. The key may 
lie instead in the identity of the religious actors and their resulting credibility in the eyes of the 
parties, as well as, in this case, in the power that the Catholic Church wielded to influence public 




Harare in February 1980 crackled with tension. Lancaster House had yielded a peace plan two 
months previously, but the real test of the settlement was now at hand. Elections had just taken 
place and after several days of vote counting, the results were about to be announced. Rumors 
swirled about what each group planned to do if it lost. Whites were counting on Muzorewa to win 
the election and finally gain the recognition denied him in 1978 under the abortive Internal 
Settlement. But it was widely known that General Peter Walls of the Security Forces had a coup 
prepared to intervene in the event that the election turned out differently than expected. 
On the other hand, many had also heard, and believed, reports that Mugabe's guerrilla fighters 
were no longer in the agreed holding zones. The word was that they were quietly moving out in 
preparation for battle and were being replaced by mujibas, young, less-experienced guerrillas. 1 
Cuban troops were said to be just over the border in Beira with tanks and weapons, and the 
Nigerians allegedly had 19 ,000 troops waiting at airstrips in the event of a white takeover or South 
African inte~ention. South Africa had placed, at the request of the Rhodesians, a small army unit 
oil the Rhodesian side of Beitbridge. "Everybody had their contingency plans," recalls one Moral 
Re-Armament worker. "It appeared to us was that whoever won the election, we were back into 
confrontation. "2 
A sober group ofMRA workers, the "Cabinet of Conscience" as they had come to call themselves, 
gathered on Saturday morning at the end of election week to assess the situation. The moment of 
truth was nearing, for on Tuesday the election results would be announced. The fate of the 
country, not to mention the lives and future of their families, seemed to hang in the balance. After 
lengthy discussion yielded no way forward, Joram Kucherera, a member of the group with 
personal and family connections to ZANU, stood and said he knew what must happen. "Two 
people have to meet- Smith and Mugabe. There's no other way."3 Some in the room doubted the 
possibility of such an event, but agreed it wouldn't hurt to try. 





Kucherera contacted a cousin who was a senior aide to Mugabe. To his surprise, the response was 
positive. Kucherera then rang Alec Smith, son of the Prime Minister and a key member of the 
MRA group. Over the last several years Alec had arranged numerous meetings between his father 
and individual nationalists, so the invitation to meet with Robert Mugabe could hardly have come 
as a complete shock to the elder Smith. 
Both sides were interested in a meeting, but wary4. The elder Smith insisted on meeting 
personally with Kucherera and sought clarification from the Mugabe side about the agenda of the 
meeting before agreeing. Mugabe's aides, for their part, arranged a meeting at Mugabe's residence 
with a representative of Mozambican president Samora Machel to gain the support of their long-
standing patron for such a meeting.5 
Though frightened by the thought that his bold venture to get the two leaders together could easily 
end in the loss of his own life, Kucherera felt he was undertaking a divine mission and made no 
secret of what he saw as the source of his inspiration. Told in an early meeting that the idea of a 
meeting was a "thought from God", a skeptical Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe's head of 
Security, shot back, "You think God fixes things like this? A meeting with Ian Smith?" But 
Mugabe himself saw no need to challenge Kucherera's assertion that "this country needs a 
miracle".6 What Kucherera offered was something the Mugabe camp keenly sought- low-
visibility access to Ian Smith via Kucherera's trusted friend, Alec. After several days of almost 
round-the-clock meetings - Kucherera recalls coming home from one meeting at three o'clock in 
the morning - both sides gave their approval. 
Two and one half days after the MRA group had met, the man who had squandered the lives of 
thousands and the economy of his nation to destroy Robert Mugabe and his fellow African 
nationalists was driven by Kucherera in an aging Morris Minor automobile to the headquarters of 
Mugabe's party. Accompanied only by Kucherera, he walked past fifty tense and heavily armed 
guards into the house. "Let's get rid of him now," shouted one young guerrilla, raising his rifle. 
4 The events of the actual meeting were reconstructed from interviews by the author with Former Prime Minister. Ian 
Smith, April 28, 1992, in Harare; former ZANU Head of Intelligence and Special Advisor to Mugabe, Emerson 
Mnonangagwa, August 17, 1992, in Harare, and Joram Kucherera, MRA worker, August 18, 1992, in Kwe Kwe. 
All three of these individuals were present in the meeting. Additional information came from Alec Smith and Ian 
Robertson, who assisted in setting up the meeting. Cf. Alec Smith's account in his book Now I Call Him Brother 
(London: Marshalls 1984) 117-120. 




The senior Commander of the ZANU forces turned, and with the butt of his own weapon, sent the 
youth sprawling. Inside the house, Mugabe invited Smith to sit next to him on a couch, and for the 
next several hours, the two men talked about the future of the nation. 
Both had been tipped off regarding the expected outcome of the election, so they entered the 
meeting aware that in less than twenty four hours Mugabe would be announced as the winner. In 
the meeting, Mugabe indicated that, as a civilian leader he would approach things differently than 
he had as leader of a liberation army, and he outlined policies he intended to pursue. He stressed 
his eagerness to retain the confidence of whites and inquired from Smith what measures would be 
necessary to do so. Mugabe also put an offer on the table: Smith would be welcome to nominate 
two white Cabinet Ministers to serve in Mugabe's Cabinet. 
The following morning, Tuesday, March 4, came the public announcement of the election results. 
That evening Mugabe delivered his famous "reconciliation speech."7 In his first public response, 
on Friday Smith made his astonishingly positive response, encouraging fellow whites to stay. A 
few weeks later, with the political transition process nearing its completion, Prime Minister 
Mugabe reiterated the theme: "If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today I have become a 
I 
friend and ally. If yesterday you hated me, today you cannot avoid the love that binds you to me 
and me to you." 
MRA Roots 
Moral Re-Armament began in the 1920s among students at Oxford University. Their leader was 
Frank Buchman, an American Lutheran pastor who in England met a personal conversion 
experience under the preaching of one American evangelist and from a second, F.B. Meyer, 
learned "the secret of guidance", the practice oflistening to God. Charismatic by nature and a 
crusader at heart, Buchman quickly gathered others around him. His blend of a pietist salvation 
experience and a practical technique for receiving divine guidance appealed to many, particularly 
7 There has been private speculation among some MRA people aware of the Mugabe/Smith meeting that the speech was 
a direct result of the encounter. It is possible that the meeting had an impact on the tone and nuances of the speech -
Kucherera was present on Tuesday at Mugabe headquarters and witnessed the content being modified in a last minute 
rehearsal between Mugabe and top aides in ways that he believes to have been a consequence of the meeting. But 
the evidence is overwhelming that Mugabe and other ZANU leadership had been working on unity as a theme of 
political leadership for months previously. To cite just a few examples: Before Lancaster House the Quakers had 
noted the topic being discussed by ZANU leaders in Maputo. At Lancaster House, Josiah Tongogara, by no means a 
moderate among ZANU leaders, spoke at length in an interview on October 29, 1979, about the need to include old 
enemies in a new government. Throughout his election campaign Mugabe made clear his intent to create a society 
with room for everyone. Cf.: de Waal, The Politics of Reconciliation, 40-47. 
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to young intellectuals at a time when grand-scale tum-of-the century idealism lay shattered with 
the ruins of the first World War. 
At Oxford an active group of student followers known as the "Oxford Group" emerged and began 
conducting campaigns worldwide. The movement took the name Moral Re-Armament in 1938 
and at its peak over the next decade drew large numbers to conferences and meetings. One MRA 
function in 1939 filled the Hollywood Bowl. 
MRA Beliefs 
MRA has no creed or dogmas. God is assumed to exist and to be actively involved in 
implementing a just and loving masterplan for the world.8 Beyond these fundamental 
assumptions, MRA workers and literature reflect little interest in prescribing "correct belief'. The 
closest the organization comes to doctrine is a belief in "four absolute standards": honesty, purity, 
unselfishness, and love. To the extent that individuals apply these standards to their life, it is 
believed, they will find themselves and their relationships transformed. To the extent that leaders 
apply these standards to their personal and public lives, society will be transformed. 
But what, specifically, does "absolute love" demand? Where ethicists write books in answer, 
MRA leaves the problem to the individual. Such a response could appear to be sheer 
abandonment, but MRA points to some assistance: divine guidance. Recurrent in MRA literature 
is the call to "listen to God." God is in charge of the world, and any individual who listens will 
find that God speaks, giving guidance about what needs to be done. Active MRA workers and 
supporters typically spend at least twenty minutes each day alone or in an MRA ~roup in "quiet 
time", "listening" for "thoughts" about what to do. Often these thoughts are about individual 
actions to set aright one's own life and relationships, which MRA stresses as the place where 
genuine change of any kind must begin. But as one's own life comes aright, God will also prompt 
the individual with thoughts about actions needed to effect God's purposes in the world. An oft-
repeated MRA story, for example, recounts how Desmond Reader, a senior academic at the 
University of Rhodesia, was prompted in a quiet time to apologize to an African colleague for 
under-estimating his abilities and under-employing him. Gordon Chavunduka, the man in 
question, responded warmly; his work and the relationship were transformed as a result. This 
experience brought the two men into deeper conversation and they began working together on a 
8 Although most MRA supporters are theistic, they do not insist on belief in God. Most belief that anyone, including 
atheists, can receive guidance if they merely undertake the discipline of listening to their "inner voice." 
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series of lunches and dinner parties to bring together people who were, in Reader's words, 
"extreme opposites."9 Chavuriduka was Secretary-General of the African National Congress and 
thus had access to a variety of internal African leaders. These meetings continued for several 
years. 
The assumption critical to understanding virtually all MR.A activities has to do with the 
phenomenon of change: social change begins with individual change. "In order to build a new 
society, you must have people who are willing to begin with themselves," was the way Alec Smith 
summarized the purpose of the MR.A "Cabinet of Conscience", a key MR.A strategy group in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Henry Macnicol, a Scotsman who spent several years in the country during 
the height of the war and served as a central figure in MR.A efforts put it this way: "You can 
change the system all you like but unless you change the hearts of men, you're changing 
nothing."10 
More than the Catholics or the Quakers, MR.A workers carried in their own minds a clear and 
relatively uncomplicated agenda: to call individuals to do what God wanted them to do. Only as 
this happens can constructive change take place in society. Whether meeting in private prayer 
sessions with Abel Muzorewa, publishing a full-page newspaper statement, or arranging a one-on-
one meeting between Robert Mugabe and Ian Smith, MR.A workers maintained a simple, if often 
unspoken, agenda. Their task was to support individuals in listening to God. This would lead to a 
change of heart and to clarity about the "right" thing to do. And if leaders get themselves oriented 
in the right direction, society must follow. 
Activation of MRA in Rhodesia 
MR.A was active in southern Africa from 1928 onwards11, holding conferences and workshops in 
South Africa and Rhodesia. MR.A workers in the 1970s were surprised to discover that numerous 
liberation front leaders, including Nkomo and Mugabe, already knew about the organization. 
Nkomo, like many black Africans, held positive views from his encounters with MRA in the 
1950s, for MR.A had already then challenged individual whites to change their racist attitudes. 
Mugabe had seen MR.A films as a student at Ft. Hare and told an MR.A worker in 1976 that he 
respected the organization's concept of beginning with mending one's own ways as the key to 
9 Elliot, 20. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Frank Buchman, Remaking the World (Washington DC: Mackinac Press, 1950), xxiv. 
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healing relationships. But he held serious reservations. The idea "works in the family, and also in 
society," he said, but "it doesn't work in politics." "They are the oppressors and we are the 
oppressed. If we change our attitude, nothing happens. We've tried it." 12 
After influencing the lives of thousands of young people in southern Africa in the 1940s and 
1950s, MRA faded. By 1970, activities in Rhodesia had dwindled to personal visits by a handful 
of retirees. "My first contact with MRA was at a quaint old house in Harare, and nobody in the 
room was under 75 years old," recalls Alec Smith, a key figure in the revival ofMRA in Rhodesia. 
But as Smith soon discovered, the MRA people possessed a major asset: they had "built up a 
network of friendships across society that laid the basis for everything [that followed]." 13 
Smith's involvement with the small and aging group of pensioners began in 1974 and led in a 
remarkably short time to the re-activation of MRA in Rhodesia. He was on the rebound himself 
from a decade of vintage 1960s-style rebellion: alcohol and drugs, partying, and dismissal from 
Rhodes University in South Africa all figured in a past of which the young Smith had now 
wearied. A few months prior to encountering MRA, he had experienced a profound personal 
religious conversion. Awakened for the first time to the painful realities of war-tom Rhodesia, he 
was convinced that God was able to bring great change in the lives of human beings and filled 
with a burning desire to carry this message to his own countryfolk. An MRA film about Dr. 
William Nkomo from Pretoria, the first president of the African National Congress Youth League 
in South Africa, deeply impressed Smith. Nkomo was a committed MRA supporter who had 
overcome bitterness through his own experience of God, and who traveled widely in Europe and 
Africa challenging audiences with fundamental MRA concepts: to begin living by absolute moral . 
standards, to hand over control of their lives to God and to listen to Him for guidance.14 
Impressed by the Nkomo account and the MRA vision for re-building broken societies through 
individual renewal, Alec Smith took up an active role in MRA. Others were becoming active at 
the same time, including Sir Cyril Hatty, a former Cabinet member and Dr. Elliottt Gabellah, 
Vice-President of Rhodesia's African National Congress. Meeting regularly and groping for a way 
to reach their countrymen with a message they felt offered the only possibility of a peaceful future, 
the group decided to convene an international MRA conference in Salisbury. 
12 Interview with Robertson, Harare, May 25, i991. 
13 Alec Smith, interview with Cynthia Sampson, Washington, DC., Sept. 23, 1990. 
14 Peter Hannon, South Africa: What Kind of Change? (Johannesbu~g. Grosvenor Books, 1977) 13-18. 
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The event, held in June 1975, drew more than a thousand participants and laid the groundwork for 
MRA work in Rhodesia for the next five years. Among those present were four Cabinet Members 
from the Smith government, as well as a delegation from the opposition United African National 
Congress, whose leader, Bishop Muzorewa, was out of the country at the time but sent a message 
of support. 15• Several individuals who over the next several years numbered among MRA's most 
active workers encountered the organization for the first time at this conference. 
One key relationship that resulted was a close friendship between Alec Smith, and Arthur 
Kanodereka, an African nationalist. At the conference Smith spoke with deep feeling about fellow 
Rhodesians driven in desperation to fight in the bush for liberation. "It's people like me who have 
sent them there," confessed the son of the Prime Minister before the whole assembly. "For my 
part, I am deeply sorry for the thoughtlessness of my past life and I have now committed myself to 
finding a solution for our country to building bridges of reconciliation and to showing the rest of 
Africa that black and white can live together. That, under God, there is an answer."16 
Alec's speech stirred a response in Kanodereka, a Methodist minister deeply embittered by his 
experiences with whites and now a recruiter of young men into the guerrilla forces. Kanodereka 
was touched by Smith's words, and invited him to come to his church to speak. A friendship 
resulted, and the two began addressing audiences together on a regular basis. Kanodereka also 
began holding weekly meetings in his congregation to enable blacks and whites to dialogue 
together. On occasion, as many as eight hundred people attended at a time. 
Smith and Kanodereka traveled widely in Rhodesia and to South Africa as well, offering, in 
classic MRA style, first-person accounts of their own experiences of the power of God to bring 
change and reconciliation, and challenging listeners to set aright their lives in accordance with the 
four absolute standards as a first step towards finding God's plan for themselves and the nation. 
Until Kanodereka's assassination17 in December 1978, the pair were by far the most visible in 
MRA activities in Rhodesia. 
15 Letter from Henry Macnicol, October 30, 1992. Muzorewa, of course, later fell into disrepute within the liberation 
movement for opting to participate in compromise measures with the Rhodesia Front. But at this time he stood in 
high esteem as the formal representative of the liberation movement within Rhodesia. 
16 Elliott, 63. 
17 Kanodereka is an enigmatic figure around whom controversy lingers. He was assassinated by unknown gunmen 
outside his home after initiating a promising peace effort in 1978 (See following Quaker section for more 
information). Almost a decade later, Ken Flower, the man who for years directed Ian Smith's Central Intelligence 
Organization, asserted in his memoirs, Serving Secretly (Johannesburg: Galago Books, 1987), that Kanodereka was a 
paid agent of the CIO. Flower, now dead, claimed that Kanodereka cooperated in a scheme that recruited many 
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But a larger nucleus stood just behind them. At the heart ofMRA activities between 1975 and 
1980 was the group that came to be known as the "Cabinet of Conscience". Meeting eight to ten 
times per year for much of this time, the "Cabinet" served partly as a central strategy-planning 
group, partly as a place of encounter and dialogue for people of diverse backgrounds, and partly as 
a forum for confronting individuals with the call to change their own lives according the four 
absolute standards." 
The core group was small, less than a dozen. 18 They were also poorly-balanced: They were more 
white than black, more reliably connected to Government than to black nationalist circles, and 
better connected to Muzorewa and other Internal Settlement leaders willing to strike a compromise 
with the Smith regime than to the leaders of ZANU and ZAPU.19 But they were ambitious and 
deeply committed. They carried a message of reconciliation both challenging and hopeful at a 
time when the nation was weary of war. Perhaps most important, on a continent where personal 
hundreds of young men into the guerrilla forces and then sent them into the bush in poison-doused trousers to die a 
slow death. MRA workers dismiss this claim. "I saw Kanodereka risk his life too many times for the cause of 
peace," says Henry Macnicol, a key MRA worker who worked closely with Kanodereka, "to believe such a claim 
from a man who made his living as a professional deceiver. (Interview with Macnicol, June, 1991) Macnicol 
believes Flower sought with one cynical last effort to discredit a man of integrity. 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, who served as ZANU's Head of Security throughout the war years and then as Minister of 
State for Security in the new Zimbabwe state and thus as Flower's boss until the latter's retirement in 1981, supports 
Flower's claim. In an interview with the author in August, 1992, he said that Kanodereka was for many years on 
ZANU's list of "suspicious persons" and that Flower told him soon after the transition in 1980 that Kanodereka was 
a CIO agent, a claim which Mnangagwa accepts. However Mnangagwa proved to be an unreliable source of 
information on the Mugabe/Smith meeting, and another source, who requested to remain anonymous, says that 
Mnangagwa once commented that Kanodereka was working for ZANU. Alec Smith says that ZANU(PF) leadership 
went out of their way to provide financial support to the family of Kanodereka in the early 1980s, and that over this 
time Simon Muzenda, Tongogara, and Mnangagwa all expressed in strong terms to him or other MRA workers their 
respect for Kanodereka. To the author the true identity of Kanodereka remains a mystery. 
18 At the core of the group were a handful of individuals deeply committed to the work of MRA: Alec Smith, Arthur 
Kanodereka, Ian Robertson, a British biologist who took up work in Rhodesia in 1977 in order to support·MRA 
activities there; Henry Macnicol, a lifetime MRA worker from Edinburgh who lived in Rhodesia from 1974 to 1984; 
Steven Sibare, a young Rhodesian who joined MRA as a full-time staff person in 1979; Don Barnett, an accountant, 
Stan O'Donnell who had served for 9 years as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Champion Chigwida, a trade unionist; 
Kevin Hongwe, a student, Dixon Maremba, a school headmaster. Other sporadic attenders included Sir Cyril Hatty, 
a former Cabinet Minister; Dr. Elliom Gabellah, a member of the Executive Committee of Muzorewa' s ANC; 
Desmond Reader and Gordon Chavunduka, both academics at the University; Hugh Elliott, a British MRA worker, 
Andre Holland, a Cabinet member. 
19 Individuals in MRA developed friendships with members of ZANU and even more so with ZAPU, and secondary 
players from both organizations attended MRA conferences on occasion. But no leaders in the external liberation 
forces publicly identified themselves with MRA in the way that several leaders involved in the Internal Settlement 
did. Muzorewa, for example, was a close friend of the key MRA strategist Henry Macnicol and attended several 
MRA gatherings. ChiefChirau, Muzorewa's colleague in the Internal Settlement along with Ndabaningi Sithole 
and Ian Smith, was the only politician among a small number of individuals signing a call for unity published by 
MRA just prior to the elections in 1980. 
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relationships often transcend politics and ideology, they were tireless in cultivating relationship~ 
across the political spectrum. 
Their relationship-building not only gave them access to a variety of key leaders, it also brought 
several well-connected additions to the group. One such person was Stan O'Donnell, who had 
been Secretary of Foreign Affairs for nine years. Andre Holland, a sporadic attender, was a 
government Cabinet member; another was a key staffer in the Prime Minister's office. Joram 
Kucherera, who set up the Mugabe/Smith meeting, had close personal and family ties to top 
ZANU leadership. 
As a result, then, of all these factors, Moral Re-Armament was on the scene of most of the critical 
political events affecting Rhodesia between 1976 and 1980, and MRA workers interacted with 
many of the key players on the political stage over this time, in several cases at substantial depth. 
During this period, four to eight people, more than half of them volunteers from England and 
Scotland, worked full-time for MRA in a variety of activities.20 
MRA Activities 
Promoting Reconciliation Between Key Individuals 
MRA teaches that individual change is the key to social change. Thus bringing individuals of 
diverse backgrounds together for face-to-face encounters formed the heart ofMRA activities. 
MRA strategies to accomplish this were diverse and creative: 
The MRA conference, an event refined through long MRA experience elsewhere to a unique blend 
of inspiration, admonition, and confession, all conveyed in the genre of the personal narrative, 
provided the foundation for many ofMRA's activities in Rhodesia. It was to such an event, the 
gathering described above, that Alec Smith and others turned in 1974 to put MRA "on the map". 
MRA workers in Rhodesia took advantage of the large international MRA conferences, held every 
year in Caux, of Switzerland, for bridge-building purposes of their own as well. Over the critical 
period 1975-1979, MRA took delegations often to twenty Rhodesians every year to Caux. In 
1979, one such group spent a week in Caux before continuing on to London for the Lancaster 
House talks. 
20 Presentation by Dick Ruffin, head of MRA activities in the US, in a meeting of the Steering Group of the Religion 
and Conflict Project on September 25, 1989 in Washington DC. 
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In addition to the large Caux gathering, a shorter regional conference took place every year in 
southern Africa that Rhodesians attended. MRA workers held small workshops every few months 
in Rhodesia as well, seeking to apply MRA principles to family life, education, industrial 
relations, etc. 
Another innovative strategy for interpersonal encounter was dinner parties, described above in the 
account of the Reader/Chavunduka partnership. One MRA leader estimates a dozen were held, 
each involving perhaps twenty people.21 Among the guests were several members of Smith's 
Cabinet and prominent African National Congress leaders.22 
MRA set up several one-on-one encounters among key leaders with the intent of destroying 
stereotypes and fostering new attitudes. The high-stakes, eleventh hour meeting between Mugabe 
and Smith, which opens this account, provides the most dramatic example of MRA use of 
interpersonal encounter. But there were others: 
* 
* 
Every six to eight months over a several year period MRA workers took people connected 
to political rivals of Prime Minister Ian Smith to visit Srnith.23 Usually these were 
arranged by Alec Smith. On two occasions Alec took his friend and MRA co-worker, 
Arthur Kanodereka, to have tea with his parents. These meetings, Alec felt, were a 
precedent for the elder Smith, who had previously never invited blacks on a social basis 
into his home. On the first occasion, after Kanodereka and his wife had departed the 
Prime Minister thanked his son and commented: "If all blacks nationalists were like him, 
I'd have no trouble turning over the country tornorrow."24 
Kanodereka had a similar impact on the Minister of Law and Order, Hilary Squires. MRA 
arranged a meeting between the two in early 1976 in which Kanodereka, then Treasurer of 
the UANC and thus a key leader in the internal nationalist camp, recounted his personal 
struggle with bitterness against whites. Squires was visibly impressed. "I've never seen 
such a change in a man's attitude in my life", recalls Torn Glen, the MRA worker who 
arranged the meeting. Later that year during the Geneva Conference, Squires and 
21 Interview with Henry Macnicol, London, July, 1991. 
22 Information from Elliott, 20; Hannon, 36-37; and interview with Henry Macnicol, July 1991 in London. 
23 Dick Ruffin, presentation to Study Group at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, 1989 





Kanodereka held several additional meetings. From that point on, Kanodereka was able to 
secure permission for public meetings of the UANC with a mere phone call to Squires.25 
A few weeks prior to the Mugabe/Smith meeting, an MRA team went to visit officials at 
Mugabe's headquarters. One member of the group, a former Secretary of Foreign Affairs 
under Smith, broke the ice after a tense beginning by sharing his struggle with the near-
loss of a son injured in the war. A top ZANU official, the man who was instrumental in 
setting up the meeting a few weeks later between Mugabe and Smith, was deeply touched 
and responded by sharing his own experience of picking the body of his brother out of the 
trenches after a battle between Rhodesian Security Forces and ZANU. 
At the Geneva Conference in 1976 MRA was present and set up several meetings--albeit 
ofno apparent consequence--between members of Smith's delegation and leaders of the 
UANC.26 
Aware that Ian Smith harbored bitterness towards the British for what he regarded as 
dishonesty and broken promises regarding Rhodesian independence, MRA workers 
arranged a meeting between Smith and several senior British diplomats who in their 
personal capacity apologized for British actions.27 
Conversations with Public Figures 
The second major category of MRA activities was effort to inject moral principles into the 
decision-making process of key political leaders and, to a lesser extent, of the public as well. In 
congruence with the earlier described conviction that social change begins with individual change, 
MRA workers devoted enormous amounts of time and energy to cultivating relationships with 
individual leaders. They did so in the belief that, as one MRA worker put it: "If you change the 
attitude of one person, he begins to change society if he's a prominent person. "28 
Dedicated pursuit of persona/friendships formed the heart ofMRA efforts to engage public 
figures. Alec Smith, of course, related to his father extensively throughout and had many 
25 Interview with Tom Glen, April 1992, Harare. 
26 Interview with Macnicol. 
27 Dates of this encounter unknown. Ruffin transcript, ibid.; confirmed by Alec Smith, interview with Alec Smith, 
April 1992, Harare. 
28 Interview with Robertson, May 15, 1991. 
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conversations with him about the issues he faced as Prime Minister.29 Another significant 




Henry Macnicol, a senior MRA worker recalls accompanying Arther Kanodereka in 1978 
to visit Muzorewa after an embittering incident with the British. Muzorewa had been left 
out of a meeting with the liberation front leaders because, he was told by the British, he 
had no army. Concerned about the temptation this offered for Muzorewa to establish his 
own army3°, Macnicol and an accompanying MRA worker visited at some length with 
Muzorewa. At the end of the visit the three knelt and prayed and Muzorewa "thanked God 
for these men who have come to call me to my Christian faith. 1131 
At Lancaster House in 1979, Macnicol and Hugh Elliott, a London-based MRA worker 
who knew Muzorewa from visits to Rhodesia again met with Muzorewa. Elliott shared a 
"word from God" he felt that he had received specially for the Bishop in "quiet time" that 
day. "Bishop," he told Muzorewa, "You just fight this election (the upcoming campaign 
in February 1980) as the man the people trust to be a man of God, and on the basis of love 
but not hate." 32 
MRA teams were present at both the failed Geneva conference as well as Lancaster House 
and actively sought opportunities to interact with the negotiators in these critical meetings. 
At Geneva, Macnicol and Kanodereka (at that time still on the executive committee of the 
UANC) had breakfast several times with UANC leaders to discuss the negotiations. The 
King and Queen ofRumaniajoined one of these breakfasts to share insights from their 
personal struggle with bitterness in the aftermath of exile from fascist and communist 
governments. 33 
29 The elder Smith claims not to have been aware of any particular moral concerns from his son, nor even of the fact 
that Arther Kanodereka and other MRA visitors which Alec took to meet him were affiliated with MRA. Interview 
with Ian Smith, Harare, April 28, 1992. 
30 Muzorewa did in fact yield later to this temptation. By the end of the war he had an "auxiliary force" of about 
26,000 loyal to his party, the UANC. From "The 1980 Rhodesian Election: A Report", issued by the CIIR, 
London, March 1, 1980, 10. 
31 Interview with Macnicol. 
32 Ibid. History again shows that Muzorewa failed to heed the advice of his MRA friends. He conducted an 




At Lancaster House, members of the eight-person MRA delegation had numerous late-
night conversations with members of the negotiating teams.34 A common theme was the 
concern of the MRA workers that a settlement be reached. These meetings often took 
place without an explicit MRA identification. For example, the head of the African 
Farmers' Union stayed at the Moral Re-Armament House and, due to extensive prior 
relationships, MRA workers viewed him as part of the MRA "team". He arranged a 
meeting with Mugabe in his role as head of the Farmers' Union, not as a representative of 
MRA. Mugabe responded with great surprise and concern to the accounts of personal 
suffering among villagers offered to him. 35 
But it would be misleading to suggest that MRA workers established friendships with an agenda 
restricted to moral concern. MRA team members sought, particularly at the time of the Geneva 







Ian Smith was invited to the MRA guest house in London during Lancaster House and the 
MRA workers sought to create an atmosphere where "he could relax like he was amongst 
friends. "36 Later, Smith commented that "it was such a change to come to that house." 
Concerned about Smith's status as a pariah in London - other politicians on the scene were 
so reluctant about being in the same photograph with him that they refused to go near 
when press were around - the MRA staff rang an old friend of Smith, a well-known retired 
European leader, and asked him to come to London to provide personal support for 
Smith.37 
MRA workers took members of Mugabe's team away to the country to relax on several 
weekends during Lancaster House. 38 
Henry Macnicol sought to provide moral support to his old friend, Bishop Muzorewa, 
whose willingness to support new elections was essential and hung in the balance for 
much of the Conference. 39 
36 Cynthia Sampson interview with Alec Smith. 
37 Interview with Macnicol. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Interview with Robertson, April 1992. 
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A strategy for which MRA workers used frequently with remarkable effect in their conversations 
with public figures was sharing a personal struggle or confessing wrong as a means of breaking 
down barriers of mistrust. Examples here would include Alec Smith's confession at the 1974 
MRA conference in Salisbury, the meeting between MRA staff and Mugabe aides a few weeks 
before the election when the ice was broken after an MRA member shared an intimate story of his 
struggle with the near-death of a son in battle, and the fruitful liaison between Reader and 
Chavunduka in sponsoring dinner parties, begun as a result of Reader's confession to Chavunduka. 
"It's a key MRA concept," reflects Alec Smith, "to be honest about yourself." Others may then 
"drop their guard" and respond with similar scrutiny of themselves. Politicians in particular are 
accustomed and resistant to being told what they ought to do, believes Smith. Often the only way 
to engage in dialogue at the level MRA sought was for MRA workers to take the first step towards 
personal vulnerability. 40 
Another frequently-used approach was itinerating carefully chosen outside visitors in Rhodesia. A 
group of about twenty MRA workers as far scattered as London, Washington, Caux, and Salisbury 
communicated regularly through letters and phone calls to identify candidates for these visits.41 
Several individuals with extensive previous experience in the British Foreign Affairs Office were 
part of the British team and helped to make sure the group did not commit political blunders.42 
"We would constantly be trying to figure out who has the experience anywhere on the globe that is 
relevant to what is going on with these people at the center of these negotiations," recalls one 
MRA strategist.43 Each year from 1976 to 1979, MRA workers arranged 2 to 3 group tours and up 
to a dozen individual visits with visitors including the exiled King and Queen of Rumania, a 
Minister of Education from Australia, a West Indian cricket star, religious figures, business 
people, educators, politicians. Some of these foreign visitors had fifty or more meetings, most of 
them private with individuals or small groups, but some involving groups of one hundred people 
ormore.44 
The goal in these meetings was to encourage Rhodesian leaders to engage in moral reflection. The 
visitors didn't preach, rather they shared personal experiences of transformation, reconciliation, 
40 Interview with Alec Smith, May 1991. 
41 Ruffin, ibid. 
145 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid., also interview with Robertson, May 1, 1992. 
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and healing as a way of opening dialogue. The ongoing nature of the interaction between MRA 
workers and some public figures suggests that at least some of these conversations were effective. 
But not all appreciated the visits. Former Rhodesian Prime Minister Garfield Todd, an outspoken 
critic of the Smith/Muzorewa government, found the meetings annoying and contrived, 
commenting in a later interview: 
"I could tell how popular I was from the amount of attention I was getting from 
MRA. When I was popular, they were interested. When I was not, I didn't hear 
from them .... They would do anything, absolutely anything, as a pretext to come 
and talk with me. "45 
Moral Appeals to the Public 
In addition to its central mission of interacting with key individuals MRA sought to exert moral 
influence on the larger society through outreach to the public via publications, newspaper ads, 
and open meetings. Over the war years MRA ran several full-page newspaper ads putting forward 
MRA concepts at key moments. For example, ten days before the elections in early 1980, MRA 
took out a large ad in the leading newspapers of Salisbury, Gweru and Bulawayo. The ad was a 
Manifesto calling for "God-led unity", urging Rhodesians to "rise above our conflicts and 
sufferings and launch the new Zimbabwe in unity and peace." "What is right, not who is right" is 
the key to the future, the Manifesto proclaimed. Rhodesians should do three things: forgive others 
and ask forgiveness; live "with standards of absolute honesty, unselfishness, clear morals and care 
for one another"; and "help our leaders to do the same". Signatories included Chief Chirau, one of 
the participants in the Internal Settlement, and Cabinet of Conscience members Joram Kucherera, 
Alec Smith, and Stan O'Donnell, a former Cabinet Member under Smith, along with 11 other 
Rhodesians from various walks of life. 
MRA also held regular showings ofMRA films46 and circulated tens of thousands of copies of a 
pamphlet calling readers to set their own lives in order as a part of re-building the nation. Perhaps 
the greatest impact on the public arena was had by the many dozens of meetings held throughout 
the country by Alec Smith and Arther Kanodereka who shared their experience of personal 
reconciliation and the principles on which they had found it. 
45 Interview with former Prime Minister of Rhodesia, Garfield Todd, Harare, April 30, 1992. 
46 One MRA worker estimated there were 3-4 showings per week at the MRA house in Harare over this time, for 
groups ranging from 2 to 20 in size. Interview with Robertson, May 1, 1992. 
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Assessment of MRA Involvement 
MRA is simultaneously the easiest and the hardest to assess of the three major groups we are 
studying. The Mugabe/Smith meeting probably altered the history of the nation. It is probable 
that white Rhodesians would have fled the country in far greater numbers had it not been for the 
conciliatory mood between Mugabe and Smith resulting from their MRA-arranged meeting. Even 
though Mugabe had been planning a policy of reconciliation before this meeting, it is doubtful that 
jittery whites would have believed him or cooperated so readily in the critical early months of 
transition had Smith not led the way. Then too, it is possible if not probable that the coup-in-
waiting by General Walls would have been implemented. Mugabe's top advisor at the time, 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, confirmed the pivotal role of the meeting in a later conversation with 
MRA workers. "If it had not been for what this young man did," he told Macnicol and Kucherera, 
"the streets of Salisbury would have been running with blood. We had absolutely no touch with 
the white leaders when we came in from the bush. He provided it."47 
Beyond this verifiable success, the results of MRA activities resist simplistic conclusions. MRA's 
goals and modus operandi were the most narrowly and self-consciously "spiritual" of the three 
groups. What mortal can judge whether the targets ofMRA activities "listened to God", which is 
at root all that MRA sought to accomplish? Similarly, it is almost impossible to determine 
whether targeted public figures acted with greater moral conscience as a result of the promptings 
of MRA friends or associates or, if so, what the impact of their behavior might have been. 
At its best, the MRA experience in Rhodesia offers inspiring insights about attitudinal and value 
change unparalleled in either the Quaker or Catholic involvements. Under-lying MRA encounters 
with the political actors was a radical sense of individual responsibility and openness to 
transcending purpose. "How you respond could transform the entire situation," was implied in 
virtually all MRA encounters. Further implied was this: "Be prepared for the possibility that you 
will be guided in the interests of reconciliation in a direction which may be difficult and 
unpopular." It is difficult to imagine Joram Kucherera risking his life by setting up a meeting 
between two bitter enemies unless motivated such values. Alec Smith, Arther Kanodereka, 
Desmond Reader, Gordon Chavunduka, to mention only the more obvious examples - all 
experienced profound personal transformations through encounter with MRA, and undertook risky 
reconciliation efforts as a consequence. 
47 Letter from Macnicol, October 30, 1992. 
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MRA's genius lay in part in the way it communicated these values to others. Sharing a story with 
an inescapable moral or theological implication was at the heart of most MRA activities. This 
parable.telling approach enabled MRA workers to communicate values of individual 
responsibility and commitment to larger purpose without prescribing or preaching. Almost always 
the stories contained a central note of confession or error or vulnerability, further reducing 
defensiveness and inviting similar vulnerability from others. 
MRA's emphasis on individual change demarcates it most clearly from the other actors in this 
study, particularly from the Catholics. Where the Church produced public dossiers criticizing the 
actions of Salisbury in great detail, and to a lesser extent the excesses of the liberation fronts as 
well, MRA resorted to brochures and newspaper ads which called individual readers to do what is 
right and to live by broad standards of unselfishness, honesty, purity, and love. MRA had been on 
record for decades in opposing racism - a creditworthy tradition to be sure - but it dealt with a 
structural evil by individual remedies. 
In my assessment MRA' s emphasis on individual change was its greatest limiting factor. There 
is something disquieting about brochures and newspaper ads which, in the context of massive 
racial injustice and economic inequality, merely call the reader to do what is "right" and to live 
by vague standards of unselfishness, honesty, purity, and love. The attack on evil perhaps ought 
to start at home, within the individual, as MRA teaches. But if there is anything to learn from 
the moral tragedies of the twentieth century, it is that evil exists in the collectivity as well. 
Because of the structures created in its service, collective or structural evil has a life of its own 
that is more tenacious than individual evil, and it is more powerful than the sum of perversity 
within the individuals who comprise it. The greatest weapon of structural evil is its hiddenness; 
its ability to prevent, for example, consumers in New York from recognizing that cheap bananas 
have anything to do with poverty in South America. Thus the first step in fighting structural evil 
is to name it. To shrink from doing so not only suggests naivete or worse, apathy, it also hinders 
the struggle to respond with measures commensurate to the injustice. 
In contrast to the Rhodesia experience, MRA has in some other arenas been prepared to name 
structural evil, notably in its crusade in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s against the evils of 
communism. But its record in naming structural evil is inconsistent, reflecting little insight, for 
example, into the injustices of the capitalist system. This imbalance makes MRA all the more 
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vulnerable to the criticism that individual reform tends by nature to affirm the status quo, 
reinforcing the existing social order through its silence regarding blatant structural inequities. 
MRA's emphasis on individual change also made MRA workers both more sympathetic towards 
and attractive to the reformers of Rhodesia than to the revolutionaries. It seems more than chance 
that MRA's closest and most reliable affiliations were with Muzorewa and other compromised 
supporters of the Internal Settlement who in the end proved to be out of touch with the Rhodesian 
grassroots. An emphasis on individual change as the avenue to social change, after all, is virtually 
by definition a gradualist and reformist approach. In a situation that cried out for a sharp break 
from the structures of the past- the election of Mugabe established that this was surely the verdict 
of the majority of Zimbabweans - MRA attracted and publicly allied itself with reformers. 
But Zimbabwe's revolutionaries must provide the final verdict on the work ofMRA in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. According to MRA workers, after the war both President Mugabe and one 
of his top lieutenants, then Security Minister Emmerson Mnongagwa initiated meetings in 1980 
with MRA members to acknowledge their work.48 Additionally, a few months after the elections, 
Zimbabwean Vice President Simon Muzenda summoned Alec Smith and Joram Kucherera to his 
office and thanked them for their role in the struggle for a new nation.49 In 1982, Speaker of the 
House Didymus Mutasa addressed an MRA conference in Salisbury and spoke with enthusiasm of 
the importance ofMRA's work and principles.50 If in principle, then, MRA is vulnerable to 
criticism as individualist and reformist in approach, there is no denying the perceptions of those at 
the forefront of the struggle for structural change: the organization contributed in significant ways 
to the creation of a new Zimbabwe. 
48 Interview with Alec Smith, May 1, 1992, and interview with Robertson, May 1, 1992. 
49 Telephone interview with Alec Smith, September 6, 1992. 
so Ibid. 
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0 Chapter Ten 
The Quakers 
Though both the Catholics and Moral Re-Armament played key roles in the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
conflict from their bases in Salisbury, in the end it was a London-based group of Quakers who 
became the most strategically involved in negotiation efforts to end the war. Between 1972 and 
1980, Quakers conducted four missions to Africa in the interest of peaceful change in Rhodesia, 
and sent delegations to both the Geneva and Lancaster House conferences. The trips to Africa 
formed the heart of the Quaker contribution, but London was the scene of other activities as well, 
including meetings with leaders from the liberation movements. 
Establishing Human Solidarity with All Parties 
More than either the Catholics or Moral Re-Armament, the Quakers engaged the combatants in 
substantive discussion about the war and how to end it. This is paradoxical for, of the three 
groups, the Quakers consistently brought the simplest agenda to their meetings with the parties: 
establishing human solidarity with everyone involved. They engaged the parties at other levels, to 
be sure, as we shall see later. But whether meeting Mugabe in Maputo, Nkomo in Lusaka, 
Muzorewa in Salisbury, or heads of Frontline States, the Quakers' subordinated even the most 
ambitious tasks to their primary agenda, that of engaging the parties as human beings suffering 
from a ghastly war and struggling to find their way out. In a situation where everyone else was 
lobbying for something, the Quakers were a unique phenomenon: a traveling reservoir of 
unconditional and uncomplicated good will. 
Several points deserve particular attention: For one, the amount of time and effort a small group 
like the Quakers were prepared to devote to such an innocuous activity is staggering. For another, 
the breadth of their connections was remarkable. They were best connected to black Rhodesians, 
notably to the external liberation front leaders Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, andto Abel 
Muzorewa. Though they never succeeded in meeting with Ian Smith, they met regularly with 
several top white government officials, including an Under Secretary and a Permanent Secretary in 
Foreign Affairs, and they regularly visited with business and church leaders in Salisbury. 
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But their connections extended well beyond the combatants. Keenly aware of the larger forces at 
work in the Rhodesian conflict, the Quakers maintained active personal ties to a network of 
leaders outside Rhodesia. In their missions they met with President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, 
President Kaunda of Zambia, and President Seretse Khama of Botswana. They also met with top 
officials in the capitols of each of these countries on several occasions, as well as with officials 
from Mozambique, South Africa and Nigeria. 
In addition, they met regularly with British and Commonwealth policy-makers. These included a 
meeting with David Owen, the Secretary of State for British Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 
and many other meetings with officials from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. On 
numerous occasions they met with individual Members of Parliament. They also maintained close 
ties with officials at the Commonwealth Secretariat, including Emeka Anyaoku, then-Deputy 
Secretary-General. 
In addition to these connections to the top level leadership of each side, the Quakers also sought to 
connect to civilians on the ground suffering from the impact of the war. Quakers Tony and Eirene 
Gilpin spent January to March, 1978, in Botswana, exploring possibilities for Quaker assistance to 
refugees who by then were arriving in increasing numbers.1 On several other occasions Quaker 
peacemakers toured refugee camps in Lusaka and Maputo in order to arrange relief.2 
Timeline of Quaker Activities 
1972 - George Loft visits Lusaka and Salisbury to promote contact between the ANC and white 
authorities 
November-December 1976 - Quakers send five-person team to the Geneva Conference 
January 1977 - Trevor Jepson spends 8 days in Rhodesia and follows up with visits to British 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and with Commonwealth Secretariat, urging 
perseverance 
November 1977 - Jepson visit to Salisbury 
January - March 1978 - Tony Gilpin and wife explore Quaker assistance to Rhodesian refugees 
in Botswana ( continued next page) 
I 
Confidential Quaker Document. The aid would have been from Friends Service Council, renamed Quaker Peace and 
Service in 1978. A note is in order regarding the source "Confidential Quaker Document" which will be cited 
extensively in following footnotes. Staff members at Quaker Peace and Service, Quaker House, London were concerned 
not to violate their commitment to confidentiality in peace work. They agreed to give me access to records of the 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe peace efforts under condition that no specific documents be identified. Rather all would be cited 




Second half of 1978 - Extensive meetings in London about possibility of a Quaker mission to the 
region, including with Muzorewa and representatives of all liberation fronts 
August 1978 - Walter Martin and Jepson make first major visit to the region. They spend several 
weeks in Rhodesia and several Frontline States, meet Muzorewa and other Internal 
Settlement leaders in Lusaka and Nkomo in Lusaka 
September-October, 1978 - Second major visit (Trevor Jepson and Tony Gilpin) includes 
meetings with Internal Settlement leaders in Salisbury, ZAPU leaders in Lusaka, and 
ZANU leaders in Maputo 
October-November 1978 - Quakers fund an African peace initiative (Byron Hove, Arther 
Kanodereka, Max Chigwida) 
October 1978 - Meeting and correspondence with British Foreign Secretary David Owen, and 
exploration of a possible meeting between Owen and Mugabe 
March 1979 - Third major mission to Africa (Adam Curle and Walter Martin). Meetings in 
Salisbury, Bulawayo, Maputo, Dar es Salaam, and Lusaka. Exploration of possibility of 
convening an informal gathering of second-level leaders. 
May-June 1979 - Fourth mission (Adam Curle and Walter Martin). Meetings in Nairobi, 
Salisbury, Maputo, Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, and Gaborone. Quakers convey messages 
from Nyerere to Muzorewa and back; and from Muzorewa to ZANU and ZAPU and back. 
July 1979 - Jepson meets with Internal Settlement leaders in Salisbury, and with Muzorewa in 
London 
August 1979 - Lusaka Accord achieved at meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government (no 
Quaker presence) 
August 1979 - Fifth mission {Trevor Jepson and Walter Martin). Meetings in Maputo, Lusaka, 
Pretoria (South African Foreign Affairs), Dar es Salaam. 
September 10 to December 21, 1979 - Lancaster House 
Transitional period - Mr. and Mrs. Curle go to Salisbury November 24, before end of Lancaster 
House until January 24, 1980. Mr. and Mrs. Gilpin go February 1 till end of March, 1980. 
February 27-29, 1980 - Elections 
This broad range of active relationships proved fundamental to the Quaker contribution. With the 
possible exception of British and American diplomats, who were inescapably perceived as bearing 
heavy agendas for their own governments, no other individuals or organizations maintained active 
communication with so broad a network of actors in the web of political influence at work in the 
conflict. 
Seeking solidarity with others as an end in itself is an act of altruism, and altruism, even at its best, 
elicits skepticism in today's world. But the Quakers practiced their art with such transparent 
fidelity that expressions of compassion alone provided not only a constant theme guiding their 
actions throughout the conflict, it served as their primary means of access as well. 
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Their primary agenda, for example, in their first several trips to Rhodesia and the Frontline States 
in 1977 and 1978 was to express their concern about the suffering of the people of Rhodesia. This 
humble agenda proved quite adequate to open doors. "Without exception we were warmly and 
sympathetically received and almost universally encouraged to remain in touch with the parties," 
recalled one team member later.3 The same theme shaped Quaker involvements throughout. At a 
later stage, for example, when their role was well established and they were exploring the 
possibility of informal, off-the-record talks under Quaker auspices, concern for the ever-mounting 
suffering caused by the war continued to serve as their rationale for such an encounter. 
It would be misleading, however, to highlight the effectiveness of a modest agenda as a means of 
entry without noting the context. The Quakers benefited enormously from their own history in 
solving the "entry problem." In addition to a reputation within the broader circles of diplomacy for 
a quiet, principled approach to peacemaking, the team operating in Rhodesia profited from a 
recent history of involvements in Rhodesia and elsewhere in Africa. 
An American Quaker couple living in Salisbury had openly supported the African nationalist 
cause in the 1950s and 1960s, before the outbreak of violence, and the wife, Margaret Moore, had 
served as Secretary of two political parties started by Joshua Nkomo. A British couple had 
worked extensively with families of political detainees held by the Smith government in the mid-
l 960s, developed a friendship with Sally Mugabe, the activist wife of Robert Mugabe, and also 
made acquaintances with nationalists Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo and Josiah Chinamano. 
Another Quaker couple had worked extensively with political prisoners in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and backed by funds from British Quakers, they founded a well-known rural training center at 
Hlekweni. The husband, Roy Henson, was the only white member of the African National 
Council, a broadly-based coalition of African nationalists, at its founding in 1971, the heyday of 
its credibility in the nationalist community.4 
Old connections also assisted the Quakers in gaining entre to the extraordinary range of 
governments influencing the evolution of the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict. The British High 
Commissioner in Botswana was himself a Quaker and arranged meetings with President Seretse 
Khama of Botswana. In Mozambique, the Quaker team met a warm welcome from President 
Joachim Chissano because of assistance American Quakers had given to gaining United Nations 
3 Ibid. 
4 Interview with Trevor Jepson, Wales, July 7, 1991. 
recognition for Frelimo.5 In Zambia, President Kenneth Kaunda had known Quakers for many 
years.6 
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Thus when the Quaker team initiated a role in the Rhodesia conflict by sending a delegation to the 
Geneva Conference in 1976, they were pleased to discover that many of the delegates, particularly 
the nationalists, were already personally acquainted with one or more members of the delegation. 
This provided ready access to many delegates, particularly for private meetings in hotel rooms. 7 
One key member of the team felt in retrospect that later mediation efforts would have been far 
more difficult had it not been for this "pioneering work."8 
Access to white Rhodesian government officials was deficient throughout the Quaker effort, but 
the two best Quaker contacts here also resulted from Quaker history. The Under Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs had years earlier participated in a Quaker conference for diplomats as well a_s in 
the Quaker-sponsored London Diplomats Group and had been deeply impressed with Quaker 
commitments. As a result he met with Quaker delegates regularly in their visits to Salisbury and 
commented latter that Walter Martin, with his low-key but persistent emphasis on compassion, 
reconciliation, and justice, had changed his life.9 The Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs was 
a personal friend of a Quaker family in Salisbury. This introduction led to a request by the 
Permanent Secretary to seek the release of a dozen white Rhodesians who had been abducted into 
Mozambique by guerrilla forces. 10 
But the team of peacemakers benefited from more than Quaker history, they also demonstrated the 
genuineness of their compassion by calling a network of Quaker relief organizations into play in 
the conflict. The war created many refugees; the most hard-pressed fled the country to 
Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana. In response to needs brought to their attention by the team 
of peacemakers, Quaker service agencies or foundations sympathetic to their work forwarded cash 
and materials to the Red Cross in Salisbury for refugees within Rhodesia, to United Nations 
s Ibid. 
6 Quaker Experience of Political Mediation: A Document Result from a Quaker Consultation, August 21-24, 1989, 
Buckinghamshire, England. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Interview with Adam Curle, London, July, 1991. 
9 Interview with Tim Hawkins. 
10 The Quakers took up the issue with Mugabe's aides in a later meeting to no immediate avail. But some months later 
four abductees were released and the Quakers' contacts in the Salisbury Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote and 
thanked them for their contribution to the release, "brought about by the water-dripping-on-a-stone technique of 
pressing the matter at every opportunity. " The Confidential Quaker Document cites an undated Jetter from Tim 
Hawkins. 
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organizations, to the Christian Council of Mozambique for refugee needs under the care of ZANU 
in Mozambique, and also directly to ZANU and ZAPU for refugees. The amounts sent were 
modest, totaling some 10,500 pounds in value at the time, but they reinforced the genuineness of 
the Quaker concern. 
Whatever the advantages offered by Quaker history and charitable activities, the original point still 
holds: A simple, straightforward agenda of concern for the human beings involved in the conflict 
was the dominant theme of Quaker involvement and provided their primary tool for entry. The 
Quaker team benefited from their past, but they moved far beyond it by their tireless rounds of 
personal contact with key parties. 
If expressing concern for human suffering opened doors for the Quakers, practicing disciplined 
listening opened hearts. In memos drawn up in preparation for major missions, the desire to hear 
and support the parties invariably topped the list. The number one goal chosen by the team who 
attended the Geneva Conference was typical: "To build up relationships with participants so as to 
develop a sympathetic understanding of their fears, hopes and intentions and to support and 
strengthen their efforts at achieving a just settlement in a conciliatory manner." 11 
Listening well opened the doors for further conversation, for increasingly the parties became eager 
to know what the Quakers were hearing from other parties.12 The Quakers were diligent not to 
betray confidences, but found their own growing knowledge of the situation soon became a 
resource welcomed by the parties. "Very rarely was access a problems," recalls Trevor Jepson, a 
key member of the team. Thus the Quaker role emerged from the dynamics of relationships. "We 
felt we had been put into the role and must continue. 1113 
It would be simplistic, of course, to suggest that the Quakers held no goals in their meetings other 
than listening. Clearly they sought to influence the parties to function more humanely and to 
encourage non-violent means of resolving the conflict. But listening was for the Quakers no mere 
prelude to serious talk. Listening was itself a genuine contribution to change, a means to support 
the dignity, credibility, and rationality of the individuals with whom they were interacting. And 
because the Quakers consulted widely each time they expanded their role, listening was also a 
manifestation of their political values. Rather than give advice, the Quakers sought advice about 
11 Confidential Quaker Document. 
12 Interview with Jepson. 
13 Interview with Jepson. 
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they should do and at all times presented themselves as quiet servants of the needs of the parties. 
Theirs was the politics of transformative listening. 
Opening Channels of Communication 
As trust grew the depth of discussions expanded, and with it, the scope of possible Quaker 
involvements. The Quakers were open at all times about their contacts with other parties and, as a 
result, people with whom they were meeting asked them to convey messages to other parties on 
several occasions: 
In May, 1979, President Nyerere requested a "personal, nongovernmental link" with Muzorewa, 
then, in name at least, Prime Minister of Rhodesia. 14 Nyerere was deeply concerned about the 
potential for the Rhodesia conflict to expand into an East/West confrontation and hoped that 
Muzorewa might assist in moderating the war. In addition to establishing a communication link, 
he sought from Muzorewa a less bellicose stance towards the Frontline States and towards the 
Patriotic Front itself. The Quakers carried the request to Muzorewa, who responded positively to 
the idea of a link. This led to a second round of "shuttle diplomacy" for the Quakers, to explore 
further the nature and purpose of such a nongovernmental link. In their second meeting with 
Muzorewa, he handed to Walter Martin, the Quaker representative, a packet of letters to deliver: to 
Nyerere, Kaunda, Mugabe, and Nkomo. 
But on the day that Muzorewa handed over conciliatory letters to Martin for delivery, the 
Rhodesian air force bombed Lusaka in a "preemptive strike" against Nkomo's troops 
headquartered there, a move later publicly endorsed by Muzorewa. That Muzorewa had a hand in 
planning this military adventurism was perhaps unlikely. But even the kindest interpretation 
suggested that Muzorewa was impotent to control his own government, and Nyerere concluded 
there was now no point in further communication with the Prime Minister. "Perhaps, after all, the 
British will help more to solve the Rhodesia problem than the Bishop," he mused to Martin. 
A month later, Nyerere played a key role in the move to convene the Lancaster House conference. 
At the gathering of the Commonwealth States in August in Lusaka, the elder statesman of Africa 
called for British intervention in Rhodesia and all-party talks among the combatants. In the days 
that followed, Thatcher, Nyerere and others in a six member caucus forged an unprecedented 
14 Muzorewa began his role in politics as a respected leader of the internal Nationalist party, the African Nationalist 
Congress. But by June, 1979, when Nyerere made this overture, Muzorewa was a part of the Internal Settlement 
and stood in the ironic role of supporting a war against his old comrades, a task he undertook with all the bombast 
and rhetoric of his predecessor Smith. 
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consensus: the recently "elected" Muzorewa/Smith government would remain unrecognized and 
instead constitutional negotiations would begin as soon as possible under British auspices. 
There were other instances of Quaker efforts to open channels of communication as well. In late 
1978, several members of the Quaker team met with David Owen, a key formulator of British 
policy as head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. In response to a comment by the 
Quakers about the depth of suspicions that existed within the Patriotic Front regarding the motives 
of the British, Owen expressed a desire for more interaction with Robert Mugabe. 
A few weeks later, in November 1978, the Quakers mentioned this to Mugabe's associates and 
received their support to work on such a meeting, so long as it could be set up in a way that 
threatened no damage to the unity of the Patriotic Front. One possibility would be for the Quakers 
to arrange for Mugabe to address a small group of people at the Quaker House in London, a 
meeting to which Smith and other FCO officials would also be invited. In such a meeting personal 
interaction could follow without the implications of a formal, planned encounter. Preliminary 
signals from both parties were positive to such an approach, so the Quakers arranged funding for 
Mugabe to come to London and began making arrangements for meetings. But in the end, other 
events intervened and the trip never took place. 15 
The Quakers provided financial support in late 1978 for a peace initiative by three black African 
nationalist Rhodesians. At their request, the Quakers secured funds for travel enabling further 
discussion of a proposal to found a "Committee for Permanent Indaba" in Rhodesia 16• This 
initiative looked promising for several months, but fell to pieces when Rev. Arther Kanodereka, 
the central figure, was assassinated. Though the Quakers had no role other than providing moral 
support and finance for the initiative, the incident demonstrates the depth of the Quaker 
commitment to support any bona fide effort to establish negotiation among the parties. 
In early 1979, after British Prime Minister James Callaghan had explored but then decided against 
convening all-party talks, the Quakers actively pursued the possibility of bringing together a small, 
15 British Prime Minister James Callaghan sent Cledwyn Hughes on a high-profile mission in November-December 
1978 to explore the possibility of all-party talks, an eventuality that would have rendeted moot a meeting with 
Mugabe. After the initiative had dominated the scene for nearly three months, Callaghan announced that the time 
was not yet ripe for a conference. 
16 "lndaba" is a term used widely in southern Africa meaning "palaver". Kanodereka and Byron Hove had recently left 
Muzorewa's ANC; the third person was Max Chigwida. Kanodereka, of course, was a central figure in MRA from 
1975 until his death, and Chigwida, to a lesser extent, was also involved in MRA. 
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private, informal gathering of second-level people from all parties. 17 In a series of meetings over a 
period of several months, the team consulted extensively with officials, many of them at high 
levels, from the United Nations, Zambia, Tanzania, Nigeria, and England, in addition to top-level 
representatives from the liberation armies and Smith's government. Responses to the possibility of 
such a gathering were generally positive. But again, other events overtook the initiative.18 
At Lancaster House, the Quakers met informally with numerous delegates, many of whom had by 
now become old friends. From these conversations arose six different requests to bring 
individuals or groups who were officially incommunicado together in special meetings. The 
chairman of one of the compromised Rhodesian internal parties, for example, requested assistance 
in meeting delegates from ZANU and ZAPU, and the Quakers arranged a meeting.19 In another 
instance, the Quakers conveyed to Nkomo and Mugabe a query from the Salisbury Government 
delegation about the possibility of an informal meeting of Muzorewa, Nkomo, and Mugabe. 
Supporting Formal Negotiations 
The Quakers never saw their work as more than a footnote to a larger story. There were moments, 
to be sure, when the footnote nearly leaped into the text. But even in their most ambitious efforts 
to convene face-to-face meetings between representatives of the parties, the Quakers saw 
themselves as serving a larger process: formal negotiations that would have to involve the British 
in a convening role.20 Most of the activities already described above had the effect of supporting 
formal negotiations. But there were other activities that deserve mention as well: 
In October 1978, after their second major mission to Africa in which they had met representatives 
of all the key parties, the Quakers arranged a meeting with David Owen, the British Secretary of 
State. They sent a follow-up letter a few days later, listing ten concerns and suggestions regarding 
ways to move the negotiation process forward. They stressed "the need for preparation, yet speed, 
in convening an All-Party Conference. "21 
17 Confidential Quaker Document. 
18 The events included the April 1979 election in Rhodesia, the Quaker-facilitated round of communication between 
Muzorewa, Nyerere, ZANU and ZAPU described above and, ultimately, the Lusaka Accord, which turned the 
attention of the parties towards Lancaster House. 
19 Of the six requests for meetings, this is the only one that the Quakers knew for certain had taken place. 
20 The external liberation fronts were adamant that the British be at the table since, in their view, Rhodesia had yet to 
become genuinely independent from British rule. 




The Quakers usually informed the British Foreign Office before leaving on their trips, and 
on several occasions visited with officials from the FCO upon returning. 
The Quakers held a series of interviews in Lusaka, Maputo, and Salisbury with 
representatives of virtually all the key parties just after the Lusaka Commonwealth 
Conference in 1979. The external liberation fronts in particular were deeply skeptical of 
British motivations. The Quaker team listened to these objections but still supported the 
viability of the Lancaster House negotiations as a step to end the war. 
* Present at both the failed Geneva Conference as well as Lancaster House, the Quakers 
interacted with many key delegates and sought to offer low-key suggestions about courses 
of action and attitudes to adopt that they felt would enhance the likelihood of resolution. 
At Lancaster House the Quakers wrote personal letters of welcome to all the delegates 
whom they knew personally and met with many of them privately - in all, over one 
hundred meetings22. In these conversations, they tried to interpret the perspectives of each 
delegation to other delegations.23 "Our role had become that of a lubricant," reflected 
Trevor Jepson later, "by identifying sticking points and where appropriate making 
representation with a view to problems being overcome rather than used as a reason to 
break off negotiations. "24 
* As it became apparent at Lancaster House that the British would supervise a transitional 
period, the Quakers directed substantial effort towards influencing British policy-makers 
towards strategies that, from their interactions with all the parties, the Quakers believed 
were essential to the implementation of the cease-fire and establishment of monitoring 
forces. They had numerous meetings with officials in the British Foreign and 
22 Quaker Experience of Political Mediation. 
23 Although they sought to do this without bias, much of their attention was directed towards helping the Salisbury 
delegation and the British government understand the position of the Patriotic Front. By all accounts, Carrington 
played a highly assertive role in mediating the talks. He frequently undertook a strategy of first testing proposals on 
the Salisbury delegation, and after getting their approval, putting them to the Patriotic Front. On several occasions, 
when the PF balked, he threatened to go ahead with the proposals anyway and simply work out a bilateral settlement 
between the British and the Rhodesian government. A reluctant partner to the talks in the first place, the PF reacted 
to the dynamics of the negotiation process by adopting a consistently reactionary posture. Concerned about the 
possibility of the whole exercise breaking down, the Quakers sought to reduce the possibility of a walkout by trying 
to create better understanding, particularly among the British, of PF concerns. 





Commonwealth Office, wrote letters to Lord Carrington, and in one instance, to Prime 
Minister Thatcher.25 
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On one occasion the Patriotic Front threatened to walk out of the Lancaster House talks, as 
did the Salisbury delegation on another. In both instances, the Quakers urged the 
delegates in private conversations to stay in the interests of the people of Rhodesia as a 
whole. 
It was a secret to no one that the Patriotic Front struggled to maintain unity between the 
liberation fronts of Mugabe and Nkomo. Predictably, the Lancaster House talks brought 
new strains to this relationship which the Quakers sought to overcome by stressing to both 
wings of the PF the importance of a unified stand. 
Towards the end of the Lancaster House Conference it became apparent that there was 
poor coordination between the Patriotic Front and the Frontline States and that the British 
were using this to increase pressure upon the PF. Concerned that this could lead to 
misunderstanding and abrogation of agreements later, the Quakers encouraged African 
diplomats to better coordinate their policies.26 
In the months just after Lancaster House, an advisor to Nkomo asked the Quakers to relay 
a message to a British Member of Parliament requesting that Carrington be sent to 
Rhodesia urgently to render an "agreed interpretation of the Lancaster House Agreement." 
The request was delivered but Carrington remained in England. 27 
Advocating Policies and Actions in Support of Reconciliation 
Role conflict is inescapable for the intermediary. Any effective mediator constantly analyzes the 
dynamics of the dispute and forms opinions about how the policies and activities of each side 
affect the likelihood of resolution. But when should the mediator express these opinions to the 
parties? Doing so can give the impression of partisanship and destroy the possibility of mediating. 
Thus the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict presented the Quaker intermediaries with a difficult role 
conflict. On one hand, they were mediators, potentially at least, and keen to maintain their 
impartiality. But on the other hand, they were deeply sensitive to questions of justice: Quaker 




institutions, for example, actively supported sanctions against the Rhodesian government.28 They 
were also British citizens, concerned that their own government handle its role responsibly, and 
they had access to a variety of key British policy-makers, the majority of whom knew far less 
about the dynamics of the Rhodesia situation than the Quakers themselves knew. 
At several points, therefore, the Quakers shifted from the role of mediator to policy advocate in 
relationship to their own government. They chose to go to Geneva, for example, in part because 
the British government was reticent to assist a peaceful transition by being involved in any way in 
a transitional period. The Quakers felt that it might be necessary to play a role in "informing the 
UK public and building a sympathetic understanding" for support of agreements reached.29 The 
Quakers harmonized their roles in this complex situation by framing their advocacy in the 





They conveyed to several British Members of Parliament their conviction that if sanctions 
against Rhodesia were lifted too soon, the fighting would escalate and the war would be 
prolonged. 
In the months prior to the Lusaka decision to call all-party talks, they communicated to 
British officials the universal rejection among African leaders of the Muzorewa/Smith 
Internal Settlement government and the concern raised by President Nyerere that if Great 
Britain and the United States recognized the Salisbury government, a major East/West 
conflict was likely to result. 
At Lancaster House, as described above, they devoted substantial effort towards helping 
the British and the Rhodesian government understand the concerns of the PF, in order to 
reduce the likelihood of a walkout by the PF or abrogation later of an agreement perceived 
to be unfair. 
Also at Lancaster House, Quakers participated in writing briefing papers on several 
occasions designed to inform and influence all parties. Team member Tony Gilpin, for 
example, assisted the Catholic Institute for Internat&>nal Relations in preparing briefing 
paper about cease-fire arrangement. 30 






In the interim period between the Lancaster House agreement and the election two months 
later, a report by Quaker Adam Curle raised concerns in urgent tones about handling by 
the British of sensitive governance issues in Rhodesia. 
In the same period, Quakers cooperated with Tim Sheehy of the Catholic Institute for 
International Relations in writing a letter to Lord Soames suggesting measures to reduce 
tensions before and after the elections.31 




Following the downing of a civilian aircraft by Nkomo's troops in September 1978, 
Quakers Jepson and Gilpin in the course of a meeting with ZAPU officials pointed out the 
serious damage that had been done to ZAPU's credibility by the incident and Nkomo's 
comments thereon. 
Throughout their involvement, the Quakers were deeply concerned about the great fear 
expressed by whites about the liberation fronts, particularly Mugabe's ZANU forces. In a 
meeting with ZANU officials in October 1978, Jepson and Gilpin were struck by the 
amount of thought being given in ZANU to the nature of the new society sought for 
Zimbabwe. Changes were to be made gradually, "avoiding the mistakes made through 
precipitate action in other African countries. "32 Impressed, the two stressed to ZANU 
leadership the importance of conveying this thinking to Rhodesia and the outside world. 
In each of these instances the Quakers were advocating a viewpoint or strategy. Grounded in deep 
principles of justice and fairness, they were open at all times about their own values. They were 
cautious, however, in advocating specific strategies. When they did, as in the above instances, 
they couched their appeals in the language of a higher non-partisan purpose: reconciliation, 
fairness, long-term peace. "Our motivating power is reconciliation, not advocacy"33 was the way 





Assessment of Quaker Involvement 
The Quaker involvements in Rhodesia are, at one level, a study in failure as a fundamental aspect 
of peacemaking. The Quakers invested substantially in four major efforts to set up meetings 
among top leaders, all of which failed to materialize: a Nyerere/Muzorewa link in 1979, an 
Owen/Mugabe meeting in 1978, an effort to convene a meeting of second-level leaders in 1979, 
and the peace initiative by Kanodereka, Hove, and Chigwida in 1978 which the Quakers funded. 
What then did the Quakers contribute? 
Fundamental to a response to this question is an understanding of the nature of the Quaker focus. 
MRA focused on individual and attitudinal change; Catholics on structural change. The Quakers 
focused on perceptions and processes that would enable a negotiated settlement. In the end the 
parties reached that outcome at Lancaster House, rendering the work of the Quakers almost 
invisible against the backdrop of larger success. Their work was so interwoven in the complex 
fabric of influence moving the parties towards a negotiated peace that it is impossible to isolate the 
Quaker contribution from that of other actors. 
But one measure might be the amount of access which the parties accorded the Quakers. Mugabe, 
Nkomo, and Muzorewa as well as many of their top aides met repeatedly with the Quakers 
throughout their involvement. The ongoing access which these leaders offered to the Quakers 
means they must have found the meetings useful. The British apparently recognized the 
significance of the Quaker role as well: When at the start of the Lancaster House talks Lord 
Carrington invited the incoming delegates to a dinner party, the sole person invited who was 
unaffiliated with any of the parties was Quaker Walter Martin. 
Another measure can be found in subsequent comments by parties present. A few weeks after 
Mugabe's election in early 1990, two prominent members of ZANU strongly encouraged the 
Quakers to maintain a role in Zimbabwe, with a focus on race relations.34 A leading figure in the 
Commonwealth Secretariat echoed this sentiment, stressing the need for informal gatherings 
between whites and blacks.35 Josiah Chinamano, a leading figure in ZAPU, also encouraged a 
Quaker role in the post-Independence period, adding that "not only we but you have a 
34 Nathan Shamuyarira, Minister of Information and Tourism, and Didymus Mutasa, member of the ZANU Executive 
Committee and later elected Speaker of the House of Assembly, made these comments in private meetings with Tony 
Gilpin. Confidential Quaker Document. 
35 Emeka Anyaolru, then Deputy Secretary General of the Commonwealth Secretariat, speaking with Tony Gilpin in 
March 1980. Anyaolru, of course, was not a party to the conflict but had been at both Lusaka and Lancaster House, 
and was intimately acquainted with the perceptions of all parties. 
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responsibility in all this. "36 Joseph Msika, another top ZAPU leader endorsed this, adding that a 
quality he had always appreciated about the Quakers was their optimism. "During our darkest 
times in Lusaka, we were greatly heartened by visits from Quakers whose faith in the possibility of 
progress towards peace helped to revive our hopes. 1137 
In 1981 Nathan Shamuyarira, the then Minister of Information who had held a position of senior 
leadership in Robert Mugabe's ZANU during the war when ZANU was based in Maputo, told 
Trevor Jepson that the fact that the Quakers had taken a serious interest in ZANU and represented 
their views to the British Foreign Office had contributed to their credibility in the eyes of the 
British. Another Cabinet minister, Josiah Chinamano, over the same time recalled in conversation 
with Jepson that towards the end of the war senior leadership of ZANU and ZAPU had become 
concerned about growing anti-white feelings among younger guerrillas, and decided to adopt a 
firm policy of reconciliation after the war. They decided at this time there would be no trials or 
victimization of whites who had opposed them militarily or politically. He went on to say, 
recalled Jepson, "that the Quaker emphasis on reconciliation, as a necessary sequel to a just peace, 
had been in their minds in reaching this decision. "38 
President Nyerere of Tanzania wrote a letter thanking Quakers for their work in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.39 A United Nations diplomat commented some years later that it was widely 
recognized that "the Quakers had played an important part in creating the conditions for a 
satisfactory settlement. "40 The Personal Assistant to Nyerere expressed a similar conviction to 
Walter Martin a few months after Lancaster House. In a letter of "congratulations to you and your 
colleagues who have been active for peace with justice in Zimbabwe," she wrote, "I believe that 
the quiet intervention of Quaker Peace and Service personnel may well have had a special 
importance at different moments in the lead-up to Lusaka, and during the Conference itself."41 
Then, too, there are times when nothing clarifies like failure. President Nyerere was angry and let-
down by the Rhodesian air strikes against Lusaka that coincided with the messages the Quakers 
were conveying between him and Muzorewa. But having failed in his effort to work cooperatively 
36 Confidential Quaker Document. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Confidential Quaker Document. 
39 Interview with Adam Curle. 
40 Adam Curle, Tools for Transformation, (Stroud: Hawthorn Press, 1980), 85. The comment was made by an 
American diplomat attached to the United Nations throughout the war to Curle, whom the speaker had no idea was 
himself a Quaker. 
41 Letter from Joan Wicken to Walter Martin, March, 27, 1990; Confidential Quaker Document. 
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with Muzorewa through the good offices of the Quakers; he was prepared a few weeks later to take 
leadership in the call for the British to convene the Lancaster House negotiations. It is likely that 
this Quaker-assisted failure contributed to the evolution of Nyerere's decisive stance. 
Precisely the difficulty of "proving" success illustrates an important characteristic of many 
religious peacemakers. The Quakers intentionally operated in such a way that their own 
contribution to success would be barely, if at aU, visible. They made no effort to hide their role, 
but they sought to be genuine servants to the interests of others, and they understood that their 
ability to contribute depended on keeping a Quaker stake in the outcome minimal. They knew that 
earning the trust of the parties, which is often the hardest part of mediating in cases such as this, 
depends upon a commitment to the interests of the parties that is unadulterated by the need for 
"credit." As one social commentator put it, "You can have social change, or you can have credit 
for social change, but you can't have both. 1142 
Thus it should come as no surprise that the Quakers would be the least concerned about evidence 
of "success". Religious peacemakers at their best engage in their work, ultimately, not because 
they seek success, but rather because they are "called" by a reality larger than the empirical 
"facts". If this appears at one level to be naive or unrealistic, at another it reflects what is perhaps 
the fundamental asset of the religious intermediary. War, after all, is a consequence of the loss of 
hope that talking can yield results. Any peacemaker motivated by "success" as a yardstick would 
fade quickly in the atmosphere of pessimism that envelopes most serious conflicts. A sense of 
transcendent calling is more sustaining than pragmatic ambition, and the Quakers, faithful to their 
call, persevered in the face of long odds and major setbacks. 
Msika's description of the Quakers was insightful but, if anything, he understated the truth. 
Quakers are more than optimistic, they are grounded in divine hope. God, who is loving and good, 
is seen to be present everywhere working to bring things aright. The hopefulness, then, that 
pervades their work is not the cocky but ultimately brittle confidence of a clever strategist or a 
skilled practitioner. Rather, it is the calm assurance of a spiritual visionary who knows that all 
appearances to the contrary, in the end a deeper reality will prevail. It is difficult to imagine 
anyone functioning with the quiet perseverance that characterizes Quaker mediation efforts 
without such a deeply-rooted optimism. 
42 Quote is from the American sociologist Robert Theobald 
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Claims to "trust in God", of course, are common as the American penny 43. But Quakers add to it 
trust in human beings. For centuries they have taught that within the heart of even the tyrant there 
exists a divine spark. The challenge is to address and kindle that spark, to "speak to that of God in 
every person". Thus Quakers are hopeful about the possibility of establishing constructive 
relationships even in discouraging circumstances with difficult people. 
Other traits come closely aligned. If God resides in every person, there is no room for pretense, 
arrogance, or superficiality in relations with others. Nor is there room for injustice, selfishness, or 
"looking after our own" at the expense of other people. It was no chance that the Quakers won 
trust rapidly with most of the people with whom they met. Though they were "foreigners" to most 
of their contacts, they operated with such modesty, such transparent openness to and concern for 
each party whom they met that doors opened relatively quickly for them. 
Getting through the door, after all, was the primary prerequisite for the Quaker involvement. To 
the extent that their contribution can be documented, it consisted mostly of conveying messages 
and interpreting to each party the concerns and actions of other parties. The harder to document 
aspects of their work -- encouraging the parties not to give up hope; listening well in order to 
reduce defensiveness and other psychological impediments to rational analysis and strategizing, 
encouraging constructive attitudes -- required little more than getting in the door as well plus the 
well-honed Quaker skills in these activities. 
The whole Quaker contribution depended, then, on a quality of interpersonal bearing that would 
appear, at first glance, merely psychological or sociological in nature. In fact, the roots of this 
bearing are profoundly theological. Getting "through the door" is no spiritual exercise, of course, 
but the Quaker example suggests that the right kind of spiritual roots are an enormous asset. An 
interpersonal bearing that is grounded in a spiritual vision brings consistency, congruency, and 
simplicity of purpose to the task, and thus heightens the odds of getting through the many doors 
that await any potential peacemaker -- and of rapidly building trust once inside. 
The Quaker reputation for integrity, non-partisanship, and work in the field of peace and justice 
proved to be a great asset in gaining entry as well. In the exquisitely sensitive world of mediation, 
interpersonal bearing in the end often speaks more loudly than reputation. But a good reputation 
helps a great deal, and the two qualities in combination gave the Quakers almost instant access. 
43 I refer here to the fact that the American penny is inscribed with the motto "In God We Trust". 
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Chapter Eleven 
Conclusion to Section Two 
Christian Council of Rhodesia 
Although incidental to the purposes of this thesis, an account of religious involvements in 
peacemaking in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe would be incomplete without at least some mention of the 
work of the Christian Council of Rhodesia. The Council was a convening point from 1964 
onwards of ecumenical efforts within Rhodesia for efforts to oppose the Smith government and the 
war it was waging. Though sympathetic to the African nationalist perspective throughout, from 
1971 to 1979 the Council was often paralyzed in the debate between the moderate nationalism 
associated with Bishop Muzorewa and the more militant nationalism of the external liberation 
movements.1 
In July, 1979, the Council formed a Christian Council Reconciliation Committee (RC) to initiate 
involvement in the quest for political solutions. The RC undertook as its primary goal to seek 
unity among the African nationalist parties, now bitterly divided by Internal Settlement.2 Though 
able to meet Muzorewa, himself a member of the Executive Committee of the Christian Council 
until 1978, the RC was prevented by logistical problems of travel arrangements and visas from 
meeting Mugabe and Nkomo.3 
Four members of the RC traveled to Lancaster House, with a clear mission: "to impress upon the 
three main actors on the Zimbabwean scene the need to end the war in Zimbabwe through Political 
Reconciliation."4 One of their main concerns was to support unity among the African leaders.5 
The RC made several efforts to get Muzorewa, Mugabe, and Nkomo to meet, but gave up when 
Nkomo6 declined. Instead they met separately with the three leaders and their aides: three times 
1 Cf. Hallencreutz, 51-101. 
2 M. Kuchera, a member of the Reconciliation Committee, in interview with the author, Harare, August 19, 1992 
3 Ibid. 
4 Carl Hallencreutz, "A Council in Crossfire: ZCC 1964-1980", in Carl Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo, editors, 
Church and State in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1988), 98. Presumably this is a quote from Council 
documents. 
5 Interview with Kuchera. 
6 Right up until the 1980 elections Nkomo apparently entertained notions of single-handedly dominating the political 
future of the country. Cf. Flower, Serving Secretly, 264, 268. 
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with Mugabe, twice with Muzorewa, twice with Nkomo. They pied moderation with all three, 
stressing the suffering taking place at home. To the liberation movements they urged that so long 
as the settlement put full political control in the hands of the majority, including control of the 
police and security forces, the remaining issues were not urgent enough to block agreement.7 
Muzorewa, for his part, promised he would not "stand in the way of a good deal for Zimbabwe. 118 
In the latter part of the Lancaster House conference, the group sought to support "the credentials of 
the Patriotic Front to Christian groups in Great Britain and to the international press. 119 
Summary of Section Two 
The three religious groups in this study present a remarkably broad spectrum of responses to 
conflict. What is the problem which peacemakers are choosing to address? The question cleaves 
to the heart of the differences between these three groups . .Consider the following spectrum: 
Personal Relational Structural 
Microanalysis <--------------------------------------------------------------------------->Macroanalysis 
In this schema, Moral Re-Armament defined the problem as a personal one. Individuals were not 
living according to God's standards, not listening to God, and consequently conflict and injustice 
prevailed. Thus MRA devoted almost exclusive attention to reaching individuals and working for 
attitudinal and moral change. MRA left a mark, willy nilly, on processes by which the parties 
communicated with each other and on the structures that emerged as a result of its work with 
individuals. The Mugabe/Smith meeting, after all, facilitated Mugabe's offer to include whites in 
his cabinet in the new government and Smith's positive public response probably led to a 
significant change in the attitude of some whites to the incoming Mugabe government . But these 
results were affects, not the targets ofMRA activities. 
The Catholics, for the most part, defined the problem as a structural one. The political and 
economic structures were fundamentally unjust and needed to be over-hauled. This required 
7 The Patriotic Front leaders were ambivalent about the churches. On one hand their resentment towards Bishop 
Muzorewa, whom they regarded as a traitor, made them suspicious of churches in general and in particular of 
members of the delegation thought to favor him. On the other hand, recent grants from the World Council of 
Churches to the liberation movements had helped restore their faith in the churches, and additionally, they sought the 
support of the influential Council. Source: Kuchera, ibid. 
8 Interview with Kuchera. 
9 Hallencreutz, "A Council in Crossfire", 99. Hallencreutz cites Bishop Shiri, a member of the Committee. 
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mobilizing opinion against the existing structures via publications and lobbying efforts. The 
Catholics, too, devoted some attention to problems of relationship. The Catholic appeal to 
commence negotiations, made directly to the parties a year before Lancaster House, and to the 
international world just prior to the Lusaka Conference, was probably one of the numerous 
important influences that eventually brought the parties to the table. But the Catholics influenced 
relationships by structural methods. They functioned mostly as moral lobbyists within the 
structures of power, not as clarifiers of communication or facilitators of negotiation. 
The Quakers centered their activities around problems of relationships. The parties were not 
communicating clearly, and negotiation efforts were bedeviled by misinformation, 
misinterpretations, and lack of forums and mechanisms to communicate constructively. The 
Quakers sought to fill this gap, interpreting each side's concerns to others, conveying messages, 
trying to arrange face-to-face meetings, exploring options for resolution with the parties 
informally at Lancaster House and elsewhere. More than either the Catholics or MRA, the 
Quakers were involved in discussion of substantive issues with a broad range of leaders, and thus 
came the closest to a mediating role. 
Though the Quakers devoted the bulk of their attention to relationships, they were also directly 
concerned with individuals and with structural problems. Like MRA, they spent a great deal of 
time with individual leaders in a listening and supportive role. Like the Catholics, they 
demonstrated profound awareness of structural imbalances. Though they were careful not to 
• 
endanger their mediation role through open activism, they interacted quietly with London-based 
groups, such as CUR and the British Council of Churches, which sought to highlight injustice in 
Rhodesia, and they sought to influence the British government to take what they felt were more 
enlightened approaches to the situation. 
The groups focused upon different aspects of the larger problem because they defined the problem 
itself differently and thus employed differing strategies. But the effect of the three involvements 
proved to be a complementary one. The Catholics and the Quakers recognized this and cooperated 
throughout the war years, keeping each other well-informed of activities. But contacts between 
MRA and the other two groups were minimal. This seems a regrettable gap: closer cooperation, if 
only in the sharing of information and insights about the conflict, particularly between the Quakers 
and MRA, might have substantially enhanced the work of both organizations. 
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The three groups shared a striking similarity: all dealt with the "entry" problem by use of listening 
strategies. Individuals from both the Quakers and MRA teams repeatedly emphasized in later 
interviews the importance of low-key, non judgemental listening to the parties as a central part of 
their work, and both organizations spent enormous amounts of time doing it. The Catholics were 
less self-conscious about it, but they based their truth-telling on listening nevertheless. The far-
flung network of Catholic personnel in Rhodesia and the reports from the thousands of individuals 
who brought complaints to the Commission for Justice and Peace formed the backbone of Catholic 
truth-telling efforts in the world arena. If anything sets the work of these three religious 
organizations apart from that of many other organizations, it is the scope and quality oflistening in 
which they engaged. 
Did the religious groups make a difference in the outcome of the conflict? This conflict was 
resolved by formal political negotiations, and the religious groups were only one of numerous 
actors on the scene. Clear evidence of their impact is hard to come by. Even so, the answer is 
unequivocally yes. 
The evidence is episodic but incontrovertible in the case ofMRA where Ian Smith, a key 
protagonist, confirms that the MRA-brokered meeting altered his response to Mugabe before a 
breathless nation. 10 The evidence is less dramatic in the case of the Catholics, who tirelessly 
goaded the world to take action in Rhodesia. But the magnitude and scope of the Catholic efforts, 
particularly at truth-telling, make it virtually certain that the conflict would have been prolonged 
and the human toll thus substantially higher had the Church not been so deeply involved. 
With regard to the Quakers, the evidence is neither decisive nor voluminous, yet the levels of 
access to the disputing parties and to key external policy-makers, and their expressions of 
appreciation afterwards suggest that the Quakers played a role that the parties found constructive 
as they groped their way towards a settlement. It is hard to imagine the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
conflict becoming "ripe"11 for resolution and moving into a new dispensation with so little 
bitterness had it not been for the roles played by these three religious actors. 
10 Interview with Ian Smith. 
11 The "ripeness" school ofnegotiations theory holds that settlement has relatively little to do with the skills and attitudes 
of the negotiators, and rather is a function of "the balance of inputs of internal and external actors involved in the 
conflict system at any time." When the key parties all decide in a given moment that now is the time most favorable 
to their own interests to settle, the conflict is "ripe" and settlement becomes likely. Mottie Tamarkin in a thought-
provoking paper, "Negotiations or Conflict Resolution South Africa: Lessons from Zimbabwe", published in 
conference proceedings Conflicts and Negotiations (Germany: Herbert Quandt Foundation, 1992) draws on Richard 
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Haas' elaboration ofripeness theory to analyze the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe negotiations. Though I find Tamarkin's 
analysis overly-machiavellian, from within his framework, I believe one could reasonably conclude that the religious 
actors were one of numerous important influences bringing the situation to a point of "ripeness". To take one 
instance, Tamarkin believes Margaret Thatcher's about-face, her rejection of the Internal Settlement, was the key to 
the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe conflict becoming "ripe". It is likely that both the Catholics and Quakers contributed to what 
some called "the education of Maggie Thatcher"; the Catholics through their protracted lobbying efforts and the 
Quakers through their quiet conversations with British politicians and FCO officials who were part of the complex 
web of influence at work on Thatcher. Legum, ibid, 126ff, highlights the influence of the Australians and 
Mozambicans in Thatcher's change of heart; MRA workers believe that they were influential in tipping Malcolm 
Fraser, then Australian Prime Minister, towards challenging Thatcher. Interview with MRA worker and senior official 







Testing the Paradigm 
Section One o~__!!~~d _!_paradigm for peacebuilding based on the values and experiences of 
peace builders in the Mennonite/ Anabaptist tradition. Section Two documented the work of three 
religiously based peacebuilders that were active in the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. 
This chapter compares the paradigm of peace building from Section One with the experience of the 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe actors. 
The Introduction and Vision chapter of Section One argued for the importance of peacebuilders 
identifying the vision or myth in which they locate their moral decisions and for them to articulate 
the connections between that vision and their strategic understanding of peace building. By 
articulating this, I said, peacebuilders become more capable of moral reflection on the issues 
raised by involvement in conflict, more effective in facilitating such reflection in others, and more 
accountable to others for their own actions as peacebuilders. Section One reflects my effort to 
accomplish this in regards to my own vision and understandings of peace building, or more 
accurately, my understanding of the vision for life and its implications for peacebuilding held by 
my own primary community, the Anabaptists. 
Important though self-reflection and self-explication are, however, the challenge of operating with 
effectiveness and integrity in the arena of public affair requires yet another step. No human 
community, after all, has a "comer on truth". Ifwe hope to contribute constructively to the 
interaction of communities in our world - and such an intention is surely the minimum required of 
any peacebuilder at work in communal conflicts - we are compelled to do our self-explication 
publicly and to test our "truth" about how to engage in peacebuilding with that of others. From 
that dialogue can emerge the closest thing to Truth accessible to human beings. 
One dimension of that Truth is the truth of particularity that is committed to the universal. By this 
I refer to the integrity of the internal understanding of truth held by a community that seeks at all 
times to be open, reflective and self-critical, and sensitive to needs of other communities as it 
formulates its own understandings of truth and their implications for action in the world. A 
second dimension is the truth of universality discovered through the interaction of particularities. 
Here I refer to consensus about meaning, being, or action that is forged in dialogue between 
differing communities. Neither of these, in my estimation, are ever "ultimate Truth" and when 
viewed as such they threaten to become imperialistic. Rather they are working hypotheses, 
subject to new insight and challenge, whose ability to welcome and survive dialogue and 
contention is the most convincing mark of their truthfulness and vitality. 
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Section One represents an effort to reach for the former, particularity committed to the universal. 
The current Section seeks the latter, universality through interaction of particularities. To what 
extent can the themes highlighted in my paradigm be found to be at work in the response of other 
religiously-based peacebuilders? Finding commonalities is not essential of course to the value and 
integrity of my own paradigm. But to the extent that they are found to exist they contribute to the 
possibility of developing a descriptive theory of religiously-based peacebuilding. Then I will look 
0 
for key differences between the approaches of these peace builders and my own and seek to 
analyze these from my own perspective. 
Section One began with "Vision", arguing that strategies for peacebuilding reflect a deeper 
underlying vision. Consistency would suggest beginning the current section with the same theme, 
comparing my vision with the vision of the actors in this study. However practicality requires 
otherwise, for this would entail an extensive review and comparison of the theological 
backgrounds of the actors in this study. Besides, the focus of the thesis is not to compare or 
critique the visions from which peacebuilding strategies are derived, but rather to develop the 
strategic implications of one particular vision for peacebuilding and to compare those strategic 
proposals to the actions of other peacebuilders. 
Thus I will restrict comparisons to strategic actions, not to the theological underpinnings of those 
actions. This said, it nevertheless merits noting that all three groups in this study shared a 
common heritage in their origins in Christianity. All had a vision for human life which compelled 
them to act, ultimately, at levels of commitment substantially above that of the numerous other 
Christian groups close to this conflict. While their ways of expressing this vision theologically 
differed, it seems apparent that their underlying motivation came from a conviction that God 
created human beings as equals and intended them to live in a state of well-being and justice, and 
that this divine intent required a concerted response to the tragedy of injustice and war in 
Zimbabwe. In later sections it will become apparent that they held differing understandings about 
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how to respond to this conviction. My point for now is that a vision for human life different from 
that which prevailed around them lay at the heart of the response of these groups. 
Transformation 
Chapter Two argued that peace building guided by shalom is about more than imposing justice or 
creating the best possible package of solutions to a conflict, that it calls for transformation of the 
people and societies involved in conflict. With strategies of empowerment peacebuilders can 
support the ability of each party to recognize and act on the fullest possible range of options for 
response available to them. By providing opportunities for recognition peacebuilders encourage 
other-awareness within the parties. Discernment is an effort to engage people in conflict in 
reflection, discussion and planning regarding the personal, relational, structural, and cultural 
dimensions of conflict, in a quest to jointly find "life-giving" responses to their conflicts. To what 
extent does a similar understanding of the goal of peacebuilding seem to guide the activities of the 
three actors examined at work in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe? 
Moral Re-Armament and Transformation 
True to its name, Moral Re-Armament made moral transformation a high and explicit priority, and 
its activities provide a rich and fascinating study in strategies for reaching the hearts of individuals 
involved in conflict. From its first conference in Rhodesia in 1974 through to the dramatic 
meeting between Mugabe and Smith in 1980, Moral Re-Armament's activities are characterized 
by a consistent goal: to get people involved in the conflict, particularly those in places of great 
influence, to awaken spiritually and to adopt a different attitude towards others. 
MRA's tactics in accomplishing this ranged from the sublime to the banal, and effected people 
accordingly. Alec Smith's heartfelt public confession of his own culpability in the suffering of 
black Rhodesians melted the heart of the erstwhile guerrilla fighter Arther Kanodereka and laid the 
foundation for public partnership between the two that lasted for several years, until Kanodereka's 
assassination in 1978. Small dinner parties brought together prominent white and black leaders 
on a regular basis for intimate conversation and opened up valuable channels for communication. 
On the other hand, a former Prime Minister was deeply alienated by the vaudeville character of 
uninvited drama presentations made in his office by visiting MRA workers. 
MRA understood its activities in spiritual and theological terms such as "listening to God" or 
"living by absolute principles" but virtually everything MRA did can be understood in the 
categories of Folger and Bush. Implicit and often explicit in the message ofMRA was an 
227 
assertion with powerful overtones of empowerment. "You matter. You have clear choices 
regarding how you respond to your opponents in this conflict. The place to begin is with your own 
heart. God has a plan and a message for you. How you respond may have an impact on many 
others." The fact that this message (my paraphrasing ofMRA's message) was,9onveyed in 
theological terms only heightened its impact. To assert that someone is significant and equal with 
others in the eyes of God and a potential partner in a divine plan to heal the nation is as profound a 
statement of empowerment as could be imagined. 
The message ofMRA also reflected clear themes of recognition. Interestingly, one of the most 
common presentations of this theme took the form of a call for self-judgment: "Set your life 
aright in relationship to others; confess and make amends to them your failures in living by the 
'four absolute principles' as the first step in hearing God". This message came through repeatedly 
in MRA discussions with individuals, literature and films, and public presentations. While this 
call was likely one of the aspects of the MRA approach which some listeners found offensive, 
MRA was nevertheless able to assert it regularly with surprising success by presenting it in the 
disarming form of self-confession on the part of MRA workers. 
Additionally, MRA's first principle was "absolute love", a standard which well exceeds the 
studied tepidness of "recognition" in the intensity of its call for acknowledgment of the needs, 
feelings, and perceptions of others. Thus a high-voltage challenge to recognition of others and to 
actively confess and make amends for failure to offer recognition awaited anyone who listened for 
long to the message ofMRA presentations. 
The call for recognition and opportunities to act on it came in other ways as well. MRA 
consistently spoke out for the equality of all and the ending of racial privilege. More important, 
MRA actively created ways for blacks and whites to meet and mingle as equals. MRA workers 
usually attended meetings in teams and often these were bi-racial in character. Conferences 
featured people of diverse racial backgrounds contributing as equals to the struggle for peaceful 
change. The heart of MRA public outreach for several years, the partnership between young 
Smith and Kanodereka, was of course biracial. Similarly, the dinner meetings organized over a 
several year period by MRA workers brought blacks and whites together for acquaintance and 
discussion, affording them opportunities for recognition which in some instances lasted well 
beyond the hours of the social gathering. Finally, the meeting which MRA arranged between key 
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individuals on a number of occasions, notably the Mugabe/Smith encounter, facilitated acts of 
recognition. 
It deserves mention, however, that MRA's relatively narrow focus on spiritual categories and 
principles may have limited the imagination of its members regarding ways to support moral 
transformation of the actors in conflict. Despite the creative, wide-ranging, and often effective 
ways in which MRA sought to touch the hearts of others, the secular categories of empowerment 
and recognition suggest a range of other strategies which MRA in its relatively narrow emphasis 
on listening to God and scrutinizing self in light of absolute principles apparently never 
considered. The experiences of Martin Luther King and Gandhi in applying principles of non-
violent direct action, for example, clearly fall in the category of moral transformation because of 
the prominence of concern apparent in them for both empowerment and recognition. There is no 
evidence that MRA members ever sought to explore such riskier and more activist strategies in 
addressing the Rhodesia/Zimbabwe situation. 
The strategies proposed by Folger and Bush summarized in Chapter Two likewise suggest a 
variety of relatively mundane approaches which might have been effectively employed by MRA 
workers in their efforts to reach the minds and hearts of the combatants. But by the same token, 
the repertoire ofresponse proposed by Folger and Bush for moral transformation could be 
substantially broadened by the experience of MRA. The most significant addition is, to put it in 
religious language, repentance and confession as avenues of recognition. No secular equivalent 
exists, but terms like "critical self-reflection", "apology", "voluntary admission of failure to meet 
widely accepted standards of conduct towards others" convey at least some important dimensions 
of these religious terms. 
The MRA experience highlights a related dimension of moral transformation on which Folger and 
Bush are silent: the powerful impact that evidence of moral transformation within peacebuilders 
can have on others. Of specific interest here is the effect that the confessions of their own failures 
or vulnerability which MRA people themselves made had on individuals for whom they sought 
transformation like Arther Kanodereka. 
A recurring emphasis in MRA's work was on what Stephen R. Covey in his widely-read book The 
Seven Habits of Highly Effective People calls an ethic of character1• This ethic, says Covey, 
I Stephen R. Covey, The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989).~ 
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teaches "that there are basic principles of effective living, and that people can only experience true 
success and enduring happiness as they learn and integrate these principles into their basic 
character."2 It contrasts, according to Covey, to the "personality ethic" which emphasizes 
personality, image, skill, and technique as the key to success. 3 MRA's first principle of moral 
transformation was "transform yourself'. To the extent that people opened themselves to this 
challenge, MRA taught, they would find that they were capable of being instruments in the 
transformation of others. This echoes the theme of critical self-scrutiny developed in Chapter 
Seven on "Community" as an essential foundation for peacebuilding in the transformational 
understanding. 
The MRA example suggests an important strategy for peacebuilders seeking to support moral 
transformation: be humble and demonstrate your own struggle with the issues involved in moral 
transformation. More fundamentally, it highlights a significant dimension of preparation of 
peacebuilders, the need for them to enter fully as persons into the struggle for moral 
transformation in their own lives. 
I suggested that at the heart of transformation lies a vision to restore moral response and dialogue 
as the basis for addressing conflicts. This understanding clearly was shared by MRA. The focus 
of MRA was to call people in conflict to recognize and begin acting upon a category of timeless 
values, regardless of the response of others. The "four absolute standards" defined what MRA 
believed to be the contents of such a moral realm, "listening to God" was a way of invoking 
guidance from it, confession and apology were the consequences of applying moral reflection to 
one's own life. 
However, MRA applied an individual model of change to a situation in which structural issues 
were paramount. Rather than encouraging reflection on the nature of the society they envisioned, 
MRA focused on calling individuals to reflect on their own personal conduct. The two of course, 
are ultimately closely linked, for a society is to a certain extent the sum of the individuals within 
it. But there is little evidence of effort on the part ofMRA workers to engage the people they met 
with in what I call discernment, reflection on their deepest values, the implications of those values 
for others and how to build social and political structures supporting their values. 
2 Ibid., 18 
3 Ibid, 19 
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The Quakers and Transformation 
The Quakers were less explicit in articulating transformation as a goal and more circumspect in 
their efforts to interact deeply with those in conflict than MRA. Nevertheless they were clearly 
concerned with more than merely resolving the conflict, but rather also with laying the foundation 
for a new social order in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Although their most important work was in the 
area ofrelationships, they engaged in interaction with individuals which fit Bush and Folger's 
understanding of"moral transformation". Likewise they sought to contribute to establishing 
structures enabling the parties to more effectively work out their problems on an ongoing basis. 
If the strength ofMRA was its message, the strength of the Quaker effort was its meta-message. 
The Quakers conveyed no hints of divine plans or special missions for individuals. What they 
brought was a consistent stance of deep respect and caring towards the parties, coupled with a 
general sense of optimism that something could be worked out. Underlying their respect and 
caring of course was the Quaker theological conviction that God dwelt in each person they met. 
But they rarely if ever articulated their convictions in such terms, relying instead on action and 
attitude to convey the message. 
I noted earlier that the desire to hear and understand the concerns of each party invariably headc;d 
the list of goals Quakers set for themselves in planning their missions. Of course it is tactically 
wise for peace builders to have the fullest possible understanding of the perceptions of all sides. 
But the persistence with which the goal appears in Quaker planning, and the self-evident way in 
which the goal was often articulated coheres with Quaker theology. Listening to the parties was 
more than tactical wisdom, it was an expression of Quaker faith, a statement about the intrinsic 
worthiness of each person with whom they interacted. 
Bush and Folger say that: "In the most general terms, empowerment is achieved when disputing 
parties experience a strengthened awareness of their own self-worth and their own ability to deal 
with whatever difficulties they face, regardless of external constraints.',4 If there was anything 
that the Quaker presence seemed particularly to support, it was a heightened sense of self-worth. 
A review of their number one goal for themselves in attending the Geneva Conference offers 
insight as to why. The Quaker team hoped "to develop a sympathetic understanding of [the 
parties'] fears, hopes and intentions and to support and strengthen their efforts at achieving a just 
4 Bush and Folger, 84. 
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settlement." 5 The italics are mine, added to highlight language that could have been lifted 
straight from Bush and Folger's expositions on the merits of empowerment. At Geneva and 
beyond, the Quakers sought first and foremost to support and strengthen the parties. Even when 
more ambitious agendas emerged capable of elevating them into prominent intermediary roles, 
such as the effort to set up meetings between Robert Mugabe and British Foreign Minister David 
Owen, the Quakers always subordinated these agendas to their commitment to strengthen the 
parties' sense that they were heard, understood, and respected. 
The desire to support the parties' understanding of the claims of their opponents and to recognize 
the legitimate dimensions of those claims similarly played a prominent role in the Quakers' self-
understanding of their efforts and clearly received a great deal of their attention in practical ways. 
Describing Quaker activities at the Geneva Conference, for example, Trevor Jepson characterized 
them as firstly, supportive, and secondly, "interpretive, so that having established a basis of trust 
in our relationship with members of various groups, their differing aspirations and fears could be 
interpreted to one another so as to foster better communication."6 In an essay reflecting on a 
variety of Quaker experiences in international mediation, Sydney Bailey highlights elimination of 
misperceptions and misunderstandings as a. "primary task" in Quaker efforts, and comments that 
"the Quaker team working on the Southern Rhodesian question regarded the removal of 
misperceptions as a crucial task."7 
"Eliminating misperceptions and misunderstandings" sounds like a different activity than 
recognition. But in practice the two were virtually identical. The point of clarifying 
misperceptions, after all, was not merely pristine communication, but rather to prepare the way for 
negotiation. Misperceptions and misunderstandings are almost always negative, that is, they 
contribute to the process of demonization of enemies, and mitigate against recognition. Thus to 
eliminate misperceptions substantially increases the chances of recognition taking place. 
What is more, the Quakers augmented their efforts at clarifying communication with active steps 
to give opportunity for the parties to recognize the legitimate needs on the other side. For 
example, they conveyed to the British government the concern held by Nyerere of Tanzania that a 
decision on the part of the UK and the US to recognize the Muzorewa government might lead to 
5 Martin, 7-8 
6 Trevor Jepson, "Rhodesia and Quaker Peacemaking", Quaker Monthly, August, 1977, 157. 
7 Sydney D. Bailey, "Non-Official Mediation in Disputes: Reflections on Quaker Experiences", International Affairs, 
February, 1985, 219. 
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major East/West conflict. At Lancaster House, they repeatedly sought to interpret the concerns of 
the Patriotic Front to the British government. When the Callahan commission of the British 
government recommended against the convening of all-party talks, the Quakers actively explored 
with all the parties the possibility of convening talks under their own auspices. Towards the end 
- ···~-~"-
ofthe war, they encouraged Mugabe's lieutenants to publicize their commitment to moderate 
governance in a new dispensation so as to defuse white anxieties. 
The Quakers were aware that at times they spent more effort advocating the legitimacy of the 
views of the liberation movements to the British and to representatives of Salisbury than vice 
versa. Walter Martin noted in his report on the Quaker efforts that at Lancaster House they 
actively sought to interpret the position of one side to another. "Whilst this was done, without 
conscious bias, in all directions, the bulk of this experience was concentrated on explaining the 
position of the Patriotic Front to the Salisbury delegation and the UK govemment."8 
If then, in practical terms, their efforts concentrated more on one party than another, recognition 
appears to have been an ever-present implicit goal on the part of the Quakers, and often an explicit 
one as well. The lack of a formal mandate from the parties to mediate restricted the Quakers to 
low-key efforts, of course. But in the context, an on-going civil war where virtually no direct 
communication was taking place between the parties themselves, clarifying misperceptions and 
interpreting the concerns of the opposing parties to each other in a positive light clearly belong in 
the category of recognition. Not only did they imply a bold statement - that the Quakers thought 
the concerns of the mutual enemies deserved serious consideration - they also provided the parties 
in several instances with practical means to take steps towards recognizing the legitimacy of the 
other parties' needs. 
In their patient efforts to advocate negotiations and prepare the opponents for it, the Quakers' 
efforts can also be understood in terms of my proposal to view the essence of transformation as 
evoking moral awareness and seeking to draw people in conflict into discussion of solutions based 
on deep moral reflection rather than on mere pragmatic give-and-take. The respect with which 
Quakers treated all parties and their emphasis on understanding them was a reflection of their 
theological conviction that something of God dwells in all persons, and as such a statement of 
their belief that all parties were capable of responding constructively. 
8 Confidential Quaker Document, 120. 
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The Catholics and Moral Transformation 
Whereas MRA' s primary target of interaction was individuals and that of the Quakers individuals 
and small groups, Catholics concerned themselves mostly with political processes and structures. 
It is apparent that moral impact was a major theme in the Catholic response and that, in support of 
my understanding of transformation, Catholics sought to get the combatants and influential 
constituencies to respond to the conflict at an moral level. The Catholic response was grounded in 
regular proclamations from the Bishops in the form of Pastoral Letters setting out a comprehensive 
vision for a just society which differed clearly from the existing one. The Catholic Church was 
threatening to the government precisely because such publications made it clear that the goal of 
the Church was fundamental change of the political and social order, not merely restoration of 
peace and stability. 
Further evidence of Catholic commitment to moral transformation is that much of their work 
consisted of appeals to conscience. By placing evidence of atrocities in front of first Ian Smith 
and then the world, CJP members clearly hoped to arouse others to take action to address 
injustices. Similarly, when they mounted a major campaign to get the parties into negotiation in 
the months preceding Lancaster House, the Catholics again did so on the grounds of conscience, 
appealing to the parties to end the suffering caused by the war. 
The Catholic approach to transformation differed substantially from that of the Quakers and MRA. 
While MRA members commonly functioned as individuals interacting with other individuals, the 
Catholics typically addressed institutions as an institution. While the Quakers tiptoed to avoid 
damaging relationships, the Catholics pressured and polarized, even filing a court suit against the 
government. Where MRA members confessed personal culpability and Quakers presented 
themselves as humble servants of the needs of the parties, the Catholics assumed a stance of moral 
rectitude and exhorted the parties on their own failings. While Quakers listened quietly and asked 
questions intended to provoke awareness in the parties and MRA encouraged people to listen to 
God's voice, the Catholics issued statements asserting their own understanding of what needed to 
..... be done. 
To grasp fully the reasons for this sharp divergence in style would require addressing themes 
beyond the scope of this thesis, including differing understandings of the role of the church in 
relationship to society, as well as differing understandings of the meaning of revelation and 
mission. But the simplest explanation has to do with a theme already touched on in Section One, 
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namely, the relationship between the peacebuilders and those in conflict. Whereas neither the 
Quakers nor MRA had extensive institutional bases in Rhodesia, the Catholics were pervasively 
engaged in the society through their networks of schools, hospitals, and service agencies. The 
very survival of the Catholic Church in Rhodesia was at stake in ways that had no parallel for the 
Quakers or MRA who institutionally were only marginally affected by the war. 
More than self-interest was at stake, however, for through this deeply engaged network, Catholics 
were existentially enmeshed in the suffering of the war's victims. In a way that parallels my own 
call for taking a conscious bias as peacebuilders towards understanding the conflict from the 
standpoint of those who are most vulnerable, Catholics actively sought to press that suffering into 
the awareness of the combatants and the influential surrounding world. While on one hand this 
deep engagement doubtless increased the stridency of the Catholic responses, on the other hand, it 
enormously enhanced the credibility and impact of Catholic efforts. 
Not only were Catholics deeply engaged in the conflict situation, they located themselves in moral 
terms in ways never contemplated by the Quakers or MRA. It is true, on one hand, that the 
Catholic Church could have probably been more effective in the ways it did this had it broadened 
its repertoire of interaction with key figures in the conflict to include the more facilitative and 
elicitive approaches to transformation modeled by the Quakers and MRA (e.g.: listening, eliciting, 
clarifying, asking thoughtful questions, acknowledging own failures, etc.) These skills appear to 
have enabled the latter two groups to engage key leaders in conflict in thoughtful give-and-take in 
a way that never happened with the Catholics. But at root, the Catholic inclination to articulate its 
own values in the context of discussion about the conflict coheres with my own understanding of 
the need for peace builders to operate from a standpoint of clear definition of their own values. 
Summary Regarding Transformation 
The work of all three actors can be understood as taking place within a transformational paradigm 
of peacebuilding. However each actor targeted a different arena of operation as critical to 
transformation and employed a different style of operation. In my view the possibility for 
transformation would have increased had these actors recognized the need for work in all three of 
the complementary areas they were engaged in and chosen to coordinate their efforts accordingly. 
Alternatively, I do not believe that these differing approaches are necessarily mutually exclusive 
and that in some situations one organization with adequate resources could to some extent work in 
all three areas. In terms of my framework, such a response would begin and be at all times 
0 
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sustained from a point of clear moral location and deep engagement with suffering similar to that 
of The Catholics. It would be accompanied by the modest, thoughtful inquiry and relational 
emphasis employed by the Quakers, and grounded in the insistence of MRA that no social change 
is meaningful or sustainable unless it is rooted in the lives of individuals. 
Vulnerability 
MRA and Vulnerability 
The work of MRA parallels in a number of ways my proposal that vulnerability serve as a "marker 
of reality" in guiding peace builders to the most important dimensions of a conflict. MRA' s 
emphasis on personal confession often led MRA personnel to share deeply from their own 
experiences and to acknowledge their own failings. This had positive results on numerous 
occasions. Alec Smith's confession of culpability in the injustices leading to war led to the 
"conversion" of Arther Kanodereka; Desmond Reader's apology to a colleague led to a fruitful 
partnership between two black and white academics in convening dinners bringing together whites 
and blacks. The account by a former Rhodesian Secretary of Foreign Affairs oflosing a son in 
the war led to an empathetic account by one of Mugabe's men of picking the body of his brother 
out of the trenches in Mozambique in the aftermath of a Rhodesian raid. 
MRA also clearly maintained a careful eye for the personal vulnerabilities of key actors and 
sought to respond constructively. The special effort to provide emotional support to the socially 
ostracized Ian Smith during the Lancaster House talks, Henry Macnicol's offer to pray with 
Bishop Muzorewa as he struggled with giving up his central role in government, and the weekend 
outing provided for exhausted members of Mugabe's staff during the same time all illustrate this 
point. One of MRA' s greatest strengths proved to be its ability to see even highly-placed leaders 
as vulnerable human beings, to approach and minister to their needs, and in moments of grace to 
encourage them to make choices based on principles of cooperation rather than recrimination and 
fear. 
On the other hand, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that MRA's perceptions of the conflict 
were based, not on the experiences of those who were most vulnerable, the African masses living 
in the townships and rural areas of the country, but rather on the outlook of the national leaders 
with whom MRA interacted as its primary target of influence. I noted earlier that MRA was best 
connected to leaders from the Muzorewa/Smith "internal settlement" camp which took a reformist 
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stance regarding political change in the country. In the end this stance was strongly rejected by 
Zimbabwean voters. 
Examples abound, to be sure, ofMRA involvement with "the masses". Alec Smith and Arther 
Kanodereka devoted countless hours, after all, in dozens of meetings in a tireless public campaign 
for unity. But these activities seem secondary to the more dramatic mission which formed the 
centerpiece of MRA work in Rhodesia as other places in the world: interaction with highly placed 
and therefore influential individuals. The latter focus was an important agenda in the formative 
1974 MRA premier conference in Salisbury, frequently occupied the attention of the "Kitchen 
Cabinet", set priorities in determining attendance at MRA conferences in Caux, Switzerland, and 
perhaps most tellingly, dominate the accounts ofMRA workers reflecting in later years on their 
work in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. 
Emphasis on work at this level enabled MRA to contribute in significant ways already pointed out. 
But it also limited MRA' s impact to the cast of characters already calling the shots within the 
conflict. Rather than, for example, supporting the emergence of new constellations of influence at 
"middle" levels as proposed by Lederach, a focus on interacting with existing high-level 
individuals tended to reinforce the role of elites as the ones who decide what the issues are, who 
the negotiators will be, what options will be considered, etc. In this sense MRA's strategy could 
be understood as tending to reinforce the status quo of the power formations on each side of the 
conflict and thus as a conservative response. 
Here again we must acknowledge that MRA engaged in some work at "middle levels". The dinner 
parties, for example, brought together a variety of people from academia, business, and religious 
backgrounds who were leaders in their setting but not prominent in the national political context. 
But these activities focused on individual encounter and individual change, not on the formation of 
new institutions or on-"going initiatives capable of supporting peace initiatives. By attending 
primarily to individual influence, MRA's impact was limited by the constraints of the existing 
institutions within which those individuals operated. In interacting primarily with individuals 
who were "at the top of the pile" of those institutions, MRA members developed their own key 
understandings of the conflict and possibilities for its resolution through the eyes of people with a 
stake in those institutions. 
In conclusion then, although the MRA experience coheres with my proposal that attention to 
vulnerability serve as a guide to religiously-based peacebuilders in determining their agenda, my 
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proposal highlights a dimension largely missing in MRA work: the value of consciously seeking 
out extensive interaction with the experiences of those who are the most vulnerable in conflict. 
The Catholics and Vulnerability 
To a substantial extent it was the Catholic church's own experiences of vulnerability that brought 
it into the arena of peacebuilding. The efforts by the Smith government in 1969 to impose 
separation of the races on all church institutions goaded the Church into open disobedience of the 
government and marked an important turning point in its response to the overt racism of Smith's 
Rhodesia Front. From this point onward the Church took an activist role in promoting racial 
justice, formalized in 1972 with the establishing of the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace. 
Similarly, it was the suffering of her own people in dioceses and parishes throughout the country 
which motivated the Church to confront first Ian Smith with a delegation in 1973 regarding the 
atrocities of the war, the nation through Parliament and mass publications in 1974, and finally the 
world in 1975. As the war intensified, Catholic priests and sisters themselves became regular 
vistims along with their lay charges and in the end at least 25 lost their lives. 
But if it was the experience of her own membership and personnel which initially impelled the 
church to act, the structure created by Church hierarchy to formally address the conflict, the 
Commission on Justice and Peace made its primary mission that of documenting and publishing 
the experiences of vulnerable people everywhere. Utilizing the "listening church", the extensive 
network of on-the-ground Catholic clerics, the Commission received the testimony of thousands, 
and carried it to the world stage in the books and reports it published. 
Even in 1977, when the Church shifted to a less partisan role, that of advocating negotiations, it 
did so on the basis of the suffering of vulnerable people. The appeals which the traveling 
delegations made to the heads of the liberation fronts and to the government stressed one theme: 
the importance of ending the war in order to end the suffering of ordinary people. 
In summary, in making the reality of suffering visible nationally and internationally it seems 
apparent that the CCJP played an important role in bringing pressure to bear on all parties to end 
the war. Clearly the Catholic experience then supports my proposal to use vulnerability as a 
marker in determining the "realities" of conflict and choosing a focus for peacebuilding efforts. 
However it is worthy of note that the Catholics were weak where MRA was strong. While MRA 
was effective in connecting to the vulnerabilities of individuals and limited in its interaction with 
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the most vulnerable sectors of the populace, for the Catholics the converse held. Bishop Lamont, 
Sister Janice McLaughlin, and many other Catholic advocates of the poor were highly effective in 
articulating the needs of the African majority but in their interaction with individuals whose 
policies they opposed, they displayed no awareness of or interest in the arts of listening and 
empathy which characterized Quaker and MRA activities. 
0 
This in no way challenges the rightness of the advocacy role through which the Catholic Church 
was able to alter the larger power dynamics at work on the Rhodesian scene in favor of the African 
majority. But no evidence suggests that the Catholics succeeded in touching the hearts of 
individuals in ways comparable to the impact that the MRA-arranged meeting had on Mugabe and 
Smith or that some MRA encounters had on other individuals. Had Catholic workers brought 
more than the tools of polarization and polemics to their efforts to challenge the powerholders in 
Salisbury it is possible that their impact might have been substantially increased. 
The Quakers and Vulnerability 
Concern for the suffering caused by the war was at the center of Quaker motivation for their role, 
and as noted earlier, formed the primary agenda of many of their meetings with the parties. The 
Quakers themselves seem to have been at times somewhat surprised by the receptiveness of the 
parties to meet with them on the basis of such a modest agenda. A focus on vulnerability thus not 
only was central to the Quaker initiatives, it provided a rationale for involvement that proved 
credible to the parties. 
Like the Catholics the Quakers took conscious steps to connect to and support individuals 
suffering the most from the war. Quaker peace representatives visited refugee camps in 
Botswana, Maputo and Lusaka, and arranged for support by Quaker affiliated agencies and 
foundations. 
Summary Regarding Vulnerability 
Although the kinds of vulnerability to which they responded and the ways in which they sought to 
connect to it varied, a profound sensitivity to and concern for suffering and vulnerability was a 
hallmark
0
ofthe work of the religiously-based peacemakers in this study. None of the groups 
explicitly articulated a desire to give special weight to the experiences of vulnerability. But in 
fact, it is apparent that the Catholics and the Quakers did so. Both stressed the dimension of 
suffering repeatedly in their meetings with leaders on all sides. The Catholics in particular 
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confronted leaders sharply with this concern in their major push for negotiations in early 1979 just 
prior to the decision to go to Lancaster House. 
Thus the study yields an important insight about a specific agenda which is probably broadly 
characteristic of religiously-based peace builders. It also stakes out a spectrum of ways in which to 
attend to vulnerability, ranging from the highly individualized attention of MR.A members to the 
personal vulnerabilities of key leaders on one hand to the solidarity with the suffering of the 
masses portrayed by some Catholic efforts on the other. 
Engagement 
I proposed that to enable transformation peacebuilders need to conduct their efforts in the context 
of a particular kind of relationship with people in conflict. That relationship is characterized by 
connection to the parties, accomplished by long-term relationships; location, accomplished by 
being open about the values peacebuilders hold to be important; and vulnerability, accomplished 
by an inability to impose solutions on those in conflict and in some instances by a willingness to 
endure risk in the mission of peacebuilding. 
Catholics and Engagement 
To a substantial extent the stance of the Catholic Church in the Rhodesian conflict corresponds to 
the three criteria I proposed. Without a doubt the Catholic Church was connected via extensive 
relationships: it is clear from the account of Catholic activities that Catholic workers were deeply 
involved at all levels of Rhodesian society. Indeed much of the Church's unique contribution was 
due to her deep rootedness in Rhodesian society. At a time when journalists were denied first-
hand access to the victims of the war, the Salisbury government was unable to prevent the Church 
from continuing to document and publish abroad the stories of systematic abuse of human rights 
by the Rhodesian military. The Church was also located morally, publishing a stand in support 
of racial justice relatively early in the conflict. This put the Church on a collision course with the 
government, so that up until 1977 the Church functioned primarily in the role of advocate and 
activist and made no effort to engage the parties in negotiations. 
In regards to vulnerability of Catholics as peacebuilders, the picture is mixed. On one hand the 
Church had little power in her own right to impose any kind of solutions on the parties. Moreover, 
as was pointed out earlier, Catholic personnel and laypeople often fell victim to the violence of the 
war. But on the other hand, the Church had access to the world stage and carried much moral 
clout there. It seems apparent that the ceaseless campaign of the CJP and London-based CIIR 
0 
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played an important role in creating the world awareness which led in the end to the decision of 
UK officials to convene the Lancaster House talks. 
Moral Re-Armament and Engagement 
Although far smaller in numbers than the Catholics, MRA workers also founded their efforts on 
long-term relationships. MRA workers lived in the country throughout the war years and viewed 
cultivation of relationships as a central feature of their work. It is clear that the trust that 
developed between MRA workers and some key leaders, notably Abel Muzorewa, Ian Smith, as 
well as some "second tier" people in all camps, was key to MRA's entire mission. It is 
e 
impossible to imagine MRA doing what it did, bringing together people who had never met 
before, and quietly encouraging individual leaders to support peace efforts except in the context of 
extensive and in some cases intimate relationships. 
Although never taking a position on the practical political issues in the Rhodesia situation, MRA 
nevertheless provided at least a general sense of its own moral location through open advocacy of 
the four "absolute principles". Most importantly, MRA made it clear throughout that it supported 
racial justice. 
In regards to vulnerability, MRA held almost no positional power over the parties. MRA members 
placed themselves in situations of personal danger on numerous occasions. Alec Smith and Arther 
Kanodereka were obviously vulnerable to partisans from either side opposed to the public displays 
ofracial cooperation which they offered in their many joint presentations throughout the country. 
Arther Kanodereka frequently risked his life in meetings with guerrillas in the bush and of course 
tragically lost his life in the end at the hands of an assassin. Joram Kucherera pressed ahead with 
his effort to bring Ian Smith and Robert Mugabe together, despite his fears for his own life. 
Quakers and Engagement 
Like the other actors, the Quakers based their efforts on long-term relationships. The 
contributions of a handful of Quaker individuals to early nationalist endeavors in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s seems to have been important in establishing Quaker credibility among the 
liberation front leaders. Similarly, their long-standing relationships with Kuanda, Nyerere and 
other African leaders was central to their capacity to draw the influence of larger African political 
figures into their peacebuilding efforts. 
In regards to locating themselves morally, the Quakers, like the other groups in this study were on 
the record in opposing racism. The larger Quaker reputation for commitment to justice and 
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equality was well-established. Quaker institutions actively supported sanctions against the 
Rhodesian govemment.9 But Quaker values probably came through most clearly in the quiet 
candor of their efforts to remove distortions on each side about the intentions and character of the 
other side and foster a view of the conflict that took intent account the concerns of others. 
Tim Hawkins, Deputy Secretary of Rhodesian Foreign Affairs and one of the few members of the 
white Salisbury regime with whom Quakers succeeded in establishing close ties, recalled later that 
he, like most other whites in the government, pictured Mugabe as a "bloody-handed communist 
who had to be kept out of the country at all cost." Without preaching or moralizing, Hawkins says, 
Quaker Walter Martin "disabused me of that notion" and "persuaded me to see the 'terrorists' in a 
better light. He did this very gently .... made me see that the only hope for this part of Africa was in 
reconciliation and that majority rule was the only thing that could happen, that it was futile to 
resist it." 10 In unspoken ways, the deep Quaker commitment to respect for the humanity of all 
was apparent to others in such encounters, as well as the commitment to equal empowerment of 
all. 
In regards to their own vulnerability, the picture is unclear. Operating largely from outside the 
country, the Quakers were the least vulnerable physically of the three groups. While MRA lost 
Kanodereka and the Catholics lost more than two dozen priests and nuns, the Quakers had no 
casualties. Given their regular meetings with heads of state in Africa and British Foreign Affairs 
in London, obviously the Quakers were well-connected to people with substantial positional power 
over parties in the conflict. But on the other hand, the Quakers were careful not to flaunt their 
contacts or to manipulate others with threats of coercion. 11 While they clearly held some 
influence, the Quakers never traded on it. Rather they forged their identity as peacebuilders in 
terms of unconditional human regard, honesty, scrupulosity in handling information, and obvious 
commitment to the interests of others rather than their own. In short, they operated solely on the 
grounds of the trust they had built up with the people they met. 
9 Trevor Jepson, "Zimbabwe", Case Study in Appendix C of "Quaker Experience of Political Mediation: A document 
arising from the consultation at Old Jordans, Buckinghamshire, in August 1989" (London: Quaker Peace and Service 
1989) 3. 
10 Interview with Tim Hawkins, by Ron Kraybill, in Harare, August 17, 1992. 
11 Hawkins reports that he never knew who else the Quakers were going on to see. He says he thinks they would have 
told him had he asked, but that he assumed they didn't tell him in order to avoid embarrassing him. Ibid. 
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Summary Regarding Engagement 
The work of the peace builders in this study supports my proposal that engagement is an essential 
pre-requisite to the possibility of peacebuilders contributing to moral transfonnation of a conflict 
through long-term relationships, a clear moral location in tenns of their own values, and relative 
powerlessness in terms of inability to impose solutions on the parties. While it is impossible to 
assess the precise extent to which the peacebuilders were able to contribute to moral 
transformation, it seems evident that to some extent at least they did, and that the engaged nature 
of their presence was essential to their contribution. 
In the case of the Catholics, for example, it seems clear that the flow of infonnation documenting 
the impact of the war in general and the atrocities of the Security Forces in particular had a 
significant impact on the international actors, and that this impact was due in substantial part to the 
deeply-rooted location of the Catholic effort. In the case ofMRA and the Quakers, it is apparent 
that a substantial part of their efforts were directed towards changing the way the parties 
conceived of their enemies and how to resolve the conflict. The fact that the parties continued to 
interact with the religious actors at this level suggests that their efforts had at least some influence. 
It seems highly unlikely that the parties would have been willing to engage in these conversations 
had they not taken place in the context of deep-rooted "location". 
Finally, the experience of the Catholics highlights the importance oflocation in influencing how 
peacebuilders themselves perceive the conflict and the issues at stake. Ian Linden observes that 
whether Catholic missionaries gave credence to Ian Smith's defense of the war or to the reports of 
rural African victims "depended much on whether they belonged to the rural/township or the white 
urban Church."12 Thus we see that location is more than a matter of credibility and influence on 
the parties, it is also fundamental to enabling peacebuilders to gain a true understanding of the 
conflict. 
Transformation of Structures 
I argued in Section One that transformation calls for special attention to the way in which 
peacebuilding efforts connect to social and political structures: I said that the transformation 
required by shalom is a greater possibility if peacebuilding efforts reflect the following three 
emphases: 
12 Op cit., Linden, 223. 
1) If they penetrate beyond elite leadership of the parties in conflict. In most cases, as 
Lederach suggests, beginning at the "middle level" of social/political structures is a 
preferable place to establish peace initiatives. 
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2) If ownership of the peacebuilding enterprise itself lies in the hands of conflicting parties or 
people close to them. 
3) If peacebuilding is understood to be a long-term process unfolding over a period of many 
years during which the awarenesses, skills and institutions required to sustain genuine 
peace can be developed. 
Catholics and Transformation of Structures 
Of the three groups in this study, the Catholics operated the most extensively at all levels of 
society. In their advocacy work they were deeply involved at the gras~roots level in documenting 
the proportions of suffering of the African masses during the war and trying to alleviate it. As 
the largest religious body in the country, Catholic representatives also engaged in extensive 
conversations at middle and top policy levels, pressing their concerns about the conduct of the war 
and its devastating consequence for ordinary citizens. 
But far-reaching advocacy is one thing, a comprehensive strategy for empowering a society at 
broad levels to build peace is quite another. While Catholic efforts demonstrate concern for the 
masses, during the war they offer little resonance with the call of this section for actively nurturing 
structures of peacebuilding which enable a society to transform itself long-term towards 
reconciliation. Even when the Catholics moved into a less partisan role prior to Lancaster House, 
and focused on encouraging the parties to negotiate, their primary strategy was to admonish the 
parties to settle quickly to end the war. No evidence exists of Catholic efforts to ask what kind of 
peacebuilding structures or bodies were best-suited to accomplish the task of ending the war. The 
assumption seemed to be that the existing structures, namely, the political groupings who 
eventually gathered at Lancaster House, were quite adequate to handle the task of peace building. 
All that was necessary was for the parties to be more cooperative and enter into negotiations. 
In this regard the Catholic understanding of the relationship of peace building initiatives to social 
and political structures differs substantially from my own, placing more trust in the vision and 
capacity of political structures to take primary leadership in the quest for peace. 
The question of Catholic understandings of the timeframe of peacebuilding efforts moves into the 
period of the 1980s, beyond the timeframe of this thesis. Nevertheless some tentative conclusions 
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are possible from existing literature. The Catholic bishops made repeated calls for reconciliation 
for several years in the new political dispensation 13• The Catholic Commission on Justice and 
Peace continues its work up to the present in independent Zimbabwe. Over the time of the 
disastrous Matebeleland incident in 1982-84, when thousands were killed in the outbreak of 
regional fighting, the Commission returned to its previous role of documenting abuses and 
outraged the government by publishing a pastoral letter of concern; indeed, several staff members 
of the Commission on Justice and Peace were imprisoned for several weeks as a consequence. 
Victor de Waal reports that the Commission was in communication with both sides and assisted in 
setting up talks by "assuring each that the other was open to talks. 14 The Catholic Church also ran 
a number of projects designed to facilitate recovery from the traumas of war. De Waal cites in this 
regard the Zimbabwe Project, which sought to assist war veterans in returning to civilian life15 
and also "crying workshops" which were conducted by a pair of Jesuits to assist emotional healing 
in people who had experienced particularly traumatic events during the war. 16 
Although these efforts lack the comprehensive framework for strategizing long range 
peacebuilding called for in my proposal, they nevertheless reflect a similar awareness that 
peacebuilding efforts must continue beyond the cessation of hostilities. 
Quakers and Transformation of Structures 
The emphasis I placed on conducting peacebuilding activities in ways that facilitate long-term 
transformation at structural levels resonates only in part with Quaker activities in 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. In regards to the social location of their efforts, the Quaker focus was on 
what Lederach calls "upper" levels, that is, on senior leaders of all parties. Such a focus appears 
consistent with the pattern of most Quaker peacebuilding efforts elsewhere in the world.17 To be 
sure, Quaker representatives consulted with a wide variety of people at all stages of their 
involvement, including middle and, to some extent, grassroots levels. But the purpose of 
interaction at the lower levels seems to have been information-gathering to equip the Quakers with 
13 Patrick M. Mutume, "The Priorities of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference Since Independence", in Carl 
Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo, editors, Church and State in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1988) 461-476. 
14 Ibid., de Waal, 95. 
15 Ibid., de Waal, 97. 
16 Victor de Waal, The Politics of Reconciliation (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers, 1990) 82. 
17 See for example, Mike Yarrow, Quaker Experience in International Conflict (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1978) who studies Quaker mediation efforts in post-War Germany, the India-Pakistan war of 1965, 
and the Nigerian Civil War of 1967-70. See also "Quaker Experience of Political Mediation" a document arising from 
a consultation at Old Jordans, Buckinghamshire, in August 1989 (London: Quaker Peace and Service) which assesses 
Quaker mediation efforts in Zimbabwe, the Middle East, South Africa, and Northern Ireland. 
a solid grasp of the issues rather than to explore the possibility of peace processes involving 
people at those levels. 
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In regards to empowering local peacebuilders, the Quakers provided strong moral and financial 
support to the effort by Kanodereka and Hove to establish a peace initui.tive by Rhodesians in 
1978. But no other evidence exists to suggest that Quakers at that time deemed it important to 
base peacebuilding efforts close to those in conflict, or to develop conflict resolution capacity 
among people in or close to the groups in conflict. This is a surprising omission given the 
presence of Quaker communities at several locations in Africa including in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe 
itself, and all the more surprising in light of the prominence of the theme of empowerment in 
many Quaker programs. 
In regards to Quaker understandings of the timeframe of peacebuilding, it is apparent that they 
viewed the task of peace building as a long-term one. Between the time of the Lancaster House 
agreement in December 1979 and Independence in April, 1980, the Quakers actively explored the 
possibility of a long-term reconciliation role, sending four senior Quaker peacebuilders for 
exploratory visits and meeting with several senior leaders in the incoming govemment. 18 This led 
to a decision to establish the Quaker Friendship Center in Harare, which functioned for about a 
year after Independence, staffed by a Zimbabwean Quaker. 19 Later, in 1981, Quaker 
representatives from London also discussed with two Cabinet members the possibility of 
organizing a "diplomats' conference" for southern and central African countries in which 
Zimbabweans would have been invited to take a leading role.20 It appears then that conceptually 
Quakers shared my view of peacebuilding as a long-term effort. However the programmatic 
expressions of such an awareness are modest. 
MRA and Transformation of Structures 
In regards to the social location of their efforts, MRA workers interacted broadly with a wide 
variety of people on both sides of the conflict. Although they clearly placed great emphasis on 
and faith in the possibility of contributing to the larger picture by influencing top-level 
decisionmakers, they also interacted extensively with people and middle and lower levels. In the 
latter regard, the intensive efforts by Alec Smith and Arther Kanodereka to jointly address 
18 Trevor Jepson, "Zimbabwe Case Study", Quaker Experience of Political Mediation, ibid., 7. 
19 Ibid., 7. 
20 Trevor Jepson, "Report on Visit to Southern Africa 23rd September to 9th October 1991 ", contained in confidential 
collection of Quaker documents. Although the response was positive, the conference never materialized. 
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audiences of ordinary folks throughout the country with a message of reconciliation is particularly 
noteworthy. However, it is equally clear that MRA assumed that the appropriate locus of 
·'. 
discussion regarding strategies for peace was at top"'levels. Although they sought to encourage 
conciliatory attitudes among individuals at grassroots and middle levels, there is no evidence that 
they sought to explore the creation of peacebuilding mechanisms based at this level as advocated 
by Lederach. 
In regards to empowering local peacebuilders, MRA's approach is closer to my proposal than that 
of the Quakers. The MRA effort was based in Zimbabwe, and although several key full-time 
staffpeople came from overseas, most of the key MRA people including the majority of the 
"Kitchen Cabinet", were native Zimbabweans. MRA also held workshops from 1974 onwards that 
targeted unionists, managers, civil servant, teachers, and many others, suggesting a commitment to 
disseminate broadly the vision for reconciliation. On the other hand, the fact that the gifted and 
well-connected Arther Kanodereka had to go to the Quakers to get financial support for his peace 
initiative suggests less than full commitment on MRA's part to supporting indigenously based 
peacebuilders. In regards to the MRA workshops, it must be acknowledged that the focus was 
individualistic, motivating persons in attendance to act with integrity and fairness in their arenas of 
influence. Such an emphasis, however important, is different from the strategic commitment to 
supporting the emergence of on-going processes and institutions for peacebuilding called for in 
my proposal. 
As with the other religious actors in this study, MRA efforts continued beyond the end of the war. 
Alec Smith took a post as chaplain in the new Zimbabwean army and in that capacity showed the 
MRA film "Freedom", which seeks to introduce the concept of moral living in the context of post-
Independence Africa, to 12,000 Army personnel.21 Over the time of the Matebeleland crisis MRA 
sent a delegation of 16 to meet with President Mugabe to express concern over the escalating 
confrontation there.22 MRA maintains a house and a full-time worker in Harare up to the present. 
Summary Regarding Structures and Transformation 
All of the awarenesses I identified as important in this section were present in the work of at least 
one of the three religious actors in this study. Clearly the concerns I seek to address in this section 
are neither novel or unique. But on the other hand, I am aware of no evidence that any of these 
21 Alec Smith, interview with the author, May 27, 1991, Harare. 
22 Ibid Smith was unsure whether the meeting took place in 1983 or 1984. 
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groups gave priority to the question I wrestle with in this section: how to go about peacebuilding 
in ways that contribute to an ongoing, self-sustaining process of transformation of social and 
political structures. The priority that I give to this challenge sets my framework apart from the 
work of the Zimbabwe peace builders. 
Reconciliation 
In the chapter on Reconciliation I called for formal, joint, proactive attention to healing of 
relationships as a matter of highest ongoing priority in peacebuilding. I proposed a view of 
reconciliation as a complex process made up of several stages unfolding over a period of time and 
said that part of the task of peace builders is to help those in conflict to recognize the importance of 
reconciliation and to plan strategies to accomplish it. To what extent does this understanding of 
reconciliation correspond with the activities of the peacebuilders in this study? To answer the 
question adequately would require a study of activities after the war in the 1980s, which moves 
beyond the historical scope of my study. Nevertheless, on the basis of secondary literature some 
conclusions can be drawn regarding activities prior to Independence and, to a lesser extent, after 
Independence. 
Catholics and Reconciliation 
Some components of the approach to reconciliation which I outlined are apparent in Catholic 
responses to the war and in activities after Independence. One of the most significant was the 
hearings held by the Commission on Justice and Peace which provided opportunity for large 
numbers of African victims of the war to tell their experiences of suffering to members of the 
Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace. Aside from its importance as an information-
gathering strategy for the Catholic Church, for reasons already laid out in Section One these 
hearings contributed, I believe, to the long term healing of the war victims. The work of the two 
Jesuits who organized "crying workshops" provides another illustration of a similar contribution. 
The regular Pastoral Letters issued by the Catholic Bishops also hold a place in my understanding 
of reconciliation in their capacity to assist victims of conflict to engage in essential identity work. 
By naming racial discrimination as the primary villain in the war the Catholic Bishops contributed 
to the task of recovery of self-respect among blacks who for decades held the identity of second-
class citizens. 23 The Pastoral Letters addressed the residents of the war-tom country as moral 
23 See quotes from Pastoral Letters in R.H. Randolph, Dawn in Zimbabwe: The Catholic Church in the New Order 
(Gweru: Mambo Press, 1985) 200-214. 
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beings of equal status and worth, appealing to them to work out their differences humanely. At a 
time when powerful forces of polarization threatened to divide the people of Zimbabwe into 
ontologically fixed categories of race and ideology, the pastoral letters called them to a larger 
identity as children of the same Father.24 
In their big push for negotiations in the months prior to Lancaster House, Catholic representatives 
pushed leaders from all sides to pull back from the effort to defeat the other side and to work out 
their issues jointly. This corresponds to the theme of"re-connection" proposed in my chapter. 
In the post-Independence era, the Catholic Church repeatedly issued statements in favor of 
reconciliation and peace25 and cooperated extensively with the government in the administration 
of development projects essential for reconstruction in the post-War period.26 But there is little 
evidence that the Church actively sought to enter the difficult arena of practical issues raised by 
the history of injustice leading up to the war. It appears rather that church responses primarily 
involved unilateral assistance to victims of the war rather than actively participating in or seeking 
to foster larger dialogue about the question ofrestoration in a country still marked by major 
injustices. Of course, the new government was actively seeking to address such questions and 
Church leaders may have wished to avoid being seen as invading political territory. But such 
questions deserve more than political responses, calling for the most comprehensive reflection 
human communities are capable of engaging in. 
Even in regards to those matters of justice which clearly fell under her own jurisdiction, the 
Church proved disinclined to enter the debate. In 1988, Paul Gundani, a cautious and relatively 
uncritical commentator, pointed out that the Church had so far failed to address the fact that she 
herself was one of the largest landholders in a country where land settlement remained a divisive 
issue.27 In 1989, former President Canaan Banana reiterated this concern and challenged the 
Church to take the lead in the land question.28 
24 Ibid. 
25 Patrick Matume wrote in 1988 that "Every single pronouncement the Bishops have made since 1980 speaks of 
reconciliation and peace." Patrick Matume, "The Priorities of the Zimbabwe Catholic Bishops' Conference Since 
Independence" in Hallencreutz and Moyo, Ibid., 467. 
26 For a summary of these projects, see Paul H. Gundani, "The Catholic Church and National Development in 
Independent Zimbabwe", in Hallencreutz and Moyo, Ibid., 215-250. 
27 Gundani, Ibid., 243. 
28 Canaan Banana, Turmoil and Tenacity (Harare: The College Press, 1989) 209. 
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In summary, the work of the Catholic Church illustrates some dimensions of essential tasks of 
reconciliation, but the evidence suggests that no comprehensive understanding of reconciliation 
through active engagement with the issues in conflict guided her. The Church's biggest 
contribution during the war came in assisting people in "truth-telling" and after the war in actively 
working against the threat of revenge. But the dimension of enabling or participating in active 
engagement between former opponents regarding the traumas and injustices of the past which I 
view as essential to reconciliation is missing. 
MRA and Reconciliation 
Similar to the Catholics, the work of MRA in Rhodesia/Zimbabe overlaps in some dimensions 
with my understanding of reconciliation. MRA constantly sought to identify personal 
vulnerabilities among key people - bitterness in Ian Smith towards the British for past treatment, 
homesickness on the part of Mugabe's staff, resentment in Muzorewa at not being taken seriously 
by international actors because he had no army - and actively sought to address these 
vulnerabilities. In this and in their extensive one-on-one interaction with individual leaders, MRA 
workers did a lot of listening, thus contributing to the personal tasks of truth-telling and wrestling 
with identity issues. 
It is also apparent that in some conversations with Muzorewa MRA members encouraged the 
reluctant Bishop to risk the loss of the political power he held when entering the Lancaster House 
talks by agreeing to the proposals for a new Constitution and fresh elections. 
More than either the Catholics or the Quakers, MRA created forums for people with opposing 
backgrounds and views to meet. Their national conference which convened people from a variety 
of backgrounds in 1974 offers an example here, as do the many dinner meetings organized in the 
mid and late 1970's. The most dramatic example of course is the Mugabe/Smith meeting. 
The most interesting overlap between my framework of reconciliation and that of MRA is the 
latter's emphasis on confession and forgiveness as the critical step towards reconciliation. There is 
no question that on numerous occasions confessions on the part of people related to MRA 
succeeded in breaking down interpersonal barriers and opening up avenues of reflection and action 
for individuals which are rare in the polarized atmosphere of war. From my perspective such an 
emphasis is constructive because, more powerfully than perhaps any other single human action, 
confession asserts a commitment to the possibility of a moral response to human conflict and from 
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a standpoint of vulnerability, invites others to join in such a commitment. To confess or to forgive 
makes a profound statement of faith in the possibility of transformation. 
However from the standpoint of my framework of reconciliation, the MRA emphasis on 
confession and forgiveness also seems simplistic. Precisely because they important and powerful, 
I placed apology and forgiveness near the end of my cycle of reconciliation because they can be 
destructive if offered too early in interaction between alienated people. Part of the power of 
apology is its virtually implicit call to others to moral response to conflict. Hence a too-quick 
apology is likely to arouse mistrust and resentment because it arouses fears that the apologizer 
seeks to draw others into releasing him or her in a facile way from culpability for the past. 
Apology is capable of drawing others into moral response only when there are some grounds for 
trust, and in many circumstances those ground have to be established first. 
The concept of "taking responsibility" offers a way of understanding MRA's emphasis in ways 
that address my concerns. Peacebuilders should encourage people in conflict to look for ways to 
signal their intention to taking responsibility for their actions past and present. This implies a 
commitment to moral response without suggesting superficiality. When upon further discussion it 
becomes apparent that certain costs of conflict cannot ever be compensated, apology and 
forgiveness can at that time be offered. 
Quakers and Reconciliation 
Several Quaker activities correspond to themes developed in the "Reconciliation" chapter. Quaker 
commitment to improving or establishing relationships can be found in the efforts to bring Robert 
Mugabe and British Foreign Office Secretary David Owen together in 1978, and in the effort in 
1979 to assist President Nyerere in establishing communication with Muzorewa. 
The conversations which the Quakers held with nationalist leaders could also be understood as 
contributing to identity work on the part of the latter, particularly over the time they were 
anticipating the question of how to relate to whites in the aftermath of the war. The comment by 
Zimbabwean Cabinet Minister Chinamano in 1981 that the Quaker's emphasis on reconciliation as 
a necessary sequel to a just peace had been influential in the decision of the nationalists to adopt a 
firm policy of reconciliation after the war seems particularly significant here. 
The comment by Joseph Msika, a top ZAPU official who commented after the war that he had 
always appreciated the optimism of the Quakers is also telling: "During our darkest times in 
Lusaka, we were greatly heartened by visits from Quakers whose faith in the possibility of 
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progress towards peace helped to revive our hopes. "29 This suggests that the Quakers might have 
contributed to the willingness of some nationalists to accept the risks of exploring reconciliation. 
Of these three groups, the Quaker involvements after Independence had the shortest lifespan, just 
under a year. This practical reality to some extent mitigates against a conclusion otherwise 
suggested by the nature of Quaker efforts during the war that the Quakers placed substantial 
emphasis on reconciliation and relationships. It is true of course that the Quaker effort during 
the war was based outside the country. With all key actors located in country by the time of 
Independence, for the Quakers to pursue their previous efforts for reconciliation required 
developing a whole new internal infrastructure which for the other groups had already long been 
present. However the latter highlights the importance of the point made in Chapter Five, that to 
work for peace in ways that maximize the possibility of genuine transformation requires 
particular attention to the structure of peace initiatives. Had the Quaker peace initiatives during 
the war been structured in such a way as to empower peacebuilders closer in geographical and 
relational terms to the warring groups, it is likely that sustaining a long-term reconciliation 
mission in Zimbabwe would have been more easily accomplished. 
Summary Regarding Reconciliation 
Addressing the emotional and relational needs of the people in conflict was clearly a common 
theme in the efforts of these three actors. Although the ways in which they sought to accomplish 
this varied substantially, one response shared by all three groups was an effort to persuade 
people in the conflict of the importance of relationships and of the necessity of moving beyond 
the hatred and pain of the past. Minimally the study supports my assertion that healing and 
reconciliation of relationships is an important theme in peacebuilding. 
Significant as their contribution was, all three groups were handicapped in their ability to 
contribute to long-term transformation by lack of a conscious theory of reconciliation capable of 
enabling them to integrate the sometimes contradictory tasks of reconciliation or to assist the 
parties in wrestling with these tasks. MRA would probably have benefited the most here had it 
been able to articulate its calls for confession and forgiveness in the context of a framework 
recognizing the equal legitimacy, indeed importance, of anger and rage as an essential 




failures, MRA had explicitly invited them in appropriate forums to voice their hurt, pain, and 
anger? 
A similar point could be made in regards to the Catholics and Quakers. Suppose that the pastoral 
letters by the Bishops during and after the war had, as part of the call for forgiveness and 
reconciliation, urged Zimbabweans to openly bring their grief and rage into Catholic masses in 
rituals of lamentation, and named the expression of these feelings as a constructive step towards 
national reconciliation? Suppose that the Quakers, in addition to their apparent contribution of 
helping some nationalist leaders recognize the importance of adopting a policy of reconciliation 
after the war, had been able to point the ZANU leadership towards an understanding of 
reconciliation richer than the call to "forgive, forget, and rebuild" which Mugabe eventually 
issued? 
Community 
This section called for rooting peacebuilding efforts in the structures of a community of 
peacebuilders. To what extent was community a guiding theme among the peacebuilders at work 
in this study? 
Catholics and Community 
The structures of Catholic responses to the war support a number of themes developed in Chapter 
Seven. Although they were late in doing so, the majority of Catholic leadership in Rhodesia 
eventually recognized that their values required a society structured in ways fundamentally 
different from that envisioned by Ian Smith and the Rhodesia Front. This conclusion came only as 
a result of lengthy and often anguished debate. Although my own understanding of shalom differs 
from that of most Catholics, the Catholic experience nevertheless provides an example of response 
to conflict rooted in a vision for life that emerged from a community of awareness with deep 
traditions of its own. 
Much of the effectiveness of the Catholic response to the war lay precisely in the size of the 
Catholic community. The "truth-telling campaign", arguably the most significant Catholic 
contribution, was possible only due to the logistical reach of Catholic institutions. With a large 
Qletwork of personnel and institutions on the ground in Rhodesia and a well-placed mouthpiece in 
London, the Catholic Church was probably the most effective opponent of the Smith regime. The 




Although operating in teams seems much less a consistent pattern in the Catholic responses than in 
that ofMRA and the Quakers, it is nevertheless clear that individuals saw themselves as 
accountable to the larger structures of the Catholic Church. The priests and nuns, after all, who 
formed the backbone of Catholic on-the-ground institutions, were nurtured by and accountable at 
every point of their lives to the Catholic Church. 
MRA and Community 
The concept of community is clearly present in the structures with which MRA sustained its 
activities throughout the period under study. The MRA conferences, perhaps the hallmark of 
MRA efforts worldwide, could be understood as short-lived but often highly effective efforts to 
create a community among participants, and to harness the power of that community in breaking 
down old barriers and opening up new possibilities for those present. The dinner parties organized 
by MRA in Salisbury could be viewed in a similar light. 
The delegations which MRA regularly put together to pay visits to key leaders could be viewed as 
a traveling community. Like the Catholics, MRA depended heavily on its international network 
for counsel in determining directions to take and for logistical support in arranging visitations 
from outsiders as well as for sustaining a presence at Geneva and London. 
To a degree that is highly unusual in organizations, MRA appears to have been guided in day-to-
day decisionmaking and planning by an ethic of community. Very few hierarchical roles existed 
then or now within the organization and even where they did exist, the individuals filling them 
appear to have consistently made themselves accountable to others in the organization. A great 
deal of planning and strategizing in MRA begins in group "quiet time"; during this time 
individuals listen for "thoughts" from God, and these are then discussed and debated by the 
group. 
Quakers and Community 
Like the Catholics and MRA, the Quaker initiatives were deeply rooted in a tradition of belief and 
activity which sustained and was sustained by a substantial community of adherents. This 
tradition and community gave the British Friends who staffed the Quaker peace initiatives the 
perspective necessary to seek goals different from the politically-motivated intentions that guided 
British political decision makers. Equally important, it enabled them to gain an identity in the 
eyes of key actors in this conflict that set them apart from their nationality. 
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Like MRA the Quakers depended heavily on group discernment in planning how to respond and 
on teams to undertake visits with key leaders. But the Quakers appear to have provided 
substantially less in the shape of formative, sustaining community to the individuals who carried 
out the Quaker missions than either the Catholics or MRA. Supportive communities pervade 
Catholic structures in the form of orders, parishes, mission and service institutions. MRA 
members in Salisbury and London often worked as teams on a daily basis, shared regular quiet 
time, and attended MRA conferences together. The Quaker response, in contrast, was relatively 
small and fragmented. All four of the individuals who were most involved in the Quaker response 
had other full-time jobs, so their capacity to interact with each other was limited. 
Summary Regarding Community 
That these three religiously based peace initiatives were deeply rooted in communities of values 
and drew heavily on those communities in their activities is so obvious as to render the point 
almost trivial. Nevertheless it is an important one, for this characteristic sets the work of these 
peacebuilders apart from many others and supports the proposal that efforts to make peace on the 
basis of moral vision rather than mere political bargaining require a model of peacebuilding that is 
rooted in more than political frameworks and individual realities. 
The connection between community-based peacebuilding and my earlier call for engagement 
deserves to be highlighted. Being rooted in a community of values is an enormous asset for 
peacebuilders committed to "locating" themselves morally in the eyes of conflicting parties. 
However, although the experiences of these three actors strongly supports the proposal for rooting 
peace building in a community of peace builders, two dimensions of my proposal are missing: the 
call for peacebuilders to seek to build a "community of peacebuilders" with other peacebuilding 
groups and the emphasis on giving priority to strengthening the communities of those who are in 
conflict by building peacebuilding initiatives on existing resources as close to the combatants as 
. possible. 
In regards to the former, Section Two points out that although the Catholics and Quakers 
cooperated at key points, there is no evidence of an effort to strategically link their efforts, much 
less to seek to create a "community of peacebuilders" among the various other groups, religious 
and otherwise, which participated in initiatives of their own. MRA of course operated in virtual 
isolation from the other two groups. 
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In regards to the latter, all of the groups seem to have been relatively content with a model for 
peace building which made the community of peacebuilders itself the primary resource. The 
Kanodereka-Hove initiative funded by the Quakers is an exception here. But even this initiative 
appears to have come not from the Quakers but from Kanodereka and Hove themselves who 
approached the Quakers for funding. 
256 
Chapter Thirteen 
Conclusion to the Thesis 
In the interplay between the framework for peacebuilding outlined in Section One and the work of 
the religiously-based actors in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe documented in Section Two lie insights for 
current practice in the field of conflict resolution and also further unanswered questions. These 
become evident in a review of noteworthy features of this study. 
Moral Vision as Central to Conflict Transformation 
At several points the thesis advanced an understanding of peace building as an effort to engage 
(i 
people in conflict in moral discourse, with the goal of finding ways of resolving conflict through 
moral reflection rather than coercion. To my knowledge such a proposal has never been 
developed elsewhere in the literature on conflict resolution and deserves further exploration. 
On one hand, it is clear that the religious actors all responded to this conflict from a powerful 
moral vision. This vision caused them to respond in ways that they hoped would not merely end 
the conflict but improve the moral capacity of the people involved. Their identification with such a 
vision in the eyes of others was central to their capacity to relate to those in conflict. But there is 
not a great deal of evidence showing that they actively engaged the parties in moral discourse 
regarding the combatants' own values, the situation and the choices open to them, an activity 
which in Chapter Two I called discernment. The Catholics moralized, but the transaction was one-
way. The Quakers encouraged actions which they felt were moral, but there is little evidence of 
active conversations. Moral Re-Armament raised moral issues, but the vocabulary and scope were 
individualistic in nature. 
This highlights then an area which holds substantial promise. An understanding of peacebuilding 
that incorporates moral discourse offers an attractive alternative to common understandings of 
conflict resolution as simply negotiating "win/win agreements" or settlement reflecting the 
existing configurations of power. For purposes of describing what happens in negotiation, the 
concept of moral discernment is illuminating for it focuses attention on a critical but often ignored 
dimension of human conduct: that we are inherently meaning-centered beings and that profound 
structures of meaning underlie even apparently superficial conduct. By organizing the data of 
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human conduct in the arena of conflict and negotiations around this proposal, the concept of moral 
discourse may prove a better tool for describing the deepest realities driving people in conflict 
than many current theories. 
For prescriptive purposes the concept of moral discourse also offers useful insights in guiding the 
efforts of peacebuilders. Such an understanding makes it harder for peacebuilders to ignore the 
often unacknowledged values at play in their own lives and communities and thus requires a more 
honest relationship to people in conflict. An emphasis on moral discourse leaves peacebuilders 
no option but to enter their role through extensive, sympathetic interaction with the worldviews of 
those in conflict, thus greatly increasing the chances that the issues essential to truly resolving 
conflicts will indeed be dealt with and not merely shoved under the table in pursuit of cease-fires. 
Morally, the case seems obvious that dealing with conflicts on the basis of a quest for what is right 
is preferable to mere expediency. Of course, it is differences of understanding regarding what is 
right which cause many conflicts in the first place and makes them intractable. Determining "what 
is right" will never be easy. But an emphasis on moral discourse at least enables peacebuilders to 
move to the heart of many conflicts and draw people into reflection and encounter regarding the 
factors which influence their perceptions of what is "right." 
The question of how in practical terms to do this remains a challenging one. This study 
contributes to an understanding of the nature of the relationship requtred for such discourse to take 
place, but in the context of the "connected" relationship for which I called, what is further required 
to enable it to happen? What skills, techniques, and awarenesses are required to facilitate it? How 
can it be done it ways that people in conflict experience such encounter not as threatening or 
moralizing in nature, but rather as opportunity to reflect on things that they care about deeply and 
are motivated to discuss? Does it have to be done separately, in caucus with each party or could it 
be done jointly? Answers to these questions could yield valuable insights for peacebuilders 
committed to the transformation of conflict. 
Engagement as Basis for Peacebuilding 
More consistently than with any other proposal in Section One, the worl~ of the religiously-based 
peacebuilders supports the understanding that transformation requires peacebuilders to be deeply 
engaged with people in conflict through long-term relationships, openness about their own values 
0 
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as peacebuilders, and vulnerability in the sense of lack of capacity to impose solutions on 
combatants and willingness to take personal risks. 
This challenges widespread practices taken for granted in the larger field of international conflict 
resolution. An enormous amount of work in the field in recent years has been undertaken on the 
basis of"one-off' training events or other short-term involvements in which peacebuilders with no 
previous relationships or long-term commitments seek to assist people in situations of conflict. 
More active involvement of religious actors could provide an important antidote to this trend. 
To what extent is a bias towards engagement specific to the nature of religiously-based 
peacebuilding? To what extent does it apply more broadly, regardless of the base from which 
peacebuilders operate? Are there particular kinds of conflict resolution tasks which are amenable 
to short-term, "non-engaged" involvements and others which demand the deep engagement I 
called for? 
The current situation in Bosnia presents an interesting case in that the need to end the war 
immediately seems obvious, even at the cost of arm-twisting by outside enforcers determined to 
0 
cut a deal in order to end the killing. Yet on the other hand the long-term limitations and dangers 
of such an approach are all too obvious. The situation cries out for the application of a vision 
similar to that proposed in Section One, that looks at the conflict on the long-term and lays out 
non-coercive transforming processes that engage the antagonists heart and soul. To what extent 
could these two approaches, contradictory but all too often seemingly required by the extremes of 
violence most fruitfully interact? 
It seems likely that all would agree that wherever possible the transformational vision is the 
preferable one. Were this the case, how could short-term settlement-oriented approaches be 
conducted in ways that would provide maximum room for transformational ones to get underway 
and succeed? 0 
Peacebuilding and Transformation of Structures 
Section Three concluded that all three of the actors in this study responded transformatively to the 
conflict by seeking to contribute to changes in attitudes and perceptions on the part of those in 
conflict. However none of the actors appear to have recognized what I see as an essential 
implication of the vision for transformation: the need to structure peace building efforts themselves 
in ways that genuinely empower people at broad levels in the conflict. 
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In my view the peacebuilders held too much faith in the political structures at work in the conflict, 
for all three invested heavily - indeed almost exclusively - in moving this conflict into the arena of 
political bargaining for resolution. Of course there was no escaping the need to deal with the 
political issues at stake and doubtless this was the place to start. My criticism is not a rejection of 
working through political structures, but rather of the degree to which these peace builders relied 
on them as a solution to the conflict and neglected to work actively to put in place structures 
capable of carrying out peacebuilding efforts on the long-term. 
In retrospect we know of course that the early years of the new Zimbabwe were tragic ones which 
saw the outbreak of fighting in Matebeleland and the deaths of up to twenty thousand people. It 
appears that criticism of government practices and excesses and the sending of delegations to meet 
with Mugabe by the Catholics and MRA members played a role in the decision by the government 
to change its disastrous course in Matebeleland. The eventual rapprochement which took place 
between President Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, who figured central in the Matebeleland affair was 
mediated by the former President Canaan Banana, the role of whose credentials as a Methodist 
minister is difficult to assess. 1 
Obviously at least two of the religious actors in this study then responded to the new conflict in the 
early 1980s, but with the agenda of the nation firmly in political hands they were unable to 
forestall major violence. This underscores the importance of the call for peacebuilding to be 
conducted in ways that have an impact on structures, through the creation of on-going structures 
mandated to carry the complex challenges of peacebuilding forward over an extended period, and 
through careful attention to working with all levels of alienated populations and not just with 
military and political elites. 
Difficult questions arise again in contemplation of actual practice. How could this be 
accomplished? The truth is that most peace efforts have been short-term and episodic in nature 
and that we have very few experiences demonstrating what the approach called for in Chapter Five 
might look like in practice. 2 Is the fault here with peacebuilders and an inability on their part to 
1 Cf. Willard A. Chiwewe, "Unity Negotiations", in Canaan S. Banana, editor, Turmoil and Tenacity: Zimbabwe 1890-
1990 (Harare: College Press, 1989), 212-287. 
2 The examples closest to what I have in mind would probably come from work of Mennonite practitioners and to some 
extent, Quakers. In the Middle East Mennonite peaceworkers have labored quietly for several decades; in Ireland, for 
nearly 20 years; in Somali, John Paul Lederach has worked with a group of "middle level" leaders for several years. 
But all of these efforts have been relatively small; none approach in scope the requirements of situations like Bosnia, 
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, etc. A study of these efforts currently in prc;gress by the Institute for Conflict Analysis and 
Transformation at Eastern Mennonite University will be published in late 1996. 
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articulate frameworks for action appropriate to the problem? Or is it with people in political roles 
who seek a monopoly of influence and over-estimate the capacity of political structures to 
facilitate healing? Probably it is both. But at a time when several conflicts of catastrophic 
proportions appear to be moving into a post-combat phase and pivotal strategic decisions are being 
made, how do we put structures in place capable of facilitating peacebuilding long-term? What 
could be learned from the experience of South Africa which, at least during the phase of intensive 
political negotiations leading up the 1994 transition, erected the most significant national-level 
structure for dealing with conflict that the world has yet seen? 
The Need for Incorporating Theories of Reconciliation into Peacebuilding 
Earlier I observed that although all three of the groups clearly believed healing of relationships 
was important and actively sought to facilitate it, none had a conscious theory of reconciliation. 
This gap is indicative of a gap not only in the larger field of peacebuilding but also in the political 
world as well. Substantially more is known about how to help people explicitly address the issues 
that divide them than about how to explicitly address the nature of their relationship or the social 
residues of bitterness and mistrust that inevitably linger in the aftermath of conflict. The work of 
these religiously-based peacebuilders suggests that they are well ahead of at least the politicians in 
their awareness of the importance of reconciliation. But the absence of effort to articulate how it 
happens even among those most pre-disposed to take seriously the need for reconciliation reveals 
how much work remains yet to be done. 
Perhaps the major question in regards to reconciliation is how to satisfy the often conflicting 
demands of long-term and short-term requirements. The framework for reconciliation outlined in 
Chapter Six calls for activities requiring a great deal of time, ideally years. Ideally, major political 
and structural decisions would be delayed until substantial progress has been made in the psycho-
social process outlined in this section. But in reality this is unlikely and for some good reasons, 
undesirable. South Africa, for example, will require decades to work through the trauma wreaked 
by apartheid on its diverse populations. It would seem ludicrous to suggest postponing the 
requirement to work out new political and social structures. 
How can we proceed with the obvious requirement for reconciliation in the midst of making 
urgent and difficult decisions about political and structural decisions? What can be learned from 
the experiences of those countries which have endured traumatic violence on a major scale? 
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Community as Basis for Peacebuilding 
It is apparent that these religiously-based peacebuilders benefited from being based in 
communities of faith rather than being solo professional practitioners. By explicitly naming what 
is surely one of the most valuable assets ofreligiously-based peacebuilders, this finding supports 
the growing recognition of the unique potential they hold for working in some conflict situations. 
It also suggests a responsibility for religious peacebuilders to be better prepared than they have in 
the past to use this precious asset more effectively for critical peacebuilding tasks. 
This finding also casts in sharp relief the reality characterizing many current actors in the field of 
conflict resolution. Many people circumnavigating the globe today to assist in resolution of 
conflicts and provide training are rooted in no discernible community, and would be hard-pressed 
to describe the values, traditions and people to which they are most deeply accountable. 
Obviously not all can or should seek to base themselves in formal structures. But the knowledge 
that being grounded in a concrete, on-going community was critical to the work of the actors in 
this conflict invites further reflection about ways in which all practitioners might become more 
effective and responsible by grounding their work in community. 
They might choose, for example, to seek to identify the traditions and values shaping their work 
and make them more explicit to others. They might elect to establish structures of accountability 
for organizational decisionmaking that explicitly serve a set of values and spread decisionmaking 
power among a network of people committed to those values. They might focus less on selling 
pre-packaged skills or training approaches and take the slower, more costly route of getting 
acquainted with the internal resources and unique needs of the communities they seek to serve. 
They might pay greater attention to forging communiti<cs of peace builders as the most important 
part of their work, shifting their away "magic workers" towards capacity-builders of communities. 
They might take more seriously the lessons to be learned from the struggle of daily life with 
family and colleagues. 
The Value of an Explicit, Coherent Framework for Peacebuilding 
Throughout the thesis I have stressed the imP,ortance of approaching peacebuilding with an 
explicit, coherent, reflective framework of response. I made the case for this on ethical grounds 
in the Introduction, arguing that an explicit framework is required by integrity, honesty and 
accountability. But the grounds for such an approach have broadened in the course of the study, as 
follows: 
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Articulating a Framework Yields Rich Insights for Peacebuilders Regarding the Implications 
of Their Own Values 
This assertion arises from my personal experience in this thesis of seeking to develop a coherent 
framework for peacebuilding based on my own values and those ofmy own primary community. 
Although I have been working full-time in peacebuilding for sixteen years, it has only been in the 
process of reflection occasioned by this thesis that I was able to consciously articulate certain 
values which I now recognize were often implicitly at work in my past activities. For example, 
although my colleagues and I have typically gone to great lengths to connect to vulnerable people 
in situations of conflict and not to rely heavily on interaction with political and military leadership, 
it is only in writing this thesis that I realized that a profound epistemological assertion underlies 
this bias, namely that what we hold to be God's "reality" is not reliably apprehended through 
experiences of privilege and power. By bringing this statement to conscious awareness I shall be 
able to act with greater consistency, to interpret my actions more clearly, and to function more 
effectively in enabling others wishing to study and learn peacebuilding to wrestle with this issue. 
Parallel examples could be given in regards to virtually every theme developed in Section One. 
The impact of such an exercise extends well beyond the individual or individuals conducting it. 
In seeking to develop clear explanations for my own understandings of peacebuilding I repeatedly 
sought the assistance of Mennonite colleagues. These conversations will continue long after the 
thesis is submitted. 
Articulating a Framework Lays the Groundwork for Dialogue with Others 
In interacting with the approaches to peacebuilding taken by the actors in this study, in Chapter 
Twelve I identified numerous points at which those actors fell short in terms of my own proposals. 
Although it is possible of course that this study fails to accurately capture the full scope of the 
efforts of these actors, these observations make it possible to engage them at a depth not possible 
before. By articulating my own understanding of peace building and engaging in constructive 
critique of others from that perspective, I hope to be able to contribute to the peacebuilding 
capacity of all. Likewise, I anticipate that as others pursue a similar exercise their own 
perspectives will enhance the peacebuilding capacities of myself and others. 
An Explicitly Value-Based Approach Is Integral to the Approach and Contribution of 
Religiously-Based Peacebuilders 
It is apparent that being rooted in a tradition with known values, seeking to apply those values to 
the conflict, and at certain moments actively advocating those values was a common denominator 
for all three of the peacebuilding groups in this study. Descriptively, this supports what might 
readily be surmised through common sense: that an explicitly value-based approach to conflict 
may be one of the distinguishing characteristics of religiously peace building efforts. 
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Prescriptively, this study also supports my assertion that an identity rooted in a set of explicit 
values is an asset in peacebuilding rather than a liability as often believed. Rather than hampering 
their access to conflict, the value-based identity of these religious actors appears to have facilitated 
it. It would be too broad, of course, to say that any set of values would do. In this case the 
common strands seem to be values regarding the sanctity of human life, reduction of suffering, 
justice, fair play, and tolerance of cultural and racial diversity. The actors in this study made no 
secret of being committed to these values, and it seems reasonable to conclude it was precisely 
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